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Matthew Barker, PhD

Associate Professor, Philosophy

Department Chair, August 2018 - July 2021


Matthew Barker, PhD
Office: S-S 302-00 
S Annex,
2145 Mackay
Phone: (514) 848-2424 ext. 2515
Email: Matthew.Barker@concordia.ca

Research Biography: Matthew Barker is Department Chair, August 2018 - July 2021. Much of his research is aimed at uncovering and answering philosophical questions about scientific categories. Some of these questions are quite general, e.g., investigating ways in which categories can vary in their objectivity, and how norms of scientific reasoning influence conclusions drawn about categories. Other questions zoom in on specific categories, such as species and individual in biology, and well-being and humility in psychology. His work also takes up connected issues, including ethical concerns about biotechnology and the environment, the role that values must and should play in science, and how to infer probabilities of hypotheses from existing data. His primary research areas are philosophy of biology, general philosophy of science, and philosophy of psychology; secondarily he sometimes works on virtue ethics and applied ethics, and the history of the philosophy of science. His teaching also focuses on all those areas. He has published in The Journal of Philosophy, Mind, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Philosophical Topics, Cognitive Systems Research, The Journal of Applied Philosophy, The Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, Philosophy Theory and Practice in Biology, and other scholarly venues.

Education

PhD in philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison, with Elliott Sober (2007-2010)
MA in philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison (2007-2009)
MA in philosophy, University of Alberta, with Robert A. Wilson (2003-2005)
BA in philosophy, Lakehead University (1994-1998, 2003)
BSc in biology, Lakehead University (1994-1998)

View current CV.


Publications

Samples of published work

For a more complete list see my cv

Barker, Matthew J., 2019, “Species and Other Evolving Lineages as Feedback Systems”, Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 11: 013, at http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/ptpbio.16039257.0011.013

Barker, Matthew J. and Robert A. Wilson, 2019, “Well-being, Disability, and Choosing Children”, Mind 128: 305-328. Published online first, September 17th, 2018, at https://academic.oup.com/mind/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/mind/fzy039/5098725

Barker, Matthew J., 2019, “Diverse Environments, Diverse People”, in Tyler C. DesRoches, Frank Jankunis, and Byron Williston (eds.), Canadian Environmental Philosophy, McGill-Queen’s University Press, pp.99-122.

Barker, Matthew J., 2019, “Eliminative Pluralism and Integrative Alternatives: The Case of SPECIES”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70(3): 657-681. Published online first, November 28th 2017, at https://academic.oup.com/bjps/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/bjps/axx057/4671054?redirectedFrom=fulltext

Wilson, Robert A. and Matthew J. Barker, 2019, “Biological Individuals”, in Edward Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Fall 2019 Edition.) URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/biology-individual/. [This replaces the 2013 essay we wrote for SEP called “The Notion of Biological Individual”.]

Barker, Matthew J. and Alana Friend Lettner, 2017, “Environmentally Virtuous Agriculture: How and When External Goods and Humility Ethically Constrain (or Favour) Technology Use”, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 30: 287 – 309. Online at https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10806-017-9669-4

Barker, Matthew J., 2017, “Connecting Applied and Theoretical Bayesian Epistemology: Data Relevance, Pragmatics, and the Legal Case of Sally Clark”, Journal of Applied Philosophy 34: 242 – 262. Online at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/japp.12181/abstract

Barker, Matthew J.,  2015, “Science and Values”, in Robert A.Wilson (ed.), Eugenics Archive. Online at http://eugenicsarchive.ca/discover/encyclopedia/53d82bed4c879d0000000003

Barker Matthew J. and Joel D. Velasco, 2013, “Deep Conventionalism about Evolutionary Groups”, Philosophy of Science 80: 971-982. Online at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/673923?journalCode=phos

Barker, Matthew J., 2013, “Biological Explanations, Realism, Ontology, and Categories”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44: 617-622. Online at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1369848613001179

Barker, Matthew J., 2010, “From Cognition’s Location to the Epistemology of its Nature”, Cognitive Systems Research 11: 357-366, 2010. Online at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1389041710000367

Barker, Matthew J. and Robert A. Wilson, 2010, “Cohesion, Gene Flow, and the Nature of Species”, The Journal of Philosophy 107: 61-79. Online at https://www.jstor.org/stable/25700483?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

Barker, Matthew J., 2010, “Specious Intrinsicalism”, Philosophy of Science 77: 73-91, 2010. Online at https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/650209?seq=1

Wilson, Robert A., Matthew J. Barker and Ingo Brigandt, 2007, “When Traditional Essentialism Fails: Biological Natural Kinds”, Philosophical Topics 35:189-215. [A journal backlog misleadingly backdated the publication date to 2007; the paper was not actually finished and available till 2009.] Online at https://www.jstor.org/stable/43154503?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents


Research activities

Current research projects:

1.   Norms of scientific classification: Are there ways in which we must, and others in which we should, draw upon norms rather than just data when defending theories about scientific categories--such as the categories species, planet, and skin cancer? With the help of RAs, Matt Slater and I are showing how the answer to these questions is 'yes'. And this helps steer us away from disagreements about whether scientific categories are objective, towards questions about which category claims are rational and in which ways. Work presented at CLMPS 2019 in Prague, and ISH 2019 in Oslo

2.    Species and other evolving lineages as feedback systems: Having recently proposed that species and other evolving lineages are special kinds of feedback systems, I am now further developing this proposal, and its implications for many issues related to species, lineages, systematics, classification, and the philosophy of these.

3.   Startling implications about species: You are almost surely human, but is it possible that you may one day become something else, not human, and yet still be you? Do our best evolutionary theories about species even tell us what it is to be distinctively human? Is it possible that one and the same group of organisms could belong to two or more species at once? People recognized different species long before science began, so did later scientific theories clarify and improve upon the pre-scientific ones? Those four questions get very surprising answers, as this project uncovers overlooked implications of our best theories about evolutionary groups.

4.   The nature of humility. Since ancient times people have written about and praised the character trait of humility, but what is it exactly? This project develops a hypothesis about humility's nature, one that integrates recent empirical studies. The hypothesis is that humility is the interaction of two dispositions: being disposed to and motivated by unabsorbed and reasonable views of one's self, and being disposed to selflessly take the bigger picture of things into account. This project outlines means of empirically testing this hypothesis and argues that if the hypothesis is correct, then we should think humility is a virtue that strengthens rather than weakens people. (Work presented with James Luong at a May 2019 CRÉ/GREE conference)

Recently completed projects:

1.    Well-being and disability: When people are planning to have a child and can select between different embryos, do they have a significant moral reason (one to weigh up against their other reasons) to select against embryos that are predicted to develop into children with recognized disabilities? It is common to answer Yes, but we analyzed different types of well-being in order to show that the prevailing case for such selection against disability is mistaken, and reflects an overlooked kind of hubris that tacitly privileges lives that are most like our own. (With Rob Wilson.)

2.   Environmental virtue ethics: This work showed that, on one hand, environment-regarding character traits are not strictly required for human flourishing, but then, on the other hand, examined the links between diversity of environments and diversity of human populations to show that some environment-regarding character traits are nonetheless of great ethical importance for human flourishing.

3.   Humility, biotechnology, and the environment: Can an approach to ethics based on virtuous human character traits and well-being offer clear and specific principles for deciding how to use biotechnology in agriculture? We argued that it can, by generating principles based in both humility and ecosystem sustainability, also illustrating the use of these principles in GMO and CRISPR crop cases. (With Alana Friend Lettner.)  

4.   Integrating pluralism about species and other scientific categories: Rather than there being just one legitimate theory about the nature of species, is there a plurality of theories that are equally legitimate even though they contradict each other? For several years it has been very fashionable to answer Yes, and to use this as an example of how a happy, ecumenical pluralism is common in the sciences. Authors have drawn upon this to help argue for sweeping conclusions about how science should be governed and organized. My project challenged the main case for eliminative species pluralism, and argued that a dilemma faces such pluralism in many cases of scientific categories.

5.    Bayesian epistemology and the Sally Clark double murder case: How can theoretical and applied philosophy inform each other? To elaborate interesting ways in which the two are reinforcing, this work joined debate about applying Bayesian epistemology to the famous legal case of Sally Clark. When Clark’s first baby died, this was blamed on SIDS. But when she had another baby and it also died, Clark was charged with double murder. In the now famous ensuing court case, a statistician testified that the probability of double SIDS was astronomically low. Others have disagreed and claimed that the chance of double murder was even lower. By drawing on theoretical Bayesianism, my work reached the applied conclusion that both sides are mistaken – the two probabilities are roughly equal, and the relevance of post-partum psychosis in this case has been overlooked. The work also reached a more theoretical conclusion – it generated a new general principle for how to infer prior probabilities from frequency data in a wide variety of cases.

Planned future projects:

1.    Conservation biology and its values: How do presuppositions about what is valuable operate tacitly within conservation biology, and can we further improve the already impressive work in conservation biology by bringing these presuppositions about value out into the open? Drawing on the growing literature on science and values, we will conduct a meta-analysis that helps answer these questions. (With Dylan Fraser.)

2.    Robert Boyle’s metaphysics of science: Was the 17th century scientist Robert Boyle the archetypal reductionist and mechanist that historians and others often describe? I plan to show he was not, that his views about the nature of matter and explanation were more nuanced than has been appreciated, and that we have much to learn from this today.

3.    Race, realism, and Bayesian genetics: Should we believe that data analysis using Bayesian statistical software provides evidence that human races are biologically real, as many authors have claimed when criticizing decades of anti-realism about race? I plan to clarify the potential and limits of such analyses, and improve debate about the biological reality of races and other groups.

4.    History of species: Were taxonomists prior to Darwin as mistaken in their views of species and other taxa as many traditional historians have long claimed, or were their views much closer to our contemporary ones, as some history revisionists have recently argued? I plan to show that both the traditionalists and revisionists are partly correct and partly incorrect – that it has been a mistake to couch the debate in terms of “species essentialism” and that upon getting more fine-grained in our comparisons of pre- and post-Darwinian taxonomy, we see more clearly how some things have changed and how others have stayed the same.

Research Networks:

Centre de Recherche en Éthique (CRÉ), member from 2019 and member of affiliated Group de recherche en éthique environmentale et animale (GRÉEA)


Loyola Sustainability Research Centre (LSRC), research fellow from 2012


Teaching and supervision activities

Courses taught (undergraduate and graduate level):


  • Philosophical Foundations of Biology, PHIL 441/641 & BIOL 421 (cross-listed in the Department of Biology), recently offered once/year; most recent syllabus (outline)
  • Advanced Philosophy of Science, PHIL 420/644, offered about every other year; most recent syllabus (outline)
  • Philosophy of Biology, PHIL 318, offered in many years; most recent syllabus (outline)
  • Philosophy of Social Sciences, PHIL 324, offered now and then; most recent syllabus (outline)
  • Introduction to Philosophy of Science, PHIL 220, usually offered once/year; most recent syllabus (outline)

Current or Recent Research Assistant(s):

James Luong 2018-19

Graduate students supervised:

Laura Gallivan, MA in philosophy completed 2018; title of Master's Research Paper: "An Experiential, Inclusive Approach to Hope" (co-supervised with David Morris)

Mehdi Najafi, MA in philosophy completed 2018; title of Master's Research Paper: "Sharon Street and Debunking of Morality"

Sean Boivin, MA in philosophy completed 2018; title of Master's Research Paper: "The Likelihood Principle: Objectivity and the Values and Science Debate".

Louise Sheils, MA in Hispanic studies completed 2017

Catalina Peralta, PhD in Humanities completed 2017; title of Dissertation: "Commissioning Truth: An Exploration and Assessment of an Alternative Approach to the Production of Truth in the Aftermath of Violence" (I was a co-supervisor; lead supervisor was David Howes)

Anthony Gavin, MA in philosophy completed 2016; title of Master's Research Paper: "Schizophrenic Bodies: Towards a Radical Biopolitical Ontology of Schizophrenia"

Edward Taylor, MA in philosophy completed 2016; title of Master's Research Paper: "The Importance of Humility for the Teaching of Critical Thinking"

Dan Atack, MA in philosophy completed 2016; title of Master's Research Paper: "A Vice-Oriented Approach to Environmental Ethics"

Sarah Azzarello, MA in philosophy completed 2014; title of Master's Research Paper: "Race: A Plurality of Concepts" (co-supervised with Justin Smith)

Fred Comeau, MA in philosophy completed 2014; title of Master's Research Paper: "A Phenomenological Critique of Wheeler's Action-Oriented Representation" (co-supervised with David Morris)

Undergraduate student research supervised:

James Luong, Concordia Undergraduate Student Research Award (CUSRA) project, 2019

John Nenniger, Concordia University Student Research Award (CUSRA) project, 2015

Alana Friend Lettner, Concordia University Student Research Award (CUSRA) project, 2015

Louis-Robert Bart, Concordia University Student Research Award (CUSRA) project, 2014

Michèle Martin, Concordia University Student Research Award (CUSRA) project, 2014

Michèle Martin, Concordia University Student Research Award (CUSRA) project, 2013

Laura Boyd-Clowes, Research Assistant, 2012

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