PhD Oral Exam - Debdeep Chatterjee, Business Administration

When studying for a doctoral degree (PhD), candidates submit a thesis that provides a critical review of the current state of knowledge of the thesis subject as well as the student’s own contributions to the subject. The distinguishing criterion of doctoral graduate research is a significant and original contribution to knowledge.

Once accepted, the candidate presents the thesis orally. This oral exam is open to the public.

Abstract

This dissertation examines the antecedents of corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR). Despite the prevalence of corporate harm to the environment and society, prior research has focused primarily on corporate social responsibility, leaving our understanding of why firms engage in CSiR relatively limited. This dissertation addresses several unsettled questions regarding how key stakeholders shape firms’ engagement in CSiR. The first chapter reviews and synthesizes the literature on the antecedents of CSiR, identifies key gaps, and outlines directions for future research. The second chapter examines how government subsidy dependence shapes CSiR. Building on resource dependence theory, I argue that firms with greater dependence on government subsidies reduce CSiR to avoid putting the subsidies on which they rely at risk. Using 16,863 firm-year observations of publicly listed manufacturing firms in the US, I find that greater government subsidy dependence is associated with lower CSiR and that this negative relationship is stronger when firms make greater employment commitments in exchange for subsidies, receive subsidies from a broader range of government agencies, and maintain subsidy relationships over longer periods. The third chapter examines how shareholder activism influences CSiR. Distinguishing between wealth-oriented and CSR-oriented shareholder activism, I argue that the two types of activism have contrasting effects on CSiR by directing managerial attention toward different priorities—financial concerns versus stakeholder harm. Examining shareholder proposals submitted to S&P 500 firms from 2006 to 2020, I find that wealth-oriented activism increases CSiR but find no evidence that CSR-oriented activism reduces CSiR. I further find that board CSR committees do not buffer the positive effect of wealth-oriented activism but enhance the effectiveness of CSR-oriented activism in reducing CSiR. Collectively, the three chapters advance our understanding of how stakeholder pressures, stakeholder dependencies, and governance mechanisms shape firms’ engagement in CSiR.