A Systematic Review on the Outcomes of Primary and Secondary Prevention Programs in the Field of Violent Radicalization

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Report No 2021-PREV-EN

Disclaimer

This publication was funded by Public Safety Canada's Community Resilience Fund. The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of Public Safety Canada.

Keywords

violent radicalization, violent extremism, systematic review, primary prevention programs, secondary prevention programs, evidence-based best practice guidelines

To Cite This Report (APA 7th Edition)

Hassan, G., Brouillette-Alarie, S., Ousman, S., Kilinc, D., Savard, É. L., Varela, W., Lavoie, L., Fetiu, A., Harris-Hogan, S., Borokhovski, E., Pickup, D., Madriaza, P., Rousseau, C., Thompson, S. K., McCoy, J., Venkatesh, V., Boivin, M., Srimathi Narayana, M., Morin, D., … the CPN-PREV team. (2021). *A systematic review on the outcomes of primary and secondary prevention programs in the field of violent radicalization*. Canadian Practitioners Network for the Prevention of Radicalization and Extremist Violence. https://cpnprev.ca/systematic-review-2/

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Funded by the Government of Canada

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Executive Summary

Introduction

Over the past two decades, planned and executed attacks attributed to extremist movements or "lone actors" have intensified and spread throughout many parts of the world, amplifying the fears of local populations and prompting a number of governments to invest significant sums of money into preventing violent radicalization and extremism. Despite these investments, current knowledge regarding best practices for prevention remains disparate, and the effectiveness of current practices has not yet been clearly established. This means that trillions of dollars are currently being spent funding programs whose effectiveness and potential side effects are unknown.

Objectives

Considering the above, the Canadian Practitioners Network for Prevention of Radicalization and Extremist Violence (CPN-PREV; https://cpnprev.ca/) has conducted a systematic review on the effectiveness of primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention programs in the field of preventing violent extremism (PVE). The goals of this review were threefold: **1)** to determine if primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention programs are able to counter violent radicalization; **2)** to identify specific program modalities associated with a higher chance of success or failure for the targeted populations; and **3)** to assess the quality of the literature in order to identify less reliable evidence, knowledge gaps, and studies which should be given more weight in the interpretation of results.

> "Despite these investments, current knowledge regarding best practices for prevention remains disparate, and the effectiveness of current practices has not yet been clearly established."

The review integrated evidence on the following: **a)** religiously-inspired (e.g., Islamist), right-wing, extreme-left, and "single-issue" (e.g., misogyny) violent radicalization; **b)** outcomes classified by prevention levels; and **c)** benefits/harms, costs, transferability, and community-related implementation issues when mentioned by the authors. We used systematic review methods developed by the Campbell and Cochrane collaborations. The logic model driving the review is grounded in an ecosystemic public health model, dividing programs into primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention levels. Because the outcomes of primary/secondary PVE programs and those of tertiary prevention programs were very disparate, we decided to treat results of primary/secondary prevention programs separately from those of tertiary prevention programs. However, we used a common method for both reviews.

Results

Of the 11,836 studies generated from the searches undertaken (up to June 2019), only 56 were found to be eligible for this review (i.e., they included an empirical—quantitative or qualitative—evaluation of a primary or secondary prevention initiative using primary data). Among these, 23 were found to be of insufficient methodological quality (score of 3/10 or less on the Quality of Study Assessment tool) and were therefore excluded.

The final set of studies comprised 33 evaluations of primary or secondary prevention programs. They reached a total sample of 6,520 individuals from 15 countries, with sample sizes ranging from 5 to 1,446 participants (M = 210.32, SD = 396.0).

Most of the identified studies (k = 24) evaluated programs targeting violent Islamist radicalization. Nine studies assessed the outcomes of "general" prevention programs, that is, programs that do not target a specific type of violent radicalization but rather aim to improve openness towards others, respect, civic education, etc., within both "vulnerable" individuals and the general population. Only one study assessed programs targeting violent far-right radicalization, and none targeted far-left or single-issue violent radicalization.

Among the 33 program evaluation studies, 18 reported mostly positive outcomes, seven reported mixed outcomes (both positive and negative), and eight reported mostly negative outcomes. Of note, all negative assessments were related to initiatives under Prevent, the UK's national PVE strategy. On average, primary and secondary prevention programs seemed more effective than targeted primary prevention programs. However, this result is inevitably linked to the multiple negative assessments of Prevent, a strategy encompassing multiple targeted primary prevention programs.

Discussion

Key Findings

1. Programs that target a specific ethnic or religious group—in this case Muslim communities—generate more negative/iatrogenic effects than benefits. Although some programs led to positive outcomes, most were viewed negatively not only by the minority communities they target, but also by stakeholders and personnel working for the program. The core mistake of targeted primary prevention programs is the conflation of religious background or ethnicity with the risk of violent radicalization. In absence of other empirically validated indicators, using those will lead to feelings of discrimination and stigmatization for the targeted communities;

2. Programs that focus on surveillance methods (monitoring and control) in education, healthcare, or via the use of hotlines generate more negative/iatrogenic effects than benefits. Similar to targeted primary prevention programs, surveilled participants (including staff) declared negative outcomes such fear of being spied upon, self-censorship, stigmatization of Muslim communities, and worsening of Muslim students' university experiences;

3. Studies assessing the outcomes of police-community partnerships have produced mixed findings, likely due to problems with research design, methods, and measures. Most evaluation studies focused on the subjective perceptions of police officers, stakeholders, and community partners. As expected, these programs tended to be more positively perceived by police officers and stakeholders, who reported feelings of empowerment, acknowledgment, and mutual trust. Unfortunately, these views contrasted with those of targeted community members, who declared trust issues with the police and feelings of discrimination, which led to implementation issues;

4. Primary and secondary prevention programs seem to be effective in improving personal, interpersonal, or psychosocial characteristics that have been reported as potential protective factors against violent radicalization (e.g., empathy, openness towards others, conflict management skills). However, improvement in general protective factors cannot be assumed to be effective in reducing the risk of violence or involvement on a violent radical trajectory. This emphasizes

the need to distinguish between a program's impact on intermediate outcomes (e.g., self-esteem, psychological distress) from its impact on final outcomes (e.g., an individual's risk of acting out, not disengaging from a movement/ideology, promotion of violence);

5. The current systematic review found only three eligible counternarrative program evaluations. Even though these studies reported mostly positive results, none of these studies measured the impact between exposure to counternarrative campaigns and violent radical attitudes or behaviors, which limits the positive conclusions reached by the authors;

6. Of the 33 studies reviewed, none evaluated prevention programs targeting left-wing or single-issue violent radicalization, and only one targeted the far right, while 24 analyzed programs targeting violent Islamist radicalization and nine targeted violent radicalization in general. This suggests that some prevalent types of radicalization do not receive appropriate consideration by researchers, funders, and program developers, or that evaluations that have been conducted were not made available to the public; and

7. Data is currently scarce concerning the implementation challenges of PVE programs. This obfuscates the avenues by which such programs may be improved in the future. Furthermore, studies very rarely mention facilitators, implementation successes, budget management issues, or the sustainability and transference of practices after project completion. None of the reviewed studies mentioned the costs of program or evaluation research, making it difficult to improve resource allocations in relation to expected outcomes.

Limitations of Studies

1. Reliable empirical data on primary and secondary PVE programs is currently limited. Of the 56 eligible studies, 23 did not achieve a score of more than 3/10 on the Quality of Study Assessment tool and were therefore excluded. The empirical studies reviewed generally suffered from weak experimental designs, small or biased samples, and heterogeneity of definitions, measures, and outcomes. This makes the integration of evidence quite challenging, especially since several manuscripts had multiple sections missing;

2. Conflicts of interest also permeate evaluation studies of primary and secondary prevention programs. In seven of the 33 studies reviewed, data relied mostly on the views of program providers, deciders, stakeholders, community partners, or police/correctional staff, who were solicited to assess the effectiveness of programs in which they were involved. In six studies, authors were also program implementers. In six others, the perceptions of community members towards a program were used as primary data rather than asking those who went through the program itself. This results in evaluations that are potentially biased, overly positive (or negative in the case of initiatives related to UK's Prevent), and, more importantly, inattentive to the real impacts these programs have on the targeted population;

3. Instead of operationalizing success as, for example, the reduction of empirically documented risk factors related to violent radicalization, program designers sometimes used measures of user satisfaction or program provider satisfaction. Alternatively, some identified what they assumed to be risk factors and measured the program's ability to address them. This limits the conclusions that can be drawn concerning the real effectiveness of these programs in preventing and countering violent extremism;

4. Several studies did not assess for negative or iatrogenic outcomes, thus potentially introducing a bias in the interpretation of their effectiveness and obstacles to their comparability with programs that looked for negative outcomes. This may have resulted in a disservice to programs that have been more frequently evaluated and that assessed negative/iatrogenic outcomes;

5. Very few studies described or formulated a theory of change and logic model to understand the processes of change underlying a program's positive and negative outcomes. This could have helped to explain how some prevention activities were able to achieve the positive outcomes reported and to determine if these positive outcomes increased resilience towards radicalization to violence; and

6. In conclusion, due to the lack of theoretically and methodologically robust empirical evaluations, our ability to identify best PVE practices based on empirical evidence is limited. Furthermore, although processes to violent radicalization may have some commonalities across types of extremist groups or individuals, generalizing findings across contexts is generally impossible given the limited state of evidence in the field, the diversity of populations and drivers of violent extremism in different states/societies, and the heterogeneity in programming approaches. Considering the lack of evaluative studies on far-right, far-left, or single-issue prevention programs, the conclusions of this report can only be applied to general programs or those targeting violent Islamist radicalization.

Although evidence regarding primary and secondary PVE programs remains severely limited, the following preliminary recommendations are provided for professionals working in the field of PVE, based on the conclusions generated in this review.

Recommendations for Future Program Design, Implementation, and Delivery

1. Prevention programs should not target any specific cultural, religious, or ethnic group in the absence of other risk factors (i.e., targeted primary prevention) as this can result in the stigmatization of the targeted communities. This does not mean that programs should not be tailored to their audiences. When based on specific evidence and with buy-in from the involved communities, tailoring is, in fact, recommended;

2. Trust relationships with individuals and collaborations with communities are likely to be harmed if programs designed for primary or secondary prevention conflate surveillance/information gathering with psychosocial/mental health support. If your program contains components that may be used for surveillance/information gathering, be transparent with individuals and clearly explain the limits of your confidentiality commitments, as dictated by your professional code of conduct;

3. Primary and secondary prevention programs should not be expected to prevent an attack from occurring but rather to reduce the risk—in the mid- to long-run—that an individual may engage in violent radicalization. Well-designed primary and secondary PVE programs that target relevant risk and protective factors have generally been found to be effective and should be encouraged;

4. There is a need for primary and secondary prevention programs that address, among other things, extreme-left, extreme-right, and single-issue (e.g., misogyny) violent radicalization. Practitioners, researchers, and policymakers should encourage the implementation and evaluation of programs encompassing these types of extremism, especially in regions where they are prevalent;

5. The generalizability of PVE programs appears to be limited. Therefore, practitioners should refrain from transplanting a program "as is" from one context to another. Practitioners must adapt and tailor programs to local contexts; and

6. If funding enables it, methodologically robust evaluation models should be designed at the onset of programs. Stronger data concerning primary and secondary PVE programs are urgently needed.

Recommendations for Future Program Evaluation

1. When evaluating prevention programs, conflicts of interest and potential biases should be kept to a minimum or explicitly disclosed, if unavoidable. Evaluators should be authorized to publish and disseminate their findings independently;

2. Evaluators should aim for representative samples and prioritize data coming from program participants rather than staff, stakeholders, or community members not directly involved in the program. However, combining program beneficiaries with other types of participants (e.g., staff) can be a comprehensive way to conduct assessment;

3. Program designers and evaluators are encouraged to consider both intermediate (e.g., improved perspective taking) and final outcomes (e.g., reduction in violent radical attitudes or behaviors) that go beyond user satisfaction in their assessment of programs. Collecting data on final outcomes ensures that a program is truly effective and provides data on the link between risk and protective factors and violent radicalization;

4. Program designers and evaluators are encouraged to assess the negative/iatrogenic effects of their program. Results compiled in this systematic review suggest that rigorous program evaluations often report more negative outcomes than evaluations where these effects were not assessed. This does not mean these programs are any less effective. Therefore, policymakers, stakeholders, and funders must be supported in adequately understanding the results of program evaluations before making a value judgment as to their effectiveness;

5. In addition to the commonly reported positive/negative outcomes and implementation challenges, program designers and evaluators are encouraged to collect data about the monetary aspects, implementation facilitators, and sustainability of projects;

6. Quantitative research on primary and secondary PVE programs would benefit from using more robust experimental designs, namely by collecting data on control variables and using pre-/post-measurements, control groups, and/or randomly assigning participants to groups if the procedure abides by ethical standards (if not, quasi-experimental designs should be considered);

7. For qualitative research, ensure rigor in the analyses to minimize potential confirmation biases by researchers. Rather than simply reporting quotes that confirm the main narrative of the research, clearly disclose the discourse analysis procedure; and

8. Whether doing qualitative or quantitative research, try to formulate an initial theory of change that can explain your program's expected effects and then build and disclose a logic model accordingly. If possible, as mentioned earlier, integrate intermediate and final outcomes in the model. With time, revise and complexify your model as needed.

Introduction

What is CPN-PREV?

The Canadian Practitioners Network for the Prevention of Radicalization and Extremist Violence (CPN-PREV; https://cpnprev.ca/) is an evidence-based and practitioners-centered network funded by Public Safety Canada's Community Resilience Fund and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. The goal of CPN-PREV is to bring forward Canadian leadership and develop excellence in preventing violent extremism (PVE). It supports best practices and collaborations among intervention teams through sustained knowledge mobilization between researchers, practitioners, policymakers, and various community sectors.

CPN-PREV has four inter-related objectives in matters of PVE:

1. Generate evidence-based best practice guidelines related to assessment, prevention, and intervention;
2. Identify existing assets and examine the level of collaboration through a Canada-wide mapping of existing initiatives;
3. Strengthen collaborative resource development by and for practitioners across multiple sectors and disciplines through capacity building in areas of high need; and
4. Expand and improve access to the collection of evidence-based resources tailored to Canadian practitioners.

The Importance of Evidence-Based Best Practice Guidelines

The field of violent radicalization is at a crucial intersection between the following: **a)** a recognized social need for addressing its rise among vulnerable populations; **b)** an increase in demands for evidence-based guidelines on online and offline prevention/intervention efforts, especially given the substantive investments made by national, regional, and inter-governmental actors; and **c)** the availability of empirical evidence, which, however, has not yet been sufficiently generated, appraised, and integrated into practice guidelines. Moreover, because violent radicalization is a low-occurrence and context-dependent phenomenon (its antecedents, evolution, and dynamics vary appreciably between locations), there can be too much heterogeneity for models to fit well within local contexts. The field also lacks best practice guidelines that are empirically

grounded, with practitioners currently relying on local expertise and case-by-case results to design and implement PVE programs. A focus on guidelines that are flexible and adaptable rather than pre-set models is therefore preferable, allowing the context to drive the work. Such guidelines are especially relevant given the relative infancy of PVE practice in most countries and contexts.

An evidence-based best practice guideline is a recommendation that **a)** aims to optimize client care and well-being by helping practitioners and clients make the most appropriate decisions for specific situations; **b)** is informed by a systematic review of the evidence; and **c)** includes an appraisal of the balance of benefits and harms in comparison to other care options (Graham et al., 2011; Pacini et al., 2016). In North America, guidelines are also used to assess the quality and outcomes of implemented interventions and to consequently allocate resources as needed. Moreover, evidence-based best practice guidelines have been reported to improve quality of care (Wallen et al., 2010).

Guideline development often relies on systematic reviews as a starting point. A systematic review collects and analyzes quantitative and qualitative empirical studies on a particular research question through an exhaustive search using explicit, accountable, and highly robust methods (Cooper, 2017; Gough et al., 2012). The ultimate goal of a systematic review is to provide a reliable synthesis of trustable evidence that can be used to develop guidelines for research, policy, and practice (Pettigrew & Roberts, 2006). Guidelines not based on systematic reviews may be misleading or cause harm because they can be grounded in biased or questionable evidence (Lim et al., 2008).

Consequently, since 2017, CPN-PREV has been conducting systematic reviews to generate evidence-based best practice guidelines on the following topics:

1. Can exposure to extremist online content lead to violent radicalization, and if so, how?

2. What is the relative success of programs that aim to a) prevent violent radicalization among vulnerable populations and b) disengage individuals adhering to violent radical ideas/behaviors? Are there specific intervention modalities associated with a higher chance of success or failure?

In 2019 and in collaboration with the UNESCO-PREV Chair, CPN-PREV launched a Delphi process (https://www.rand.org/topics/delphi-method.html) to evaluate guidelines emerging from its systematic reviews. Canadian and international PVE experts (https://cpnprev.ca/guideline-committees/) were asked to review these guidelines by indicating agreement or disagreement and, if applicable, suggest modifications. Once finalized, improved and consensual guidelines will be adapted to local and national contexts and disseminated in scientific articles, policy briefs, and other knowledge transfer media.

The current document contains the systematic review on the effectiveness of primary and secondary PVE programs (Topic 2a). For readers seeking the systematic review on the link between exposure to extremist online content and violent radicalization (Topic 1), consult Hassan et al. (2018). To obtain the outcomes of tertiary prevention programs (Topic 2b), please consult the following link: https://cpnprev.ca/systematic-review-3/. Note that the tertiary prevention report may come out a couple of months after the current report and, thus, may not be immediately available.

Empirical Context

Over the past decade, planned and executed attacks attributed to extremist movements or lone actors have intensified and spread across many parts of the world, amplifying the fears of local populations and prompting governments to invest significant sums of money in preventing and countering violent radicalization and extremism.[1] These efforts now constitute a significant development in North-Western countries and have led to the increased involvement of institutions outside the traditional national security sphere, including the mental health, education, and community sectors, as well as the legal and prison systems. For example, it is estimated that the United States allocated 16% of its entire discretionary budget (2.8 trillion dollars) to fund counter-terrorism measures between 2002 and 2017 (Zucchi, 2018).

> "The rapid deployment of prevention initiatives, often under the influence of panic and without a deep understanding of the phenomenon, poses significant social, scientific, and ethical problems."

Despite such massive investment, current knowledge regarding best practices in terms of prevention remains disparate, and the effectiveness of currently used practices has not yet been clearly established (Horgan & Braddock, 2010). Of the large body of studies related to violent radicalization and terrorism—nearly 20,000, according to Lum et al. (2006)—very few are outcome evaluations of PVE programs put in place by governments, institutions, or organizations (Christmann, 2012; Veldhuis & Kessels, 2013; Schuurman, 2020), and many of them are not publicly accessible (e.g., evaluation reports conducted internally by and for governmental agencies on programs they funded). This means that trillions of dollars are currently being invested in programs whose effectiveness and potential side effects are almost entirely unknown. Further, the quality and reliability of the few available studies on the subject remain unassessed (Burke, 2013; Rabasa et al., 2010).

The rapid deployment of prevention initiatives, often under the influence of panic and without a deep understanding of the phenomenon, poses significant social, scientific, and ethical problems. The implementation of prevention programs, without adequate knowledge about their potential outcomes and impact, may ultimately be counterproductive, stigmatizing, and lead to greater harms than benefits (Romaniuk, 2015). Currently, available information regarding the effectiveness of most programs is generally a matter of opinion rather than empirical evidence. In addition, many studies claim to be "evaluations" despite not meeting the basic standards expected of such evaluations.

In order to address the above situation, CPN-PREV conducted a systematic review on the effectiveness of primary, secondary, and tertiary PVE programs.[2] Based on the results of this review, recommendations were provided for program providers, policymakers, practitioners, and researchers in the field.

The Importance of Clear Definitions

One of the major recurring limitations within the empirical literature on violent radicalization is the lack of any consensus regarding definitions. Most of these terminology issues stem from the fact that terms such as radicalization, terrorism, and violent extremism have been used interchangeably; terrorism and violent radicalization refer to an outcome or a method of political violence, while radicalization describes a process or a state of being (Hafez & Mullins, 2015). In addition, definitions tend to be shaped by the author's field of practice and their understanding of comparable social problems. Most existing definitions also tend to focus on religious-based violent radicalization (e.g., Korkhoskovar; 2014; Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

1 The distinction between preventing violent extremism (PVE) and countering violent extremism (CVE) is not always obvious. Efforts to counter violent extremism could fall under the umbrella of prevention depending on the author and situation, and vice versa. Because of that, most authors tend to use both terms interchangeably or combine them (PVE/CVE). We suggest that the literature might be better served by classifying efforts to fight violent radicalization and extremism in terms of primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention. Therefore, in the current report, the term PVE will be used to represent both preventing and countering violent extremism, as well as all levels of prevention (primary, secondary, tertiary).

2 The current report covers the outcomes of primary and secondary PVE programs.

Recent definitions of violent radicalization (e.g., Hafez & Mullins, 2015) highlight a more holistic understanding of the phenomenon by integrating systemic, anthropological, psychosocial, and socio-political dimensions, which echoes Heitmeyer's (2002) work on social disintegration whereby violent radicalization is viewed as the product of individual experiences and social conditions that generate social grievances (Alava et al., 2017). Ecosystemic definitions (e.g., Schmid, 2013), in opposition to "us vs. them" rhetoric, describe violent radicalization as an escalation of confrontational tactics where violence is considered as the only or most efficient means of defending one's (or the group's) cause. In an attempt to integrate these different definitions, CPN-PREV defines violent radicalization as a **non-linear process by which an individual or group (including a state) undergoes systemic transformations (e.g., behavioral, socio-economical, psychological, identity-based, political, and/or ideological) that lead them to support or facilitate the use of violence towards an individual or group in order to further their cause and bring about individual or societal changes.**

Systematic Reviews in the Field of PVE

Several literature reviews on violent radicalization have been published over the past decade, but very few were about prevention programs or have been systematic in their approach. Indeed, the vast majority of these reviews—some published by major international consortia—are theoretical in nature and present a more or less exhaustive portrait of the various conceptual, theoretical, and/or empirical writings concerning the possible causes of violent radicalization (e.g., Borum, 2012; Christmann, 2012; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Doosje et al., 2016; King & Taylor, 2011; McGilloway et al., 2015; Rahimullah et al., 2013; Schmid, 2013). However, the knowledge integrated by these reviews is disparate and focuses on different forms of radicalization among different populations.

Other existing reviews are traditional literature reviews or narrative reviews of PVE programs (e.g., Davies, 2018; Feddes & Galluci, 2015; Holmer et al., 2018; Kudlacek et al., 2017; Radicalisation Awareness Network [RAN], 2019; Samuel, 2018; Stephens et al., 2019). Thus, they are summaries of publications and/or descriptions of research around a common theme and, as such, tend to be selective by necessity and subsequently often subjective and susceptible to bias (Jackson, 1980).

To our knowledge, only five systematic reviews have focused on PVE programs (Andersson Malmros, 2018; Bellasio et al., 2018; Christmann, 2012; Gielen, 2019; Madriaza & Ponsot, 2015). The first, published by the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales (Christmann, 2012), examines PVE program results but covers only two deradicalization programs established for young people involved in the English justice system, making its scope limited. The second, published by the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (Madriaza & Ponsot, 2015), is a typological review that provides a detailed classification of the different PVE programs and strategies, but it does not systematically and critically review their results, nor does it examine the quality and reliability of the associated evidence. The third, by Gielen (2019), is a realist review of PVE evaluation studies that is impressive in scope and prudent in its conclusions, as it only groups the results of evaluation studies that are comparable. However, a realist review—in contrast to a fully-fledged systematic review—does not ponder studies according to their methodological quality and is neither standardized nor reproducible. The fourth, published by the RAND Corporation (Bellasio et al., 2018), is a systematic review of PVE strategies, policies, and programs implemented in the Netherlands and abroad. However, being focused on evaluation methods and design rather than results, it does not provide recommendations for clinicians, only for researchers and program evaluators. Furthermore, its geographical scope is limited. The fifth, by the Segerstedt Institute (Andersson Malmros, 2018), is a fully fledged systematic review of PVE programs, but it was only presented in a short conference and the full report is yet to be published.

In sum, currently available systematic reviews of PVE studies have methodological limitations or are restricted in scope, thereby decreasing their usefulness for developing evidence-based best practice guidelines.

Objectives

To our knowledge, there has been little aggregation of the available evidence regarding the effectiveness and potential side effects of PVE programs, and currently available systematic reviews do not properly assess the quality of the literature in a formal and structured way. To address this knowledge gap, CPN-PREV conducted a systematic review of the literature on the effectiveness of prevention programs in the field of PVE. Following a quick overview of the literature, it became clear that the outcomes of primary/secondary and those of tertiary prevention programs were very disparate, in part due to the highly variable definitions of risk and protective factors, "root causes," and the lack of widely accepted good practices. This prompted us to treat results on primary and secondary prevention programs separately from those of tertiary prevention programs but to use a common method for both reviews.

The goals of our systematic review were as follows:

To describe the outcomes of PVE programs in terms of preventing and/or reducing the risk of violent radicalization;

To identify specific program modalities associated with a higher chance of success or failure for the targeted populations;

To assess the quality of the literature in order to identify knowledge gaps and which studies should be given more (or less) weight in the interpretation of results; and

To formulate preliminary recommendations for program providers, policymakers, practitioners, and researchers working in the field of PVE.

The results of this review aimed to provide a reliable, trusted, and valid knowledge base for the development of evidence-based guidelines that will speak to practitioners, researchers, and deciders from multiple sectors. This was achieved by integrating evidence on the following:

a. **Right-wing, extreme-left, religious-based, and "single-issue" (e.g., misogyny) violent radicalization;**

b. **Outcomes classified by prevention levels; and**

c. **Benefits/harms, costs, transferability, and community-related implementation issues when mentioned by the authors.**

Public Health and Logic Models Applied to the Field of PVE

A number of authors have noted the advantages of applying public health models to PVE program analyses (Bjørgo, 2013; Harris-Hogan et al., 2016; Stares & Yacoubian, 2007; Weine et al., 2017). Firstly, these models provide a framework for the review and analysis of a host of embedded push and pull factors that are situated at all levels of an individual's ecosystem (Schmid, 2013). In turn, this framework offers a solid basis upon which to categorize the expected vs. achieved individual and societal outcomes of PVE programs. Second, they can be used to map PVE programs into clusters of services using the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels of public health models (see Figure 1) (Harris-Hogan et al., 2016). Such models can, therefore, help to organize and categorize very different areas of programming that contain specific assumptions, programming elements, and goals. Third, they provide crucial information on the gaps in inter-agency and multidisciplinary team coordination, as well as on the obstacles and facilitators to community engagement—a key element for the success of PVE efforts. Furthermore, public health models provide robust methodologies for the design of evidence-based best practice guidelines, as generated by collaborations such as Campbell, Cochrane, NICE, and PRISMA.

Figure 1

Levels of Prevention in Public Health



A logic model is a summary diagram that maps out a target population in conjunction with an intervention and all its anticipated outcomes (Baxter et al., 2014). Logic models are considered best practices in program evaluation studies, as they uncover theories of change. That is, they inform the processes of how and why an intervention succeeds, fails, or leads to a given outcome (Weiss, 1998). They also document the links between short-, middle-, long-term, and final outcomes, both expected and unexpected (Pottie et al., 2011; Rogers, 2008). Logic models are also increasingly integrated into systematic review methodology, particularly reviews of program evaluation studies, as can be seen in Campbell Collaboration review methods. In this context, logic models have numerous advantages:

a. They enable the identification of the target population;
b. They help to operationalize key definitions;
c. They help to posit links between concepts and variables;
d. They enable the formulation of the main review questions;
e. They structure the search strategy, codification of studies, and analysis of evidence;
f. They frame the interpretation of evidence;
g. They support guidelines development based on evidence-based best practices; and
h. They help to identify gaps in the literature and future research priorities (Anderson et al., 2011; Pottie et al., 2011).

In summary, logic models have the potential to make systematic reviews and the recommendations they generate more transparent to decision makers (Anderson et al., 2011; Wallace et al., 2012). With the precision of analyses they offer, systematic reviews based on logic models of intervention help move conclusions beyond the often repeated "more evidence is needed" (Baxter et al., 2014).

Methodological Framework

The systematic search strategy was based on the Campbell Collaboration review methods (https://www.campbellcollaboration.org). Today, the Campbell Collaboration is considered the standard-bearer in systematic reviews, particularly in the social and human sciences. In accordance with their guidelines, the steps outlined below were followed.

Step 1: Develop the logic model and formulate key questions

1.1: Develop the logic model

1.2: Formulate key questions

Step 2: Set admissible evidence

2.1: Set definitions

2.2: Set inclusion/exclusion criteria

Step 3: Search the literature and update searches

Step 4: Select admissible evidence for inclusion in the review

Step 5: Assess the quality of studies

Step 6: Gather information from studies

Step 7: Integrate results and interpret the evidence

Step 8: Write the report and formulate preliminary recommendations

Step 1: Develop the Logic Model and Formulate Key Questions

1.1: Develop the Logic Model

Our logic model (see Figure 2) classifies programs that aim to counter violent radicalization into tiers of prevention according to the public health model. Primary prevention programs are designed for members of the general population not at risk or not identified as at risk of violent radicalization. Their goal is to prevent violent radicalization before it happens by targeting an entire population (Brantingham & Faust, 1976). In the context of PVE, primary prevention programs encompass initiatives ranging from "openness towards others" programs disseminated in schools and universities to counter-narratives displayed on radio or television (e.g., radio broadcasts sponsored by the United State Agency for International Development; Aldrich, 2014).

In our literature review, we found multiple instances of programs targeting non-at-risk members of specific populations, based mostly on the religious or ethnic backgrounds of individuals. We labeled these programs "targeted primary prevention programs" because they target a specific population not clearly identified as at risk of radicalization (e.g., Diamond targeting Muslims; Feddes et al., 2015). This was found to have implications as to their side effects (e.g., stigmatization).

Secondary prevention programs, in turn, are directed towards populations that are somehow identified as vulnerable to violent radicalization and extremism. This assumption can be rooted in valid and reliable assessment procedures (although very few are empirically validated; Scarcella et al., 2016) or in information suggesting that such populations are at risk (e.g., if they were exposed to extremist discourses; Liht & Savage, 2013). These programs mostly aim to prevent violent behavior or attachment to extremist ideologies among individuals identified as vulnerable but not yet violent.

Figure 2

The PVE Logic Model



Finally, tertiary prevention programs (i.e., intervention, disengagement, or deradicalization programs) target individuals who already are on a path towards radicalization, have committed acts of political violence, or have joined a violent extremist group. They focus on reintegrating the individual into society and make them give up violence. They can also promote ideological changes.

Prevention programs, whether they are primary, secondary, or tertiary, can have both beneficial and adverse effects, and these can be intended or not by the program providers. These effects can lead to changes (positive and/or negative) in attitudes and behaviors associated with violent radicalization (e.g., openness towards others). These, in turn, have an effect on the desired final outcome (e.g., disengagement from a path towards radicalization).

1.2: Formulate Key Questions

Based on the logic model, we formulated the main question to guide our systematic review strategy: **"What are the main recommendations regarding prevention in the field of violent radicalization that can be generated from the literature?"** This main question, in turn, implies multiple specific questions and concepts.

Specific key questions:

1. **Who are the populations included in PVE programs?**
2. **What are the primary-level prevention programs that have been evaluated for outcomes?**
3. **What are the secondary-level prevention programs that have been evaluated for outcomes?**
4. **What are the tertiary-level prevention programs that have been evaluated for outcomes?**

For each level of prevention, the following specific sub-questions were asked:

a. **What is the content of these programs?**

b. **How were the outcomes of these programs defined and measured?**

c. **What are the intermediate and final positive outcomes?**

d. **What are the intermediate and final negative outcomes?**

e. **What mechanisms do authors use to explain these outcomes?**

f. **What are the implementation and cost issues, if reported?**

Step 2: Set Admissible Evidence

2.1: Set Definitions

Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Levels of Prevention

A small number of studies have applied the public health model to the study of PVE programs (Bjørgo, 2013; Harris-Hogan et al., 2016; Weine et al., 2017). Based on the public health model, the distinction between primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention becomes clear. Our systematic review uses this model but emphasizes the distinction between primary and targeted primary prevention programs.

We refer the reader to the section above for the definitions that were used to classify programs as primary, targeted primary, secondary, or tertiary prevention.[3] Note that even though the search strategy included all types of prevention programs, results regarding their outcomes will be presented separately.

3 In our systematic review, the classification of programs as primary, targeted primary, secondary, or tertiary prevention was done according to the sample of the study. Thus, there may be discrepancies between how authors describe the program they are assessing and our classification of these programs.

Operationalization of Violent Radicalization

In addition to the conceptual definition of violent radicalization adopted in this systematic review, we also rely on McCauley and Moskalenko's (2009) operationalization of manifestations of violent radicalization. These authors provide a distinction between political activism (participation in legal and non-violent political actions) and violent radicalization (political actions that are specifically violent and/or illegal). Thus defined, violent radicalization may manifest itself as expressions of violent attitudes, participating in violent activities, or taking part in acts of political violence in order to defend the interests of one's group (or of oneself) through the attack, persecution, or elimination of members of the outgroups. Violent radicalization outcomes thus include hate-based emotions, attitudes, discourses (and their propagation), as well as the perpetration of actual physical violence.

Operationalization of Program Outcomes

In this systematic review, program outcomes were split into two categories: positive and negative outcomes. Positive outcomes encompass any outcome that enhances variables related to individual or social well-being and reported in the literature as potential protective factors to violent radicalization. Such outcomes include increased resilience towards radicalization, increased self-esteem, increased citizenship engagement, knowledge acquisition about topics related to discrimination, or user satisfaction towards the program. Positive outcomes also encompass the reduction of risk factors related to violent radicalization, such as the decrease in supportive attitudes towards extremist groups or reduced distress. Negative outcomes, in contrast, are anticipated or unanticipated failures of the program, such as user dissatisfaction, program dysfunctions (e.g., inadequate allocation of funds), implementation problems, stigmatization of the targeted community, increased personal distress, or increased polarization towards radical ideas.

Negative effects also include other variables reported in the literature as risk factors related to violent radicalization. Unanticipated negative side effects are often referred to as iatrogenic effects in the medical field.

2.2: Set Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria

Because the field is characterized by heterogeneous studies, designs, and outcome measures, we adopted inclusion and exclusion criteria that maximize inclusiveness, thereby increasing the likelihood of locating studies that use different conceptual frameworks and/or methods. In addition to improving generalizability and consistency, this approach enables triangulation of evidence. The following criteria laid the rules for the evidence we considered admissible:

- **Written in English or French (languages spoken by members of the research team);**
- **Had to include an evaluation, from primary data, of any kind of prevention initiative for violent radicalization;**
- **If this condition was met, we did not impose any restriction for study design, type, method, or date (up to June 2019);**
- **Studies with ethically questionable access to primary data were excluded.**

Assessing the quality of the available literature is one of the many goals of systematic reviews. Thus, we were purposely exhaustive in what we considered eligible as it allowed us to critique the state of the literature as it is. Step 5 contains more details on the procedure we used to assess the quality of studies.

Step 3: Search the Literature and Update Searches

In consultation with a library science expert, we developed a search strategy that aimed to target an array of bibliographic databases and grey literature resources. Wherever possible, we made use of controlled vocabulary terms from database thesauri and adapted the strategy by the database to make full use of its features. To reduce "publication bias" (Bernard et al., 2014), we conducted a thorough search for grey literature by searching the Web, using Google for studies, reports, electronic journals, conference proceedings, and other relevant documents. The search for primary, secondary, and tertiary PVE programs was done simultaneously, as they share multiple keywords.

In addition to the documents identified using the search strategy outlined above, we compared our results with the studies of seven recently published literature/systematic reviews on PVE programs: Andersson Malmros (2018), Bellasio et al. (2018), Davies (2018), Gielen (2019), Kudlacek et al. (2017), RAN (2019), and Samuel (2018). Each eligible English or French document that we had not identified was added to our database. We did the same for studies figuring in the Impact Europe PVE intervention database (http://www.impact.itti.com.pl/index#/inspire/search).

If a set of authors published multiple papers using the same sample, analyses, and objectives (e.g., a government report later published in a scientific journal), only the latest version was retained. The complete list of examined databases, as well as sample search statements from our database and Google searches, can be found in Appendix 1.

Step 4: Select Admissible Evidence for Inclusion in the Review

To select admissible evidence studies, five research assistants screened the titles and abstracts of documents identified in the literature search. To ensure that inter-rater agreement was adequate, Fleiss' kappa (Fleiss, 1971) was computed. Results showed the interrater agreement for selection of eligible studies was acceptable (.64 for primary and secondary prevention studies, .65 for tertiary prevention studies).

Next, the teams reviewed and cross-reviewed the full-text documents for final eligibility. We used the PRISMA (http://www.prisma-statement.org) template to record the results of the literature searches in a flowchart (see Figure 3).

Step 5: Assess the Quality of Studies

Leading systematic review organizations, such as the Campbell Collaboration and Cochrane, have highlighted the challenges of assessing the quality of studies in fields where research is very diverse in terms of design, samples, tools, and outcomes. For the purposes of this review, the quality of studies was assessed with a modified version of the Appraisal of Guidelines for Research & Evaluation II (AGREE II; Brouwers et al., 2010), which was adapted to fit the state of the literature in the field of PVE.

The Quality of Study Assessment tool can be found in Appendix 2 and comprised 10 items worth one point each. These items cover **a)** the clarity of concepts, variables, and research questions/hypotheses; **b)** the amount of methodological detail (e.g., sample description) and the validity of the strategy; **c)** the robustness of the collected evidence; **d)** disclosure of limitations and potential conflicts of interest; and **e)** whether authors discussed the implications for practice or future research.

Figure 3

PRISMA Statement



We decided to weight each item equally (one point each) due to the heterogeneity of studies in this field, as well as the lack of clear guidelines on methodological quality assessment when studies comprise different designs and come from both official and grey literature. This approach increased the flexibility of the tool and the scope of studies that could be included. For example, we found grey literature reports with very solid methodological designs that contained very few details about the sample and statistical analyses because of the nature of the report. If we had given too much weight to sample description and presentation of methods, such studies would have been excluded despite containing robust evidence. However, studies that met too few of these criteria (quality rating of 3/10 or less) were excluded from the systematic review, as they provided excessively unreliable evidence. Note that the quality rating of each study must not be interpreted as a quantitative measure but rather as a qualitative rating of the presence/absence of basic methodological criteria for sound scientific research.

Step 6: Gather Information From Studies

We developed coding sheets to extract data and information from each selected study. Once completed, these sheets provided information on the following: **a)** conflicts of interest; **b)** program location and objectives; **c)** sample characteristics; **d)** methodological design; **e)** measures related to the program (e.g., user satisfaction); **f)** outcomes potentially influenced by the program (e.g., change in radicalized behaviors/attitudes, self-esteem); **g)** results in terms of positive and negative outcomes; **h)** limitations; and **i)** recommendations for policy or future research. All data from studies were then integrated in a summary of evidence table.

Step 7: Integrate Results and Interpret the Evidence

We initially tried to structure the aggregation of evidence by types of outcomes (changes in attitudes, behaviors, program satisfaction, etc.), but outcomes were so heterogeneous that the task proved impossible to complete with parsimony. We thus conducted parallel aggregations of evidence according to **a)** program location/country; **b)** program name; and **c)** whether outcomes were mostly positive, negative, or mixed. This ensured that each study would be listed only once.

Once positive and negative effects were catalogued, the systematic review team rated each study to determine whether outcomes of the prevention program were mostly positive, negative, or mixed (according to authors). For an outcome to be considered "mostly positive," authors had to report exclusively positive effects, or substantially more positive than negative outcomes (and inversely for "mostly negative" outcomes). If a program led to both positive and negative outcomes, without a clear preponderance of either type, it was labeled as "mixed." If a program had neither positive nor negative outcomes, it was sorted in "mostly negative," because on balance, such program outcomes do not justify the associated cost/resource allocation.

Step 8: Write the Report and Formulate Preliminary Recommendations

We synthesized the accumulated evidence as follows: **a)** the key findings that emerged from the literature; **b)** the degree of trust in each finding (i.e., the robustness of studies, assessed qualitatively and through the Quality of Study Assessment tool); **c)** the generalizability and applicability of findings; and **d)** the limitations of existing knowledge and research gaps. Finally, we used a narrative synthesis method to integrate the results and generate the preliminary recommendations (Moher et al., 2009).

Results

The current document relates the outcomes of primary and secondary PVE programs. To obtain the outcomes of tertiary prevention programs, please consult the following link: https://cpnprev.ca/systematic-review-3/. Note that the tertiary prevention report may come out a couple of months after the current report and, thus, may not be immediately available.

Of the 11,836 studies generated from the searches, 56 were eligible for this review as they included an empirical evaluation of a primary or secondary prevention initiative using primary data. Of these, 23 were of too low methodological quality (score of 3/10 or less on the Quality of Study Assessment tool) to be included. This indicates multiple problems in the state of the literature, which will be discussed in the later sections. For those wishing to consult the list of eligible but excluded studies, see Appendix 3.

The 33 primary and secondary prevention studies assessed the outcomes of 31 different programs in 15 countries (UK [*k* = 16], USA [*k* = 4], The Netherlands [*k* = 3], Afghanistan [*k* = 1], France [*k* = 2], Kenya [*k* = 2], Somalia [*k* = 2], Australia [*k* = 1], Belgium [*k* = 1], Iraq [*k* = 1], Germany [*k* = 1], Mali [*k* = 1], Scotland [*k* = 1], Sweden [*k* = 1], Tunisia [*k* = 1]).[4] No Canadian program was assessed. The total number of participants was 6,520, with sample sizes ranging from five (Madriaza et al., 2018; Manby, 2010b) to 1,446 (Swedberg & Reisman, 2013). The mean number of participants was 210.32 (*SD* = 396.0).

Table 1 presents each of the 33 retained evaluations, listed by **a)** geographic location, **b)** types of outcomes, and **c)** program name. Most of the studies (*k* = 24) evaluated programs targeting violent Islamist radicalization. Nine studies assessed the outcomes of "general" prevention programs, that is, programs that do not target a specific type of radicalization but rather openness towards others, respect, civic education, etc. Only one study assessed programs targeting violent far-right radicalization. None targeted far-left or single-issue (e.g., misogyny) violent radicalization.

Among the 33 studies, 18 reported mostly positive outcomes, seven reported mixed outcomes (both positive and negative), and eight reported mostly negative outcomes. Of note, all negative assessments were related to initiatives under Prevent, the UK's national PVE strategy.

> "On average, primary and secondary prevention programs seemed more effective than targeted primary prevention programs."

On average, primary and secondary prevention programs seemed more effective than targeted primary prevention programs. These initiatives seemed to yield more negative than positive outcomes and were overall less successful than other types of prevention. However, this result is inevitably linked to the multiple negative assessments of Prevent, a strategy encompassing multiple targeted primary prevention program.

4 Two studies (Christiaens et al., 2018; Swedberg & Reisman, 2013) were conducted in multiple countries, explaining the disparity between the number of studies (*k*) and countries.

Table 1
Retained Evaluations of Primary and Secondary Prevention Programs, Listed by a) Geographic Location, b) Types of Outcomes, and c) Name

Types of outcomes	Programs	*n*	Method	Type of Violent Radicalization	Type of Prevention
Africa					
Mostly positive	Being Kenyan Being Muslim, Kenya (Savage et al., 2014)	24	Quanti.	Islamist	Secondary
	Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership-based programs, Mali (Aldrich, 2014)	200	Quanti.	Islamist	Primary
	Search for Common Ground: Bottom-Up Approach to Countering Violent Extremism, Tunisia (Bala, 2017)	10	Quali.	Islamist	Primary
	Somalia Youth Livelihoods Program, Somalia; Garissa Youth Program, Kenya; and Kenya Transition Initiative Eastleigh Program, Kenya (Swedberg & Reisman, 2013)	1,446	Mixed m.	Islamist	Primary
Mixed	Somali Youth Leaders Initiative, Somalia (Mercy Corps, 2016)	812	Mixed m.	Islamist	Primary
Mostly negative	-	-	-	-	-
Asia					
Mostly positive	Break the ISIS Brand Counter Narrative Project, Iraq (Speckhard et al., 2018)	N/A*	Mixed m.	Islamist	Primary, secondary
Mixed	Introducing New Vocational Education and Skills Training, Afghanistan (Mercy Corps, 2015)	729	Mixed m.	Islamist	Primary
Mostly Negative	-	-	-	-	-
Australia					
Mostly Positive	More Than a Game, Australia (Johns et al., 2014)	39	Mixed m.	Islamist	Targeted primary

Mixed	-	-	-	-	-
Mostly Negative	-	-	-	-	-
Europe					
Mostly Positive	Being Muslim Being British, UK (Liht & Savage, 2013)	81	Quanti.	Islamist	Secondary
	Being Muslim Being Scottish, Scotland (Boyd-MacMillan, 2016)	21	Mixed m.	Islamist	Targeted primary
	BOUNCEUp, Belgium, France, Germany, The Netherlands, and Sweden (Christiaens et al., 2018)	151	Mixed m.	General	Secondary
	Diamond, The Netherlands (Feddes et al., 2015)	46	Quanti.	Islamist	Targeted primary
	Diamond, The Netherlands (Scientific Approach to Formulate Indicators & Responses to Radicalisation [SAFIRE], 2013)	46	Mixed m.	Islamist	Targeted primary
	Prevent [Citizenship Programme], UK (Manby, 2010a)	9	Mixed m.	General	Secondary
	Prevent [Pathways into Adulthood], UK (Manby, 2010b)	5	Mixed m.	Islamist	Secondary
	Prevent [Pilot Parenting Project], UK (Manby, 2009a)	7	Mixed m.	General	Primary
	Prevent [Theatre Project], UK (Manby, 2009b)	6	Mixed m.	General	Secondary
Mixed	Advisory Directorate for Youth, Women, and Imams' Active Development, UK (Sheikh et al., 2012)	82	Quali.	Islamist	Targeted prim., sec.
	48 programs under Prevent, UK (Hirschfield et al., 2012)	104	Quali.	Islamist	Targeted prim., sec.

	Prevent [Film Project], UK (Manby, 2009c)	9	Mixed m.	General	Secondary
	Vivre-Ensemble, France (Madriaza et al., 2018)	5	Quanti.	General	Secondary
Mostly Negative	Prevent, UK (Bowie & Revell, 2018)	8	Quali.	Islamist	Targeted prim., sec.
	Prevent, UK (HM Government, 2011a–d)	1,158	Mixed m.	Islamist	Targeted prim., sec.
	Prevent, UK (Joyce, 2018)	38	Mixed m.	Islamist	Targeted prim., sec.
	Prevent, UK (Kundnani, 2009)	32	Quali.	Islamist	Targeted prim., sec.
	Prevent, UK (Kyriacou et al., 2017)	9	Mixed m.	Islamist	Targeted prim., sec.
	Prevent, UK (Lakhani, 2012)	56	Quali.	Islamist	Targeted prim., sec.
	Prevent, UK (Younis & Jadhav, 2019)	16	Quali.	Islamist	Targeted prim., sec.
	Prevent [Pathfinder], UK (McDonald & Mir, 2011)	1,149	Quali.	Islamist	Targeted prim., sec.
North America					
Mostly Positive	LAPD iWatch, USA (Castillo, 2015)	18	Quali.	General	Primary, secondary
	Redirect Method, USA (Helmus & Klein, 2019)	N/A*	Quanti.	Far right, Islamist	Secondary
	WORDE, USA (Williams et al., 2016)	179	Quanti.	General	Primary
Mixed	See Something, Say Something, USA (Campbell III, 2011)	25	Quali.	General	Primary
Mostly Negative	-	-	-	-	-

*Speckhard et al. (2018) and Helmus and Klein (2019) assessed the impact of online counternarrative campaigns. Because the number of individuals reached by these campaigns (e.g., number of clicks, likes, comments) cannot be compared to "traditional" participants of a study, they were excluded from the participant count.

The Summary of Evidence section can be found at the end of this report (p. 56) and synthesizes the current state of evidence regarding the benefits, harms, and costs (when documented) of primary and secondary PVE programs. Tables 2.1 to 2.33 contain the following information about each program: **a)** the name and country where the program was executed; **b)** objectives of the program; **c)** sample characteristics; **d)** methodological details; **e)** positive outcomes; **f)** negative outcomes; **g)** the balance of outcomes (overall positive, negative, or mixed); **h)** limitations identified by authors; **i)** limitations not mentioned by authors but identified by our team; and **j)** a study quality score (/10). Each table is followed by a textual summary of the content of each study, followed by an assessment of the reliability of its results. The general integration and synthesis of the results of the 33 studies are presented in the sections on key findings, limitations, recommendations, and future research.

Discussion

The current document comprises a systematic review on the effectiveness of primary and secondary prevention programs in the field of violent radicalization. Compared to similar literature or systematic reviews, the current study has notable advantages. First, it is up to date, as it includes manuscripts published until June 2019. Second, it contains program evaluation studies from around the globe rather than one specific region (despite the overrepresentation of studies about the UK's Prevent programs). Third, in addition to aggregating evidence, it critically appraises it and weighs key findings and recommendations accordingly. Fourth, because one of its objectives was to lay the groundwork for the development of evidence-based best practice guidelines, it provides recommendations for clinical practice in addition to those for future research and program evaluation.

In the next sections, we discuss key findings from our systematic review, major limitations of the included studies, and limitations of this review. Finally, we formulate recommendations for future program design, implementation, delivery, and evaluation.

Key Findings

1) Programs That Target Specific Community Groups are Counterproductive

Based on available evidence, programs that target a specific ethnic or religious group—in this case, Muslim communities—generate more negative/iatrogenic effects than benefits (Bowie & Revell, 2018; HM Government, 2011a–d; Kundnani, 2009; Kyriacou et al., 2017; Lakhani, 2012; McDonald & Mir, 2011; Younis & Jadhav, 2019). Although some programs led to positive outcomes (More Than a Game [Johns et al., 2014], BMBS [Boyd-MacMillan, 2016], and Diamond [Feddes et al., 2015; SAFIRE, 2013]), most were viewed negatively—not only by the minority communities they target but also by stakeholders and personnel working for the program. They were described as mostly counterproductive, resulting in negative consequences such as stigmatization, discrimination, suspiciousness, and fear of being monitored. These negative consequences are especially problematic because they have been documented in the literature as risk factors for violent radicalization, mainly in connection to how extremist movements in Western countries mobilize grievances centered around discrimination and racism to create an "us vs. them" mentality to justify action (Piazza, 2011). Furthermore, the negative impacts of these programs seemed to persist over time.

Most of these negative outcomes came from evaluations of the UK's Prevent strategy. However, Prevent has not been a fixed strategy over the years and has comprised several different local programs, some of which are included in this systematic review. The first version of Prevent (2007–2011) explicitly focused on Muslim communities and was considered as a major factor for stigmatizing that community (Busher et al., 2019; Kundnani, 2009; Romaniuk, 2015). Indeed, most of the negatively slanted studies in our review assessed components of the initial Prevent strategy. In 2011, the strategy was broadened to include all forms of extremism in order to avoid stigmatizing the Muslim community (Busher et al., 2019). Consolidated in 2015 with the "Counter Terrorism and Security Act" (the Prevent Duty act), this shift in strategy also legally obliged local authorities from different social sectors to become involved in the prevention of terrorism: a move which was interpreted as a call for imposed denunciation (Busher et al., 2019; Elwick & Jerome, 2019). Unfortunately, studies in our review about the second phase of Prevent found the same iatrogenic effects as those highlighted in the first phase, despite efforts to renew the strategy (Bowie & Revell, 2018; Kyriacou et al., 2017; Younis & Jadhav, 2019).

The core mistake of targeted primary prevention programs is the conflation of religious background or ethnicity with the risk of violent radicalization. The assumption of risk in the absence of empirically validated indicators may lead to feelings of discrimination and stigmatization for the targeted communities. In contrast, several secondary prevention programs that were tailored to address Islamist radicalization were not viewed with suspicion, as they were adapted to individuals who were actively courted by Islamist extremist groups or were already on a trajectory towards violent radicalization.

Of note, studies that highlighted the negative aspects of targeted primary prevention programs often failed to distinguish the opinions of individuals participating in the program from those of community members or stakeholders. Therefore, it is unclear if the negative outcomes were truly experienced by participants or if external observers had negative opinions about a program they potentially did not fully understand or experience. However, even when taking this limitation into consideration, there is currently insufficient evidence to conclude that prevention programs specifically targeting an ethnic or religious group in the absence of other risk factors should be further encouraged. Stakeholders still wishing to implement these types of programs should be wary of potential iatrogenic effects and plan for the continued assessment and monitoring of such effects over the course of the program.

2) Programs That Focus on Surveillance are Counterproductive

Based on available evidence, programs that focus on surveillance methods (monitoring and control) in education, healthcare, or via the use of hotlines generate more negative/iatrogenic effects than benefits (Bowie & Revell, 2018; Joyce, 2018; Kyriacou et al., 2017; Lakhani, 2012; Younis & Jadhav, 2019). Similar to targeted primary prevention programs, surveilled participants declared negative outcomes such as fear of being spied upon, self-censorship, and stigmatization of Muslim communities. Furthermore, these programs create climates of distrust and suspicion by encouraging practices that infringe on freedom of thought and expression. Indeed, the programs were seen as actively worsening the university experiences of UK Muslim students, with staff hesitating to put them into action.

3) Programs Based on Community Policing Face Implementation Challenges and Have not Been Properly Assessed for Effectiveness

Studies assessing the outcomes of police-community partnerships have produced mixed findings, likely due to problems with research design, methods, and measures (Castillo, 2015; McDonald & Mir, 2011; Sheikh et al., 2012). Most evaluation studies have only collected participant satisfaction rates and the subjective perceptions of police officers, stakeholders, and community partners. As expected, these programs tended to be more positively perceived by police officers and stakeholders, who reported feelings of empowerment, acknowledgment, and mutual trust. These findings provided little insight into a program's real capacity to prevent violent radicalization, particularly considering that these views were in stark contrast with those of targeted community members, who declared trust issues with the police and feelings of discrimination.

These programs were also hampered by several implementation challenges. For example, most of these programs targeted Muslim populations, which increases the general suspicion regarding these communities and may increase stereotypes and stigmatization. Furthermore, such programs were viewed as a form of ethnic or religious profiling by members of minority communities, especially because of previous tense relations with security agencies. This finding is of particular importance given the legacy of post-9/11 security measures, the

trust gap among racialized communities and law enforcement, and the pre-existing negative perceptions that some newcomer communities may have of the police.

Thus, at present, there is insufficient evidence to determine the efficacy of community policing programs for the prevention of violent radicalization, mainly due to the lack of proper evaluative studies and inconclusive or biased outcome measures (e.g., program designer satisfaction).

4) Primary and Secondary Prevention Programs Seem to be Effective in Improving Potential Protective Factors Against Violent Radicalization

Evaluation studies report that primary and secondary prevention programs are effective in improving personal, interpersonal, or psychosocial characteristics that have been reported as potential protective factors against violent radicalization. Positive effects were documented in general prevention programs (Madriaza et al., 2018; Manby, 2009a–c, 2010a; Williams et al., 2016) as well as those focusing on Islamist radicalization (Boyd-MacMillan, 2016; Feddes et al., 2015; Hirschfield et al., 2012; Johns et al., 2014; Liht & Savage, 2013; Manby, 2010b; Mercy Corps, 2015, 2016; SAFIRE, 2013; Savage et al., 2014; Swedberg & Reisman, 2013). These programs enabled civic engagement, employability, openness towards others, integrative complexity, teamworking skills, self-control, conflict management/communication skills, knowledge of violent radicalization dynamics, empathy, self-esteem, sense of identity, critical thinking, and religious knowledge.

However, improvement in general protective factors cannot be assumed to be effective in reducing the risk of violence or involvement on a violent radical trajectory. For example, although some programs were successful in improving employability and civic engagement, such improvements did not correlate with a decrease in support towards extremist groups or the use of violence for political motives (Mercy Corps, 2015; Swedberg & Reisman, 2013). Similarly, two evaluation studies reporting improvements on sense of identity, openness towards others, empathy, self-esteem, and conflict resolution skills found no accompanying decrease in violent radical attitudes (Madriaza et al., 2018; SAFIRE, 2013).

These findings emphasize the need to distinguish between a program's impact on intermediate outcomes (e.g., self-esteem, psychological distress) and its impact on final outcomes (e.g., an individual's risk of acting out). Several studies that reported improvements on intermediate outcomes did not measure final outcomes. Thus, even though such programs may achieve the objectives they set out for themselves, it remains unknown if they were truly successful in reducing the risk of extremist violence. Caution is therefore warranted when interpreting studies that report highly positive results without assessing final outcomes or potential iatrogenic effects. Such studies will paint a better picture of the program they assess not because it is actually better but because of confirmation biases not present in more methodologically robust evaluations. For example, Mercy Corps (2015) employed a very robust methodological design, assessed negative and final outcomes, and found nuanced results indicating that employability programs improve employability but do not lower radical attitudes. Such a finding does not mean that INVEST is less effective than programs for which "better" results have been found. Thus, readers should be aware that the overall outcome of the program—as we report it—is not a true measure of effectiveness but rather a conflation of methodological rigor, author/sample biases, and, of course, effectiveness. Furthermore, research in this field has not yet definitively identified all the protective and risk factors that increase the risk of extremist violence, although meta-analyses are starting to come out (e.g., Wolfowicz et al., 2019). As such, a number of early prevention efforts may have been based on untested assumptions.

However, it is important to highlight that some programs were successful in improving both intermediate and final outcomes. BMBB (Liht & Savage, 2013), Diamond (Feddes et al., 2015), specific programs under Prevent (Hirschfield et al., 2012), and, to some extent, SYLI (Mercy Corps, 2015) all lead to improvements on protective factors while lowering violent radical attitudes, susceptibility to recruitment, or risk of acting out in a politically violent way. In addition, these studies tended to be among those using the best methodological designs. The findings are encouraging and broadly support the use of programs that aim to improve resilience to violent extremism by targeting intermediate outcomes such as protective and risk factors (Harris-Hogan, 2020). From a public health perspective, the use of such programs is in line with the World Health Organization (2008) recommendations for violence prevention, which emphasize the importance of broadly targeting the social determinants of violence. At the macrosocial level, this approach may reduce risk and improve resilience for a large number of individuals potentially at risk of violent radicalization, depending on changes in life circumstances. Improved general protective factors provide long-term benefits against social polarization and delinquency, which themselves constitute potential risk factors for the rise of violent radicalization at the societal level.

5) Our Systematic Review Found Scarce but Encouraging Evidence on Counternarrative Campaigns

The current systematic review found only three eligible counternarrative program evaluations (Aldrich, 2014; Helmus & Klein, 2019; Speckhard et al., 2018). These studies reported mostly positive results: Aldrich (2014) found that individuals exposed to radio programs focused on peace and tolerance were more likely to engage civically; Helmus and Klein (2019) found that the Redirect Method made users looking for extremist content on Google click on counternarrative ad videos at a rate that was similar to what regular Google ads achieve; and Speckhard et al. (2018) found that a video countering ISIS propaganda on Facebook achieved its intended outcome for most viewers, that is, to evoke disdain for ISIS, to gather solidarity for the fight of Iraqi people against ISIS, and to increase knowledge about PVE. However, none of these studies measured the impact of exposure to counternarrative campaigns on violent radical attitudes and behaviors, thereby curtailing the positive conclusions reached by authors.

The limited number of counternarrative studies found in this systematic review is likely the result of our search strategy not being tailored to identify counternarrative campaigns. Readers particularly interested in such campaigns may like to consult a recently published systematic review exclusively on this topic by Carthy et al. (2020).

6) There is Nearly no Evidence on the Outcomes of Prevention Programs for Right-Wing, Left-Wing, and Single-Issue Violent Radicalization

Of the 33 studies reviewed, none evaluated prevention programs targeting left-wing or single-issue violent radicalization, and only one targeted the far right. Twenty-four studies analyzed programs targeting violent Islamist radicalization, while nine targeted violent radicalization in general. Notably, the number of terrorist incidents in the United States motivated by far-right ideology more than quadrupled between 2016 and 2017 (Jones, 2018). During the same period, far-right attacks increased by 43% in Europe (Jones, 2018). Despite this rise, nearly no empirical evaluations exist of primary and secondary prevention programs targeting far-right radicalization. This lack of evidence suggests that either some prevalent types of radicalization do not receive appropriate consideration by researchers, funders, and program developers or that evaluations that have been conducted were not made available to the public.

7) There is not Enough Evidence Regarding Monetary Aspects and Implementation Successes of Prevention Programming

Multiple implementation challenges were highlighted by evaluation studies, especially those focusing on the Prevent program (Bowie & Revell, 2018; Hirschfield et al., 2012; HM Government, 2011a–d; Joyce, 2018; Sheikh et al., 2012). Such studies mentioned poor management and coordination by decision-makers, lack of appropriate training for staff members, unrealistic timetables, trouble connecting with potential partners because of Prevent's reputation, poor use and lack of funding, and guidelines not adapted to context. Consequently, in some cases, staff were hesitant to put Prevent into action. Implementation challenges of other programs were also reported. BOUNCEUp, a train-the-trainers program, found that even though participants appreciated the program, less than 20% went on to publicize and implement BOUNCE into their milieus (Christiaens et al., 2018). Finally, Madriaza et al. (2018) mentioned that the data collection of the first Vivre-Ensemble cohort was tarnished because lack of disclosure from the staff concerning the program's objectives made participants reluctant to disclose undesirable information.

In sum, apart from Prevent, data is currently scarce concerning the implementation challenges of PVE programs. This obfuscates the avenues by which such programs may be improved in the future. Studies rarely mention facilitators, implementation successes, budget management issues, or the sustainability and transference of practices after project completion. Furthermore, none of the reviewed studies mentioned the costs of program or evaluation research, making it difficult to improve resource allocations in relation to expected outcomes. These are key concerns in terms of funding, dissemination, and replication. For example, a successful but resource-intensive prevention program may not necessarily be applicable in a low-resource setting.

However, we are aware that the lack of information on implementation may be due to restrictive publication criteria, notably article length, which precludes the use of multiple pages to discuss these issues. Grey literature, namely organization reports, may be more useful than official literature in this regard.

Limitations of Studies

Considering the preceding discussion, we agree with our colleagues (Christmann, 2012; Feddes & Gallucci, 2015; Lum et al., 2006) that reliable empirical data on prevention programs for violent radicalization is currently limited. In 2015, Feddes and Gallucci conducted a systematic review of the methods used in evaluation studies of prevention or deradicalization programs. They noted that only 12% of the 135 samples reported in these studies[5] were based on primary data. Our systematic review reaches similar conclusions, highlighting the lack of sound empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of primary and secondary PVE programs. Importantly, the Quality of Study Assessment tool's goal was not to criticize correlational designs or studies without control groups but rather to ensure that basic methodological details were provided (objectives, sample size, statistical analyses, limitations, etc.). Despite this leniency, 41% (k = 23/56) of the reviewed studies did not achieve a score of more than 3 on the 10-point scale—a worryingly low figure considering its design. This suggests that many programs have been advertised as effective without having been properly evaluated (or without publishing a formal report of the evaluation for us to trust its results sufficiently).

5 Extracted from 55 studies (some studies had more than one sample).

The reviewed quantitative studies generally suffered from weak experimental designs (e.g., no pre-/post-measures, no control variables, no control group, no random allocation), small or biased samples, and heterogeneity of definitions, measures, and outcomes. Qualitative studies often failed to mention how they analyzed their data, only covering data collection and reporting quotations in results sections to support their narrative. Most studies relied on attitudinal surveys containing embedded notions of risk and protective factors that may not be supported by the literature. These limitations may be due to the novelty of these programs, which left little time for meaningful and thorough evaluations. As a result, however, integration of evidence is quite challenging, especially since several manuscripts had multiple sections missing (e.g., sample characteristics, aims of the study, methods). That said, not all studies produced questionable empirical evidence. Boyd-MacMillan (2016), Feddes et al. (2015), Liht and Savage (2013), Madriaza et al. (2018), Manby (2009c), and Savage et al. (2014) used pre-/post-measures. Feddes et al. (2015) and SAFIRE (2013) used longitudinal designs. Aldrich (2014), Mercy Corps (2015, 2016), Swedberg and Reisman (2013), and Williams et al. (2016) used a control group. Encouragingly, most of these studies found positive outcomes on measures beyond user satisfaction.

Methodological problems aside, conflicts of interest also permeated evaluation studies of primary and secondary prevention programs—especially those employing qualitative designs. In seven of the 33 reviewed studies, data relied mostly on the views of program providers, deciders, stakeholders, community partners, or police/correctional staff, who were solicited to assess the effectiveness of programs in which they were involved (Bala, 2017; Bowie & Revell, 2018; Hirschfield et al., 2012; HM Government, 2011a–d; Joyce, 2018; Kundnani, 2009; Younis & Jadhav, 2019). In six studies, the perceptions of community members towards a program were used as primary data rather than asking those who went through the program itself (Campbell III, 2011; Castillo, 2015; HM Government, 2011a–d; Kundnani, 2009; Lakhani, 2012; McDonald & Mir, 2011). Consequently, evaluations are potentially biased, overly positive (or negative in the case of Prevent), and, more importantly, inattentive to the real impacts these programs have on the targeted population. Finally, in six studies, authors were also program implementers (Liht & Savage, 2013; Madriaza et al., 2018; Mercy Corps, 2015, 2016; Savage et al., 2014; Speckhard et al., 2018). Even though program implementers would be anticipated to publish positively skewed assessments of their own programs, most of the studies mentioned above were nuanced and methodologically robust, evaluating intermediate, negative, and final outcomes with appropriate data collection and analysis procedures. Thus, while caution would be warranted in reading the results of evaluations made by program implementers, the conflation of assessor and implementer does seem to have potentially positive effects, namely in terms of mobilizing staff, making sure they understand the complexity of the process, and sustaining their motivation throughout the evaluation. That being said, it may be worthwhile to design mixed evaluation teams with both internal and independent external evaluators in order to counterbalance potential conflicts of interest.

One of the main challenges facing evaluation studies for prevention programs is defining what success looks like and how such success links theoretically and empirically to violent radicalization. Instead of operationalizing success as, for example, the reduction of empirically documented risk factors to violent radicalization, some studies have used outcome measures of user satisfaction or program-provider satisfaction. Such operationalizations limit the conclusions that can be drawn concerning the real effectiveness of these programs in preventing and countering violent extremism. Some authors argue that improvement in protective

factors and reduction in risk factors towards violent radicalization do not constitute true measures of success because these outcomes are at most proxy measures of "true" violent radicalization. However, readers must keep in mind that it is not possible to measure the impact of programs on a non-event. In other words, it cannot be inferred that an attack did not take place due to a prevention program. Similarly, it cannot be inferred that an attack took place because a program was not put in place or did not yield positive results. By redefining PVE programs from a public health perspective, it becomes clear that they are not designed to stop violent radicalization or an attack from happening; they are designed to reduce the risk, in the mid- to long-run, that a vulnerable individual will engage on a path towards violent radicalization. Therefore, future studies that use improvement in protective factors or reduction in risk factors as proxy measures of success would better align with existing practice in the field of general violence prevention (World Health Organization, 2008). However, additional research on intermediate outcomes is needed to inform how these proxy measures relate to actual incidents.

"In conclusion, due to the lack of theoretically and methodologically robust empirical evaluations, our ability to identify best PVE practices based on empirical evidence is limited."

Another important limitation is that several studies did not assess for negative or iatrogenic outcomes, potentially introducing both a bias in the interpretation of their effectiveness and obstacles to their comparability with programs that looked for negative outcomes. This may have resulted in a disservice to programs that have been more frequently evaluated and that assessed negative/iatrogenic outcomes, such as programs under the UK's Prevent strategy or Mercy Corps' INVEST initiatives. Even though evaluating negative/iatrogenic outcomes may put programs and their stakeholders and clinical staff under the spotlight of criticism, it is a courageous endeavor that must ultimately be encouraged as it speaks to methodological and scientific rigor.

It also means that policymakers, stakeholders, and funders must be supported in adequately understanding the results of program evaluations before making a value judgment as to their effectiveness.

Finally, very few studies described or formulated a theory of change and logic model to understand the processes of change underlying a program's positive and negative outcomes. Therefore, it remains impossible to explain how some prevention activities were able to achieve the positive outcomes reported and to determine if these positive outcomes increased resilience towards radicalization to violence.

In conclusion, due to the lack of theoretically and methodologically robust empirical evaluations, our ability to identify best PVE practices based on empirical evidence is limited. Furthermore, although processes to violent radicalization may have some commonalities across types of extremist groups or individuals, generalizing findings across contexts is generally impossible given the limited state of evidence in the field, the diversity of populations and drivers of violent extremism in different states/societies, and the heterogeneity in programming approaches (Bjørgo, 2015; Kruglanski et al., 2014). Given the lack of evaluative studies on far-right, far-left, or single-issue prevention programs, this report's conclusions can only be applied to general programs or those targeting violent Islamist radicalization. Finally, because of the lack of clarity on sample characteristics and level of risk, it remains unknown which primary- or secondary-level prevention programs have been effective and for which populations.

Limitations of the Current Study

When interpreting the findings of this systematic review, the following four possible limitations must be considered. Firstly, some potentially relevant studies may not have been included as they were produced in languages not known by the systematic review team. To address this limitation, identified studies that appeared to meet our inclusion criteria (often based on abstract reviews) were dispatched to CPN-PREV colleagues fluent in these languages. Ultimately, these identified were all found to contain unreliable evidence. Having already encountered numerous other problematic publications, this batch of studies was not included.

Second, many government-led programs may have been internally evaluated in reports not accessible to researchers. As such, we may only have a truncated picture of the outcomes of government-led primary and secondary PVE programs. By not making the methods and results of these studies public, governments may run the risk of putting too much confidence in potentially questionable results and thereby contribute to public distrust and suspicion of a government's programs, remit, and ethical standards. These negative consequences could, however, have been avoided by opening government reports for peer review. Moving forward, gaining access to government data or reports could confirm, contradict, or at least further shed some light on the results found in this systematic review.

Another limitation may result from the variability introduced by each rater. We attempted to address this by measuring and monitoring inter-rater agreement rates, as well as by reaching consensus when raters had divergent selections or ratings. However, inter-rater reliability remained relatively low, suggesting that research assistants' future training on inclusion and exclusion criteria should be improved.

Finally, because our search strategy was designed to be broad in order to include a wide range of PVE programs, it may not have been tailored to some specific types of programs, such as counternarrative campaigns. Readers wishing to get a clearer picture of such programs' outcomes should consult available systematic reviews or wait for them to be published by other research consortia. Naturally, these constitute avenues for future research.

Recommendations

Best intervention practices are derived from techniques that have proven effectiveness and can be implemented or generalized to other contexts (White & McEvoy, 2012). Due to the lack of strong evidence regarding primary and secondary PVE programs, the conditions required for evidence-based best practice guidelines to emerge are currently absent. Thus, the existence of numerous documents, toolkits, and guides presenting "best practices" is surprising, and the validity of their recommendations is questionable. To optimize the process of identifying evidence-based best practices for PVE, CPN-PREV has constituted a Canadian and an international consensus committee that will develop empirically validated guidelines for practitioners, researchers, and policymakers. These guidelines will be the result of a Delphi process that brings together practitioners and researchers from multiple sectors and countries, yielding a plurality of perspectives through consensus building. This systematic review is the first step of this Delphi process.

Recommendations for Future Program Design, Implementation, and Delivery

Based on the evidence gathered in this review, the following preliminary recommendations are provided for professionals working in the field of PVE:

1. Prevention programs should not target any specific cultural, religious, or ethnic group in the absence of other risk factors (i.e., targeted primary prevention) as this can result in the stigmatization of the targeted communities. This does not mean that programs should not be tailored to their audiences. When based on specific evidence and with buy-in from the involved communities, tailoring is, in fact, recommended;

2. Trust relationships with individuals and collaborations with communities are likely to be harmed if programs designed for primary or secondary prevention conflate surveillance/information gathering with psychosocial/mental health support. If your program contains components that may be used for surveillance/information gathering, be transparent with individuals and clearly explain the limits of your confidentiality commitments, as dictated by your professional code of conduct;

3. Primary and secondary prevention programs should not be expected to prevent an attack from occurring but rather to reduce the risk—in the mid- to long-run—that an individual may engage in violent radicalization. Well-designed primary and secondary PVE programs that target relevant risk and protective factors have generally been found to be effective and should be encouraged;

4. There is a need for primary and secondary prevention programs that address, among other things, extreme-left, extreme-right, and single-issue (e.g., misogyny) violent radicalization. Practitioners, researchers, and policymakers should encourage the implementation and evaluation of programs encompassing these types of extremism, especially in regions where they are prevalent;

5. The generalizability of PVE programs appears to be limited. Therefore, practitioners should refrain from transplanting a program "as is" from one context to another. Practitioners must adapt and tailor programs to local contexts; and

6. If funding enables it, methodologically robust evaluation models should be designed at the onset of programs. Stronger data concerning primary and secondary PVE programs are urgently needed.

Recommendations for Future Program Evaluation

The results of this systematic review have highlighted the urgent need for more and better-designed studies that evaluate the effectiveness of primary and secondary PVE programs. Considering the observations made in the Key Findings and Limitations of Studies sections, we provide the following recommendations for future research:

1. When evaluating prevention programs, conflicts of interest and potential biases should be kept to a minimum or explicitly disclosed, if unavoidable. Evaluators should be authorized to publish and disseminate their findings independently;

2. Evaluators should aim for representative samples and prioritize data coming from program participants rather than staff, stakeholders, or community members not directly involved in the program. However, combining program beneficiaries with other types of participants (e.g., staff) can be a comprehensive way to conduct assessment;

3. Program designers and evaluators are encouraged to consider both intermediate (e.g., improved perspective taking) and final outcomes (e.g., reduction in violent radical attitudes or behaviors) that go beyond user satisfaction in their assessment of programs. Collecting data on final outcomes ensures that a program is truly effective and provides data on the link between risk and protective factors and violent radicalization;

4. Program designers and evaluators are encouraged to assess the negative/iatrogenic effects of their program. Results compiled in this systematic review suggest that rigorous program evaluations often report more negative outcomes than evaluations where these effects were not assessed. This does not mean these programs are any less effective. Therefore, policymakers, stakeholders, and funders must be supported in adequately understanding the results of program evaluations before making a value judgment as to their effectiveness;

5. In addition to the commonly reported positive/negative outcomes and implementation challenges, program designers and evaluators are encouraged to collect data about the monetary aspects, implementation facilitators, and sustainability of projects;

6. Quantitative research on primary and secondary PVE programs would benefit from using more robust experimental designs, namely by collecting data on control variables and using pre-/post-measurements, control groups, and/or randomly assigning participants to groups if the procedure abides by ethical standards (if not, quasi-experimental designs should be considered);

7. For qualitative research, ensure rigor in the analyses to minimize potential confirmation biases by researchers. Rather than simply reporting quotes that confirm the main narrative of the research, clearly disclose the discourse analysis procedure; and

8. Whether doing qualitative or quantitative research, try to formulate an initial theory of change that can explain your program's expected effects and then build and disclose a logic model accordingly. If possible, as mentioned earlier, integrate intermediate and final outcomes in the model. With time, revise and complexify your model as needed.

Conclusion

This systematic review aimed to critically synthesize the outcomes of primary and secondary prevention programs in the field of violent radicalization. Conducting this systematic review has highlighted significant overarching caveats in the field that have posed challenges to integrating the evidence. As of now, evidence on the outcomes of primary and secondary PVE programs is characterized by divergences and contradictions in the following, to name a few:

1. understanding of radicalization and its risk and protective factors;
2. program types, characteristics, and design;
3. training and experience of practitioners;
4. political considerations; and
5. diversity of local environments in which programs are deployed (e.g., cultural considerations, nature of the problem locally, available capacity/resources on the ground).

This heterogeneity may, unfortunately, contribute to suspicion and legitimacy issues regarding programs and their funding, and it may obfuscate lessons learned.

Nevertheless, on a more positive note, the current state of the evidence on PVE programing shows that primary and secondary prevention programs are effective in improving personal, interpersonal, or psychosocial characteristics that have been reported as potential protective factors against violent radicalization.

Due to the lack of strong evidence, however, the conditions required for evidence-based best practice guidelines to emerge are currently absent. One way to address this limitation is to develop guidelines that stem from expert evaluations of evidence generated in systematic reviews or meta-analyses. CPN-PREV aims to achieve precisely such guidelines in the next years with its Delphi process that puts together experts from multiple countries and sectors. The CPN-PREV Delphi committee is currently assessing guidelines from the systematic reviews on online radicalization and primary/secondary PVE programs. It will eventually evaluate guidelines on tertiary prevention programs when the systematic review is made available.

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Appendices

1) Quality of Study Assessment Tool

Quality of Study Assessment Tool

Prevention systematic review — **Rating (0 = no, 1 = yes)**

1) ARE THE KEY CONCEPTS AND VARIABLES CLEARLY DEFINED? ☐

Examples of key concepts/variables : violent radicalization, self-esteem, program completion, etc.

2) ARE THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS/HYPOTHESES CLEARLY STATED? ☐

Example : Did completion of program X reduce radicalized behaviors and/or attitudes among sample Y?

3) IS THE CHOICE OF METHODS IN LINE WITH OBJECTIVES? ☐

Example : If the program provider wants to assess if program X had an effect on attitudes, are there pre/post measures, or at least a control group?

4) IS THE SAMPLE ADEQUATELY DESCRIBED? ☐

Examples : *N* , ethnicity, gender, age, civil status, employment, …

5) ARE THERE ENOUGH METHODOLOGICAL DETAILS? ☐

Examples : quantitative/qualitative design, allocation to groups, description of variables/scales, statistical analyses, interview procedures, content/discourse analyses, …

6) ARE THE DATA ANALYSIS METHODS APPROPRIATE? ☐

Example : If variables are dichotomous, were statistical analyses adapted to such variables (e.g., using tetrachoric correlations, logistic rather than regular regression, etc.)?

7) IS THE EVIDENCE ROBUST? ☐

Examples : Is it minimally representative? What is the strength of the research design? Were control variables/ alternative explanations considered?

8) WERE MAJOR LIMITATIONS INCLUDED IN THE PAPER? ☐

Examples : biases in the chosen sample, suboptimal research design, weak quantitative/qualitative analyses, …

9) WERE MAJOR CONFLICTS OF INTEREST DECLARED IN THE PAPER? ☐

Examples : interviews conducted by program staff, financial ties, authors of the paper not mentioning that they are also authors of the tool they assessed, …

10) ARE FUTURE RECOMMENDATIONS OR IMPLICATIONS MENTIONED? ☐

Examples : how to improve the program, how to better reach the targeted populations, how to improve policies, etc.

TOTAL (/10) ☐

2) Database Search

A broad array of databases was checked for relevant material across disciplines (Political Science, Sociology, Religion, Education, etc.), as well as multidisciplinary databases (Academic Search Complete, Web of Knowledge). Searches were originally conducted in the summer of 2016, and updates were performed at the end of 2017 and in June 2019. Databases searched were as follows: ABI/Inform Global (ProQuest), Academic Search Complete (EBSCO), ATLA Religion Database (EBSCO), CBCA Complete (ProQuest), Communication Abstracts (ProQuest), Canadian Public Policy Collection, Canadian Research Index (ProQuest), Education Source (EBSCO), ERIC (EBSCO), Érudit/Persée, Francis (EBSCO), International Political Science Abstracts (ProQuest), Medline, PAIS International (ProQuest), Political Science Complete (EBSCO), Dissertations & Theses Global (ProQuest), PsycINFO (EBSCO), Repère, Sociological Abstracts (ProQuest), SocINDEX (EBSCO), and Web of Knowledge.

Database Search Example

The following example is the search run in the PsycINFO (EBSCO) database:

("Radical Islam*" OR "Islamic Extrem*" OR Radicali* OR "Homegrown Terror*" OR "Homegrown Threat*" OR "Violent Extrem*" OR Jihad* OR Indoctrinat* OR Terrori* OR "White Supremacis*" OR "Neo-Nazi" OR "Right-wing Extrem*" OR "Left-wing Extrem*" OR "Religious Extrem*" OR Fundamentalis* OR Anti-Semitis* OR Nativis* OR Islamophob* OR "Eco-terror*" OR "Al Qaida-inspired" OR "ISIS-inspired" OR "Anti-Capitalis*")

AND

(Prevent* OR interven* OR respon* OR screen* OR assess* OR procedur* OR instrument* OR program* OR reduc* OR treatment* OR counterterror* OR "counter-terror*" OR "de-radicali*" OR detect* OR "countering violent extrem*" OR CVE)

AND

(AB youth OR adult* OR adolescen* OR student* OR teenag* OR "young people" OR colleg* OR universit*)

All searches were conducted by a library science expert and made use of database-specific features and controlled vocabulary where appropriate. Several French-language databases were also checked after the search terms were translated into French by a translation expert. Search results were exported to an Endnote database for management and abstracts then screened for relevance.

Additional searches were run using the Google search engine in order to seek out grey literature; because the goal was to locate non-traditional publication types, the full Google search engine was used and not Google Scholar, which would have returned mainly standard journal articles. An exhaustive single search statement is not possible using Google, so a series of searches were run, varying the keywords employed. The first five pages of results were reviewed, and relevant materials manually entered into the project's Endnote database. The OpenGrey.eu database was also checked for potentially relevant material.

3) List of Eligible Primary and Secondary Prevention Studies Excluded Because of Insufficient Methodological Quality

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Summary of Evidence

Africa—Positive Outcomes

Table 2.1
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Savage et al. (2014) | Secondary prevention | Violent Islamist radicalization**
Program and Country	Being Kenyan Being Muslim (BKBM), Kenya.
Objectives of the Program	*Main objective:* Counter violent extremism and other forms of intergroup conflict through the promotion of value and integrative complexity. *Specific objectives:* 1) Increase participants' integrative complexity and expose them to the multiplicity of values that influential Muslims embody; 2) Structure group activities that allow participants to explore values on issues central to extremist discourse and relevant to events in Kenya, free from criticism or social pressure; 3) Protect from the black-and-white discourse used by radical groups; 4) Train professionals who work in the PVE field. *Intervention:* Participants took part in a 16-hour course consisting of films and group activities that enabled them to solve problems on topics related to violent extremism, according to their personal values and priorities. The program was adapted to include relevant aspects of Kenyan culture and terrorist events. During the intervention, films representing an array of Muslim viewpoints from the extreme right to the extreme left were presented to the participants.
Sample Characteristics	*24 participants of Kenyan and Somali ethnicities who met either of the following criteria:* 1) have previously been exposed to extremist discourse or 2) were PVE professionals. 22 completed all the pre- and post-test assessments, eight were identified as vulnerable to extremism, and six were former Al-Shabaab members. Mean age = 29.6; 52% men and 48% women; 96% born in Kenya, 4% born in Somalia; 92% had secondary education, 50% had technical college education, 37% had university education, and 50% had Islamic religious education; 75% had work, 29% were unemployed or looking for work; and 61% reported being Muslim, but the sample included a few Christians and individuals identifying to other groups. Participants were invited by the Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) to BKBM and were selected because of recent activity or alignment with extremist groups or ideology.

	Four subgroups of participants went through BKBM: Subgroups 1 and 4 comprised individuals who were considered to be vulnerable to extremism. Subgroup 2 included KTI staff, and subgroup 3 included co-workers, organizations, and individuals who worked in the field and were contracted by KTI.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	*Measures:* 1) Paragraph completion tests were coded for integrative complexity using a standardized protocol and an intercoder reliability criteria (kappa = 0.89); *2)* During the last session, participants gave a presentation about what they learned and how they would apply integrative complexity to future situations in their lives. Presentations were qualitatively analyzed for the presence/use of differentiation (ability to perceive the validity of two or more viewpoints) and integration (ability to perceive underlying common values). Then, a score of 1 was given for every piece of information that reflected differentiation or integration, and a cumulative total score was calculated. This score was correlated with participants' post-test scores. Presentations were also coded for social intelligence and the confidence to address extremist issues with integrative complexity; *3)* Conflict-style questionnaire consisting of two scenarios each for the pre- and post-tests. The questions were followed by five response options capturing Kraybill's five conflict-style constructs; *4)* Demographics, social identity, and power measures: five-item demographics questionnaire given at the end of the course in addition to the Social Identity & Power scale.
Positive Outcomes	1) The intervention had a significant effect on increasing the complexity with which participants think about social issues and social groups relevant to extremism, as indicated by levels of integrative complexity; 2) 100% of the presentations reflected understanding and applied differentiation, and 50% reflected integration; 3) 77% of the participants experienced an increase in social intelligence; 4) 100% experienced an increase in confidence; 5) Conflict style shifted to direct, which is in line with the confidence and empowerment expressed by participants; 6) The program seemed effective even for former Al-Shabaab members; 7) Integrative complexity seems to highly increase traditional Islamic teachings regarding mercy and benevolence to others.
Negative Outcomes	None reported.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.

Limitations (Authors)	1) The intervention should last longer (weeks instead of days) in order to let participants process the material and integrate new ways of thinking; 2) Floor effects exist in measuring integrative complexity, as it is difficult to capture enough argumentation or evaluation in verbal data for integrative complexity to be scorable (especially difficult in the context of written test conditions); 3) Group sizes should be smaller.
Limitations (Team)	1) The researchers assessed a program they were involved in, introducing potential conflicts of interest; 2) The protocol of the intervention should be presented more clearly, as many variables were measured. It is sometimes difficult to understand what was done during the pre- and post-tests.
Quality of Study (/ 10)	9

This paper empirically assessed the Being Kenyan, Being Muslim (BKBM) program, which took place in Nairobi, Kenya. The main objective of the program was to counter violent extremism and other forms of intergroup conflict by promoting value complexity and integrative complexity. More specifically, the BKBM program aims to increase integrative complexity and expose participants to the multiplicity of values that influential Muslims embody. The program was offered to participants who had previously been exposed to extremist discourse, as well as professionals working in the PVE field. During the program, 24 participants of Kenyan and Somali ethnicities who have previously been exposed to extremist discourse, as well as PVE professionals (mean age = 29.6), followed a 16-hour course consisting of films and group activities that enabled them to solve problems on topics related to violent extremism according to their personal values and priorities. The program was adapted to include relevant aspects of Kenyan culture and terrorist events experienced in Kenya. During the intervention, films representing various Muslim viewpoints ranging from the extreme right to the extreme left were presented to participants. The intervention was given over the course of four days and eight sessions. To assess the program, researchers asked the participants to complete two open-ended paragraphs as a pre-test (first session) and another two as a post-test (last session). The completed paragraphs were coded for integrative complexity using a standardized protocol, and intercoder reliability was assessed (kappa = 0.89). Coders were blind to pre- and post-conditions. In the last session, participants gave a presentation during which they shared what they had learned in the course. They were also asked to say how they are applying or wish to apply integrative complexity to specific situations in their lives. The presentations were recorded, and the transcripts were qualitatively analyzed in order to see if the participants had been learning about and applying differentiation (the ability to perceive the validity of two or more viewpoints) and integration (the ability to perceive underlying common values). The presentations were also coded to determine the participants' social intelligence, as well as their confidence in addressing extremist issues with integrative complexity.

Finally, participants filled a conflict style questionnaire, a demographics questionnaire, and a social identity and power scale. The authors reported that the intervention had a significant effect on increasing integrative complexity. Results also showed evidence of understanding and applying differentiation in 100% of the presentations and integration in 50% of the presentations. Moreover, 77% of the participants experienced an increase in social intelligence, and 100% experienced an increase in confidence. The intervention seemed to be effective as a prevention program among both a non-radicalized sample and former Al-Shabaab group members. However, researchers reported a few limitations. According to the authors, future interventions should be deployed over longer periods in order to allow participants to process the material and integrate new ways of thinking more fully. Participants should also be split into smaller groups. There also seem to be floor effects in measuring integrative complexity, as it is difficult to capture enough argumentation or evaluation in verbal data for integrative complexity to be scorable (particularly difficult in the context of written test conditions). The authors did not mention potential conflicts of interest due to evaluating their own program. Neither did they provide details concerning the intervention protocol.

Table 2.2
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Aldrich (2014) | Primary prevention | Violent Islamist radicalization**
Program and Country	Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP)-based programs, Mali.
Objectives of the Program	Counter violent extremism using "soft security" and development programs comprising educational training for groups vulnerable to terrorist recruitment, norm messaging through local radio programming, and job creation in rural communities.
Sample Characteristics	*200 participants split into two groups:* 1) Residents of Timbuktu who were exposed to the TSCTP programs and 2) Residents of Diré who mostly did not benefit from the programs (control). Participants were selected randomly from the broader population by knocking on people's doors and administering the survey to those who agreed to participate. The sample included men and women from early to late adulthood of diverse socioeconomic, political, and cultural backgrounds.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	*Quasi-experimental design aiming to understand if several years of U.S. government-funded PVE programs have achieved the following:* 1) increased the access to peace and tolerance programs on local radio channels; 2) increased civic participation; 3) led more residents to be critical of Al Qaeda's use of violence in the name of Islam; and 4) motivated people to see the United States as combatting terrorism, not Islam. This was done through a 14-question survey with Likert scales. The study controlled for sex, age group, and ethnicity. *Data analysis:* After ensuring that the Timbuktu and Diré samples were comparable, the authors used bivariate analyses to see if there were any noticeable connections between exposure to the programs and outcomes of interest. Cross-tabulations with chi-squared distributions were performed, as well as regression analyses (ordered probit) to control for factors such as age, sex, demographic, socioeconomic, and cultural characteristics. The authors also reordered the data through propensity-matching techniques to better resemble a twins-study structure and to ensure that the control and treatment groups were comparable.

Positive Outcomes	1) Bivariate analyses indicated a strong positive connection between exposure to the programs and listening to radio broadcasts about peace and tolerance; 2) Regressions showed that Timbuktu residents exposed to the sponsored radio programs were 40% more likely than those of Diré to listen to radio broadcasts focused on peace and tolerance, as well as to civically engage.
Negative Outcomes	1) No difference in attitudes towards Al Qaeda or the United States between the two samples; 2) The study was unable to prove a causal relationship between programming and behavioral outcomes.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Bivariate analyses cannot control for confounding factors; 2) The results were potentially affected by other unmeasured factors, such as historical legacy, self-perception, local leadership, the media, and participants' perceptions of US foreign policies; 3) The sample size is limited and did not intend to be representative of the entire nation; 4) Some participants might have felt uncomfortable discussing their religious views and support for the Sharia law with the interviewers as it is a sensitive subject; 5) No baseline measurements were taken in the control and treatment groups.
Limitations (Team)	1) The authors did not sufficiently describe their sample; 2) Insufficient information regarding the questionnaire; 3) The selection of the participants by knocking on doors could be biased and not representative of the city as some neighborhoods could be over-represented.
Quality of Study	8

Aldrich (2014) aimed to evaluate if the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) PVE programs contributed to changes in cognitions and behaviors in Malians living in Timbuktu compared to the residents of Diré, a neighboring city that was not exposed to these programs. More specifically, the study examined if the PVE programs have achieved the following: **1)** increased the access to peace and tolerance programs on local radio channels; **2)** increased civic participation; **3)** led more residents to be critical of Al Qaeda's use of violence in the name of Islam; and **4)** motivated people to see the United States as combatting terrorism, not Islam. To do so, 200 randomly selected participants living either in Timbuktu or Diré filled a 14-question survey. Therefore, the study had two groups: residents of the city of Timbuktu who were exposed to the TSCTP programs and residents of the city of Diré who mostly did not benefit from the programs (control group). The data was then analyzed using bivariate and multivariate statistics to see

if there were any connections between exposure to the programs and outcomes of interest. Cross-tabulations with chi-squared distributions between the treatment and control group were performed, as well as regression analyses (ordered probit) to control for factors such as age, sex, demographic, socioeconomic, and cultural characteristics. The researchers also reordered the data through propensity-matching techniques to better resemble a twins-study structure and to ensure that the control and treatment groups were comparable. Results showed that residents from Timbuktu who were exposed to the PVE programs were more likely to listen to radio broadcasts about peace and tolerance than the residents of Diré. They were also more civically engaged than their counterparts. However, even though the broadcasts included components aimed at discouraging violent extremist behaviors, no difference was found between the attitudes of participants from Timbuktu and Dire towards either the US foreign policy or Al Qaeda.

A few limitations were noted by the authors. The sample size was small and, consequently, the results cannot be representative. Some participants were uncomfortable discussing their religious and political views with the interviewers. Also, there was no baseline data to compare any change of behavior over time. Furthermore, the study did not test the empirical link between exposure to radio broadcasts and actual radicalized behaviors. Limitations not mentioned by authors include not adequately describing their sample nor giving enough information regarding their questionnaires. Finally, the selection of the participants by knocking on doors could be biased and not representative of the city, as some neighborhoods could be over-represented.

Table 2.3
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Bala (2017) | Primary prevention | Violent Islamist radicalization**
Program and Country	Search for Common Ground: Bottom-Up Approach to Countering Violent Extremism, Tunisia.
Objectives of the Program	*Main objective:* Increase the ability of vulnerable communities to prevent and counter violent extremism in Tunisia. *Specific objectives:* 1) Increase the engagement of diverse stakeholders (including civil society, youth, women, religious leaders, schools and universities, local governments, and the police and the army) in a community-level dialogue to identify push and pull factors for supporting violent extremism or joining as foreign fighters in Tunisia; 2) Strengthen the capacity of diverse stakeholders to implement initiatives within their communities to counter violent extremism.
Sample Characteristics	10 participants (one or two stakeholder representatives in each of the six localities where the program was implemented).
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	*Interviews and focus groups about the following:* 1) motivation to join the program; 2) effectiveness and relevance of the program; 3) aspects of the program which worked best; 4) prior knowledge of PVE issues; 5) experience with community engagement activities; 6) the most significant change through the program; 7) whether the program improved the understanding of driving forces behind violent extremism; and 8) whether the program improved the relationship between institutions and civil society.
Positive Outcomes	1) The program contributed to raising communities' awareness of what drives someone to violent extremism; 2) It contributed to promoting a culture of dialogue, particularly within schools, as well as with youth and religious leaders; 3) The program also seemed to have succeeded in creating a stimulating environment for debate and helped ease strained relations between citizens and police forces; 4) The dialogue sessions emphasized the importance for youth to be granted access to cultural and educational activities as a deterrent to violent extremism;

	5) Stakeholders declared increased motivation and a stronger involvement in partner NGOs activities; 6) The originality of the program, its positive role in instilling a culture of dialogue, and easing of relationships between stakeholders and NGOs was appreciated; 7) The program contributed to enhance the visibility of partner NGOs within their communities by helping them develop community-led activities and increasing public awareness through workshops, school clubs, mass media, or cultural productions; 8) The program succeeded in showing how school dropouts or other less-suspected factors, such as the absence of alternative narratives, may act as recruitment drivers for violent extremism.
Negative Outcomes	None reported.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.
Limitations (Authors)	None mentioned.
Limitations (Team)	1) Key concepts and variables should have been more clearly operationalized; 2) Lack of information about the sample (age, nationality, religion, etc.); 3) As only stakeholders were questioned, it is impossible to know if the program had any effect on its targeted population.
Quality of Study	5

Bala (2017) proposed an evaluation of the program Search for Common Ground: Bottom-up Approach to Countering Violent Extremism, implemented in six localities in Tunisia (Bizerte, Sidi Hassine, Ben Guardane, Sahline, Kasserine, and Siliana). The objective of the program was to increase the ability of vulnerable communities to prevent and counter violent extremism. More specifically, it aimed to increase the engagement of diverse stakeholders (including civil society, youth, women, religious leaders, schools and universities, local governments, and the police and the army) in a community-level dialogue to identify push and pull factors for Tunisians who support violent extremist or who join as foreign fighters. Another specific objective was to strengthen the capacity of diverse stakeholders to implement initiatives within their communities to counter violent extremism. To evaluate the effectiveness of the program, the author analyzed focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews conducted with one or two of the most involved stakeholder representatives in each of the 6 localities where the program was implemented. The results of this qualitative assessment showed that, according to participants, the program succeeded in raising communities' awareness of what drives someone to violent extremism. It also contributed to promoting a culture of dialogue,

particularly within schools, as well as with youth and religious leaders. The program also seemed to have succeeded in creating a stimulating environment for debate and helped ease strained relations between citizens and police forces. Furthermore, the dialogue sessions emphasized the importance for youth to be granted access to cultural and educational activities as a deterrent to violent extremism. Throughout the interviews and the focus group discussions, participants acknowledged that greater motivation was expressed by stakeholders along with a stronger involvement in partner NGO activities. Participants appreciated the originality of the program, its positive role in instilling a culture of dialogue, and easing of relationships between stakeholders and NGOs. The program also contributed to enhancing the visibility of partner NGOs within their communities by helping them develop community-led activities and increasing public awareness through workshops, school clubs, mass media, or cultural productions. More specifically, the program succeeded in showing how school dropouts or other less-suspected factors such as the absence of alternative narratives may act as recruitment drivers for violent extremism. While it provided promising results, the study suffers from several limitations not identified by the author. Indeed, key concepts and variables should have been more clearly operationalized, and more information about the sample should have been given (age, nationality, religion, etc.). Furthermore, only stakeholders were questioned, making it impossible to know if the program had any effect on its targeted population.

Table 2.4
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Swedberg & Reisman (2013) | Primary prevention | Violent Islamist radicalization**
Program and Country	Somalia Youth Livelihoods Program (SYLP), Somalia; Garissa Youth Program (G-Youth), Kenya; and Kenya Transition Initiative Eastleigh Program (KTI-E), Kenya.
Objectives of the Program	*Common objective:* Foster and promote a positive identity for youth vulnerable to recruitment by extremist elements in regions with a substantial Al-Shabab presence and a history of Al-Qaeda actions. SYLP emphasizes positive messaging, dialogue, and information-sharing, along with support for job and skill training opportunities. Unique to SYLP was a firm emphasis on placement following the training. G-Youth focuses on enhancing the role of youth in the community, providing messages about positive behavior and personal choice, and livelihood. G-Youth has four primary pillars of intervention: youth action, education, work, and civics. KTI-E emphasizes moderation and peace, as well as the role of youth in the community (primary goal) and youth livelihood (secondary goal). Its objective was to reduce the risk of engagement with extremist groups by providing youth with positive opportunities.
Sample Characteristics	*1,446 Somali youths in five communities in East Africa (Eastleigh/Nairobi, Garissa, Hargeisa, Bosaso, and Mogadishu):* The sample comprised full beneficiaries (individuals who completed the training program), partial beneficiaries (individuals who engaged to a lesser extent or dropped out), and individuals who did not participate in the programs (control group). Equal-shares, choice-based stratified sampling in the communities of interest was used to ensure the collection of high-quality data. 90 to 110 respondents per group, per program, in each location.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	*Likert-scale questionnaires measuring the following:* 1) civic engagement; 2) perception of the effectiveness of civic engagement; 3) support and belief in the power of youth associations; 4) perception of one's employability and optimism in the future; and 5) support for the use of violence in the name of Islam. It was reinforced by focus groups and key-informant interviews (face-to-face, by telephone, or by Skype).

Positive Outcomes	*Compared to the two other groups, the full beneficiary group had both of the following:* 1) much higher levels of civic engagement and 2) higher levels of perception of the effectiveness of civic engagement, support and belief in the power of youth associations, and perception of their employability and optimism in the future.
Negative Outcomes	1) No substantial decrease in rejection of violence in the name of Islam (the difference was often not statistically significant, except in the aggregate sample); 2) Differences between full and partial beneficiaries were not, for the most part, statistically significant (although full beneficiaries usually scored higher than partial ones); 3) Implementation issues (given the important non-response rate, the entire list of partial beneficiaries had to be used instead of a randomized selection).
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Potential selection bias (people who signed up were potentially more motivated than those who did not); 2) Translation of tools, questions, and responses from Somali and/or Kiswahili to English and vice-versa might have affected the quality of the gathered information; 3) Difficulties in establishing a baseline: Because programs were already underway, collecting baseline data on participating residents and affected communities was not possible.
Limitations (Team)	Not enough information about the sample. Even though demographic information was said to be collected, no data is presented.
Quality of Study	8

United States Agency International Development (USAID) evaluated the outcomes of three PVE projects they funded. The first project to launch was the Somalia Youth Livelihoods Program (SYLP) in Somalia. The program focused almost exclusively on technical skill training, ranging from traditional vocational and technical training areas (e.g., plumbing) to non-traditional market niches (e.g., water filter production). The second project was the Garissa Youth Program (G-Youth). It was a localized intervention that focused on a combination of livelihood/skill training as well as the establishment of strong community relationships in the Garissa Municipality of Kenya's North Eastern province. Lastly, the Kenya Transition Initiative Eastleigh Program (KTI-E) aimed to foster moderation, identity, and self-confidence in at-risk youth in Eastleigh to help them reject extremism. KTI-E's three primary lines of action were building capacity among youth and community for moderation and non-violence, empowering

the local youth, and youth livelihood support. In order to assess the comparative results of the three projects on youth resistance to extremist recruitment, surveys were administered in five communities in East Africa (Eastleigh/Nairobi, Garissa, Hargeisa, Bosaso, and Mogadishu). In each community, the survey sampled three segments of the population: full beneficiaries (individuals who completed the program), partial beneficiaries (individuals who engaged to a lesser extent or dropped out), and the comparison group (individuals who did not participate in the program). Face-to-face interviews were prioritized to administer the surveys; however, telephone and Skype-based interviews were occasionally conducted. Focus group discussions were held with key informants involved in the project. Data was organized into five categories: 1) civic engagement; 2) perception of the effectiveness of civic engagement; 3) support and belief in the power of youth associations; 4) perception of one's employability and optimism in the future; and 5) support for the use of violence in the name of Islam. Quantitative results were triangulated with focus groups that explored these issues with youth in the surveyed communities.

Results indicated that full and partial beneficiaries of the evaluated programs in East Africa were highly engaged in their communities, especially through youth associations, which project beneficiaries joined in large numbers. However, this high level of engagement was not always matched by a corresponding sense of efficacy (a feeling that this engagement was productive). In the area of identity, beneficiaries were very optimistic about their job prospects and the future, particularly in Somalia and Garissa. As for attitudes, both beneficiaries and the comparison group condemned violence in the name of Islam. Limitations mentioned by the authors included a lack of sufficient demographic information, impossibility to collect baseline data on participants, potential loss of information by translating questionnaires, and possible selection bias. In fact, because a high non-response rate made it impossible to randomly select participants for the full-beneficiaries group, all participants from the list were contacted. Nevertheless, because there were a lot of positive outcomes, the authors described the programs as successful overall.

Mixed Outcomes

Table 2.5
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Mercy Corps (2016) | Primary prevention | Violent Islamist radicalization**
Program and Country	Somali Youth Leaders Initiative (SYLI), Somalia.
Objectives of the Program	Foster good governance, economic recovery, and reducing the appeal of extremism through targeted interventions that increase education and civic participation opportunities for Somali youth.
Sample Characteristics	***802 participants for quantitative analyses:*** 504 in-school youth (treatment group) and 298 out-of-school youth (control group). ***25 participants for qualitative analyses:*** 15 in- and out-of-school youth from the above samples and 10 teachers/Ministry of Education officials/members of community education committees.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	Mixed-method impact evaluation. ***Quantitative:*** Quasi-experimental matched design, relying on survey data about attitudes and behaviors towards political violence. ***Qualitative:*** Key-informant interviews measuring change in participation and support for political violence and violent extremism.
Positive Outcomes	**1)** Decreased likelihood of youth participating in political violence by 16%; **2)** Increased perceptions of government doing a good job in providing services such as water, electricity, and healthcare; **3)** Reduced sense of marginalization (youth are 15% less likely to feel isolated and excluded in communities); **4)** Civic engagement activities reduced the likelihood of youth participating in political violence (by 14%) and thinking that political violence is "sometimes necessary" (by 20%).
Negative Outcomes	**1)** Increased likelihood of youth supporting the use of violence for a political cause by 11%; **2)** Decreases of over 30% in the likelihood of being satisfied with the government's provision of education; **3)** Caused a nearly 16% decrease in likelihood of feeling optimistic about future employment opportunities, and expressing fear and concern when describing the future.

Overall Outcome of the Program	Mixed.
Limitations (Authors)	None mentioned.
Limitations (Team)	Possible conflict of interest arising from Mercy Corps evaluating an initiative in which it had a role.
Quality of Study	7

In 2016, Mercy Corps evaluated the Somali Youth Leaders Initiative, whose goal was to foster good governance, economic recovery, and reduce the appeal of extremism through targeted interventions that increase education and civic participation opportunities for Somali youth. The research employed a mixed-methods impact evaluation approach. The research team used a quasi-experimental matched design relying on survey data from youth in Somaliland and key-informant interviews with in- and out-of-school youth, teachers, Ministry of Education officials, and members of community education committees. The quantitative survey—divided between 504 in-school (treatment) and 298 out-of-school (control) youth—was stabilized using inverse probability of treatment weighting, which matched treatment and control group participants using age, poverty, exposure to violence, marital status, number of children, experience of displacement, household characteristics, and baseline levels of political engagement. The qualitative interviews were analyzed using thematic coding through an inductive approach to understand the on-the-ground realities, social barriers, and structural challenges hampering access to education and undermining the stability in the region. These analyses produced mostly positive results. The program decreased the likelihood of youth participating in political violence by 16% but increased the likelihood of them supporting the use of violence for a political cause by 11%. Youth in the program showed increases in the perception that the government was doing a good job in providing services such as water, electricity, and healthcare, but decreases (of over 30%) in the likelihood of being satisfied with the government's provision of education. Also, compared to the control group, those in the program were nearly 16% less likely to feel optimistic about future employment opportunities. These findings were echoed in qualitative interviews with many youths expressing fear and concern when describing the future, as well as frustrations at unmet expectations from their government. However, the program had a positive impact on reducing the sense of marginalization experienced by the participating youth, who were 15% less likely to feel isolated and excluded in their communities compared to similar youth who were not in school. The frustrations over the government's inability to fulfill the youth's expectations could help explain the increase in support for political violence. Nevertheless, the program appeared to deter youth from actually acting on these frustrations by making them feel less isolated and vulnerable to recruitment. In addition to access to school, the effects of adding civic engagement activities to formal education showed that student-led community actions reduced the likelihood of youth participating in political violence by 14%, and that youth think political violence is "sometimes necessary" (20%). While interesting, the results of this project may be limited by a possible conflict interest, as Mercy Corps is part of the Somali Youth Leaders Initiative.

Asia—Positive Outcomes

Table 2.6
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Speckhard et al. (2018) | Primary and secondary prevention | Violent Islamist Radicalization**
Program and Country	Break the ISIS Brand Counter Narrative Project, Iraq.
Objectives of the Program	Raise awareness through a counter-narrative Facebook ad campaign designed to highlight the futility of ISIS's promises of bringing about the desired utopian caliphate and its failure to deliver any of its promises. The program showcases the realities of belonging to ISIS and offers opportunities for those considering joining to reconsider their decisions. The ultimate goal is to protect and prevent action in the fight against ISIS and violent extremism.
Sample Characteristics	*1,287,557 online participants residing in 10 Governorates across Iraq:* 82% male and 18% female; 18–50 years old (78% between 18 and 34 years old); of Shia and Sunni Muslim religious background.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	*Data collection:* Using data on a counter-narrative video ad which ran for 24 days on Facebook, the level of reach and video retention, number of impressions, clicks, likes, shares, and comments were collected in order to measure engagement with the video and to identify possible causality between exposure to the video and change in extremist behavior. *Data analysis:* Descriptive statistics on the variables mentioned above.
Positive Outcomes	1) Comments to the video evoked negative impressions and emotions of disdain for ISIS; 2) The comments sometimes led to discussions about why terrorism happens and how to prevent/stop it; 3) The comments expressed solidarity for the Iraqi people in their fight against ISIS; 4) There were multiple positive indicators about the video, such as the number of views, likes, and shares by the audience; 5) 126,400 out of the 1,287,557 individuals in the target audience were likely to remember the ad content within two days of viewing it. This illustrates the strength of the video and its positive impact on viewers.

Negative Outcomes	1) There were a few anti-Islamic/Semitic/American/European/Turkish comments; 2) Some viewers who openly support and sympathize with ISIS expressed anger in their comments by calling the researchers unbelievers, government stooges, etc.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.
Limitations (Authors)	1) The videos, which were intentionally given ambiguous titles, could be considered pro-ISIS at the initial exposure; 2) Insufficient resources.
Limitations (Team)	1) Methodological limitations (i.e., lack of pre- and post-measurements to evaluate behavioral/cognitive changes following exposure to the counter-narrative video, lack of control group); 2) Lack of pilot project to test certain aspects of the video (e.g., tone of the message, identity of the messenger); 3) Potential conflict of interest as the authors work at the center responsible for the creation of the program.
Quality of Study	6

Speckhard et al. (2018) reported on the International Center for Study of Violent Extremism's (ICSVE) Facebook ad campaign—Breaking the ISIS Brand Counter Narrative Project—aimed at raising awareness of the realities of living under ISIS and protecting vulnerable potential recruits. The campaign ran on Facebook for 24 days across 10 Governorates in Iraq and featured the video testimony of a Belgian female ISIS defector who had taken her young son to live in ISIS territory. The video generated a total reach of 1,287,557 individuals (82% male, 18% female; 18–50 years old; Shia/Sunni Muslims), while also leading to 2,339,453 impressions (i.e., the number of times the video content was displayed, regardless of whether the user clicked on it or not), and close to 1.7 million views. Consideration was given to individuals who might be engaged with, or simply exposed to extremist narratives online for the first time, and who might continue down the path of sustained engagement and exposure to violent narratives propagated by terrorist groups like ISIS. Awareness metrics (i.e., reach, impressions, frequency, video views, and video retention), engagement metrics (i.e., clicks, likes, shares, and comments), and impact metrics (i.e., indicators of behavioral changes, supportive comments, and negative comments) were used as quantitative measures to analyze the data. Comments written by the audience were analyzed qualitatively to assess the impact of the awareness campaign. Overall, the data revealed positive outcomes. Comments evoked emotions and impressions that showed disdain for ISIS and expressed solidarity for the Iraqi people in their fight against ISIS. Comments also inspired discussion about why terrorism happens and how to prevent it. In terms of quantitative analysis, there were multiple positive indicators about the video, such as the number of views, likes, and shares by the audience. Furthermore, around 126,400 of the 1,287,557 individuals in the

target audience were likely to remember the content of the ad within two days of viewing it, which illustrates the strength of the video and its positive impact on viewers. However, at the same time, a few individuals made anti-Islamic/Semitic/American/European/Turkish comments, which indicated signs of hate discourse. Some viewers, who openly supported and sympathized with ISIS, also expressed anger in their comments by calling the researchers "unbelievers" and "government stooges."

Despite its promising results, the study suffers from several limitations not mentioned by the authors, including lack of pre- and post-measurements to evaluate potential behavioral/cognitive changes following exposure to the counter-narrative video, lack of a control group, lack of a pilot project to test certain aspects of the counter-narrative video (e.g., tone of the message, identity of the messenger), and potential conflicts of interest (the authors worked, in various positions, for the ICSVE). The authors nevertheless mentioned the ambiguous title of the video (which may be considered pro-ISIS at the initial exposure) and insufficient resources as additional limitations.

Mixed Outcomes

Table 2.7
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Mercy Corps (2015) | Primary prevention | Violent Islamist radicalization**
Program and Country	Introducing New Vocational Education and Skills Training (INVEST), Afghanistan.
Objectives of the Program	The primary goal of INVEST is to increase youth employment in Helmand by offering three- and six-month vocational and technical training sessions in nine centers. These centers link students to various career choices through private sector actors and business leader mentorship. The broader goal is to improve stability in the region by targeting a population that is traditionally sympathetic to the Taliban.
Sample Characteristics	729 students from the INVEST program (between February and April 2014). Propensity score matching was used to create treatment and comparison groups that were similar along observable characteristics. The treatment group consisted of 465 recent graduates from the INVEST program, while the comparison group comprised 264 students who had enrolled in the program but did not start their classes.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	*Quasi-experimental, mixed-method impact evaluation design.* Its objectives were to examine the mechanisms through which the program was hypothesized to have influenced young Afghans' propensity towards violence and support for the Taliban insurgency. The mechanisms were as follows: **1)** direct effects on participants' propensity towards political violence; **2)** improvements in employment status and economic conditions; **3)** social status and connections; and **4)** perceptions of government performance. *Data collection:* Data was collected through face-to-face surveys and individual- and group-based interviews of former and future INVEST students. The survey included questions specifically aimed at measuring economic outcomes (employment, economic optimism, and economic conditions), social outcomes (confidence and abilities, social status, and social connections), and political outcomes (confidence in government institutions and perceptions of government effectiveness). Questions capturing propensities and attitudes towards political violence were also collected.

Positive Outcomes	1) The greatest impacts of the INVEST program were on economic outcomes: decreased unemployment, increased income, and greater economic optimism among participants. Economic optimism was significantly associated with a decrease in willingness to engage in and support for political violence; 2) Social outcomes: increased social connectedness, increased identification as an Afghan, and decreased perceived discrimination; 3) Political outcomes: significant positive impact on perceptions of local government performance.
Negative Outcomes	1) No direct program effects on attitudes towards political violence; 2) Economic outcomes: Results from the survey showed that employment status had no effect on support for political violence; 3) Social outcomes: No effects on participants' personal confidence, locus of control, perceived position in society, or their feelings of being respected in their community were recorded. There was little evidence that social outcomes can decrease propensity towards political violence; 4) Political outcomes: Participation in INVEST did not appear to improve youths' perceptions of the performance of the Afghan government or confidence in institutions; 5) A significant link between violence and the INVEST program was only recorded for three outcomes across the entire analysis: economic optimism, social connections, and identifying as an Afghan.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Mixed.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Response bias: Suspicion and social desirability could have influenced answers; 2) Data for economic factors (income, expenditures, etc.) was unavailable. This demographic information could have influenced the likelihood of program participation, outcome variables, or both; 3) Generalizability: Participants in the INVEST program had to meet certain criteria in order to enter the training. Both the treatment and comparison groups may, therefore, have different characteristics than the general population, such as having more influence in their communities.
Limitations (Team)	Potential conflict of interest (Mercy Corps carried out the study and helped to identify eligible participants for the program).
Quality of Study	6

Young Afghans—potentially vulnerable youth (limited income/unemployment, widows, female heads of households)—are traditionally considered to be sympathetic to the Taliban. With the aim of increasing youth employment in Helmand, the Introducing New Vocational Education and Skills Training (INVEST) program trains young men and women in a range of vocational skills. Nine technical vocational education and training (TVET) centers across the province are offering a range of vocational and technical training courses that develop practical skills and link participants to various career choices, including tailoring, embroidery, mobile phone repair, information technology, occupations requiring English, automobile repair, carpentry, and other employment ventures. Using a quasi-experimental, mixed methodology impact evaluation design, Mercy Corps examined the impact of INVEST on broader economic, social, and political stabilization outcomes. Mercy Corps' wider goal was to explore the causal relationship between participation in youth employment programs and propensity towards political violence. Therefore, to generate findings applicable to other programs and contexts, the study examined three specific mechanisms through which the program was hypothesized to have an indirect effect on young Afghans' propensity toward political violence and support for the Taliban insurgency: H1) Participation in a TVET program will improve young people's employment status and economic conditions, thereby decreasing the financial incentive to support or engage in political violence; H2) Participation in a TVET program will improve young people's connection to and status within their community, thereby decreasing the social incentive to support or engage in political violence; H3) Participation in a TVET program will improve young people's confidence in and perceptions of the government's performance in fulfilling basic functions, thereby decreasing the likelihood they will use violence to address grievances towards the government. The analysis was conducted on a treatment group (465 recent graduates from the INVEST program) and a comparison group (264 incoming students), matched according to propensity scores (baseline covariates that affect the outcomes and are associated with INVEST eligibility, including age, gender, education, literacy, religion, location, household poverty, and household size). Data was collected in face-to-face surveys and individual- and group-based interviews with both the treatment and comparison groups. Findings were mixed and produced little evidence to support the three hypotheses tested. A significant link between the INVEST program and violence was only found for three outcomes: economic optimism, social connections, and identifying as an Afghan. Social connections and identifying as an Afghan were both positively correlated with a propensity towards violence, which constitutes an iatrogenic effect. Also, there was a weak association between better economic conditions and decreased political violence outcomes. Thus, the analysis rejects the first hypothesis that links economic outcomes to violence. Due to the relatively weak connection between the INVEST program and social outcomes, as well as between social conditions and a decrease in propensities towards political violence, the analysis also rejects the second hypothesis. Concerning the third hypothesis, INVEST did have a slight impact on participants' perception of local governments' performance. However, this outcome was not significantly associated with a willingness to engage in or support political violence, thus making the link from INVEST to violence through political outcomes inconclusive. Overall, results suggested that the INVEST program did not contribute substantially to stabilization through decreasing support for political violence and the Taliban. These results suggest that the lack of impact was not due to a design failure of the INVEST program, but a failure of the theory that links these outcomes to employment.

Finally, regarding the study's limitations, Mercy Corps identified response bias, limited information about baseline economic characteristics, and generalizability. Also, a potential conflict of interest could have influenced the selection of participants, since Mercy Corps were involved in the identification of eligible students for the program *and* were the ones conducting the research.

Australia—Mixed Outcomes

Table 2.8
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Johns et al. (2014) | Targeted primary prevention | Violent Islamist radicalization**
Program and Country	More Than a Game, Australia.
Objectives of the Program	*Main objective:* Engage young Muslim men through a team-based sport (e.g., football) to deliver a range of activities intended to develop personal wellbeing and pro-social skills, and to facilitate a greater sense of social inclusion and community belonging. *Specific objectives:* 1) Develop young role models and leaders in the community; 2) Enhance greater understanding of the Muslim community by the broader Australian community; 3) Foster greater intercultural contact and understanding between participants and other cultural groups.
Sample Characteristics	*Three target groups:* 1) 21 program participants (young men, aged 15–25, predominantly of Lebanese cultural background, recruited from the Newport Islamic Society of Melbourne); 2) eight program facilitators; and 3) 10 college students who also participated in the Peace Team dialogue and Unity Cup.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	*Mixed method, post-evaluation approach:* Semi-structured interviews and focus groups were combined with quantitative data collection (exit surveys) as the primary method to explore participants' personal development through the program. Researcher participant-observation was also conducted during the second half of the program. *Data analysis:* Thematic analysis was used to code qualitative responses and identify patterns in the way participants and stakeholders described their experiences of the program.
Positive Outcomes	1) Sport as a level-playing field where people of all cultural backgrounds were bound by the same rules and expectations allowed participants to feel free to engage in forms of knowledge sharing and social and physical interactions with participants from difficult cultures—even with groups with which they shared a historically conflict-ridden relationship;

	2) The experiences of playing together with participants from different racial, cultural, and religious groups provided new forms of awareness and knowledge to participants, demonstrating that social functions and roles can, under certain circumstances, become more important than social identities, transcending other kinds of group boundaries and divisions. For example, out of the 21 participants who took part in the evaluation, following participation in the program most indicated a more positive attitude towards a range of cultural groups (particularly towards Jewish youth); **3)** Team-based sports that emphasize cooperation, sense of responsibility to others, and trusting teammates can reduce participants' sense of vulnerability or solitude. Participants identified this type of social bonding as providing a safe space where other cultural groups can be safely encountered, stereotypes can be challenged, and friendships formed; **4)** Discipline learned through sports encouraged participants to develop self-control in situations where conflict could arise; **5)** Using team-based sport countered feelings of alienation and strengthened feelings of belonging to the broader community and society by promoting an understanding that there is a role for everyone in the team.
Negative Outcomes	Participants felt strong bonds to their ethnic and religious community, and they thus felt torn between a sense of loyalty to their community and openness to the program.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.
Limitations (Authors)	**1)** No pre- and post-evaluation data was collected; **2)** Possible social desirability effect of participants potentially skewing recollections of their experiences; **3)** Small sample size leading to limitations for representativity; **4)** Methodological problem of trying to establish a link between sport-based mentoring programs and the prevention of violent extremism given the difficulty of measuring the processes that take place while engaging in sports activities.
Limitations (Team)	None.
Quality of Study	7

Johns et al. (2014) evaluated the More than a Game sport-focused youth mentoring program in Melbourne, aimed at developing a community-based resilience model using team-based sports to address issues of identity, belonging, and cultural isolation amongst young Muslim to counter forms of violent extremism. The research used semi-structured interviews and focus groups, combined with exit surveys, to assess the benefits of participating in team sports, namely in terms of **1)** developing a sense of belonging; **2)** interacting with people from different cultural backgrounds; and **3)** using other means than violence to resolve problems. The sample was divided into three groups: 21 program participants (young men, aged 15–25, predominantly of Lebanese cultural background, recruited from the Newport Islamic Society of Melbourne); eight program facilitators; and 10 college students who also participated in the Peace Team dialogue and Unity Cup. Thematic analysis of the participants' experiences of the program revealed a number of positive outcomes: **1)** Participants reported perceiving sport as a level-playing field where people of all cultural backgrounds were bound by the same rules and expectations, allowing them to feel free to engage in forms of knowledge-sharing and social and physical interactions with participants from different cultures, even with groups that they shared a historically conflict-ridden relationship with. Such experiences afforded them practical and powerful experiences of lived justice; **2)** The experiences of playing together with participants from different racial, cultural, and religious groups provided new forms of awareness and knowledge to participants, demonstrating that social functions and roles can, under certain circumstances, become more important than social identities, transcending other kinds of group boundaries and divisions. For example, out of the 21 participants who took part in the evaluation, most indicated a more positive attitude towards a range of cultural groups (particularly towards Jewish youth) following participation in the program; **3)** Team-based sports that emphasize cooperation, sense of responsibility to others, and trusting teammates can decrease participants' sense of vulnerability or solitude. Participants identified this type of social bonding as providing a safe space where other cultural groups can be safely encountered, stereotypes challenged, and friendships formed; **4)** Discipline learned through sports encouraged participants to develop self-control in situations where conflict could arise; and **5)** Using team-based sport countered feelings of alienation and strengthened feelings of belonging to the broader community and society by promoting an understanding that there is a role for everyone in the team. Some participants, however, also expressed negative effects arising from the program: They felt torn between loyalty to their religious/ethnic groups and the program, which in turn generated tension. Despite the strong positive impact participants related, the authors identified several limitations in their research: **1)** The evaluation was commissioned mid-way through the program, making it impossible for researchers to collect pre- and post-evaluation data from participants, which significantly limited the measurement of the precise impact of the program; **2)** Researchers feared that possible social desirability effects could potentially skew participants' recollections; **3)** The small sample size further limited the study's representativity; and **4)** The methodological problem of trying to establish a link between sport-based mentoring programs and the prevention of violent extremism proved problematic given the difficulty of measuring the processes that take place while engaging in sports activities.

Europe—Positive Outcomes

Table 2.9
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Liht & Savage (2013) | Secondary prevention | Violent Islamist radicalization**
Program and Country	Being Muslim Being British (BMBB), UK.
Objectives of the Program	Prevent violent extremism in young UK Muslims who have been exposed to extremist discourse with a course designed to allow participants to see the multiplicity of values that influential Muslims embody and to explore all positions on issues central to radical Islamist discourse. The program also aimed to decrease the affinity towards the "us versus them" discourse by increasing the participants' integrative complexity. A higher integrative complexity favors reflection, conflict resolution, and the ability to perceive multiple points of view. The program was also offered to people who are interested in issues that affect young Muslims.
Sample Characteristics	***81 youths, mostly Muslims, who have been exposed to extremist discourse or are interested in the issues raised by it.*** Only 49 out of the 81 participants filled a sociodemographic questionnaire. Mean age = 19.48; 60% men, 40% women; 88% Sunni Muslims, 5% Church of England, 2% Protestant, 5% other; 29% Pakistani, 8% Bangladeshi, 42% Afro-American, 21% Indian. The participants were divided into seven pilot groups: one in a university setting, one in a technical community college, one in a community group for newly arrived Somali immigrants, two in Prevent local initiatives, and two in existing initiatives for young Muslim men and women.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	Participants took a 16-hour, eight-session course consisting of film and group activities that enabled them to solve problems according to a broad array of personal values. Participants could explore all positions on issues central to radical Islamist discourse, free from criticism or social pressure. Activities included group discussions that were coded to assess the evolution of integrative complexity over the course of the program. Pre- and post-test data was gathered. *Measures:* 1) Recorded group discussions from the first (pre) and last (post) session of the course, scanned for integrative complexity and the presence of values using a standardized coding framework and protocol; 2) Moral dilemmas: Six vignettes with dilemmas relevant to Muslims living in Britain were presented to the participants (three pre- and three post-).

	Integrative complexity and the presence of Schwartz's 10 basic values were evaluated with responses to the dilemmas (number of times each value was present in the conversation), as well as Kraybill conflict styles. Inter-rater reliability was assessed between two trained coders blind to the pre/post conditions (kappa = 0.54).
Positive Outcomes	1) Improved integrative complexity compared to the pretest levels; 2) Significant increase in the values of universalism (equal worth of human beings), benevolence, and stimulation (valuing new information and being open to new viewpoints); 3) Better conflict resolution strategies in group discussions and in written responses to moral dilemmas relevant to Muslims living in the UK; 4) Participants shifted towards collaboration and compromise and away from the "us vs. them" discourse commonly used by extremist groups; 5) At the beginning, the views of a pilot group were aligned with those of Hizb ut Tahrir (Islamist group), but at the end of the course, all of them had significantly changed their position; 6) Improved resilience against the dichotomous discourse from extremist groups; 7) Participants were better equipped to choose prosocial ways to resolve conflicts.
Negative Outcomes	1) Improved integrative complexity compared to the pretest levels; 2) Significant increase in the values of universalism (equal worth of human beings), benevolence, and stimulation (valuing new information and being open to new viewpoints); 3) Better conflict resolution strategies in group discussions and in written responses to moral dilemmas relevant to Muslims living in the UK; 4) Participants shifted towards collaboration and compromise and away from the "us vs. them" discourse commonly used by extremist groups; 5) At the beginning, the views of a pilot group were aligned with those of Hizb ut Tahrir (Islamist group), but at the end of the course, all of them had significantly changed their position; 6) Improved resilience against the dichotomous discourse from extremist groups; 7) Participants were better equipped to choose prosocial ways to resolve conflicts.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Integrative complexity scores (pre- and post-intervention) could not be compared as paired-type data because of the anonymity of participants;

	2) No control group; 3) The cognitive load of the moral dilemmas was too heavy, making it difficult to elicit written evidence from the participants.
Limitations (Team)	1) Potential conflicts of interest as the authors evaluate a program they seem to be involved in; 2) Inter-rater reliability for integrative complexity was low; 3) The sample description is incomplete as only 49 out of the 81 participants filled a sociodemographic questionnaire.
Quality of Study	9

This paper assessed the Being Muslim, Being British (BMBB) program in the UK. The program aimed to prevent violent extremism in young UK Muslims who had been exposed to extremist discourse or were interested in the issues raised by it. It was also offered to people interested in issues that affect young Muslims. The BMBB course was designed to expose participants to the multiplicity of values that influential Muslims embody and propose group activities that allow participants to explore all positions on issues central to radical Islamist discourse. Over the course of the program, 81 youths (mean age = 19.48) from seven pilot groups took a 16-hour course consisting of film viewing sessions and activities such as group discussions and written moral dilemmas aimed at preventing violent extremism by increasing the group's integrative complexity and enabling the participants to solve problems in an environment free from criticism and social pressure. The first and the last group discussions were recorded and then coded to assess the evolution of the participants' integrative complexity over the course of the program. The discussions were also coded for the presence of Schwartz's values and Kraybill's conflict styles. Participants' written answers to six moral dilemmas were analyzed (three from the first session and three from the last) and coded in terms of integrative complexity and values. Higher levels of integrative complexity are believed to protect against radical discourse used by recruiters from extremist groups as it gives individuals the ability to perceive and understand multiple viewpoints and find linkages between them. The results of the study showed an increased integrative complexity in group discussions at the end of the program. The BMBB program also encouraged better conflict resolution strategies in group discussions, seen through a shift towards collaboration and compromise rather than an "us vs. them" rhetoric. Regarding values, an increase in the values of universalism, benevolence, and stimulation was observed in group discussions. Moreover, at the beginning of the program, one group was agreeing with the views of the Islamist group Hizb ut Tahrir, but by the end, participants had significantly changed their views. However, no significant changes in terms of values and integrative complexity were noted in the written answers to moral dilemmas. Overall, the authors felt that their program succeeded in building resilience against the black-and-white discourse from extremist groups, and helped prevent violent extremism by improving integrative complexity and increasing the participants' values. Limitations mentioned by the authors included incapacity to compare pre- and post-scores as paired-type data in order to maintain the anonymity of participants, the absence of a control group, and the complexity of the

moral dilemma activities. Limitations not mentioned by the authors included missing sociodemographic data, relatively weak inter-rater reliability, and potential conflicts of interest stemming from the fact that the authors evaluating the program were also involved in it.

Table 2.10
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Boyd-MacMillan (2016) | Targeted primary prevention | Violent Islamist radicalization**
Program and Country	Being Muslim Being Scottish (BMBS), Scotland.
Objectives of the Program	Increase integrative complexity and collaboration across communities.
Sample Characteristics	***21 participants divided into two groups:*** the Muslim group (*n* = 10; educators, housewives, students, and other professionals) and the practitioner group (*n* = 11; educators, social workers, and Prevent police officers). Mean age = 42.05; most participants (*n* = 19) had university scholarship; 13 men, eight women.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	Mixed methods. ***Quantitative:*** Pre- and post-paragraph completion tests, as well as social identity and power questionnaires. ***Qualitative:*** Presentations of self-perception and integrative complexity regarding the ingroup/outgroup.
Positive Outcomes	**1)** Increased cognitive capacities in conflict resolution (wider array of responses when facing difference and disagreement); **2)** Decreased "othering," a mindset that can be exploited by violent extremist groups; **3)** Increased capacity to respect difference and see validity in other views despite disagreement; **4)** Learned about how to communicate between communities, how to support people vulnerable to radicalization, better awareness of risk factors involved in radicalization, and increased confidence to speak about controversial topics.
Negative Outcomes	Possibility of participants growing fatigued over the two days of training, which may have curtailed their reflections and discussions.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.
Limitations (Authors)	Lack of formal follow-up measures that evaluate if benefits of the program on integrative complexity last over time.
Limitations (Team)	None.
Quality of the Study (/10)	8

Boyd-MacMillan (2016) examined the impact of Being Muslim Being Scottish (BMBS), a program designed to increase integrative complexity, and therefore, shift from closed, black and white thinking that sees no validity in others' viewpoints toward more deliberate, flexible, and open thinking without sacrificing one's core values. The research consisted of 21 participants (13 men and eight women) with a mean age of 42.05. Participants were divided into two groups; 11 in the Muslim group (educators, housewives, students, and other professionals) and 10 in the practitioner group (educators, social workers, and Prevent police officers). Of the participants, 19 had one or more years of university education; specifically, three received Islamic, and two received a Christian university education. Six participants were born outside the UK (Egypt, Libya, Algeria, and Pakistan), and 15 were born in either Scotland, the UK, Great Britain, or the European Union. BMBS intervention was delivered over two days. Before and after the intervention, participants were tasked with paragraph completion tests, where they had to complete sentences about their relationship with their community and that of a community they oppose. Next, participants were asked to write as much as they could, without self-censorship or concern for grammar, in response to prompts such as "when I think about my community" and "when I think about the other group." Once this was over, participants responded to a five-item Social Identity & Power Questionnaire, which focused on agreement with statements such as "groups that are more powerful often treat my group unfairly" or "members of my group are easily accepted into influential or powerful groups."

Finally, during the last session, all participants made an oral presentation on what they learned from the intervention. Paragraph completion test responses, scored and coded in SPSS by three experienced integrative complexity coders using cross-culturally validated frameworks, revealed that participants experienced increased cognitive capacities in conflict resolution (wider array of responses when facing difference and disagreement). This increase represented a crucial step away from "othering," a mindset that can be exploited by violent extremist groups. Participants' responses to the Social Identity & Power Questionnaire showed evidence of increased capacities to respect differences and see validity in other views despite disagreement. Finally, all presentations, which were qualitatively assessed and correlated with quantitative integrative complexity scores, showed that participants learned the following: how to communicate between communities, how to be aware of the risk factors involved in radicalization, how to support people vulnerable to radicalization, and how to speak about controversial topics with increased confidence. However, as acknowledged by the authors, the results of this research are limited by the lack of formal follow-up measures that could evaluate the possible after-glow effect on the intervention's participants. Furthermore, the participants may have grown fatigued over the two days. This may have resulted in their reflections and discussions having been curtailed.

Table 2.11
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Christiaens et al. (2018) | Secondary prevention | General violent radicalization**
Program and Country	BOUNCEUp program, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, and Sweden.
Objectives of the Program	1) The BOUNCE program aims to strengthen youngsters' resilience through group-based interventions in order to prevent violent radicalization. Personal resilience is seen here as a factor that can reduce susceptibility to violent extremism; 2) The BOUNCEUp program aims to train future BOUNCE trainers about the three BOUNCE tools (understand these tools, use them, implement them in one's own domains and cities, and inspire other services and colleagues to use and promote them).
Sample Characteristics	*Study 1:* User satisfaction of trainers who received the BOUNCEUp program (101 participants). *Study 2:* Short-term outcome evaluation of the BOUNCEUp tool by trainers (50 participants). Gender and age were not provided.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	*Data collection:* 1) User surveys (reactions during participatory observations, a quantitative questionnaire about participants' experience, and follow-up interviews with half of the participants to assess their knowledge and application of the BOUNCE program); 2) Trainers' experience of the program (semi-structured interviews); 3) Program evaluation (focus groups and follow-up interviews with trainers about the project); 4) User satisfaction (observation during training, quantitative surveys, and telephone interviews). *Data analysis:* Descriptive statistics of user satisfaction and perception of the program (quantitative) and content analysis (qualitative).
Positive Outcomes	*Study 1:* 1) Both during the training observations and in the post-training surveys, participants expressed that they were satisfied (average between 7.29 and 8.39/10) with the BOUNCEUp training (clarity of content, satisfaction with content, satisfaction with trainers, and satisfaction with exercises); 2) Participants largely perceived that the training clarified the concepts and methods of BOUNCE, with 53.5% agreeing that trainers used clear explanations;

	3) The logical sequence of the ten sessions—each following the same structure (opening circle, energizer, exercises, reflection)—was also appreciated by participants, as well as the holistic approach and combination of BOUNCEYoung and BOUNCEAlong; **4)** Participants also agreed that the trainers' attitude was adequate and enjoyable; **5)** The training content was generally well understood and supported by participants. *Study 2:* **1)** Participants said that the training taught them new working methods with younger populations; **2)** Participants also mentioned that they already knew some of the performed exercises but learned to use them for a "broader cause"; **3)** Other participants said that the BOUNCE training experience was an opportunity for self-reflection, while others mentioned that exercises were not innovative (but the structure of the BOUNCE program was); **4)** All participants agreed or strongly agreed that the training clarified the conceptualization of resilience; **5)** A majority of participants (39/50) were thinking, during the follow-up interviews, of organizing BOUNCE actions in the future. Six weeks after the program, participants were enthusiastic but uncertain about how to implement BOUNCE in their city; **6)** At the end of the follow-up, most participants had told colleagues about the program, and half of them mentioned that their colleagues were eager to learn more.
Negative Outcomes	*Study 1:* BOUNCE trainers cannot explain, with a logic model, why the program is able to prevent radicalization. The process analysis also showed that several training elements were still unclear for participants, most notably the link between BOUNCE and preventing radicalization. *Study 2:* **1)** Few participants mentioned that they gained knowledge on theoretical models, the importance of group dynamics, and resilience training; **2)** The theory behind BOUNCE is not immediately understood by everyone; **3)** During the follow-up interviews, only 10 out of 50 participants had organized BOUNCE-related activities; **4)** Even though many participants reported interest from their colleagues in BOUNCE, only five respondents said that concrete actions for implementation were taken.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.

Limitations (Authors)	1) High dropout rate (1/4 of the sample), size of the groups (should ideally be between eight to 12 while they were from six to 14); 2) Timing of the training: All sessions took place in the spring of 2017, but the last three were near the summer holidays, thus lowering possibilities for immediate action; 3) Not all colleagues understood the added value or logic of the program.
Limitations (Team)	The multitude of measures and results concerning different aspects of the program makes this report difficult to follow. The writing also lacked organization.
Quality of the Study (/10)	8

In their report, Christiaens et al. (2018) proposed an evaluation of BOUNCEUp, a train-the-trainers program implemented in five countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, and Sweden) during a year-long study between February 2017 and February 2018. The BOUNCE program aimed to strengthen youngsters' resilience through group-based interventions to prevent future violent radicalization. As for the assessed BOUNCEUp program, the objectives were to train future BOUNCE trainers about the content of the three BOUNCE tools, so that trainers go on to implement and use them in their own domains and cities. The authors of the report tried to provide a detailed description of the BOUNCEUp intervention and theoretical evaluation of its scientific basis. To do so, they proceeded in two different ways. One study was about the user satisfaction of trainers who received the BOUNCEUp program (101 participants); the other was about the short-term outcome evaluation of the BOUNCEUp tool by trainers (50 participants). The authors assessed user satisfaction and perception of the program through quantitative questionnaires and qualitative investigation (interviews, focus groups, observation, and content analysis). The results of the study about user satisfaction suggest that participants were satisfied with train-the-trainer program exercises and content, as well as with the mentors themselves. They understood the concepts and methods and appreciated the holistic approach of the program. The short-term outcome evaluation of the tools revealed that the training either taught participants new methods to work with youngsters or showed them how to use exercises that they already knew for a broader cause. In almost all cases, it clarified the conceptualization of resilience. The possibility of using the training sessions as a place for self-reflection was also mentioned. However, the results demonstrated that several training elements were still unclear for participants, most notably the link between BOUNCE and preventing radicalization. Furthermore, even if participants seemed convinced by the BOUNCE program, they were not able to convince their colleagues of its interest, nor could they implement it by themselves in their communities or workplaces. Even though the general outcome is positive, many limitations were mentioned by the authors: the high dropout rate, the size of the groups, the timing of the training sessions, and the fact that not all colleagues understood the added value or logic of the program. Furthermore, the multitude of measures and results concerning different aspects of the program makes this report difficult to follow, especially because of the lack of organization in the writing style.

Table 2.12
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Feddes et al. (2015) | Targeted primary prevention | Violent Islamist radicalization**
Program and Country	Diamond, The Netherlands.
Objectives of the Program	Strengthen participants' self-esteem and increase their agency, perspective-taking skills (cognitive ability to anticipate the behavior and reactions of other people), and empathy in order to reduce their relative deprivation and disconnectedness from society, which in turn is expected to result in more resilience against violent radicalization
Sample Characteristics	***A total of 46 adolescents and young adults:*** aged 14 to 23 (*M* = 16.9, *SD* = 2.8); 85% Moroccan, 11% Turkish, 1% Surinamese, and 1% Pakistani; all participants indicated they were Muslim. ***Participants were divided into three groups:*** Group 1 (*n* = 12; 67% men, 33% women; 45% first-generation immigrants, 58% second generation) and group 2 (*n* = 16, 63% men, 37% women; 12% first-generation immigrant, 88% second generation) included youngers who followed the training in a community center, while group 3 (*n* = 18; all men; 6% first-generation immigrant, 94% second generation) included high-school students. Participants were recruited via the municipality (e.g., unemployment office), trainers or peers (groups 1 and 2), or via the school board (group 3).
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	***Longitudinal research design with five measurements:*** T1 (pre-measurement), turning point (after the end of the first module), T2 (between-measurements), T3 (post-training), and T4 (follow-up, only with group 1). ***Questionnaire to measure outcomes of interest on scales comprising two to four 5-point Likert variables:*** **1)** individual relative deprivation; **2)** collective relative deprivation; **3)** social disconnectedness; **4)** self-esteem; **5)** agency; **6)** narcissism; **7)** empathy; **8)** perspective taking; **9)** attitudes toward ideology-based violence by others; and **10)** own violent intentions. Internal consistency of scales was overall "good" to "very good." Where necessary, questions were adapted to the ethnic and religious backgrounds of participants. ***Data analysis:*** Paired sample t-tests.

Positive Outcomes	1) A marginal increase of reported self-esteem, empathy, and perspective-taking when comparing T1 and T3; 2) A significant increase in reported agency was found; 3) Attitudes toward ideology-based violence and reported own violent intentions decreased significantly when comparing T1 and T3.
Negative Outcomes	1) Data showed a marginally significant increase of reported narcissism, which was strongly associated with ideology-based violence; 2) Higher reports of perspective-taking were positively associated with attitudes toward ideology-based violence.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Participants were not members of extremist groups nor showed signs of violent radicalization. Therefore, it is unknown whether Diamond is effective with actual violent extremists; 2) The study did not include a control group. Potential positive or negative effects may therefore have been undetected; 3) There is a possibility that participants' characteristics influenced the results of the training as they knew the objectives of the program beforehand, which might have had a confounding impact on their behavior; 4) Small sample size limiting the examination of age or context effects in the study.
Limitations (Team)	None.
Quality of the Study (/10)	9

Feddes et al. (2015) did a longitudinal evaluation of Diamond, a training program in the Netherlands whose aim is to build participants' resilience against violent radicalization by reducing their relative deprivation and disconnectedness from society and strengthening their self-esteem, agency, perspective-taking skills, and empathy. The sample, recruited through the unemployment office, trainers, and school boards, consisted of 46 young Muslims (aged 14 to 23, $M = 16.93$, $SD = 2.76$) of first- and second-generation immigrants from Morocco, Turkey, Suriname, and Pakistan. They were divided into three groups. The program offered three modules over a period of three months. In the first module, to increase self-esteem and agency, participants worked on their social and professional competencies while strengthening their identity by discussing their family history and how they experience their dual identity. In the second and third module, participants reflected on their own opinions about what is "good" and "bad" behavior in comparison to what is acceptable behavior in society as a whole, so as to think critically about their own and other's behavior and how to best deal with potential conflicts. A longitudinal research design applied at T1 (pre-measurement), turning point (after

the end of the first module), T2 (between-measurements), T3 (post-training), and T4 (follow-up, only with group 1) measured the impact of the modules. At each point, a questionnaire measuring outcomes of interest on scales comprising two to four 5-point Likert variables was administered to participants. It included data about the following: **1)** individual relative deprivation; **2)** collective relative deprivation; **3)** social disconnectedness; **4)** self-esteem; **5)** agency; **6)** narcissism; **7)** empathy; **8)** perspective taking; **9)** attitudes toward ideology-based violence by others; and **10)** own violent intentions. Internal consistency of scales was overall "good" to "very good." Paired sample t-tests revealed a marginal increase of reported self-esteem and perspective-taking when comparing T1 and T3, a significant increase in reported agency, and a significant decrease in attitudes towards ideology-based violence and reported own violent intentions when comparing T1 and T3.

However, the data also revealed a marginally significant increase in reported narcissism and perspective-taking, both of which were positively associated with ideology-based violence. Even though their methodological design was sophisticated, the authors recognized multiple limitations in their research: **1)** Participants were not members of extremist groups nor showed signs of violent radicalization. It is, therefore, unknown whether Diamond is effective with actual violent extremists; **2)** The study did not include a control group. Potential positive or negative effects may, therefore, have been undetected; **3)** There is a possibility that participants' characteristics influenced the results of the training, as they knew the objectives of the program beforehand. This might have had a confounding impact on their behavior; **4)** Finally, the small sample size limited the examination of age or context effects in the study.

Table 2.13
Summary of Evidence

Study	**SAFIRE (2013) | Targeted primary prevention | Violent Islamist radicalization**
Program and Country	Diamond, The Netherlands.
Objectives of the Program	Increase resilience against radicalization among vulnerable youth and reduce susceptibility to violent extremism of non-radical Muslim adolescents. The Diamond program is based on two kinds of interventions: the system and the resilience approaches. The program involves parents, schools, and municipal organizations such as welfare agencies and frontline workers. It aims, among other things, to increase the participants' self-esteem and sense of agency, as well as decrease social isolation.
Sample Characteristics	***46 non-radicalized Muslim teenagers:*** between 14 and 24 years old (M = 16.93), mostly with bicultural identities. Most participants were referred by government agencies such as organizations for the unemployed, social workers, or secondary schools. 85% were of Moroccan background, 11% of Turkish background, 2% of Surinam background, and 2% of Pakistani background. 78% were males and 22% females. 83% were born in the Netherlands (i.e., second-generation immigrants). ***Participants were divided into three groups:*** Groups 1 (n = 12) and 2 (n = 16) included participants who were referred to the Diamond training via social workers and municipal organizations. Group 3 (n = 18) consisted of pupils at a secondary school. Participants of groups 2 and 3 participated voluntarily in the program; however, most of the group 1 participants did not participate voluntarily. Moreover, only group 1 had completed the four follow-up measurements at the publication of the report. Group 2 had completed three follow-ups and group 3, only two.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	This research aimed to investigate the long-term effectiveness of resilience training in preventing radicalization among vulnerable youth. It is a longitudinal study using a mixed-method design. Both qualitative and quantitative measures were taken at four different times: before the training, in the middle of the training, after the training, and three months after the training. The study consisted of interviews and surveys. ***Quantitative measures:*** Participants filled a Likert-type questionnaire measuring the following factors: **1)** identification with Islam; **2)** identification with Dutch society; **3)** identification with one's ethnic background; **4)** perceived distance to non-Muslims;

	5) perceived superiority of the Muslim ingroup; 6) disconnectedness from Dutch society; 7) agency; 8) uncertainty; 9) self-esteem; 10) symbolic threats to the Muslim ingroup; 11) realistic threats to the Muslim ingroup; 12) illegitimacy of authorities; 13) collective relative deprivation (feeling of receiving less than one deserves) of the ethnic ingroup; 14) perceived humiliation of the ethnic ingroup; 15) perspective-taking skills with regard to non-Muslims; 16) empathy towards non-Muslims; 17) attitudes towards ideology-based violence; and 18) own violent intentions. ***Qualitative measures:*** semi-structured interviews examining the variables of interest. They were then coded independently by two researchers using a coding scheme and analyzed.
Positive Outcomes	*Quantitative:* 1) Reduced sense of social marginalization and isolation (social disconnectedness) as more participants were enrolled in school, had an internship, or worked; 2) Better perspective-taking abilities; 3) Steady increase in empathy over time. *Qualitative:* 1) Increase in self-esteem, perspective-taking, and empathy after the training; 2) Participants had more insight about their personal abilities and showed personal responsibility; 3) Participants learned to set concrete goals and deal with conflicts and negative feelings; 4) Decrease in social disconnectedness and feelings of relative deprivation; 5) The fact that the training was given in groups had a positive effect on participants; 6) Participants made friends during the training; 7) Participants made a positive evaluation of the training.
Negative Outcomes	*Quantitative:* 1) The decrease over time in attitudes toward ideology-based violence was non-significant, as was the increase in agency; 2) No significant results were found regarding the participants' own violent intentions; 3) No significant increases in agency and self-esteem. ***Qualitative:*** None reported.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.

Limitations (Authors)	1) It was not possible to find a comparable control group that did not follow the Diamond training; 2) Each experimental group suffered drop-out of participants; 3) Measures could not be taken at the four different time points for most groups.
Limitations (Team)	1) The program defined "vulnerability to violent extremism" as being Muslim and having multiple cultural identities; 2) We do not know if the program was effective with radicalized youth.
Quality of the Study (/10)	9

The authors assessed the Diamond PVE program, which took place in the Netherlands. The program's main objective was to increase resilience against radicalization among vulnerable non-radical Muslim youth and reduce their susceptibility to violent extremism. During the program, 46 non-radicalized Muslim teenagers between the ages of 14 and 24 learned to think about their different identities, deal with important events in their lives, and set goals. They were also taught how to deal with different opinions, aggression, and conflicts. Finally, they were coached by certified trainers who helped them find work or access education. The Diamond program was evaluated using a longitudinal design. The authors used both qualitative and quantitative methods in order to assess the program. Measures were taken at four different times across the study: before the training, in the middle of the training, after the training, and three months after the training. Participants were divided into three groups: groups 1 (n = 12) and 2 (n = 16) included participants who were referred to Diamond via social workers and municipal organizations. Group 3 (n = 18) consisted of pupils at a secondary school. The authors used Likert-type questionnaires to gather quantitative data. The questionnaires measured factors such as identification with Islam, identification with Dutch society, perceived distance to non-Muslims, perceived superiority of the Muslim ingroup, disconnectedness to Dutch society, agency, uncertainty, self-esteem, violent intentions, and empathy towards non-Muslims. Qualitative data was gathered using semi-structured interviews, which examined these variables more in greater depth. Overall, the outcomes of the program were positive. Quantitative results indicated that the participants had a reduced sense of social disconnectedness, better perspective-taking abilities, and a steady increase in empathy over time. However, there were no significant results regarding the attitudes towards ideology-based violence and the participants' own violent intentions. No significant increases in agency and self-esteem were observed. On the other hand, qualitative results seemed to show an increase in self-esteem over time. Moreover, they indicated that participants had more insight in their personal competencies, learned to set concrete goals, deal with conflicts and their negative feelings, felt more connected socially, and even made friends during the training. In addition, participants made a positive evaluation of the program. According to the authors, the Diamond program succeeded in preventing radicalization by promoting resilience among vulnerable youth. A major limitation of this study was the lack of a control group, as the authors reported being unable to find a comparable group that did not participate in the Diamond program.

Some limitations were not acknowledged by the authors, namely that they defined "vulnerability to violent extremism" as being Muslim and having multiple cultural identities, which could be stigmatizing. Furthermore, we do not know if the program was effective with radicalized youth, as the sample exclusively comprised non-radical Muslims.

Tables 2.14 and 2.15
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Manby (2010a) | Secondary prevention | General violent radicalization**	**Manby (2010b) | Secondary prevention | Violent Islamist radicalization**
Program and Country	Prevent (Citizenship Programme), UK.	Prevent (Pathways into Adulthood), UK.
Objectives of the Program	1) Provide young people with a broad grounding in citizenship, principles of democracy, terrorism, and dictatorship; 2) Undertake library assignments exploring these issues.	1) Provide an opportunity to focus on issues of identity experienced by young people in the British communities (including issues related to radicalization); 2) Create a film on the theme of identity.
Sample Characteristics	*Nine young men:* age = 14–18; ethnicity = two British Pakistani, seven White British.	*Five young men:* age = 17–18; ethnicity = British South Asian; religion = Islam.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	1) Observation of one session; 2) Live and telephone interviews with participants; 3) Telephone interviews with parents of the participants; 4) Questionnaires and interviews for the staff.	1) Observation of two group sessions; 2) Semi-structured interviews with participants; 3) Telephone interviews with parents of the participants; 4) Questionnaires for the staff; 5) Interviews with program managers.
Positive Outcomes	1) Acquisition of knowledge on citizenship and cultural diversity; 2) Better self-confidence; 3) Parents and staff members confirmed the clear positive impact of the program.	1) Exploring identity issues related to ethnocultural belonging; 2) Maturation and better self-confidence; 3) Staff had a very positive view of the program's execution and benefits.
Negative Outcomes	Some participants were too young to fully understand the notions presented.	None reported.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.	Positive.

Limitations (Authors)	Participants were not at risk of radicalization (and should have been since it is a condition of this Prevent program).	The program was only accessible to young Asian people; it should be made available to a wider demographic.
Limitations (Team)	1) Low number of participants; 2) Weak methodology.	1) Low number of participants; 2) Weak methodology.
Quality of the Study (/10)	5	4

Manby (2009a–b; 2010a–b) conducted five small-scale evaluation studies on different projects under the Prevent initiative. Manby (2010a) found that participating in the Citizenship Programme of Prevent enabled nine young men (age = 14–18, ethnicity = British Pakistani and White British) to acquire knowledge on citizenship and cultural diversity, as well as improve self-confidence. Even though parents and staff members confirmed the clear positive impact of the program, some participants were too young to understand the program content fully. Furthermore, participants in the Citizenship Programme were not at risk of radicalization but should have been as it is a condition for participating in this Prevent program.

Manby (2010b) found that participating in the Pathways into Adulthood program of Prevent enabled five young Islamic British South Asian men (age = 17–18) to explore identity issues related to ethnocultural belongingness, which led to increased maturation and self-esteem in participants.

Manby (2009a) found that participating in the Pilot Parenting Project of Prevent enabled seven British and South Asian mothers to develop stronger parenting skills and increase their capacity to safeguard their children from online recruitment into radical groups. This led to a decrease in child problem behaviors as observed by the mothers. Even though the feedback of participants was very positive, three of the seven parents had to drop out of the program because of language communication problems, whereas the provision of translators may have reduced attrition.

Tables 2.16 and 2.17
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Manby (2009a) | Primary prevention | General violent radicalization**	**Manby (2009b) | Secondary prevention | General violent radicalization**
Program and Country	Prevent (Pilot Parenting Project), UK.	Prevent (Theatre Project), UK.
Objectives of the Program	*Main objective:* Increase the knowledge, skills, and confidence of local parents so that they are better able to support their children/ young people, should they be targeted or recruited by extremist groups. Specific objectives: 1) Improve general parenting skills; 2) Build more resilient communities.	Create a short drama production on the theme of preventing violent extremism.
Sample Characteristics	Seven mothers of mixed ethnicity (British, South Asian).	*Six young people:* age = 13–17; gender = four men and two women; ethnicity = three British Asian, two White British, one of dual heritage. All had experienced racism before, either as victims or perpetrators.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	1) Parents' views of problem behaviors in their children (Eyberg Child Behaviour Inventory); 2) Interview of participants about the impact of the program; 3) Questionnaire about the experiences of participants in the program; 4) Questionnaire for the staff about the easiness of implementation and progress achieved by participants.	1) Observation of a training session and a video of the theatrical production; 2) Interviews with participants about their experience in the project, understanding of violent extremism, and self-esteem improvements during the project; 3) Questionnaires and interviews for the staff.

Positive Outcomes	1) Feeling of having developed better parenting skills (knowledge about child protection/ safeguarding and against the potential for recruitment via radical websites); 2) Decrease in problem behaviors as observed by mothers; 3) Very good overall feedback by participants.	1) Knowledge acquisition and skill development related to theatrical productions, teamwork, and conflict management; 2) Better self-confidence; 3) Cost-effective; 4) Staff commended the commitment and progress of participants.
Negative Outcomes	Three parents dropped out because of communication problems (language barrier).	The stressful context for participants (tight schedule, performance anxiety) sometimes led to conflicts.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.	Positive.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Interpreters for non-native English speakers could have prevented dropouts; 2) The program should have covered a wider range of interests and concerns.	Unclear how well the aims and potential benefits of the Prevent project were understood by the Theatre Project program staff.
Limitations (Team)	1) Low number of participants; 2) Weak methodology.	1) Low number of participants; 2) Weak methodology.
Quality of the Study (/10)	6	4

Manby (2009b) found that participating in the Theatre Project of Prevent enabled six young people (four males, two females, age = 13–17, ethnicity = White British and Asian British) who were either victims or perpetrators of racism to acquire knowledge about theatre production, teamwork, and conflict management. Study participants reported that this led to an increase in self-confidence. Although the program was deemed successful and cost-effective by the staff and researchers, they also noted that the stressful context of building a theatre play sometimes led to conflicts among participants.

Even though Manby (2009a–b, 2010a–b) found mostly positive outcomes for these Prevent projects, the evidence is potentially anecdotal. The low number of participants and weak methodology preclude generalization to larger audiences.

Mixed Outcomes

Table 2.18
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Sheikh et al. (2012) | Targeted primary and secondary prevention | Violent Islamist radicalization**
Program and Country	Advisory Directorate for Youth, Women and Imams' Active Development (ADFYWIAD), UK.
Objectives of the Program	*Main objective:* Increase community resilience to violent extremism. *Specific objectives of ADFYWIAD projects:* 1) iLead program (13–16 years and 16+ years): Build the confidence and skills of Muslim youth so that they are able to act as leaders in the community; 2) "Keep fit": Involve young Muslim women in various activities that can make them less vulnerable to extremist messages; 3) Radical Middle Way training sessions: Educate Muslim leaders and community representatives about identifying and deconstructing extremist messages so that they can cascade messages to the grassroots communities they work in; 4) Governance and child protection training for mosques, madrassahs and Muslim organizations: build the resilience of mosques, Madrassahs, and Muslim organizations across Wales; 5) Meetings between police officers and Imams: partnership work between Imams and the police.
Sample Characteristics	*A total of 82 individuals participated in this evaluation:* 1) Program participants: Of the 48 individuals in this category, the majority had participated in the iLead youth leadership program (n = 15 in the 13–16 years old group; n = 9 in the 16+ group). 10 persons were participants of the Radical Middle Way project, 10 of the "Keep fit" project, and the four left participated in the governance and child protection training for mosques, madrassahs, and Muslim organizations; 2) Institutions: A link to an online survey was emailed to 64 institutions across Wales, whose contact details were identified through the Welsh government's own networks. 29 respondents from Welsh Muslim institutions answered (response rate of 45.3%). Most of them were females (n = 16), and the majority were from Cardiff (n = 17) or Newport (n = 6). Roughly half worked with a Muslim voluntary group (n = 14), and one third worked in a mosque (n = 9); 3) Police officers: Two police officers that attended meetings with Imams were interviewed; and 4) Project coordinators: Three project coordinators were from the Muslim Council of Wales.

Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	*Data collection:* Measures focused on the awareness of ADFYWID programs and participants' perceived impacts. These were assessed using the following: 1) an online questionnaire designed by the Office for Public Management; this tool aimed to assess the awareness of Muslim institutions on four key elements of the program—governance training, child protection training, iLead youth leadership projects, and "Keep Fit" monthly social activities; 2) interviews: 14 structured interviews were administered to two police officers, nine program participants, and three project coordinators about their understanding of the program, its perceived strengths and weaknesses, and its potential impacts; and 3) focus groups: a total of five focus groups (from seven to 15 participants each) were conducted by Office for Public Management facilitators, who followed preestablished guides created by the authors. *Data analysis:* Data collected over the course of the evaluation was subjected to thematic analysis to assess both extent and type of impact. The theory of change model was used as a broad framework for analysis. Having data from different points in the evaluation allowed triangulation of the data to produce more robust findings.
Positive Outcomes	*Awareness of Muslim institutions in the iLead and child protection projects:* More than half the respondents had heard of them. *Perceived impacts:* 1) Improvement of practices within Muslim institutions (better organizational structure, knowledge, and skills needed to better support the Muslim communities they serve); 2) Progress in the partnership between Muslim institutions and statutory agencies such as the police; and 3) Development of leadership skills among Muslim youth participants such as confidence, public speaking, conflict management, etc.
Negative Outcomes	1) Awareness of the Muslim institutions of the governance training and "Keep Fit": Slightly less than a third of respondents had heard of them; 2) Difficulties reaching the targeted audiences: Recruiting mosque committee members and Imams to participate in the training sessions was challenging and time-consuming as they tended to be apprehensive in the beginning; 3) Implementation issues included poor management and coordination, and two elements of the original program for Imams were not delivered due to a lack of interest; 4) No reported impacts of the "Keep Fit" project (no decreased vulnerability to recruitment by extremist groups); 5) Inadequate training sessions mostly comprised lectures with little room for practical exercises.

Overall Outcome of the Program	Mixed.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Limited generalizability of findings (due to the small number of participants interviewed or taking part in focus groups); 2) Problematic sampling methods: involvement of Welsh government and the Muslim Council of Wales in the choice of participants; 3) Two other projects under ADFYWIAD could not be implemented.
Limitations (Team)	1) Not enough information on participants, including the total sample size; 2) Insufficient methodological details; 3) No detailed descriptions of the projects' content; 4) Relevant findings are based on subjective perceptions from participants; 5) Limited insight on real-life prevention of radicalization.
Quality of the Study (/10)	4

The Office for Public Management (OPM) was commissioned by the Welsh government to evaluate the Muslim Council of Wales's "Advisory Directorate for Youth, Women and Imams' Active Development" (ADFYWIAD) program. The main goal of ADFYWIAD is to increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism via several projects, each of which has different specific objectives. The iLead youth leadership program for 13–16 years old, and a similar project for those over 16, were developmental projects lasting a year that focused on personal development, engaging with the wider community, and leadership development. Its aim was to build the confidence and skills of Muslim youth so that they are able to act as leaders in the community. The "Keep Fit" project consists primarily of enjoyable monthly sports activities with some time dedicated to discussions about theology, citizenship, and civic responsibility, which are often led by scholars. These activities were destined to involve young Muslim women in diverse activities that can make them less vulnerable to extremist messages.

Radical Middle Way training consists of a series of training sessions delivered to Muslim leaders, who, it is hoped, will, in turn, cascade the messages to grassroots communities they work in. Governance and child protection training for mosques, madrassahs, and Muslim organizations hopes to build the resilience of mosques, madrassahs, and Muslim organizations across Wales by ensuring that **1)** they operate within the context of good governance, child protection, and safeguarding policies/procedures and **2)** help them appreciate the importance of diverse representations of governance structures. Meetings between police officers and Imams cover partnership work between Imams and the police. This evaluation used the theory of change model as a broad framework for analysis. Qualitative data was collected from 82 individuals (48 program participants, 29 workers from Welsh Muslim institutions, two police officers, and three project coordinators) through several instruments. OPM designed a short online survey whose purpose was to test the awareness of the Muslim community of the program of work being delivered in their local area. It was sent to 64 institutions

across Wales, and 45.3% responded (29 individuals). A total of 14 interviews were also conducted, following predetermined interview guides. Whether it was for the two police officers or the nine program participants, the themes discussed were the same: their understanding of the program, its perceived strengths and weaknesses, and the perceived impacts of participating in it. For the three project coordinators' interviews, two other themes were added: **1)** project recruitment, management and delivery and **2)** learning and recommendations. In addition, a total of five focus groups containing seven to 15 participants each were conducted by OPM facilitators, who followed preestablished guides created by the authors. The data collected throughout the evaluation was subjected to thematic analysis to assess both extent and type of impact. Having data from different points in the evaluation allowed the triangulation of the data to produce more robust findings. Regarding the awareness of Muslim institutions of ADFYWIAD projects, findings showed that more than half the online survey respondents (n = 15) were aware of the child protection training and the iLead project. On the other hand, approximately one third or less were aware of the governance training (n = 10) and the "Keep Fit" monthly social activities (n = 8). As for the perceived impacts ADFYWIAD, several were highlighted by participants: **1)** There was some evidence indicating that governance training, child protection training, and Radical Middle Way motivated participants to improve the working practices and responsiveness of Muslim institutions; **2)** Both interviewed police officers felt that the meetings with Imams had been the start of a more formal relationship with them and helped build trust and confidence amongst those present (this view was also echoed by the project coordinator); and **3)** Participants of iLead felt that these projects helped them develop confidence and public speaking skills. Many reported having learned a number of other skills (conflict management, teamwork, and time and stress management skills) that would be valuable to take up leadership roles in the community. Negative outcomes were as follows: **1)** Very few Muslim institutions were aware of the governance training and "Keep Fit" program; **2)** The recruitment of mosque committee members and Imams to participate in the training sessions was challenging and time-consuming as they tended to be apprehensive in the beginning; **3)** Concerning implementation issues, poor management and coordination were mentioned, and two elements of the original program for Imams were not delivered due to a lack of interest; **4)** Concerning impacts, the "Keep Fit" project could not decrease at-risk women's vulnerability to recruitment by extremist groups; and **5)** Training sessions were described as inadequate because they mostly comprised lectures with little room for practical exercises. As for limitations, the authors mentioned that the small number of questioned participants significantly weakens the generalizability of findings. Furthermore, the sampling methods used were questionable; indeed, due to difficulties recruiting participants, individuals were not randomly selected but rather approached by the Muslim Council of Wales. Also, the online survey was distributed to only a subsample of Muslim institutions chosen by the Welsh government. Additional limitations were raised by our team, including that relevant findings are based on subjective perceptions with limited methodological details surrounding their collection or analysis. This evaluation was particularly unclear, with much important information missing (barely any details on the interviewees or focus group members, including the total sample size). Methodological details were also lacking, for example, regarding data analyses, interview lengths and who conducted them, how participants were recruited, or why a follow-up focus group had more participants than the original one.

Table 2.19
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Hirschfield et al. (2012) | Targeted primary and secondary prevention | Violent Islamist radicalization**
Program and Country	48 programs under Prevent, UK.
Objectives of the Program	50 locations in the UK were identified as being at higher risk of violent extremism. The Youth Offending Teams (YOTs) of these regions were then encouraged to apply for PVE funding. 48 of these 50 locations had developed programs under the Prevent strategy at the time the evaluation took place. ***The main objectives of these programs were the following:*** 1) preventing violent extremism among young people (eight to 18 years old) by delivering programs across YOTs; 2) reaching out to children and young people who are most at risk of becoming involved in violent extremism; 3) expanding existing programs for vulnerable young people in communities where extreme views are prevalent; and 4) providing training and support for selected youth justice staff to counter violent extremism.
Sample Characteristics	In order to frame a national picture of the PVE programs under Prevent, practitioners and stakeholders across 48 locations were interviewed (*n* = not provided). Practitioners were defined as those who were directly involved in the design and/or delivery of the project. Stakeholders were those who were not directly involved but who had a direct interest in the project or were otherwise aligned to it (e.g., police officers, community engagement officers, leaders from community organizations). No further data on their profession, sex, mean age, or sociodemographic information was provided. 71 stakeholders and practitioners from 12 locations were interviewed, as well as 33 young people who participated in nine out of the 12 programs. Among the 33 young participants, 21 were men, and 12 were women. Their age ranged between 14 and 21 years old, and all but three were Muslim. In all, 18 were Asian, six Somali, five Caucasian, one Moroccan, one Algerian, one Afghan, and one was Albanian.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	The evaluation of the programs had three stages. ***Stage 1:*** Systematic review on PVE in order to scope the evidence. ***Stage 2:*** Framing a national picture of the PVE programs. This stage consisted in the identification and assessment of existing PVE programs. During this stage, the research team visited 48 sites and conducted in-depth interviews with project staff and representatives from each of the YOTs carrying PVE programs, and analyzed project documentation and data provided by the Youth Justice Board (YJB).

	Stage 3: Case studies of 12 project sites were selected on the basis of geographical spread and the delivery of different sets of interventions. Semi-structured interviews with practitioners and stakeholders were conducted (n = 71). The interviews aimed to learn more about their perceptions and experiences of the program, as well as about the interventions being delivered. They also aimed to examine the benefits and challenges of delivering the programs. The research team also conducted interviews with young people who were enrolled in the programs (n = 33) in order to understand their views, attitudes, and beliefs, and to elicit their perceptions of the interventions' effectiveness. *Project diary sheets:* The authors additionally made non-participant observations of project interventions (n = 36) and proceeded to further documentary analysis, such as of the original project bids, evaluation reports, curricula outlines, and recording sheets. This provided information about the characteristics of young people participating in the project, the range of interventions delivered (objectives, methods of delivery, nature of targeting), and an indication of project activity and change over time. Project diary sheets were filled during stages 1, 2, and 3 of the evaluation process.
Positive Outcomes	*Interviews with staff members and practitioners and program documentation analysis:* 1) Some practitioners welcomed the investment of Prevent for communities, which were often deprived and overlooked; 2) Most interviewees considered they had received enough funding to carry their program; 3) Overall, responses to the training were positive among the staff; 4) Most respondents thought their program had positive effects on tackling the causes of violent extremism; 5) Respondents felt that young people had become increasingly involved in group sessions, had received a lot of support and information, and made progress. They also reported that youth had positive reactions towards the interventions and noticed positive attitude changes towards the government and the police; 6) There was increased awareness and understanding of prejudices experienced by the participants; 7) Practitioners believed they had provided young people with the necessary skills to enable them to communicate, debate, reach their own decisions, and resist extremist views; 8) Projects involving peer mentors and youth leaders were considered to be successful and have greater longevity; 9) Some practitioners believed that their work with families led to greater resilience within the wider community;

	10) Partnerships with other organizations led to better awareness of PVE among partner agencies and increased the chances of identifying youth at risk of violent radicalization. *Interviews with participants:* 1) Participants enjoyed the programs and activities, especially sport, leisure, and outward-bound activities; 2) Some participants said they developed new skills, such as music production; 3) There was an increase in self-esteem, empathy, and open-mindedness; 4) Some reported an increased awareness of similarities with those who were previously perceived to be different; 5) Some enjoyed meeting participants who shared the same religion or ethnic background as them as it was an opportunity to discuss and learn; 6) A few participants enjoyed discussing conflicts between their faith and Western values and reported feeling more comfortable with themselves afterwards; 7) The staff was described as respectful, non-judgmental, and empathetic; 8) Some reported they were less likely to offend or re-offend because of improved critical thinking and greater awareness of alternatives to offending; 9) The young people felt they understand Islam better and were more equipped to rebut advances from radical groups; 10) Most young people were confident they would be able to put what they had learned into practice.
Negative Outcomes	*Interviews with staff members and practitioners and program documentation analysis:* 1) The title of the initiative (Preventing Violent Extremism) was seen as unhelpful and stigmatizing by some practitioners. Many felt uncomfortable with this label; 2) Most projects targeted young Muslim men and only focused on Islamist terrorism, which could be perceived as stigmatizing and discriminating, as well as potentially counter-productive; 3) There seems to be a lack of communication between the government and Prevent programs regarding the national agenda and perception of PVE, which was initially focusing on Islamist extremism but then shifted to include more types of extremism without informing the projects. Consequently, many programs could not adjust; 4) There was a lack of clarity and understanding of the term "violent extremism" among practitioners, which led to several projects implementing activities with minimal PVE content; 5) Over half of the practitioners stated they had insufficient time to develop and implement their program. They also stated the timetable was unrealistic, with most projects being at least five months behind schedule;

	6) It was difficult to recruit and retain staff because of the short length of the contracts and the negative views towards Prevent; **7)** It was sometimes difficult to establish partnerships as some organizations, such as local mosques and schools, viewed Prevent as discriminatory. Some mosques started their own programs to keep young people away from Prevent; **8)** Some Imams feared deportation; **9)** Most of the practitioners did not think their intervention was effective in reaching those most at risk of becoming involved with violent extremism (they only had access to low-risk individuals, the higher-risk ones being more secretive, harder to reach, or untrusting of Prevent); **10)** Only three out of the 12 case study programs had external evaluations and only two used pre- and post-intervention measures; **11)** Three participants displayed lower prosocial attitudes at the end of the program than at the beginning; **12)** Eleven out of 12 projects struggled to assess outcomes in a robust fashion; **13)** There seems to be a need for a wider and more holistic approach to counter the risk of violent extremism, involving other agencies and the wider community; **14)** In a few situations, the staff seemed to lack the skills required to ensure input and discussion from participants; **15)** A program had a high turnover of participants due to their legal status and the logistics involved in moving inmates; **16)** Fewer than 30% of the participants were involved over two or three seasons and just over 3% for more than three seasons; **17)** Practitioners expressed concerns about confidentiality and about what would happen to the data collected during their project (namely, if it could be used against the participants). ***Interviews with participants:*** **1)** Branding a project as PVE scared some people/families (double agenda of surveillance and intervention); **2)** Trust issues between the community and Prevent programs; **3)** Some participants felt coerced into activities.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Mixed.
Limitations (Authors)	**1)** It was not possible to determine the number of young people involved in interventions; **2)** Interviews with young participants were not always conducted in ideal situations (e.g., private spaces); **3)** No baseline data to measure progress and the impacts of PVE programs; **4)** Substantial missing data; **5)** The views presented do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the majority of the staff and participants of Prevent initiatives;

	6) Very few negative comments were made among the participants, especially for those who were attending the program under conditions.
Limitations (Team)	1) Little to no information about methods, qualitative data, statistics, and the robustness of results; 2) The evaluation was mostly based on user satisfaction; 3) The practitioner and stakeholder samples are poorly described, and the sample size is not provided; 4) The report should have been divided into two or three reports to make it easier to follow; 5) Practitioners and stakeholders may be biased as they want the program they are involved in to succeed.
Quality of the Study (/10)	8

The authors assessed 48 programs under Prevent in the UK. The study was divided into three stages. The first two involved **1)** a systematic review on preventing religious radicalization and violent extremism and **2)** identifying and evaluating the outcomes and implementation of PVE programs. This was done by interviewing project staff and stakeholders and gathering data in project documentation such as the characteristics of participants, information about the interventions that were delivered (methods of delivery, objectives covered, nature of targeting), and indications of project activity and change over time (*n* = not provided). The study's third stage involved case studies of 12 project sites during which the researchers interviewed practitioners and stakeholders (*n* = 71) about their perceptions and experiences of the program and the interventions delivered. They also interviewed young people (*n* = 33) participating in the programs in order to understand their views, attitudes, and beliefs, as well as their perception of the program's effectiveness. Observations, documentation analysis, and diary analysis were also conducted throughout the study (*n* = 36). Key findings showed an increase in self-esteem, empathy, and open-mindedness, as well as a better understanding of Islam, better communication skills, and a better perception of similarities with those who were previously perceived to be very different by participants of the program. Participants felt they were better equipped to refute advances from radical groups. Practitioners perceived that the young people who participated in their program had progressed and become increasingly involved, which made them think their interventions were directly preventing violent extremism. On the negative side, most practitioners did not think that their intervention was effective in reaching those who were really at risk of radicalization. Also, the fact that the programs were targeting young Muslim men and were branded as PVE had a stigmatizing effect and scared some of the participants. Practitioners expressed concern about the confidentiality of the information they were collecting and what would happen to the data afterwards. Moreover, three participants displayed lower prosocial attitudes at the end of the program than at the beginning. Limitations of the research were noted. According to the authors, there was substantial missing data in the internal evaluations of some programs, and there was no baseline data to measure progress in most programs. Also, it was not possible to determine the number of young people engaged across interventions, and the interviews with young participants were not always conducted in ideal situations (e.g., private spaces).

Very few negative comments were made among the participants, especially for those who were attending the program under particular conditions. Limitations not mentioned by authors include the potential biases of interviewed practitioners and stakeholders, who want the program they are involved in to be successful, the prevalence of user satisfaction measures over other outcomes, and the lack of information regarding the sample and qualitative/ quantitative analyses. The report could have been divided into two or three reports to make it easier to follow.

Table 2.20
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Manby (2009c) | Secondary prevention | General violent radicalization**
Program and Country	Prevent (Film Project), UK.
Objectives of the Program	*Main objective:* Produce a film focused on supporting and challenging young people's views. *Specific objectives:* 1) Support vulnerable individuals who could be recruited in extremist groups; 2) Challenge violent/extremist ideologies and support mainstream views; 3) Open up dialogue with young people.
Sample Characteristics	*Inclusion criteria:* Young people that had been victims of extremism or were disengaged from mainstream activities or were living in polarized communities. *Nine participants:* Six boys, three girls; age = 14–17; they all had experienced violence in their lives; four had committed offenses.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	*Questionnaires and interviews on the following:* 1) self-esteem (Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale); 2) skills learned during the project (including awareness about violent extremism); and 3) general performance. *Data analysis:* Pre- and post- measures were taken and parents were asked to fill questionnaires.
Positive Outcomes	1) Acquisition of knowledge on violent extremism, film production, and teamwork; 2) Greater self-esteem.
Negative Outcomes	1) Establishing a link between violence and extremism was cognitively hard for participants; 2) Unsure if the program will have an effect on future concrete behaviors; 3) One participant committed an offense during the program; 4) Some were suspected of using drugs; 5) The project was time-consuming and expensive.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Mixed.

Limitations (Authors)	None mentioned.
Limitations (Team)	**1)** Low number of participants; **2)** Weak methodology.
Quality of the Study (/10)	7

Manby (2009c) found that participating in the Film Project of Prevent enabled nine teenagers (six boys, three girls, age = 14–17) who all experienced violence in their lives to acquire knowledge about extremism, film production, and teamwork. The program also strengthened their self-esteem. However, participants found it hard to cognitively link extremism and violence; one committed an offense during the program, and multiple participants were suspected of using drugs.

Finally, it was unclear if the program had effects on future behaviors, and was described as time-consuming and expensive. Even though the authors clearly described the negative outcomes of the program, its effects were positive for most participants, leading to a "mixed" overall outcome. Like the other studies from Manby, this one suffers from potentially anecdotal evidence; the low number of participants and weak methodology preclude generalization.

Table 2.21
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Madriaza et al. (2018) | Secondary prevention | General violent radicalization**
Program and Country	Vivre-Ensemble, France.
Objectives of the Program	*Main objective:* Prevent the risk of violent radicalization by promoting cultural and religious pluralism. *Intermediate objectives:* 1) Develop participants' critical thinking about dogmatic thoughts; 2) Develop autonomy in regard to external influences; 3) Develop the recognition of multiple identities.
Sample Characteristics	The Vivre-Ensemble intervention was implemented on two cohorts from the Isère reinsertion and probation penitentiary services (*services pénitentiaires d'insertion et de probation*; SPIP); *n* = 10 (five per cohort). All participants were identified by the internal multidisciplinary commission of the establishment as being receptive to violent radicalization. Due to inconsistencies in the answers to demographic questions, all data collected from the first cycle had to be rejected. The second cohort comprised four men and one woman (mean age = 20.4 years old). All participants had French citizenship, but one was born in Algeria. Two individuals were employed, three were unemployed; one was in a relationship, the others were single; one had not finished college, two had graduated, one had not finished high school, and one had.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	*A pre- and post-test design was used to evaluate the outcomes of the program.* The same online questionnaire was administered before and after the intervention, with items measuring seven domains of interest: 1) sympathy towards radicalization (SyfoR); 2) integrative complexity (Moral Dilemmas Test); 3) self-uncertainty (Scale of Self-Uncertainty); 4) self-esteem (Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale); 5) empathy (Basic Empathy Scale); 6) social isolation (Social and Emotional Loneliness Scale for Adults); and 7) anxiety and depression (Symptom Scale Hopkins-25) The post-test questionnaire added 10 items to measure user satisfaction.

Positive Outcomes	1) A statistically significant decrease in self-instability was observed; 2) All participants were very satisfied with the activities included in the program; 3) All users agreed that they would recommend participating in Vivre-Ensemble.
Negative Outcomes	1) Some participants distrusted correctional services and therefore gave fake answers; 2) Many results were not statistically significant (no change in mental health and sympathy towards radicalization and a slight decrease in self-esteem, empathy, and social isolation) or could not be evaluated (integrative complexity) because of the poor quality of answers written by participants; 3) The majority of participants did not consider that Vivre-Ensemble's activities met their goals or helped them with the issues that led them to incarceration.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Mixed.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Small sample size: 10 individuals participated in the programs, and of these, only the data of five could be analyzed. Indeed, because the real purpose of the intervention was not disclosed the first time Vivre-Ensemble was implemented, some participants changed their answers to certain factual questions (e.g., age) in the post-test, invalidating their data; 2) Participants were selected according to very strict criteria, which limits generalizability; 3) Many of the assessed indicators require considerable time to change, but the follow-up was limited.
Limitations (Team)	1) Textual inconsistencies: change in the number of participants from one page to another; 2) Psychometric instruments were translated by the researchers, which limits content validity (though translations were reviewed by stakeholders); 3) Potential bias: The authors were responsible for the implementation and evaluation of the program.
Quality of the Study (/10)	7

Madriaza et al. (2018) implemented an 18-month research-action project on three sites in France. This project aimed to develop an intervention model for offenders released in the community that are radicalized or at risk of becoming radicalized. These individuals were under the jurisdiction of the reinsertion and probation penitentiary services (*services pénitentiaires d'insertion et de probation*; SPIP). The report presents in detail the implementation of the project, as well as an assessment of its outcomes. In order to assess the impacts of the program, a pre- and post-test design was used.

The same online questionnaire was administered before and after the intervention in order to measure seven dimensions of interest: sympathy towards radicalization, integrative complexity, self-uncertainty, self-esteem, empathy, social isolation, and mental health (anxiety and depression). The 99 items measuring these dimensions were taken from empirically validated instruments (translated by the authors and reviewed by stakeholders when necessary). In the post-test questionnaire, 10 items were added to assess user satisfaction. The Vivre-Ensemble program was implemented twice. Participants were recruited in the Isère SPIP and had committed property damage and exhibited antisocial behaviors. The first time, participants (n = 5) were not told the real purpose of the intervention, and it was found that, when responding to the post-test, participants changed their answers to certain factual questions (e.g., age). The data collected was, therefore, invalidated. The second time, participants (n = 5) were notified of the aim of the intervention, and data collected in the pre- and post-test were consistent. Results revealed that following the program led to a decrease in self-uncertainty, and overall user satisfaction was good. However, most users believed that activities did not meet their expectations and did not help solve the problems that led them to incarceration. Limitations acknowledged by the authors include the small sample size, an issue amplified by having to discard data of the first wave—limited generalizability, and limited follow-up time to detect lasting changes. Other limitations include using psychometric tests with a "homemade" translation in the absence of an official version (of note, efforts were made to ensure the validity of translations, which were reviewed by stakeholders), slight inconsistencies in the writing of the report (change in the number of participants from one page to another), and a potential conflict of interest (authors were responsible for the implementation and evaluation of the program).

Negative Outcomes

Table 2.22
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Bowie & Revell (2018) | Targeted primary and secondary prevention | Violent Islamist radicalization**
Program and Country	Prevent (in universities), UK.
Objectives of the Program	Detect and report extremist behavior among students and colleagues in UK universities to counter radicalization on campuses.
Sample Characteristics	***Eight participants from two English universities with Anglican foundations:*** These included two students with senior experience in student union work (both in their 20s) and six staff members who held multiple roles in universities (all in their 40s and 50s). These roles comprised operating Prevent, operating the chaplaincy, and being responsible for diversity and equality in universities. The sample included Christians, Muslims, and those of no expressed faith or belief, all from a range of genders and sexual orientations.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	***Semi-structured, in-depth interviews:*** Conducted in private, these lasted one to 1.5 hours. They explored how academics, students, and professional officers that are engaged in the implementation of Prevent in Anglican universities understood, interpreted, and applied its controversial policies. ***Data analysis:*** Interviews were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed qualitatively to draw out thematic patterns.
Positive Outcomes	None reported.
Negative Outcomes	1) Risk of controversy and poor implementation of the Prevent policy (concerns that staff responsible for Prevent, mostly teachers, might misinterpret religiosity for radicalization); 2) Students experienced fear and self-censorship due to concern that their teachers are spying on them; 3) General concern about the focus on Muslim populations and lack thereof on far-right extremist groups (highlighting the idea that Prevent is mainly an Islamophobic and racist policy—the inclusion of far-right groups in Prevent documentation being tokenistic); 4) Staff members feeling a tension between their duty as university staff and the obligations of Prevent.

Overall Outcome of the Program	Negative.
Limitations (Authors)	Small sample size.
Limitations (Team)	1) Potential conflict of interest in the choice of participants, specifically those from student unions, who were known to hold existing opposition to Prevent strategy; 2) Lack of information on methodology and data analysis.
Quality of the Study (/10)	5

Bowie and Revell (2018) examined the impact of the UK's Prevent program to counter radicalization on the campuses of two English universities with Anglican foundations. The researchers, through a qualitative approach, conducted semi-structured, in-depth interviews with two students in their 20s (representatives of student unions) and six staff members in their 40s and 50s (key individuals responsible for responding to the Prevent's proposal in university management). The participants included Christians (of differing denominations), Muslims, and those of no expressed faith or belief, and were from a range of genders and sexual orientations. The interviews consisted of questions relating to the following: **1)** the participants' involvement in the development of the Prevent/ Fundamental British Values university policy; **2)** the values and Christian foundations of the university; **3)** feelings about the government's motivations for the policy; and **4)** any training programs used by the university concerning Prevent. Five key themes emerged from the interviews: **1)** the need to be able to speak and make decisions in a religiously-informed way when it comes to judgments around Prevent, as well as the controversy of the Prevent policy and risk of poor implementation; **2)** the existence of issues of radicalization with Christian and non-religious societies and groups, highlighting the narrow perspective of Prevent, mainly focusing on Muslim members; **3)** concerns about free speech, fear of surveillance, active profiling, and concerns that the inclusion of far-right radicalization groups in Prevent was tokenistic; **4)** tension arising from the balance between critical independence and legal compliance, namely worries that universities might not be doing enough to protect students/staff from terrorism and that they were being unethical in engaging with the Prevent strategy; and **5)** the significance of having staff members who understand religious development in young people and have good knowledge and engagement with religious students. While the small scale of the research presents a significant limitation, the authors believe that the in-depth interviews revealed important challenges universities face in responding to Prevent policies. However, other limitations not mentioned by authors also characterize this study, namely potential conflicts of interest in the choice of participants, specifically those from student unions who are known to hold existing opposition to Prevent. Finally, the lack of information on methodology and data analysis limits the evaluation of the empirical strength of the study.

Table 2.23
Summary of Evidence

Study	**HM Government (2011a–d) | Targeted primary and secondary prevention | Violent Islamist radicalization**
Program and Country	Prevent, UK.
Objectives of the Program	*Main objective:* Stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism in the UK and overseas. *Five specific objectives:* 1) Challenge and rebut terrorist ideology; 2) Disrupt the activities of propagandists for terrorism; 3) Support those vulnerable to their messages; 4) Increase community resilience towards violent extremism; 5) Address grievances exploited by ideologues.
Sample Characteristics	*Besides an unknown number of MPs and councilors, a total of 1,158 individuals or organizations participated in the consultation process:* 1) 325 individuals answered the online consultation questionnaire. The majority of respondents identified themselves as from police and local authorities. The others worked in specific sectors of Prevent or were members of the public interested in Prevent. In addition, 78 respondents (individuals or organizations) sent their answers via email and post. Most of them were from local authorities; 2) 586 delegates attended the consultation events. Among these, participants were from local authorities (38%), police (22%), community organizations and faith groups (11%), the National Offender Management Service and Probation (4%), and "other" (19%). Two additional consultation events were held: one for MPs and Peers in the House of Commons, and one for local councilors at the Local Government House in London under the auspices of the Improvement and Development Agency. No information was provided on the number of participants; 3) 124 individuals (37 Muslims, 87 non-Muslims) never involved with Prevent were selected to participate in several focus groups. Respondents were selected using a mix of on-street and snowballing techniques designed to capture a wide range of backgrounds (e.g., working status, socioeconomic group, age, gender). For the Muslim subsample, most individuals were from Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, Bangladesh, and North Africa, and were between the ages of 18 and 44.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	*Online questionnaire:* Respondents were invited to answer 13 questions, with Question 14 providing respondents with an opportunity to make general comments. Questions covered key aspects of the previous Prevent strategy (CONTEST) and sought the views of respondents concerning a proposed new Prevent

	strategy. In addition, specific equality impact assessment questions were included to ensure that the project did not discriminate against any of the following characteristics: race, religion or belief, disability, gender, gender reassignment, sexual orientation, age, pregnancy and maternity, and marriage and civil partnership. ***Consultation events:*** 11 regional consultation events were held in which participants were divided into subgroups of five to 10 persons. As they answered the five questions, one individual per subgroup noted their answers, and these discussion records formed the content for analysis. ***Focus groups:*** A total of 24 in-depth focus groups were organized. Of these, 11 focused on the views of the general public in a variety of regional settings. 13 smaller sessions sought the views of Muslim members specifically. Participants had eight themes/questions to answer and discuss: 1) aims and objectives of the Prevent strategy; 2) broadening of Prevent to include other threats; 3) resilience and resilient community; 4) funding for Prevent-related interventions; 5) important institutions for the Prevent strategy; 6) collaboration of central and local governments along with community organizations to challenge terrorist propaganda; 7) risk-based approach; and 8) resisting apologists for violence.
Positive Outcomes	1) Channel, one of Prevent's key components, was seen quite positively; 2) Broad support of the aims and objectives of Prevent; 3) Some respondents felt that Prevent had had a positive impact on women and young people; 4) It was perceived that the new strategy could help to mitigate the negative impact of CONTEST on religion/race by expanding the scope of violent radicalizations targeted by the program; 5) The proposed strategy could promote active engagement and raise awareness of risks.
Negative Outcomes	*Implementation issues:* 1) Absence of clear guidelines; 2) Poor use/management of funding; 3) Lack of transparency; 4) Lack of consideration of local contexts; 5) Need for more accountability for professionals; 6) Need for more balance between central and local governments; 7) Difficult to evaluate the Prevent activity. ***Iatrogenic effects:*** Climate of distrust between program providers and the community.

	Negative impacts: Prevent was perceived to have a disproportionate focus on specific religions, beliefs, and races. Men and young people were particularly likely to be negatively impacted.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Negative.
Limitations (Authors)	None mentioned.
Limitations (Team)	**1)** Evaluation based on the perceptions of participants who did not go through the program; **2)** Absence of limitations and discussion sections; **3)** Lack of demographic information on the sample; **4)** Vague terms (e.g., "many") in the descriptive statistics.
Quality of the Study (/10)	5

Prevent is part of the CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy in the UK. Its aim is to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. A three-month consultation process was held to review the Prevent strategy and to gauge the public's perceptions of a proposed new strategy. In order to do so, multiple data collection methods were used. First, a 14-item questionnaire covered key aspects of the previous strategy and sought the respondents' views on suggestions to improve the existing strategy. In addition, specific equality impact assessment questions were included in relation to the following protected characteristics: race, religion or belief, disability, gender, gender reassignment, sexual orientation, age, pregnancy and maternity, and marriage and civil partnership. This allowed the authors to consider whether any aspect of the proposed strategy would have a disproportionate impact on any of the aforementioned characteristics. Members of the public were able to answer these questionnaires online, via email, or by post. Three hundred and twenty-five individuals completed the full online questionnaire, and of that, 52% (n = 169) responded to equality impact assessment questions.

Seventy-eight responses were received via post or email from individuals or organizations. Second, 11 regional consultation events were attended by a total of 586 delegates from a wide range of statutory and non-statutory partners. Local authorities, police-community organizations, and faith groups were the largest identifiable groups represented at these events. Approximately one hour was allocated for the completion of five questions on key areas of Prevent. Delegates sat in groups of between five and ten people, with participants mixed by sector and occupation. The discussion record forms provided the content for the analysis of responses. Finally, in order to gauge public opinion on Prevent, 24 in-depth focus groups were held across England, Scotland, and Wales. Eighty-seven respondents were selected using a mix of on-street and snowballing techniques. A separate Muslim-only sample (37 individuals) was also selected, given the perceived negative impact of the previous strategy on this group. None of these 124 respondents had been involved in Prevent consultations, were working in Prevent, or had a political interest in Prevent. No information on how data was analyzed was provided.

Regarding positive outcomes, findings from the equality impact assessment showed that some respondents felt that Prevent had a positive impact on women by removing the constraints that block their participation in the program, empowering them to tackle intolerance and play a more active role in society. Young people were also believed to have been more affected by Prevent, which was considered helpful since they are being targeted by radicalizers and would suffer the most if Prevent did not focus on them. In addition, a key component of Prevent—Channel—received largely supportive comments from respondents. Channel is a police-coordinated, multi-agency partnership that evaluates referrals of individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism, working alongside safeguarding partnerships and crime reduction panels. Comments were largely supportive, quoting its successes and supporting its continuation. The majority of responses to the consultation events were broadly supportive of the aims and objectives of the previous Prevent strategy. Findings reveal that concerns and criticisms were mostly aimed at the implementation rather than the overall strategy. In fact, key concerns raised were that the strategy had not been clear enough and that the objectives were overly ambitious and had been open to misinterpretation. Better communication of the strategy was the other prominent issue raised in responses, as the Prevent brand was tarnished and unpopular within communities.

Many respondents felt that the strategy was too Islam-focused and stigmatized individuals of the Muslim faith. Results from the equality impact assessment supported this since the strategy was perceived to have had a disproportionate impact with regards to religion, belief, and to some extent, race, namely on Muslims of South-Asian, Middle-Eastern, or African heritage. Over 80% of consultation respondents believed that Prevent should address a wider range of threats, including not only Al Qaeda but also violence from extreme right-wing or other ethnic or religious radical organizations. Furthermore, young individuals, especially men, were perceived to have been particularly negatively impacted by Prevent, as they were targeted on the presumption that they were at greater risk of radicalization. Ultimately, the review points out the difficulty of evaluating the strategy and offers recommendations to update it, taking into consideration the outcomes of their reviewing process. However, no limitation and discussion sections were presented in the manuscript by the authors, which is a major limitation according to our team. In addition, the evidence was based on perceptions of participants who did not go through the program, and there was no information on how the data was analyzed. The sample was not detailed enough, and the findings lacked precision, with the constant use of subjective terms such as “some,” “the majority of,” “several,” etc.

Table 2.24
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Joyce (2018) | Targeted primary and secondary prevention | Violent Islamist radicalization**
Program and Country	Prevent (in schools), UK.
Objectives of the Program	**1)** Identify children who may be vulnerable to radicalization; **2)** Know what to do when they are identified; **3)** Build resilience to radicalization through promoting British values and enable them to challenge extremist views; **4)** Manage concerns via setting-based safeguarding policies.
Sample Characteristics	The author identified 38 teachers through termly planning meetings and by talking to them individually. The sample consisted of 27 female and 11 male teachers working in two high schools and 10 elementary schools. Seven held undergraduate degrees, 21 had postgraduate certificates, and 10 had master's degrees. 33 participants were White British, two were British Asian, and three were Black British. The level of experience that teachers had in implementing Prevent in schools varied greatly: 15.8% had no experience, 31.6% had less than one year of experience, 50% had between two to five years of experience, and 2.6% had more than five years of experience.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	Pragmatic, sequential, mixed-method design. *Quantitative:* Cross-sectional data collected via paper-based surveys. *Qualitative:* Semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions to expand on quantitative results. The 38 surveys included information on teachers' sociodemographic and professional characteristics, as well as their attitudes towards the implementation of Prevent. 10 teachers were then interviewed on their general awareness of radicalization and extremism, the fidelity of Prevent, their attitudes towards Prevent, dosage and adaptations made to the program, the quality of the training received, how their pupils reacted to discussions around Prevent, and any other factors that might have affected the implementation of Prevent in schools. Thematic analysis using NVivo12 was applied to analyze the interviews.
Positive Outcomes	Most teachers identified anti-radicalization training as highly important.

Negative Outcomes	1) A large proportion of the teachers expressed that Prevent had not been easy to deliver in their schools, that they had not received enough training, and that they did not feel particularly comfortable putting it into practice; 2) Teachers defined and understood radicalization and extremism in different ways, affecting their perception of what their duty under Prevent legislation should be; 3) Most teachers felt that they were not given enough time to deliver the content, with few opportunities to generalize the training; 4) Teachers' general perception of Prevent is that it has a greater emphasis on policing, as opposed to educating, leading to uncomfortable tensions for some participants; 5) There was a widespread view that there were not enough resources to deliver the program effectively, with teachers having to make up many of their own PowerPoints, documents, and other resources; 6) Almost all teachers had to make adaptations to the program for it to be fit for purpose; 7) The training of the program was deemed inconsistent, with some receiving the training online only.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Negative.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Small sample size; 2) The data collection took place in schools where the author worked as a trainee educational psychologist, and as such, it is possible that teachers may have been more likely to get involved in the project, having had contact with the author in the past; 3) It is also possible that teachers who were willing to talk about radicalization and extremism already had strong views about the topic; 4) Limitations inherent to cross-sectional research (e.g., giving only a snapshot) and semi-structured interviews (e.g., possible lack of objectivity).
Limitations (Team)	None.
Quality of the Study (/10)	9

Joyce (2018) studied teachers' beliefs and values toward radicalization and extremism, as well their perceptions and attitudes towards the implementation of Prevent strategies in primary and secondary UK schools. The study comprised 38 teachers (27 women and 11 men) from different ethnicities: 33 White British, three Black British, and two British Asian. Seven participants held undergraduate degrees, 21 had a postgraduate certificate, and 10 had completed a master's degree. A pragmatic, sequential, mixed-method design was adopted for the research.

Quantitative data was collected via 38 paper-based surveys where participants were asked about their sociodemographic and professional characteristics, as well as their attitudes towards the implementation of Prevent. Ten participants were then purposively selected to conduct semi-structured interviews. Open-ended questions on teachers' general awareness of radicalization/extremism and their evaluation of Prevent's implementation produced the qualitative data. The surveys were analyzed through descriptive statistics, and the interviews were examined by thematic analysis. The results revealed that most teachers highly valued anti-radicalization training. However, they expressed that Prevent had not been easy to deliver in their schools, that not enough training was provided, and that they did not feel particularly comfortable putting Prevent into practice. Teachers defined and understood radicalization and extremism in different ways, affecting their understanding of their duty under the Prevent legislation. Almost all teachers had to make adaptations to the program for it to be "fit for purpose" and had to address the issue of radicalization on their own time. There was a widespread view that there were not enough resources to deliver the program effectively. Teachers' general perception of Prevent was that it has a greater emphasis on policing, as opposed to educating, leading to uncomfortable tensions in classrooms. Finally, the training of the program was deemed to be inconsistent with those receiving training only through online resources. Overall, the research disclosed negative outcomes as pertaining to Prevent duty for teachers in primary and secondary schools. The author noted multiple limitations to their study: the research's small-scale, possible selection biases among participants, and limitations inherent to cross-sectional research and semi-structured interviews.

Table 2.25
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Kundnani (2009) | Targeted primary and secondary prevention | Violent Islamist radicalization**
Program and Country	Prevent, UK.
Objectives of the Program	1) Challenge violent extremist ideology and disrupt its promoters; 2) Support institutions in activity fields related to prevention; 3) Support individuals who are being targeted and potentially recruited in violent extremist causes and support mainstream voices; 4) Increase resilience of communities and address grievances.
Sample Characteristics	*32 participants:* Six Prevent program workers and managers in local authorities, 10 members of local Prevent boards, 10 voluntary sector workers engaged in Prevent, and 6 community workers familiar with local Prevent work. All but 5 participants were Muslim and half were women. Interviewees were selected based upon their experience and knowledge of Prevent projects, rather than being established community leaders; they had a range of prior perspectives on Prevent, ranging from refusing to work on Prevent, to neutral ones, to viewing it positively. Participants were located across England.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	32 interviews (half face-to-face, half by telephone) followed by a roundtable event with 24 participants to explore in more detail the issues that were raised in the interviews. *Questions in the interviews and roundtable were about the following:* 1) the general impact of Prevent funding at the community level; 2) the definition of extremism in Prevent-funded projects; 3) whether Prevent efforts foster social cohesion or exacerbate inter-communal conflicts and divisions; 4) how Prevent programs interact with the local democracy; 5) how Prevent programs depict Muslim communities; and 6) whether Prevent programs involve non-police agencies in intelligence gathering.
Positive Outcomes	None reported.
Negative Outcomes	1) Prevent programs construct the Muslim population as a "suspect community"; 2) Fosters social divisions among Muslims themselves and between Muslims and others;

	3) Encourages tokenism; 4) Facilitates violations of privacy and professional norms of confidentiality; 5) Is counter-productive in reducing the risk of political violence; 6) Has been used to establish one of the most elaborate systems of surveillance ever seen in Britain.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Negative.
Limitations (Authors)	None mentioned.
Limitations (Team)	1) Evaluation based on participants who did not go through the program; 2) Potentially biased sample as to their prior opinions of Prevent.
Quality of the Study (/10)	7

Kundnani (2009) evaluated the general impact of Prevent funding and projects at the community level and examined its effects on social cohesion. The study focused on local authorities in England that have received Prevent funding and voluntary sector organizations in those areas to find out the following: **1)** the general impact of Prevent funding at the community level; **2)** the definition of extremism in Prevent-funded projects; **3)** whether Prevent funding foster cohesion across communities or exacerbate inter-communal conflicts and divisions; **4)** how Prevent programs interact with local democracy; **5)** how Prevent views Muslim communities; and **6)** whether Prevent involves non-police agencies in intelligence gathering. The research took place over a six-month period. During the first part of the study, 32 interviews were conducted (half of these were face-to-face, the rest over the phone) with six Prevent workers and managers in local authorities; 10 members of local Prevent boards; 10 voluntary sector workers engaged in Prevent work; and six community workers familiar with local Prevent work. All but five participants were Muslim, and half were women.

In selecting interviewees, the researchers were interested in speaking to people with experience and knowledge of Prevent projects rather than with established community leaders. Among those interviewed, there was a range of perspectives on Prevent, from those refusing to work on Prevent, to those who were engaged in Prevent projects but with significant concerns, or to those who were reasonably positive about the way Prevent had been designed and implemented. As a follow up to the interviews, a roundtable event with 24 participants explored in more detail the issues raised in the interviews. Overall, the participants voiced several negative outcomes arising from Prevent. Participants argued the following about the program: **1)** It constructs the Muslim population as a "suspect community" due to its focus on Muslims; **2)** It fosters social divisions among Muslims themselves and between Muslims and others (for example, many participants reported that arbitrarily favorizing "moderate" [e.g., Sufis] versus "extremist" [e.g., Salafi] worldviews has generated a climate of distrust and suspicion); **3)** It encourages tokenism; **4)** It facilitates violations of privacy and professional norms of confidentiality;

5) It is counter-productive in reducing the risk of political violence, due to its the promotion of a depoliticizing approach that undermines and discourages democratic deliberation and radical discussions on political issues; and 6) It has been used to establish one of the most elaborate systems of surveillance ever seen in Britain. In short, participants identified Prevent as a strategy that alienates the very people it wants to serve.

Although Kundnani (2009) did not discuss them in his paper, the research suffers from two limitations: The evaluation was based on participants who did not go through the program (staff rather than individuals potentially at risk of violent radicalization), and the selection of participants could have been biased (participants with a mostly negative opinion of the program).

Table 2.26
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Kyriacou et al. (2017) | Targeted primary and secondary prevention | Violent Islamist radicalization**
Program and Country	Prevent (in universities), UK.
Objectives of the Program	*Main objective:* Obstruct university students' exposure to radical and extremist narratives and thereby derail the path to violent extremism. *Specific objectives:* 1) Stop campus speakers from inciting terrorism; 2) Block access to websites inciting terrorism on campus computers; 3) Offer pastoral support to radicalized individuals or those becoming radicalized (students and staff members).
Sample Characteristics	*Nine British Muslim undergraduate students.* Invitations to participants were sent to contacts at several universities in the UK, who were asked to forward the invitations to members of the Islamic Society in their respective institutions.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	The aim of the study was to explore participants' perceptions concerning Prevent and its impact on their sense of personal and national identity. Data was collected over an eight-week period via an online questionnaire. The questionnaire comprised five-point Likert scale questions to measure agreement with a number of statements and 12 open-ended questions which required the students to report their views on the following: 1) To what extent are the students aware of the government's Prevent strategy?; 2) How do the students think the Prevent strategy will impact their experience of higher education?; 3) What do these students think about the Prevent strategy and its effectiveness in combating terrorism?; and 4) Has the Prevent strategy had any influence on their sense of personal and national identity?
Positive Outcomes	1) Participants had a general understanding of Prevent; 2) One student felt Prevent enhanced his/her identity as a British Muslim.
Negative Outcomes	1) None of the participants believed Prevent was effective or would ensure that students are not radicalized; 2) The majority of participants believed that Prevent failed to understand the root causes of terrorism and could use more effective strategies;

	3) Most felt that Prevent encourages Islamophobia and suspicion of young Muslims, that it is clearly focused on Muslims, and not—as stated by the government—on a broad range of groups that might be involved in terrorism; 4) Several were worried about possible negative repercussions on Muslim students' university experience (such as feeling isolated, becoming extra vigilant about what they say, and discourage them from going to university); 5) Three participants said that Prevent made them feel like they did not belong in Britain and made Muslims feel that they are an isolated and monitored group; 6) One participant described Prevent as institutionally racist.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Negative.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Low response rate; 2) Small, unrepresentative sample; 3) Researchers had no way of knowing which universities the participants attended.
Limitations (Team)	Lack of details about the sample.
Quality of the Study (/10)	5

Kyriacou et al. (2017) explored the views of a small sample of British Muslim students regarding Prevent and its impact on their sense of personal and national identities. The sample consisted of nine undergraduate students who were recruited through members of the Islamic Society at their respective institutions. Over an eight-week period, an online questionnaire was administered. It comprised five-point Likert scale questions to measure agreement with a number of statements and 12 open-ended questions which required the students to report their views on the following: **1)** To what extent are the students aware of the government's Prevent strategy?; **2)** How do the students think the Prevent strategy will impact their experience of higher education?; **3)** What do these students think about the Prevent strategy and its effectiveness in combating terrorism?; and **4)** Has the Prevent strategy had any influence on their sense of personal and national identity?

The responses overall revealed negative outcomes. First, none of the participants believed Prevent was effective, nor that it would ensure students did not become radicalized. Second, the majority of participants believed Prevent failed to understand the root causes of terrorism and could benefit from employing more effective strategies. Third, most argued that Prevent encourages Islamophobia or suspicion of young Muslims, and that it is clearly focused on the Muslim community and not—as stated by the government—on a broad range of groups that might be involved in terrorism in the UK. Fourth, several participants were worried about possible negative repercussions on Muslim students' university experiences, such as feeling isolated, becoming extra vigilant about what they say, and being discouraged from going to university. Fifth, three participants said Prevent made them feel like they did not belong in Britain and made Muslims feel that they are an isolated and monitored group.

Finally, one participant described Prevent as "institutionally racist." Alongside these negative perceptions, most participants said they had a general understanding of Prevent and its processes. Indeed, one participant felt that Prevent enhanced his/her identity as a British Muslim.

Limitations in the study highlighted by the authors include the low response rate and ensuing small sample size, its potential unrepresentativeness, and the fact that researchers had no way of knowing in which universities the participants attended. In addition, the manuscript was scarce on details about participants.

Table 2.27
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Lakhani (2012) | Targeted primary and secondary prevention | Violent Islamist radicalization**
Program and Country	Prevent, UK.
Objectives of the Program	*Five main objectives:* 1) Challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream voices; 2) Disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support the places where they operate; 3) Support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment or have already been recruited by violent extremists; 4) Increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism; 5) Address the grievances which ideologues are exploiting. *Two specific objectives:* 1) Develop supporting intelligence, analysis, and information; 2) Improve strategic communication.
Sample Characteristics	*56 male participants recruited through snowball sampling:* 12 members of the Muslim community; 31 individuals involved with this community (e.g., imams, representatives); one minister; two high-level public servants; three government employees; one police officer; two university teachers; and four researchers. *Respondents were categorized into two groups:* 1) informed informants (individuals conducting deradicalization and counter-radicalization work at the grassroots level within particular local Muslim communities) and 2) community members (members within four distinct local Muslim communities who were not, to the author's knowledge, directly exposed to those with extremist beliefs).
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	*Data collection:* Data was gathered over a nine-month period through in-depth, semi-structured interviews across England. Several respondents were interviewed multiple times. *Data analysis:* Transcriptions of the interviews (produced by the author using Express Scribe) were analyzed using a combination of both thematic and comparative analyses. NVivo 8 was used for qualitative analysis.
Positive Outcomes	A very small minority of grassroots groups believed many elements of the Prevent strategy were crucial to their work to provide a stronger support structure for at-risk individuals.

Negative Outcomes	1) ***Funding issues:*** Money invested through the Prevent Strategy was being wasted because many of the funded projects were far removed from the overarching aims of Prevent. Local authorities lacked knowledge and confidence on how to allocate funding for projects run by non-state actors. Local authorities were accused of funding groups with whom they already had established networks, regardless of whether these organizations had the capacity, knowledge, or experience to achieve the aims of Prevent. Local authorities were opting to fund projects which seemed to be the safest, easiest, and most risk-averse. There was a disconnect between local and central governments with a lack of specified guidance from central to local. Finally, participants felt that the government was "throwing money at the issue" in order to be seen as actively attempting to reduce the threat. 2) ***Community confusion:*** Participants found it difficult to see any obvious correlations between the commissioned projects they knew and the end goal of Prevent, due to blurred lines between community cohesion projects and counter-terrorism work. Terms such as "terrorism," "radicalization," and "violent extremism" were being used under the Prevent banner when in reality, many projects had very little, if any, meaningful connections with these issues. 3) ***Intelligence gathering/spying:*** Prevent was perceived as being used as an intelligence-gathering or spying tool for the State. Many feared that these methods, when coupled with other counter-terrorism legislations (e.g., detention without charge), could potentially disrupt the lives of individuals who were later released without charge. Muslim communities were looking at one another with suspicion, causing an element of distrust and apprehension. Half of the grassroots respondents admitted they either regretted receiving Prevent funding, subsequently refused it, or attempted to conceal it from their communities.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Negative.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Lack of trust towards the researcher; 2) Unwillingness to discuss sensitive issues around the topic of terrorism.
Limitations (Team)	1) Poor reporting of sample characteristics and research methodology; 2) Evaluation based on participants who did not go through the program; 3) Potential conflict of interest in the choice of participants (e.g., ministers and government employees); 4) Lack of female participants.
Quality of the Study (/10)	6

Lakhani (2012) assessed the perception and reception of the UK's Prevent Strategy using a sample of 54 male participants who were either **1)** conducting deradicalization or counter-radicalization work at the grassroots level within local Muslim communities or **2)** Muslim community members who were not, to the author's knowledge, directly exposed to those with extremist beliefs. The research gathered data over a nine-month period through in-depth semi-structured interviews across England. Transcriptions of the interviews were analyzed through a combination of thematic and comparative analyses using NVivo 8. The data revealed three main concerns: **1)** *Funding issues:* Participants believed money invested through the Prevent Strategy was being wasted because many of the funded projects were far removed from the overarching aims of Prevent. Local authorities lacked knowledge and confidence on how to allocate funding for projects run by non-State actors. Local authorities were also accused of funding groups with whom they already had established networks, regardless of whether these organizations had the capacity, knowledge, or experience to achieve the aims of Prevent. Furthermore, local authorities were opting to fund projects which seemed to be the safest, easiest, and most risk-averse. There was a disconnect between local and central governments with a lack of specified guidance from central to local. Finally, participants felt that the government was "throwing money at the issue" in order to be seen as actively attempting to reduce the threat. **2)** *Community confusion:* Participants found it difficult to see any obvious connections between the commissioned projects of which they were personally aware and the end goal of PVE due to the blurring of lines between community cohesion projects and counter-terrorism work. Terms such as "terrorism," "radicalization," and "violent extremism" were being used under the Prevent banner, when, in reality, many projects had very little, if any, meaningful connections with these issues. **3)** *Intelligence gathering/spying:* Participants argued that Prevent was being used as an intelligence-gathering or spying tool by the State. Many feared that these methods, when coupled with other counter-terrorism legislations (e.g., detention without charge), could potentially disrupt the lives of individuals who were later released without charge. Muslim communities were looking at one another with suspicion, causing an element of distrust and apprehension. Half of the grassroots respondents admitted they either regretted receiving Prevent funding, subsequently refused it, or attempted to conceal it from their communities. The study has several limitations; as the author recognized, lack of trust towards the researcher and an unwillingness to discuss sensitive issues around the topic of terrorism greatly limited the number of participants and reliability of the collected responses. Limitations not mentioned by the author comprise the lack of female respondents, potential conflicts of interest in the choice of participants (stakeholders who did not go through the program), and poor reporting of sample characteristics and research methodology.

Table 2.28
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Younis & Jadhav (2019) | Targeted primary and secondary prevention | Violent Islamist radicalization**
Program and Country	Prevent (in health care), UK.
Objectives of the Program	Identify and report patients who show signs of vulnerability towards radicalization.
Sample Characteristics	*16 National Health Service staff:* 10 psychiatrists, three psychologists, two general practitioners, and one manager; nine men and seven women; nine Muslim and seven non-Muslim; 10 ethnic minority and six White British.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	*Data collection:* All participants were recruited via snowballing. Semi-structured, open-ended interviews were carried out in person, as well as over the phone, and lasted between 30 minutes to two hours. A two-way dialogue was used to unpack participants' experiences of Prevent training and its translation into practice. *Data analysis:* A thematical content analysis was used to measure the narratives, where a mind map was constructed to connect themes to particular social contexts.
Positive Outcomes	None reported.
Negative Outcomes	1) Fear and moralizing discourse intrinsic to Prevent training; 2) Self-censorship among health care staff, more prominently for Muslim participants, who experienced anxiety and fear about speaking out during training; 3) Perception of Prevent as a racist policy which first and foremost targets Muslim populations; 4) Moral distress, anger, and lack of trust arising from structural issues within the National Health Services, which were amplified by integrating Prevent training.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Negative.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Most participants already held critical positions towards Prevent; 2) Small number of participants; 3) Lack of delineating between various health professionals participating in the study; 4) Prevent training sessions may have differed significantly during the ethnographic fieldwork.

Limitations (Team)	None.
Quality of the Study (/10)	5

Younis and Jadhav (2019) studied Prevent's impact on 16 National Health Service (NSH) professionals, who participated in mandatory Prevent counter-radicalization training. Participants were recruited via snowballing and comprised nine men and seven women, of whom nine were Muslim, and seven were non-Muslim. In addition, 10 participants were from ethnic minorities, and six were White British. Already at the beginning of the research, participants expressed varying degrees of dissent to Prevent policies. Semi-structured and open-ended interviews were carried out in person, as well as over the phone. A thematic content analysis was used to qualitatively understand the participants' experiences with Prevent training and their ability to share these experiences with others. Two overarching themes associated with the self-censorship of health care staff during Prevent training were identified. Fear and morality were underscored in the first theme: Participants identified Prevent training as morally charged and were afraid that they would be labelled as a terrorist sympathizer if they raised criticism about the program. Participants also labelled Prevent as a racist policy, which first and foremost targeted Muslim populations. Muslim participants reported difficulties navigating the moral salience of Prevent and the moral distress it caused them through self-censorship.

The second theme was related to structures in the NHS beyond Prevent, which nonetheless contributed to self-censorship. Participants were more self-conscious about censorship when they received training with staff they did not know as it made them feel distrustful towards each other. In addition, participants did not tend to raise their dissent when they perceived trainers simply as mediators/actors following institutional scripts. The "reluctant trainer" effect was exacerbated when the trainers themselves recognized that Prevent may pose ethical concerns but were compelled to follow the script they were given. Finally, participants expressed concerns about the limited time and attention they could devote to personal and ethical matters in the healthcare climate, highlighting the austerity and burn out issues in the UK context. The authors mentioned a number of limitations to their study, namely the exclusion of participants who may feel neutral or supportive towards Prevent, the small sample size, the lack of delineation between participants who come from a wide range of health professions, and ethnographic fieldwork being affected by significant changes occurring during Prevent training sessions.

Table 2.29
Summary of Evidence

Study	**McDonald & Mir (2011) | Targeted primary prevention | Violent Islamist radicalization**
Program and Country	Prevent (Pathfinder), UK.
Objectives of the Program	Improve mutual understanding on issues of policing, crime, and community safety between police, stakeholders, and select individuals from Black and minority ethnic communities residing in London. Improve policy development and service delivery for communities in the future.
Sample Characteristics	*1st phase:* 1,149 community residents from five boroughs: Newham (Tamil Sri Lankan), Tower Hamlets (Bangladeshi), Redbridge (Pakistani), Haringey (Turkish/Kurdish and Turkish/Cypriot), and Ealing (Somali). 54% men, 46% women; average age < 30 years old. *2nd phase:* 48 Muslim community members of 10 different ethnicities among participants that were recruited in the first phase.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	*Qualitative data collection:* Semi-structured questionnaires, one-on-one interviews, and expert briefings. *1st phase:* Local consultations in all five boroughs using semi-structed questionnaires to gather feedback from residents on a range of concerns about local crime, community safety, and local policing. *2nd phase:* More in-depth research (one-on-one interviews) on issues that emerged in the first phase.
Positive Outcomes	1) Decreased sense of suspicion and anxiety because of inter-group contact; 2) Better relations between Muslims (and other communities) and the police where mutual understanding and engagement had previously been low.
Negative Outcomes	*1st phase:* Participants expressed a number of issues afflicting their communities, which included: 1) a lack of trust and confidence in policing; 2) hate crimes and Islamophobia; 3) hidden crimes (such as domestic violence, forced marriage, and drug use); 4) youth crimes and gangs; and 5) vulnerability of young people to gang recruitment.

	2nd phase: Focused more precisely on the issue of Al-Qaeda-influenced terrorism, participants felt the Prevent program: 1) was excessively focused on their community; 2) led to a strong sense of discrimination; 3) decreased community trust and confidence in the police leading to under-reports to the police; 4) described the Muslim community as a single-faith group which tended to alienate this community; 5) was discriminatory and institutionally racist; and 6) police intervention was not seen as a helpful tool for prevention with discontent expressed by Muslim respondents on account of unfair and discriminatory "stop and search" incidents experienced in their communities.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Negative.
Limitations (Authors)	*Pre-held attitudes of participants:* 1) Lack of community trust in the police; 2) The subject of Prevent was itself already contentious, especially within Muslim communities.
Limitations (Team)	The interviews in the second phase, led by volunteers from the same communities as the participants, may have led to biases and created obstacles to the participants' ability to freely express their opinions.
Quality of the Study (/10)	6

McDonald and Mir (2011) present the results from a community-engagement program called Pathfinder, which assessed UK's Prevent program by focusing on local issues of policing, crime (violent extremism), and community safety between the police, stakeholders, and a sample of Black and minority ethnic communities residing in London. Five community organizations facilitated peer-led engagement research in the boroughs. Approximately five volunteers from each community organizations were selected on the basis of the following: **1)** their interest in participating and contributing to local policing and community safety issues; **2)** access to and knowledge of their own communities; **3)** lack of understanding and engagement with local services (including the police) in their community; **4)** ethnic background; and **5)** ability to add value to existing engagement activities. These volunteers received training and capacity-building instruction to help them undertake their local fieldwork in the community. The study, using semi-structured questionnaires, interviews, and expert briefings, collected qualitative data from 1,149 community residents in five London boroughs; 54% were men and 46% women, with an average age of below 30 years old. The first phase of the study revealed a number of issues afflicting the communities: **1)** a lack of trust and confidence in policing; **2)** hate crime and Islamophobia; **3)** hidden crimes (such as domestic violence, forced marriage, and drug use); **4)** youth crime and gangs; and **5)** vulnerability of young people to gang recruitment. The second phase of the program focused more specifically on

the issue of Al-Qaeda-influenced terrorism. Interviews of 48 Muslim community members across 10 different ethnicities revealed that local Muslims felt that the Prevent program: **1)** was excessively focused on their community; **2)** led to a strong sense of discrimination; and **3)** decreased community trust and confidence in the police, leading to under-reports to the police. Respondents also expressed concerns over how their faith was being misrepresented in the wider media. Contrary to these negative results, some participants believed that Prevent had decreased sense of suspicion and anxiety because of inter-group contact and led to better relations between Muslims and the police where mutual understanding and engagement had previously been low. The large sample size and the variety of representatives across different sections of the city display a sound research method. However, as mentioned by the authors, the results must be interpreted in light of the pre-held negative attitudes of participants towards Prevent and the police. One limitation not mentioned by the authors was the potential social desirability arising from interviews of the second phase being conducted by volunteers from their own communities.

North America—Positive Outcomes

Table 2.30
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Castillo (2015) | Primary prevention | General violent radicalization**
Program and Country	Los Angeles Police Department's (LAPD) iWatch Anti-Terrorism Program, USA.
Objectives of the Program	Use community-oriented policing programs to foster positive relationships among community members and law enforcement as a means of creating partnerships to gather information about suspicious terrorist behavior.
Sample Characteristics	10 LAPD officers (eight men, two women; between 30 and 51 years old; seven patrol-level officers and 3 full-time supervisors) and eight community members (four men, four women; between 30 and 67 years old; education ranging from high school to graduate). All participants were purposefully recruited based on their familiarity with the iWatch program.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	*Qualitative explanatory single-case study:* 18 one-on-one semi-structured interviews comprising 31 open-ended questions, administered face-to-face or over the telephone across a period of eight weeks. Interview questions were field-tested by two anti-terrorism professionals with experience in the field of law enforcement and research. *Data analysis:* Transcriptions of the interviews were analyzed through a constant comparative method to identify emerging codes, which were then sorted into themes concerning participants' perceptions of the iWatch program.
Positive Outcomes	1) iWatch was seen as a valuable program for anti-terrorism purposes; 2) Community policing was seen as an effective tool against terrorism; 3) Law enforcement education was perceived positively; 4) iWatch was thought to create effective guardians within the community who would be able to work with law enforcement professionals to report suspicious terrorist activities; 5) Feelings of empowerment, acknowledgement, and mutual trust were associated with iWatch.
Negative Outcomes	1) Federal government failed to provide specific guidelines for anti-terrorism in the US; 2) Lack of communication regarding anti-terror guidelines/ programs between the federal government, law enforcement, and community.

Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.
Limitations (Authors)	**1)** Selection of a very specific population and site; **2)** Findings limited in scope/participants/geographic region, therefore, not applicable to other contexts; **3)** Methodology did not account for existing views and biases of participants and researchers.
Limitations (Team)	Potential conflict of interest in the choice of participants (e.g., police officers).
Quality of Study (/10)	9

Castillo (2015) explored the perceptions of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and Los Angeles community members concerning LAPD's iWATCH, a partnership program aimed at countering violent extremism by building positive relationships between police departments and the communities they serve. The research employed an explanatory single-case study design within a qualitative approach and focused on iWatch's idea of capable human guardians as an important section of community policing for reporting suspicious terrorist activities. The participants, who were purposefully selected based upon their familiarity with the iWatch program, included 10 key informant LAPD law enforcement members (eight men and two women; between the ages of 30–51 years old; seven patrol-level officers and three full-time supervisors) and eight Los Angeles community members (four men and four women between the ages of 30–67 years old). A field test was performed with two anti-terrorism professionals with experience in the field of law enforcement and research to assess the credibility of the interview questions. Eighteen one-on-one semi-structured interviews that comprised 31 open-ended questions were administered face-to-face or over-the-telephone across a period of eight weeks. Data collection consisted of a transcript-based analysis record of the interviews. A constant comparative method was employed to identify emerging codes, which were sorted into themes concerning participants' perceptions about iWatch. Results revealed that, overall, participants believed iWatch was valuable for anti-terrorism purposes. More specifically, participants recognized community policing as an effective tool against terrorism and considered law enforcement education on anti-terrorism as a positive engagement. Furthermore, participants indicated that the iWatch program was a valuable tool for both community and law enforcement members. Finally, feelings of empowerment, acknowledgement, and mutual trust were associated with the program. Participants also highlighted shortcomings, namely the federal government's failure to provide specific guidelines for anti-terrorism efforts and the lack of communication regarding anti-terror guidelines/programs between the federal government, law enforcement, and community. The author recognized that the lack of control for pre-existing views of participants, the selection of a very specific population and site, and the limited scope and focus of the interviews might have limited the representativeness and applicability of results. Another limitation not mentioned by the author pertains to the potential conflicts of interest arising from interviewing police officers to assess a program run by the police department itself.

Table 2.31
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Helmus & Klein (2019) | Secondary prevention | Islamist and far-right radicalization**
Program and Country	Redirect Method, USA.
Objectives of the Program	*Main objective:* Prevent unobstructed access to extremist content. *Specific objective:* Expose individuals searching for violent extremist content on Google to an ad that redirects them to counternarrative videos.
Sample Characteristics	Google AdWord technology was used to identify Google searches in the US for violent radical content. Those who did the searches were subsequently exposed to counternarrative videos in the search results. 216,221 searches were identified during the duration of the program.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	Descriptive statistics about the number of searches for violent radical content and the number of clicks on counternarrative videos.
Positive Outcomes	The campaign effectively exposed individuals searching for violent jihadist or far-right content to videos offering alternative narratives. Among those exposed, 2.39% clicked on a link leading to a counternarrative video. This result is on par with industry standards in web advertising. The campaign was more successful in placing Google ads and CVE videos in front of users who searched for violent jihadist content than in front of individuals who searched for far-right extremist content. In addition, more users looking for violent jihadist content (3.19%) clicked on counternarrative links than those looking for far-right content (2.22%).
Negative Outcomes	None reported.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.
Limitations (Authors)	Partial evaluation that did not assess the impact of the counternarrative videos on users' attitudes and behaviors.

Limitations (Team)	**1)** Not enough information about the methods, namely the content of counternarrative videos, and by whom they were produced; **2)** No information about the keywords that were used to trigger the Redirect method.
Quality of Study	7

Helmus and Klein (2019) assessed the impact of the Redirect Method, a PVE campaign implemented in 50 US states. The Redirect Method used Google Ad technologies to identify 216,221 searches looking for either violent Islamist or far-right extremist content. The campaign then exposed those individuals to an advertisement in their search results that linked to counternarrative videos. The results of this study suggest that the Redirect Method achieved its primary goals: to expose individuals searching for violent jihadist or far-right content to counternarrative videos. However, the campaign was more successful in placing Google ads and CVE videos in front of users who searched for violent jihadist content than those looking for far-right extremist material. In addition, more users looking for violent jihadist content (3.19%) clicked on counternarrative links than those looking for far-right content (2.22%). Even though the overall outcome of the program was considered positive, the authors mentioned that this partial evaluation did not assess the impact of the video content on users' attitudes and behaviors. In addition to limitations identified by authors, there was a lack of information about counternarrative videos: What is their content, who produced them, and how was exposure to videos measured? Furthermore, no information was provided regarding the keywords used to trigger the Redirect method.

Table 2.32
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Williams et al. (2016) | Primary prevention | General violent radicalization**
Program and Country	World Organization for Resource Development (WORDE), USA.
Objectives of the Program	***Main objective:*** Create and maintain networks of civically engaged individuals who are sensitized to violent extremism and who have proactive, cooperative relationships with local social services and law enforcement agencies. ***Specific objectives:*** Promote volunteerism, youth civic engagement, cross-race/cross-religion social integration, and family relationship building.
Sample Characteristics	***179 youth and adults in Montgomery County, Maryland.*** These individuals fell in one of two categories. The first was comprised of those who had participated in any of WORDE's programs (n = 133). To ensure data was collected across demographic categories, a stratified random sample was selected from the list of interested participants. The second category was comprised of 46 individuals who reported participation in volunteerism or multicultural events, but never with WORDE. These participants were recruited by interfaith and public-school partners in Montgomery County, as well as in electronic bulletin boards (Facebook, Craigslist, Google groups). Both groups were statistically matched with respect to nine factors: 1) religiosity; 2) religious dogmatism; 3) political extremism; 4) amped political extremism; 5) emotional stability; 6) historical loss; 7) modern racism; 8) resiliency and coping; and 9) trust in police. No additional demographic information was provided on the participants.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	***Data collection:*** Focus groups were held with individuals who participated in WORDE volunteer-service or multicultural programs, where the researchers asked about motivations to participate and perceived benefits. The various answers were distilled into categories that the research team considered PVE-relevant: 1) feeling welcomed; 2) feeling part of something bigger than oneself; 3) feeling a sense of teamwork; 4) making friendships beyond the project;

	5) making friends with people from other races; 6) feeling useful; 7) having responsibilities; 8) having leadership responsibilities; 9) feeling a sense of purpose; 10) feeling free of peer pressure; 11) feeling accepted; 12) not feeling lonely; 13) not feeling afraid to talk to others; and 14) learning about other cultures. ***Data analysis:*** Employing time-series analyses, change in attendance to PVE program events was also tested. Combined with factor analyses, this allowed the authors to predict individuals' future participation in activities and programs. Additionally, to compare those who had participated in WORDE with those who volunteered in other programs or multicultural events, propensity-score matched analyses were employed.
Positive Outcomes	1) Participants felt the project had its intended effects on 12 of the 14 outcomes believed to be relevant to PVE; 2) No discernable iatrogenic effects.
Negative Outcomes	1) Two outcomes scored below the midpoint (making friends with people from other races and having leadership responsibilities); 2) None of the outcomes were significantly better in comparison to the subsample of participants who volunteered or participated in multicultural events other than WORDE.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Positive.
Limitations (Authors)	1) Some secondary PVE projects under WORDE could not be implemented during data collection and thus were not included in this evaluation; 2) Social desirability bias may have affected responses and was not controlled for; 3) Findings may not be generalizable; 4) Findings rely on inferential statistics; 5) Insufficient data (i.e., events/time points) to yield any discernable patterns or trends over time regarding the size of attendance at WORDE's various programs.
Limitations (Team)	1) Lack of demographic information; 2) Compares WORDE participants' responses to those of individuals who have taken part in similar projects rather than a fully-fledged control group.
Quality of Study	7

The World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE) is a US, community-based, and Muslim-led organization of committed individuals, local social services, and law enforcement officers. WORDE's approach to PVE does not consist of a single program, but an interlocking set of three types of programs: **1)** community education; **2)** Islamic training for Law Enforcement and cooperation between community, law enforcement, and social services; and **3)** volunteerism and multi-cultural programming. Williams et al. (2016) evaluated the effects of all of WORDE's volunteer-service and multicultural programming on 14 PVE-relevant outcomes. To do so, 179 individuals were administered the same survey. 133 of them had previously participated in a WORDE program and the 46 remaining had attended similar but non-WORDE programs. The instrument, created and tested by the authors, measured the following PVE-relevant constructs: **1)** feeling welcomed; **2)** feeling part of something bigger than oneself; **3)** feeling a sense of teamwork; **4)** making friendships beyond the project; **5)** making friends with people from other races; **6)** feeling useful; **7)** having responsibilities; **8)** having leadership responsibilities; **9)** feeling a sense of purpose; **10)** feeling free of peer pressure; **11)** feeling accepted; **12)** not feeling lonely; **13)** not feeling afraid to talk to others; and **14)** learning about other cultures. The WORDE participants' responses to this 99-item survey revealed that the volunteering and multicultural projects were perceived to have achieved 12 out of the 14 expected outcomes relevant to PVE. These included the feeling of working in a team, having a sense of purpose, being accepted, and collaborating in something bigger than oneself. The only two outcomes that were not achieved were making friends with people from other races and having leadership responsibilities. However, by comparing scores of the two groups on the successful outcomes, no statistically significant difference was found. In other words, WORDE programming's expected outcomes were reliably produced but not in a superior way relative to other similar types of programming. Factor analyses further revealed that participants' future participation in WORDE projects could be significantly predicted by their level of satisfaction, the quality of alternatives, and the level of personal investment, with these three factors explaining 77% of the scores for self-reported commitment to the projects. The authors mentioned several limitations to their research, including the possibility of a social desirability bias, or that the results could not be generalized outside of Montgomery County (Maryland). The team also noticed that there was no demographic information on the sample and questioned the decision to use individuals who participated in similar programs (outside of WORDE) instead of a fully-fledged control group. Notwithstanding these limitations, this study offered a clear analysis of perceived program outcomes.

Mixed Outcomes

Table 2.33
Summary of Evidence

Study	**Campbell III (2011) | Primary prevention | General violent radicalization**
Program and Country	See Something, Say Something, USA.
Objectives of the Program	1) Make the public more aware of tactics used by terrorists; 2) Keep the public more informed of threats; 3) Empower the public to report suspicious activities to the proper authorities; 4) Work closely with state and local authorities, as well as community groups, to fight crime and terrorism.
Sample Characteristics	A total of 25 individuals participated in this study, separated into two groups. *Government subsample (n = 10):* Department of Defense employees were recruited using both a purposive and snowball sampling technique. Half of these participants were females, and the mean age was 48.8 years old, with participants ranging from 41 to 61 years old. All participants but one were Caucasian. *College students subsample (n = 15):* Students were recruited through convenience sampling in communication department classes at a Mid-Atlantic university. 12 participants were women, and three were men. The mean age of this subsample was 22.4 years old, with individuals ranging between 18 and 33 years old. Five students were Caucasian, four were Afro-American, three were Asian, one was East-Indian, one was Persian, and one was Middle Eastern.
Methods: Data Collection, Procedure, and Measures	*Data collection:* The author conducted 25 in-depth semi-structured interviews, using a protocol pre-tested with two graduate students in communication. The interviews asked basic demographic questions and how the participant made meaning of terrorism, counter-terrorism, and campaign messages. Detailed transcriptions of the recordings were made. *Data analysis:* Using a grounded theory approach, the author looked for patterns, concepts, themes, and ideas that emerged from the data.
Positive Outcomes	1) A sense of empowerment due to giving citizens the ability to do something; 2) Raising awareness and increasing vigilance; 3) Informing the public to recognize domestic terrorism as a threat and challenging preconceived associations of terrorism with Middle Easterners (or Islam); 4) The campaign messages had a somewhat greater impact on young adults.

Negative Outcomes	1) Participants felt that the Department of Homeland Security should do more to publicize the campaign. All were receptive to the messages, but few had ever heard of it; 2) Although they felt they should be involved in the campaign, the messages had a smaller impact on government employees.
Overall Outcome of the Program	Mixed.
Limitations (Authors)	1) The author conducting the interviews can lead to biases in the data; 2) Because the government subsample was mostly unaware of the campaign, it could not be considered as the "internal public" subsample, which the author would have wanted. Therefore, the study became a comparison of two external publics: the government and young adults.
Limitations (Team)	1) Small sample size limits generalizability; 2) No detailed qualitative results were reported—only positive and convenient quotes selected by the author; 3) Lack of precision in the result section: subjective terms (e.g., "most," "a majority," "many") were used instead of clear numbers and statistics; 4) No description of the content of the campaign videos and press releases, which could have helped to understand why the campaign was unknown to most participants.
Quality of Study	6

Through a qualitative study, Campbell III (2011) aimed to evaluate the impacts of the Department of Homeland Security's See Something, Say Something counter-terrorism campaign. The goal of the campaign was to raise public awareness of terrorist tactics, keep them informed of potential sources of danger, and encourage them to report suspicious activities to the authorities. In order to examine how the campaign messages would impact various publics, interviews were conducted with two groups. The government subgroup comprised 10 Department of Defense employees recruited using a purposive and snowball sampling technique. Ages varied from 41 to 61 years old (M = 48.8), and women accounted for half the sample. Nine participants were Caucasian, and one was from another ethnicity. The external public subgroup (participants who did not work for a government agency) came from a Mid-Atlantic university. Fifteen students were recruited during classes from the communication department, using a convenience sampling method. All students but three were women, ages varied between 18 to 33 years old (M = 22.4), and this subsample was culturally diverse: Five students were Caucasian, four were Afro-American, three were Asian, one was East-Indian, one was Persian, and one was Middle-Eastern. All 25 interviews were conducted by the author, adopting an interview protocol pre-tested with two communication graduate students. The interviews began with basic demographic questions, followed by a few questions that sought to understand how participants made meaning of terrorism and

counter-terrorism. Participants then read two press releases regarding the campaign, followed by a viewing of the See Something, Say Something campaign video. Participants were then asked how they made meaning of the campaign messages. In order to conduct the analyses, detailed transcriptions were made by the author and coded in three steps: open coding, axial coding, and selective coding. This permitted for patterns, concepts, themes, and ideas to emerge from the data to determine how both subsamples made meaning of the campaign messages, and if those messages were effective in getting the public to act. All in all, the messages from See Something, Say Something were well received and had several impacts. One of the campaign goals was to raise awareness and vigilance, and it was successful for 16 participants (most of them from the student subgroup). Empowering the public to report suspicious activities to the proper authorities was another goal of the campaign, and it was met. In fact, most participants expressed a sense of empowerment following exposure to the campaign, and 19 expressed direct feelings of self-efficacy. A sense of personal responsibility for counter-terrorism efforts was also expressed by 9 participants (7 from the student subgroup and 2 government employees). Several student participants expressed a desire to be involved but felt that before being exposed to the campaign, they did not know how. After exposure, many participants knew how to take action and felt compelled to do so. Finally, the last goal of the campaign was to inform the public about terrorist threats and tactics. After being exposed to messages, most participants realized that domestic terrorism was a real threat. Some participants who previously associated terrorism with Middle-Easterners or Islam recognized that other threats exist, challenging their preconceived notions of terrorism. However, it should be noted that even though all participants were receptive to the messages, few had ever heard of the campaign before the evaluation study. Therefore, participants felt that more efforts should be made by the Department of Homeland Security to publicize the campaign. Limitations mentioned by the author include the possibility that the interviewer (and author) biased the information and ensuing data. The author also mentioned operationalization issues, which led to the comparison of two external publics (government employees and students) rather than an internal and external public. Our team also noticed other limitations, such as the small sample size, which limits generalizability. In addition, the evidence is not particularly robust, as no detailed qualitative results were reported—only positive and convenient quotes selected by the author. Furthermore, the results lacked clarity since subjective terms like "most," "a majority," and "many" were used instead of precise numbers. Finally, the article did not provide much information regarding the content of the campaign videos and press releases, which could have helped to understand why the campaign was ineffective in reaching most participants prior to the evaluation study.