This talk presents and defends the phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT), according to which all intentionality—roughly, the "aboutness" or "directedness" of mental states and other items—is ultimately a matter of phenomenal consciousness. PIT might be thought to face challenges in accounting for the contents of thought, which might include contents that have no associated phenomenal character. This talk proposes a PIT-friendly picture of thought on which thoughts have two layers of contents: a layer of "immediate" contents and one of "derived" contents. While this view is especially congenial to PIT, much of it can be reconciled with alternative views of intentionality. The talk closes by considering how PIT might deal with the case of unconscious thoughts.
Dr. Angela Mendeloviciis Associate Professor of Philosophy at Western University. She works in philosophy of mind, specifically intentionality, consciousness, and the relationship between the two. She is the author of The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality, published by Oxford University Press in 2018.