Education
PhD (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
Fields of specialization
microeconomics; game theory; information economics; political economics
Research interests
strategic information transmission; persuasion; game theoretical models of elections and political processes
Professional experience
Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Concordia University (July 2004-June 2009).
"Persuasion with costly precision,"
joint with Arianna Degan, 2021, 72(3): 869-908, Economic Theory.
"Ambiguous persuasion,"
joint with Dorian Beauchêne and Jian Li, January 2019, 179, 312-365, Journal of Economic Theory.
"Persuasion of a privately informed receiver,"
joint with Anton Kolotilin, Tymofiy Mylovanov, and Andriy Zapechelnyuk, November 2017, 85(6), 1949-1964, Econometrica.
“Psychologically-Based Voting with Uncertainty,”
with Arianna Degan, forthcoming, European Journal of Political Economy–Special Issue on Behavioural Political Economy, Volume 40, Part B, December 2015, 242–259.
“Reputation-concerned policy makers and institutional status quo bias,”
with Qiang Fu, 2014, 110, 15-25, Journal of Public Economics.
“Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication,”
2010, 10 (1), 22 pages, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Topics), Article 18.
“A Psychologically-Based Model of Voter Turnout,”
with Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2010, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 12(5), pages 979-1002, October.
“When Mandatory Disclosure Hurts: Expert Advice and Conflicting Interests,”
with Kristof Madarasz, 2008, 139(1), 47-74, Journal of Economic Theory.
ECON 695J
Topics in microeconomics--communication, persuasion, and political economics
ECON 613
Microeconomics II
ECON 425/525
Mathematics for economists
ECON 461/561
Industrial organization
