Reza Hadisi | On What Could Be in Front of Your Nose | Philosophy Speaker Series

What is the nature of practical reasoning? There is a storied debate which tries to answer this question by looking at the conclusion of practical reasoning. Here is Aristotle: “That the action is the conclusion is clear. But the premises of action are of two kinds, of the good and of the possible” (De Motu Animalium 7, 701a12-20; emphasis added). Following this, contemporary Aristotelians argue that practical reasoning is reasoning that concludes in action, while their opponents hold that it concludes, like theoretical reasoning, in an attitude, e.g., an intention.

In this talk, I will reflect on the nature of the premises of practical reasoning instead. In particular, I focus on the element of practical reasoning which, as Aristotle puts it, concerns “the possible,” i.e., the “minor premise.” I argue that the minor premise of practical reasoning cannot be a belief about means-ends relations (as often assumed) nor a perception of objects in the environment (as recently argued by Anton Ford). Rather, it must involve imagining how particular things in one’s environment could be in relation to one’s activities. At the end, I’ll discuss some implications of this result by drawing lessons from a theory of practical wisdom in the medieval Sufi tradition.

Reza Hadisi is Assistant Professor in Philosophy at the University of Arizona. His research focuses on metanormative theories in epistemology and ethics. He is particularly interested in questions about the relationship between theoretical and practical knowledge, the nature of practical reason, and moral epistemology. Much of his work is informed by his interest in the history of philosophy, especially Kant and the medieval Islamic philosophers.

This presentation will take place in-person and be simultaneously live-streamed via Zoom.