

POLITICAL AFFAIRS



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Political Affairs is a double-blind, peer-reviewed publication. Its mission is to showcase the finest undergraduate essays on political topics that combine excellent scholarship with superb writing. The Journal welcomes a wide range of positions so long they are well-supported and persuasive.



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Editor's Letter

A major undertaking tests a person's commitment to that first inspirational idea. The thought of an undergraduate journal in the Department of Political Science came at a time when I was eager to get more of my own work published. There had been a journal released at only one other time, in 2012, yet there was nothing in place that embedded publishing in the culture of the student community to sustain a yearly publication. The prospect of working on an editorial team was appealing, and many students still wanted the opportunity to have their work read by a larger audience. At the same time, I realized that if I spearheaded the effort to establish a journal, the brazen publishing of my own pieces would open up a credibility gap. So I switched goals temporarily, and my confidence grew daily in the value of the trade-off.

After the PSSA approved the proposal, the next order of business was to build a star-studded team of peers. I was fortunate to have taken courses with some highly intelligent people who were also keen writers. Bringing great people on board led to being introduced to their great friends. So capable was the group, in fact, that I had to scramble to fill a gap after *The Concordian* poached one of my assistant editors just as the project was getting off the ground. This was unexpected because I did not anticipate that one of my challenges would be to ward off the headhunting of the arch-plotting newspapers. I look back on the episode as a testament to the strength of this company of editors. With the nucleus of the project set, I went searching for members of the faculty to join. Professor Schofield saw me coming from a mile away. "Oh, please don't. Please don't," he said, sensing I was about to propose an increase to his already colossal workload. Thankfully, though, he agreed. The same goes for Professor Sokolon who provided invaluable advice on how to carry out a disinterested peer review.

At its core, this journal is about the dialectical contest of ideas that are marshalled in such a way as to leave something that matters in the forum of politics. This arena is inherently contentious, even combative, and the most effective warriors are often the ones who show a love of their chosen language. Sooner or later a person has to make a choice, or at least learns to live with the choice that is made after the rhetorical smoke clears and the dust settles. Concord is thus achieved in phases, and each subsequent phase connects to the previous one so that a person can look back and see how the dots connected and which ideas endured. Political Affairs reflects the salient desire for one's work to last and be appreciated by others far into the future. It is what motivated the writers and artists of this issue to suffer through umpteen revisions of their drafts, a period in which they likely wished someone would turn the editor into a root vegetable and punt him off the balcony. But after the long and arduous work is complete, the reader can sit back and enjoy what they have accomplished.

Isaac Paonessa
May 31, 2014
Montreal

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Levon Petrossian takes up a surgical examination of why the Athenian Stranger is repeatedly interrupted in Plato's Laws. The intrusions reflect a salutary dissent and suspicion that have a proper place in government. Petrossian asserts that Plato is deliberately employing this dialogic technique to illustrate a sound legislative process and to show that lawmaking should not be left to a single statesman, especially at a state's founding moment.

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Christian Holloway observes that some facilitators of governmental crimes incur damage to their careers and image, but many do not face criminal charges due to the ability of lawmakers and politicians to cunningly circumvent their own legal systems. Those few who are unfortunate enough to face their deserved criminal charges are often only there to serve as scapegoats for the corrupt actions of those above them in the chain of command. Despite the challenges in fighting governmental crime, Holloway commendably outlines potential solutions and holds official corruption under the microscope with the hope of starting a meaningful dialogue on this grave issue. In an age in which technology has increased government's capacity for surveillance, never before has this topic been so pertinent to the largely unaware public.

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Pictures of a pre-adolescent toting an AK-47 rifle arrested people's attention when reports of child armies burst into the public consciousness. But, as is the case with news from far and away, it fell off the Western radar with a faint assumption that the problem had also gone away. Partly in response to the oversimplification that she laments about the Kony 2012 video, Patricia Faucher returns us to the topic of child soldiers and soberly faces the puzzle of an enduring child presence in some African armies. Faucher tests three hypotheses against the case of the Lord's Resistance Army led by Joseph Kony, and her deep analysis is as thorough as it is instructive. For undergraduates taking courses that require a rigorous scientific methodology in their writing, this research paper will serve as touchstone.

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The history of political theory finds itself vulnerable to the spectre of redundancy, which always seems to overshadow philosophers who unfortunately find themselves in historical contexts prior to the 20th century. Using contemporary conceptions of liberty as a foundation from which to provide an analysis, Anna Spieser seeks to rescue the French Enlightenment's political theorist Condorcet from precisely this threat. Drawing upon Isaiah Berlin's cardinal work on the twofold concept of freedom, this article aims at and succeeds in drawing meaningful connections between, on the one hand, philosophers such as Rousseau and Condorcet, and on the other hand, contemporary political theory so as to preserve the significance of these theorists beyond the scope of their time.

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While it is true that Nietzsche's favourite philosopher was the famous nihilist Arthur Schopenhauer, it was not, according to Daniel Rhodes, the aim of Nietzsche to affirm nihilism. Rhodes provides a clear account of the Nietzschean framework which accepts nihilism, in a broad sense, only to encourage individuals to push away from the conditions out of which this disposition to the world thrives. By way of engaging in a rigorous study of Nietzsche's work, Rhodes clarifies the distinctions between nihilism and the notions that are often conflated with it. This article aims to rescue Nietzsche from the misrepresentations that often arise from these creative interpretations and that ultimately mislead many to associate Nietzsche with an advocacy for nihilism.

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Ideology is a concept that, while deeply penetrating arguably every part of society, is difficult to identify with any precision. In this article, Spiro Metaxas aims to clarify the work of James Scott and Gerhart Niemeyer who take up the task of revealing the ideology-laden aspects of modernity. More pointedly, Metaxas argues that although these two theorists do have important differences throughout the course of their analyses, there are conceptual overlaps that help clarify the results of their studies so as to better understand the ideology of modernity upon which one can firmly ground their critique.

Illustrations by Graeme Adams

Graeme is a graphic design artist from Toronto. He is entering his fourth year at Concordia this fall, majoring in studio arts and minoring in creative writing. Graeme worked as the graphics editor at The Link newspaper during the 2013/14 school year. If you have read The Link, you may recognize Graeme's signature style as you flip through the pages of Political Affairs. After graduating, Graeme hopes to continue to pursue his passion of drawing through editorial illustration work or possibly art education.



Do Not Pardon the Interruption:

The Benefits of Interjections in Plato's Laws

by Levon Petrossian

When people think of interruptions in their daily lives, they often associated them with impatience or outright insolence. Sometimes, however, interruptions are a necessary part of discourse, to make sure that the speaker does not get away

with flawed arguments or false assumptions. Throughout Plato's *Laws*, there are countless instances where Kleinias and Megillus demand clarification from the Athenian Stranger. He seems to truly enjoy beating around the bush, engaging in a back-and-forth with the Cretan or the Lacedaimonian,¹ or simply delaying his explanations. Therefore, it is understandable that they would like to have the Athenian make his points in a more direct manner after he has set an initial prelude to any

¹ Lacedaemonia (or Lacedaemon) is Sparta, and I will henceforth refer to the city-state as "Sparta" and its people (and, by extension, Megillus) "Spartan." The "Cretan" refers to Kleinias throughout the paper.

given law. Yet, on at least three occasions, instead of merely demanding elucidation and brevity, Kleinias and Megillus interrupt the Athenian Stranger outright in the middle of his speeches. I believe these intrusions underscore moments of suspicion or disapproval on the part of Kleinias and Megillus. This is either because the Athenian's explanations do not match his preludes, because he is making assumptions that Kleinias or Megillus consider to be incorrect, or because the arguments are based on incomplete information.

The first interruption is by Kleinias at the outset of Book III, and it differs from the rest not only with regards to the theme but also because it is right after the Stranger's first few words (676a5). After he lays the rules for wine-drinking in the previous Book, the Stranger enquires about the "original source of the political regime," and he does so in the form of a question that he answers himself (676a2). He allows neither Kleinias nor Megillus to state their view on the matter, but begins to assume a widely held viewpoint before the Cretan cuts him off. In the great majority of other cases, the Athenian Stranger – even when answering his own questions – seeks approval before continuing. In this instance, Kleinias' interruption has an effect on the Athenian's explanation of the origin of regimes. Prior to it, he was about to assume

an all-embracing viewpoint; subsequently, to respond to Kleinias' disruption ("From which?" [676a5]), he adds that it is "from the same viewpoint one should always choose in order to see the progression of cities as they change towards virtue and at the same time towards vice," thereby adding a second viewpoint in the form of a comparison (676a6-8).² The Stranger has still not explicitly stated what this viewpoint is, so his interlocutor asks for it again. Only then does the Athenian describe it as one that "embraces an infinite length of time and the changes during that time" (676b1-2; emphasis added). Still not satisfied with this explanation, Kleinias demands more clarification, and finally the Stranger has to back-track and use ancient examples to explain how he arrived at that conclusion. In this instance, the Athenian Stranger cannot simply make an assumption and expect the other two to accept it without examining it first.

The second interruption – this time by Megillus – occurs as the Athenian Stranger is criticizing a structural flaw in Sparta's regime (691d10). Leading up to this, the Athenian was speaking of one of the

2 It is my belief that by separating the viewpoint into virtue or vice, there are now multiple causes for the progression of cities instead of only one. The Athenian Stranger's mistake was to assume that the same causal logic can apply to prosperity and to destruction, i.e. divine will. Consequently, one can view this separation as taking power away from a god and making humans responsible for the progression of their cities.

causes of civil strife that derives not from the populace, but rather from the king himself, which is “the desire to have more than the established laws allowed” (690d5; 691a4-5). The kings of Argos and Messene both made these mistakes, and it led to their destruction (690d6-8). In the preceding conversation concerning the relationship between the ruler and his subjects, Kleinias is the one responding (689e5-6). However, once the Athenian Stranger addresses the problem of kingship and asks, “what should the legislator have set up at that time in order to forestall the emergence of this affliction,” Megillus steps in to request clarification (691b1-2).³ At this point, the Athenian takes the opportunity to speak specifically about Megillus’ “people” (691b8). Within his condemnation, the Athenian refers to a certain rule he had brought up earlier, namely, that “the stronger rule and the weaker be ruled” (690b3-4). When power is given to the weaker it will assuredly lead to destruction. The Athenian argues that no mortal being who is given power will ever be able to rule efficiently, especially not a young person (691c9-691d1). While he makes his point, he begins to condemn the mortal ruler afflicted by the “lack of intelligence” that accompanies youth, but, as he draws closer to explaining how this was specifically avoided in Sparta, Megillus interrupts him. The Athenian

³ However, this is not the interruption I am referring to.

Stranger continues his idea, stating that “there was some god taking care of [them]” who added four elements for the legitimacy to rule through different methods: divine power, old age, family relations, and lottery (691d11). All of these exemplify the relationship between the leader and the citizens that the Athenian Stranger was already talking about with Kleinias (691e3-692a8). As opposed to the first interruption, I do not believe the Athenian Stranger changed his intention once Megillus severed his dialogue, as evidenced by his acknowledgement that “[efficient lawmaking] did occur in those days” (691d8). He then continues with the idea that the Spartan regime was aided by a god, the first of four relationships. The alternative would have consisted of the Athenian Stranger’s admittance that the Spartan regime did not heed the structure of the rulers and the ruled, which would have been foolish, considering that it survived, whereas Argos and Messene did not (692a11). On the other hand, I do not know how Megillus perceives this response as Kleinias becomes the interlocutor immediately thereafter.

However, it should be noted that Herodotus’ account of the Spartan institution is different than the Athenian Stranger’s. The selection of the twin kings was not made by a god, but by the Spartans themselves in consultation with the Delphic

Oracle (Pangle 1980, 523). Maybe Megillus has heard Herodotus' version; maybe he knows something the Athenian Stranger does not. If that were the case, Megillus may have the intention of covertly letting the Athenian know that his argument was based on potentially false information. The fact that the Athenian disregards the Spartan can mean one of two things: either he was unaware that there were two versions of the inception of Spartan government – which supports the claim that leaving legislation to one person has intellectual drawbacks – or he was fully cognizant of the two versions, but chose to advance his point on the preferred version – which is more concerning, politically speaking, because it suggests that the Athenian can create laws based on blatant lies.

The final interruption – Kleinias' second – emerges much later in Book IX when the Athenian Stranger states one of his more important and contentious assumptions: “that the bad are all bad involuntarily in every respect” (860c10; 860d1). This leads to a crucial problem for legislation, which the Athenian himself raises (speaking in place of either Kleinias or Megillus). Should punishments account for the differences between involuntary or voluntary injustices? Or as he suggests, should they all be equal seeing that there are no voluntary injustices (860e11-861a2)? Kleinias tells the Athenian Stranger

that there are two possible ways to proceed: they can either discard the notion that injustices are done involuntarily or prove the veracity of the notion by offering a point of comparison (861c8-11). The Stranger opts for the latter option and is now tasked with proving how voluntary and involuntary injustices differ, yet sticking with the idea that involuntary injustices are always the case. The way in which he approaches this is to add a third element, that injuries are not all injustices, thereby separating injuries into involuntary and voluntary. In this case, the involuntary injury will go unpunished (861e6-862a8). For example, consider the citizens killed during the war games. The law would impose a small penalty in order to teach those who involuntarily injure someone to never do it voluntarily (862d2-5). This, however, reveals an argumentative error on the part of the Stranger. Fortunately, the Cretan picks up on it and asks him how the “difference between injustice and injury has [been] mixed up with the difference between the voluntary and the involuntary in these matters” (863a8-10). In the Athenian's defence, as opposed to his lack-luster reactions to the previous two interruptions, he does go on to finally support himself with a dialogue about spiritedness, pleasure, and ignorance. It seems reasonable to assume that the Athenian himself is learning from this process of interruptions. To get back to the

intrusion, I believe it is a check on the part of Kleinias to make sure that the Athenian Stranger does not diverge from their prelude-based discourse and make a law strictly based on a personal theory of injustice. While the interruption itself may not be the primary factor here, the subsequent questioning by Kleinias enables him to have the Athenian Stranger explain himself more thoroughly, as with the first case.


To conclude, I firmly believe that these interruptions by Kleinias and Megillus are not in the *Laws* by chance and that they are significant to the legislative process. I also reassert the idea that these are instances of suspicion, inherent disapproval, or simply serve as a reminder to the Athenian Stranger that the laws for this new city should not be built on any personal motive. Although the Cretan and the Spartan have generally behaved as yes-men, they, too, are skeptics about the legislative process; they would rather have the Athenian proceed with their approval. Yet, when all is said and done, both Kleinias and Megillus have been won over by the legislative prowess of the Athenian Stranger, enough to consider having him participate in the establishment of Magnesia against his will (969c7-8). The end result, however, does not take away from the importance of an immersive discussion about legislation. What can be learned from Plato's *Laws* is that,

at the founding of a city, no single person should be left responsible for the entire political process. However knowledgeable he or she may be (as the Athenian Stranger's intellect has shown), anyone is subject to cognitive biases and limitations. Interruptions – normally frustrating – serve as a barrier for illogical and illegitimate laws, and the inherent suspicion exhibited by Kleinias and Megillus is a healthy trait for any government official to have.

Levon Petrossian was born and raised in Laval. He is a third-year student at Concordia, pursuing a BA Honours in political science and a minor in history. His areas of concentration are international relations, security studies, and foreign policy. Political theory is not his academic focus, but rather a personal interest that was sparked by Hobbes's *Leviathan* and Machiavelli's *The Prince*. His contribution is the result of a recurring annoyance with the interruptions in the dialogue of Plato's *Laws*.

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Quiet Corruption in North America: *The Dearth of Consequences to Governmental Crime*

by Christian Holloway

Corruption is a topic that is discussed extensively in today's media. Especially in Canada, with the Charbonneau Commission and the Senate expenses scandal, corruption seems to be a word we can not escape from hearing on a day-to-day basis.

This discussion on corruption raises many issues. One of these problems is the definition of the word "corruption", what encompasses a "corrupt act", and whether these terms are synonymous. By defining the many different forms of corruption, and breaking down the umbrella definition typically assigned to all forms of corruption, the branch of corruption that is referred to as "governmental crime" can be seen as one of the most dangerous. This paper will discuss this form of corruption and attempt to find a viable solution if one even exists. An elaboration on

what encompasses this type of corruption and an explanation of why it poses a more serious threat than other forms of corruption will then be raised. The severity and danger that is “governmental crime” has led to an overlooked area of corruption that is allowing those who commit these crimes to avoid being held accountable for their breaches of the law. Once the theoretical framework has been established three case studies of “governmental crime” will be presented: one historical, and two that are fairly recent. The combination of both historical and current case studies is to contrast the end result of the historical case study with the developing series of events pertaining to the more recent case studies. In doing this, it allows for key indicators in the current case studies to be compared with the historical and demonstrate that they all similarly result in a lack of consequences for those who committed the offences. The first case study is a historical analysis of the Watergate scandal that occurred in the 1970’s involving former U.S. President Richard Nixon.

The second case study I will present is the robocalls scandal, involving the intentional misinforming of polling stations to voters across Canada during the 2011 federal election. The last case study I will examine is the NSA Wiretapping Program in the United States. This case study will examine the legality

of the program and how it is a corrupt action performed on behalf of the NSA and the United States federal government. Through these case studies, I will draw the conclusions that in each of these examples there was a presence of “governmental crime”. It will then be demonstrated that those truly responsible are not held accountable, let alone faced with ramifications for their actions. Lastly, recommendations that represent a viable solution to the problem of holding accountable those responsible for a “governmental crime” will be raised. This solution will show how the current case studies, as well as the historical case study could have an end without bringing the administration of justice into question when dealing with these types of crimes.

Defining Corruption

Before beginning to discuss the concept of “governmental crime”, as well as the inherent loopholes used by those responsible in order to escape from facing ramifications for them, we must first define the umbrella term “corruption”. Corruption is described as an umbrella term because it encompasses many different facets that are unique and should be defined in their own right. Corruption, as defined by Carl J. Friedrich, is “deviant behaviour associated with a particular motivation, namely that of private gain at public expense”

(Friedrich 2011, 15). This will be the basic definition I will use throughout my paper when I refer to corruption.

“Deviant behaviour” in this paper will be classified as “governmental crime”. This means that, while some forms of corruption may not be explicitly illegal, “deviant behaviour” has been chosen to denote an act that has broken some form of binding legislative directive. This definition also lacks clarity when it refers to “private gain”. For the average person this is simply a reference to monetary gain such as bribery, fraud, or embezzlement. In this paper however, I am establishing the definition of “private gain” in an indirect implication.

While the abuse of power for monetary gain would be deemed corrupt, this paper focuses on a more political private gain. The definition of “private gain” that concerns governmental crime is the attainment of political benefits (Friedrich 2011, 15). This can be classified as deviant behaviour to attain voter support, agenda support, policy backing, or a general political advancement. While a politician who fraudulently attains an edge in an upcoming election is seen as less severe by the public than one who embezzles millions of dollars, they should not be viewed in such a different light. The politician who wins an election because of information that was illegally

attained, resulting in an edge over the opposing candidates, will be elected for another term. This re-election allows them to receive an income for another term based on corrupt acts. This is no different than falsifying expenses while in office and attaining a monetary gain as a result.

Defining “Governmental Crime”

Governmental crime can be defined as a smaller group of different crimes, under the umbrella definition of corruption. In this case governmental crime is “a broad term for the whole range of crimes committed in a governmental context” (Friedrichs 1995, 54). The term governmental crime includes any illegal act committed by those in the political spectrum (politicians, civil servants, departments/agencies, etc). However, because governmental crime is a broad category, for the purpose of this paper we may break it down into two separate groups. The first is state crime. State crime can be defined as “activities carried out by the state or on behalf of some state agency” (Friedrichs 1995, 54). The second group is labeled as political white-collar crime. This can be defined as “illegal activities carried out by officials and politicians for direct personal benefit” (Friedrichs 1995, 54). This now begins to show why we established the definition of

corruption previously before continuing. Similar to the above definition of corruption, the idea of direct personal benefit in this instance means a political benefit such as votes, or agenda support. While similar, these two definitions differ in the manner only by who is the one committing the crime. In state crime it is the government, or an agency, that has performed the corrupt act. In political white-collar crime, it is an individual, or a group of individuals that do not represent a specific sector or agency of the government.

Loopholes in Combatting Governmental Crime

Having established the definitions of political white-collar crime and state crime, I will now explain the flaws built into these two forms of governmental crime. These flaws are loopholes in the forms of justifications, excuses, or manners to avoid being held accountable. These are used by those who have been found to have committed a form of governmental crime in order to distance themselves from any wrongdoing. This is possible because governmental crimes deal with those who are in control. It is difficult to prosecute someone for a crime, when the people responsible for the crimes committed are the ones who deem what is illegal (Ross 2012, 79). There are many ways to justify an act of

governmental crime. The first of these is that governmental crime can be argued as necessary to fulfill agendas (Ross 2012, 79). This means that when a political individual, or agency, breaks the law in order to gain an advantage, they can argue that it was necessary in order to fulfill the agendas it promised. This serves to give the crime a sense of legitimacy and justification. Another flaw involved with trying to reprimand those responsible for an act of governmental crime is that the guilty party can argue the *raison d'état* which is "the right of the state to engage in affairs on its own soil" (Ross 2012, 75). This can be executed because, as official entities of the state, they are in charge of governing the state in question. As a result, an implied relinquishment by the people is given to them, thus allowing them to govern in the manner that they see fit.

These first two ways in order to legitimize an act of governmental crime are circumstantial depending on whether they appease the citizens of their state. If a political actor is found to have committed an act of governmental crime, those responsible can use these two tactics to avoid responsibility if the public allows them to be used. There exist two other loopholes which allow for total separation from any smallest sense of a wrongful act. The first is the concept of plausible deniability. Plausible deniability is the act

of having a subordinate carry out a task where there is no evidence that a higher ranking official was the one who ordered the task, in this case the task being a governmental crime. As a result, if the subordinate is caught, the higher ranking official can deny any knowledge of the act and can go so far as to condemn them for having done the act in question (Walton 1996, 1). While it does result in someone taking responsibility for a governmental crime, it provides a loophole for higher ranking officials who are frequently even more responsible than the subordinate.

Even if all of these loopholes fall through, however, there is a natural barrier to holding accountable those guilty for governmental crimes. This natural barrier is that in our society, the consequences for governmental crime are political. This can be explained as those who have breached their duty in their respective position of government are not placed before a tribunal, but are instead asked, as the most serious form of punishment, to step down. When confronted with charges of corruption relating to an abuse of power, a politician has to simply step down, and all is resolved. If, however, the same charges of corruption relating to an abuse of power faced a person within the private sector, they would be put before a criminal court. This built-in acceptance by society creates an environment where a political

entity is blameless once they no longer have the power to abuse their position again. This has resulted in an imbalance in the legal system that causes no deterrence for future political entities from attempting these same governmental crimes.

To reaffirm what has been said, following is a quick summary of the theoretical framework surrounding governmental crime and why there exists a lack of consequences for such acts. As was stated previously, governmental crime is “a broad term for the whole range of crimes committed in a governmental context” (Friedrichs 1995, 54). Governmental crime is a form of corruption because, as we saw from the definition of corruption above, it encompasses both an abuse of power, as well as the pursuit of private gain (Friedrichs 1995, 54). That being said, governmental crime is comprised of two sub-categories, namely state crime and political white-collar crime.

These two forms of corruption create an inherent difficulty when it comes to the attempt to combat these crimes. The difficulties are as follows: 1) those who commit these crimes are the ones in charge of the law, 2) these acts are portrayed as necessary to fulfill agendas, 3) the concept of *raison d'état*, 4) the concept of plausible deniability, and most importantly, and 5) the fact that political crimes result in political consequences.

With an understanding of the concepts and theories behind my argument, we can now examine how political actors escape responsibility for their governmental crimes in both historical and current contexts.

Watergate Scandal, 1972

The first case study is the examination of the Watergate scandal, and how it is an example of political white-collar crime. The Watergate scandal of 1972 started with the break-in of the Democratic National Committee's headquarters located at the Watergate office complex (Kutler 2010, 5). The seven men arrested in connection with the break-in were G. Gordon Liddy, E. Howard Hunt, Virgilio González, Bernard Barker, James McCord, Eugenio Martínez, and Frank Sturgis (Kutler 2010, 5). All of these men had a connection to the president at the time, Richard Nixon, as they were all either members or affiliates of the Committee to Re-Elect the President (CREEP) (Kutler 2010, 5). During the break-in, the seven men attempted to place microphones and other listening devices in the offices, as well as take pictures of the Democratic National Committee's files (Kutler 2010, 5).

All of these men pleaded guilty, thus avoiding a trial or any inquiry further into the matter of the burglary (Kutler 2010, 6). However, this was not a satisfactory conclusion

for everyone, especially Judge John Sirica. Judge John Sirica was a member of the grand jury that presided over the hearings of the convicted burglars, but suspected that the burglary ran deeper than these seven men (Kutler 2010, 6). Judge Sirica's suspicions were correct, and in March 1973, James McCord had written a letter to Sirica stating that "the White House had pressured the defendants into silence with offers of executive clemency and hush money" (Kutler 2010, 6). McCord's letter stated that "government officials had approved the burglary, and conspired to cover up their own involvement" (Kutler 2010, 6). The resulting effects of McCord's letter was that the Watergate grand jury continued to investigate, as well, a Senate special committee was also created to also investigate the Watergate affair.

The investigation into a possible attempt by the White House to cover up their involvement in the burglary resulted in subordinates fearing they would be pinned for the organization of the break-in of the Watergate complex (Kutler 2010, 6). This fear led staffers Jeb Magruder (former Deputy Director of CREEP), as well as John Dean to testify against the President and the Oval Office, directly linking their involvement to the Watergate incident (Kutler 2010, 6). Dean linked the President to a hush-fund used to pay off the seven men who were convicted in direct relation to the burglary, while

Magruder linked the President to an attempt to cover up his involvement (Kutler 2010, 6). On April 30, 1973, President Nixon did exactly what Magruder and Dean feared, Nixon attributed the entire Watergate burglary as the actions of “overzealous subordinates” (Kutler 2010, 6).

This attempt, however, to pass the blame on to his subordinates would quickly unravel due to a hugely significant discovery by the Senate committee investigating the Watergate affair. Former White House aide, Alexander Butterfield, had testified that within certain rooms within the White House, there existed recording devices that would have recorded a significant amount of Nixon’s conversations (Kutler 2010, 7). After many attempts by both the Senate committee investigating Watergate, and the grand jury, the Nixon administration turned over these recordings. When the recordings were received, it was found that the tapes had sizeable gaps removed from them, that “technical experts later judged intentional” (Kutler 2010, 7). Some tapes, however, even after being edited, contained such convincing evidence of foul play by Nixon that he was now in direct light for impeachment (Kutler 2010, 7). Finally, the tape of June 23, 1972, provided clear and concrete evidence of Nixon attempting to cover up his involvement in the affair (Kutler 2010, 8).

Before he could be impeached by the Senate committee, President Richard Nixon resigned on August 9, 1974 (Kutler 2010, 8). In his resignation speech Nixon showed no remorse, nor accepted any wrongdoing by his actions in relation to the Watergate burglary that he orchestrated. After his resignation, Nixon did not face a tribunal, nor any form of committee or grand jury, and was seen as having paid his debt by resigning. In 1974, President Ford (Nixon’s Vice-President, and successor) granted Richard Nixon a full pardon for crimes he committed during his presidency (Ford 1974). A pardon is granted to those who have been charged and convicted of a criminal offence, who have repaid their debt to society by completing their sentence, and are now currently law abiding citizens as well as a functioning member of society. This adds insult to injury when discussing the lack of ramifications Nixon faced because he did not complete any of such requirements, yet he was still granted a full pardon.

The historical case of Richard Nixon and the 1972 Watergate scandal is an exemplary model of the lack of consequences for governmental crime. President Nixon orchestrated a burglary in order to gain a political advantage in the upcoming federal election in the United States. He broke the law in pursuit of private gain. When the Senate committee

investigating Watergate and the grand jury began to look deeper than those convicted in direct relation to the Watergate burglary, Nixon began to exploit the loopholes mentioned above. Nixon attempted to cover up his involvement by stating the entire incident was organized by his subordinates and that he had no knowledge they had planned to do so (Kutler 2010, 6). This attempt to cover up his involvement is an example of Nixon attempting to use the concept of plausible deniability.

When the former White House aide revealed that there existed recordings of the president that could possibly be beneficial to proving his involvement, Nixon attempted to withhold the tapes on the justification that “their disclosure would violate the confidentiality of the presidency and erode the separation of powers” (Kutler 2010, 7). Nixon attempted to use another loophole in order to justify his actions, stating that withholding the tapes was necessary to protect the system of governance. In the tape that recorded Nixon attempting to cover up his connections to the break-in, he is heard plotting to use the Central Intelligence Agency to say that the tapes could not be released because they threatened CIA operations in Mexico (Kutler 2010, 41). This was Nixon’s attempt to exploit the loophole of using the state agenda to justify not releasing

the tapes that would convict him.

Robocalls Scandal, 2011

Like the Watergate case study, the robocalls scandal is also an example of political white-collar crime. During the 2011 Canadian federal election, voters across the country were contacted and given false information relating to the location of their respective polling locations (Maher 2013). The calls were placed by a man claiming to be from Elections Canada under the pseudonym Pierre Poutine from Separatist Street in Joliette, Quebec (Maher and McGregor 2013, 2). These calls sparked an investigation by Elections Canada that is still ongoing at the time of writing. During the investigation by Elections Canada it has been found that those who were called identified themselves as non-Conservative party supporters, and that those who did identify themselves as Conservative party supporters were not contacted with the false information (Maher 2013). The Conservative party has acknowledged that its database was used to filter out party supporters in order to compile the list used to place the calls (Maher 2013).

The investigation by Elections Canada traced the phone calls and discovered they had originated out of Guelph, Ontario (Maher and McGregor 2013, 2). Through

further digging, the investigation by Elections Canada found sufficient evidence which has resulted in a suspect being charged, Michael Sona. Sona was the director of communications for Guelph Conservative candidate Marty Burke and remains the only person charged in relation to the investigation (Payton 2013). Michael Sona has been charged with the hybrid offence of willfully preventing or endeavouring to prevent a voter from casting a ballot (Payton 2013). As a result, Sona faces a \$2,000 fine and one year in jail on a summary conviction, or a \$5,000 fine and five years in prison on an indictable conviction (Payton 2013).

However, while being the only one at the moment charged in the case, Sona has stated many times, on record, that he is being used as a scapegoat by the Conservative party (McGregor & Maher 2013). Astonishingly, evidence exists to support his claims. In interviews, Sona stated that he did not have access to the database that was used to compile the list of those called (Maher & McGregor:1 2013). In fact, documents show that only five members of the Guelph Conservative campaign accessed the party supporter database, and Sona was not one of those individuals (Maher 2013). While there is evidence to suggest Sona was not the sole actor in the 2011 federal election scandal, it seems that he is the only person of

interest at this moment in the investigation. Michael Sona's allegations that he is the Conservative party's scapegoat does not seem to be unreasonable, and in fact seems quite plausible. As the director of communications for Marty Burke, Sona did not have access to the required database in order to complete the robo-calls. It is also worthy to note that the only reward from misleading voters of their polling stations was to sway votes. Sona would not directly gain anything from this, and it seems that receiving a five year prison sentence is a significant risk for something one does not benefit from. That is, however, if Sona was acting alone. It seems fairly certain that Michael Sona is the face of a crime and is only a puppet for someone at a higher level. At this time, the investigation is far from being concluded, Michael Sona's trial is set months from the time of this paper. Therefore, these conclusions are only speculative and these allegations should be re-examined once the investigation has reached a close when all evidence is brought forward. Yet from my deductions, I would conclude that Michael Sona is the victim of plausible deniability. As a man who gains nothing privately from swaying votes, it seems unlikely that he is the one who orchestrated this entire affair. The only tie between those responsible and Michael Sona is Sona's testimony. This is not sufficient to rid him of guilt. Therefore,

those in charge can use the concept of plausible deniability to distance themselves from any wrongdoing. Similar to the Watergate affair, higher level officials are using their subordinates to be accountable for their acts of governmental crime.

NSA Wiretapping

The third case study is of the National Security Agency (NSA) wiretapping program and is an illustration of state crime, rather than political white-collar crime seen in the two previous cases. The NSA wiretapping program is a program where the National Security Agency has been found to be secretly monitoring American citizens, as well as the citizens of countries across the globe (Ball and Ackerman 2013). The actual name of the wiretapping program being brought to question is called PRISM. The program was implemented in order to combat global terrorism and is subjected to the guidelines under the Federal Information Securities Act (FISA) 1978 and the FISA Amendments Act (FAA) 2008 (Ball and Ackerman 2013). One of the key components of both of these acts is that the wiretapping, or interception of communication, is only permitted when the parties involved are not American citizens and that the collection of data from American citizens is forbidden (FISA 1978). The current wiretapping program being used by

the NSA under the Obama administration was actually carried over from a program under the Bush administration (Gellman and Poitras 2013).

The surveillance program under the Bush administration was a direct response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks (OIG 2013). This program, similar to the one under the Obama administration, was subjected to the guidelines of FISA (not the FAA however, because the Bush NSA program predated 2008). However, similar to what is occurring with the NSA wiretapping program under the Obama administration, the program under the Bush administration was found to have been monitoring the communications of American citizens, a clear violation of the guidelines of the Act of Congress (Ackerman 2009). In response to these violations of the regulations, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) brought the NSA before the United States District Court (ACLU vs. NSA 2007). The United States District Court ruled that the NSA program, under the Bush administration, was in violation of FISA and was legally ordered to terminate the surveillance of American citizens. The PRISM program, currently being operated under the Obama administration, is built off of a program that was deemed by the American judicial body as contravening the Federal Information Securities Act. As a means of fixing the program the government

introduced, and eventually passed, the FISA Amendments Act 2008. This new Act of Congress did not, however, address any of the issues raised by the United States District Court (FAA 2008). Instead, it made the original guidelines more vague, and the classification of those that can not be targeted for surveillance narrower; this allowed for more people to be subjected under the PRISM program (FAA 2008). Also, the FAA now allowed for the monitoring of American citizens in contact with people of non-American origins (FAA 2008). The FAA made it easier and more legal to breach the original FISA guidelines. These two examples of the NSA's various wiretapping programs demonstrate a perfect example of state crime. The NSA is a government agency which has broken the law many thousands of times. Even though the NSA has shown blatant disregard for the rule of law, no one has faced any consequences. Even more shocking, the program itself, which has been deemed as contravening the law, has yet to be shut down. The NSA is demonstrating exactly how state actors can exploit the loopholes in governmental crime.

The entire purpose of the wiretapping programs, since the Bush administration, has been to combat global terrorism. Even though the program has breached its guiding regulations numerous times, it has justified it on the basis of fulfilling

state agendas (in this case the war on terror). Even when it was brought before the United States District Court by the American Civil Liberties Union, its response was not to make the program legal/constitutional, but it was to broaden the law to accommodate the illegality/unconstitutionality of the various wiretapping programs in place by the NSA and the United States federal government. As stated above in the theoretical framework section of this paper, it is hard to hold those accountable under the law when they are the ones in charge of preserving and creating it. The *FISA Amendments Act* of 2008 is an perfect model of this loophole.

Responses and Recommendations

While in most cases of corruption it is easy to deduct a way of avoiding future occurrences of the similar nature, the case of governmental crime corruption presents this as an obvious but very difficult task. When dealing with acts of fraud, embezzlement, or bribery, a solution can be as easy as an increase in transparency, or salaries. But what possible solutions could be presented from preventing the incumbent government from breaking the law in order to pursue its agenda, or from a future politician attempting to gain an advantage in a future election?

The solution I am putting forward is an increase in accountability. This means holding those responsible and accountable for their actions to the same standard as an ordinary citizen. The result would be no longer accepting a political consequence for governmental crimes, but putting the guilty in front of a judicial tribunal. While this may be an obvious solution, its implementation, however, is where the issue lies. Similar to the case of the United States government adjusting the Federal Information Securities Act to ensure the wiretapping program was no longer illegal (instead of changing the program so that it was legal under the original legislation), the ones breaking the laws are the ones who are in charge of enforcing and drafting them. This solution is therefore unattainable through drafting legislation because we can not expect the guilty to change laws and enforce them. That is due to the fact that it would result in them having to face consequences for their actions. There does exist, however, a way to increase accountability without having to change laws. The way to achieve this is through the opinion of the public and the use of unhindered watchdogs. In all three of the case studies, the implementation of one of these two methods would achieve a result that would not humiliate the justice system.

To begin, in the Watergate scandal

of 1972, President Richard Nixon's plan to attempt to obstruct justice and cover up his involvement in the burglary of the Democratic National Committee's headquarters resulted in his resignation. As I stated previously, Nixon did not face any form of criminal proceedings. This is because the public was satisfied with Nixon's resignation. If the public had been dissatisfied with this result, the public could have revolted and demanded Nixon be put before a tribunal. There already existed a Senate committee waiting to impeach the president that could have facilitated charging Nixon with the crimes he had committed. Although he was not charged, this does not mean he could not have been if the public had demanded it. The loophole of governmental crimes resulting in political consequences is seen as sufficient in the public eye. If this were not the case it could have changed the outcome of the Watergate incident and the consequences for Richard Nixon.

The other option involves the use of watchdogs. These are entities within the existing political system that are autonomous from the workings of a government used to ensure that right practices are being used and that the laws are being observed. In the case study of the 2011 Canadian federal election robocalls scandal, there is already a watchdog, Elections Canada. Loopholes are available for those involved in the

robocalls scandal because Elections Canada suffers from not being an unhindered watchdog. Elections Canada lacks the teeth required to complete a proper investigation into those responsible for the robocalls. It also lacks the ability to legally compel a witness to testify in an investigation (Roman 2013). If they were able to do this, their investigations would be much more thorough and they would be able to fully complete them (Roman 2013). These two possibilities demonstrate that there is hope for holding to account those responsible for governmental crimes. While the easiest way to provide for better accountability is irrational, as we can not expect those responsible to indict themselves, it does not mean all options are exhausted. As can be seen from the effect that unhindered watchdogs, as well as popular opinion of the public could have had on the 1972 Watergate scandal and the 2011 Canadian federal elections scandal, it is possible to implement change into a corrupt system.

Conclusion

The concept of corruption is extremely convoluted as a whole, but from my explanation above this is because it is an umbrella term. Corruption, in fact, encompasses many different forms of wrongful acts, some that are explicitly illegal, and some that are not. For the purpose of this paper I focused solely on

the form of corruption called governmental crime, which encompasses state crime and political white-collar crime. With the concept of governmental crime comes inherent loopholes that the guilty can use to rid themselves of any wrongdoing. All of these loopholes are present in the three case studies examined.

As presented, there exists a very simple solution to preventing these types of corruption: accountability. We can not, however, expect accountability to come in the form of new laws since the ones drafting and enforcing legislation are the ones who are committing these forms of corruption, and it is therefore an unviable hope. An alternative solution exists to combating this problem: the combination of popular opinion and unhindered watchdogs. Although, even these are faced with their own respective difficulties and can be a very lengthy processes. It seems that this form of corruption is intertwined with our political system and that the future of disrupting it seems possible, but bleak.

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and the development of human rights discourse. He plans to pursue post-graduate education in public policy. Christian believes his work calls attention to an issue that is often overlooked when discussing the topic of corruption. He felt the need to shed light on a grave injustice that many people may not be aware of, as well as to provide insight on how it affects Canadians as significantly as it does other countries.

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Lucrèce et les sens: la construction et l'interprétation du monde politique

par *Frédérique Dombrowski*

Lucrèce, dans son poème, « *On the Nature of the Universe* », discute des principes fondamentaux régissant la nature humaine et le monde qui nous entoure. À travers une prose riche qui présente de manière délicate une théorie dense, Lucrèce nous présente une compréhension du monde physique et de l'idéal humain auquel chacun devrait aspirer, de même que des liens qui existent entre ces deux concepts. Ainsi, j'argumenterai que le lien principal qui existe entre le monde physique et la meilleure façon de vivre pour Lucrèce est celui-ci : les sens. Nos cinq sens nous permettent de saisir et comprendre le monde qui nous entoure en plus de nous éclairer face à la morale et à la vision épicurienne d'une vie de contentement et de plaisirs. De plus, il est possible de faire un lien entre le monde physique et le monde politique; j'argumenterai qu'à l'instar des atomes dont discute Lucrèce, les individus d'une société cherchent à se combiner à d'autres afin de créer des systèmes d'atomes complexes, soit des communautés politiques.

Lucrèce : sa compréhension de la physique

Lucrèce possède une compréhension du monde qui débute et se termine dans l'Univers physique. Selon lui, le monde spirituel n'est qu'une création artificielle du cerveau (*mind*) humain ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 72). L'épistémologie proposée par l'auteur repose plutôt sur les sens ceux-ci, il nous est possible de saisir le sens du monde qui nous entoure et d'y trouver la place qui nous revient. Nos sens sont infaillibles, ils n'analysent pas ce que l'on perçoit, touche, sent, goûte ou entend (cela est le rôle du cerveau), mais ne font que recevoir l'information (Lucrèce [50 B.C.E.] 2008, 114). Selon l'auteur, la compréhension du monde passe par l'observation des éléments qui nous entourent. Nous devons faire confiance à ces sens puisqu'ils nous permettent de gagner des connaissances face au monde ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 114). Le problème majeur auquel fait face l'être humain est que notre cerveau interprète mal, ou de façon incomplète, ce dont nos sens s'emparent. Par exemple, afin d'expliquer cette situation, Lucrèce aborde le principe des rêves. Ceux-ci, selon lui, sont une juxtaposition incorrecte d'images enregistrées dans nos cerveaux. Ainsi, un centaure, par exemple, est la combinaison d'un cheval et d'un homme.



Même si ces deux éléments existent dans le monde réel, leur combinaison est improbable et donc imaginaire ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 121).

Cette façon dont le cerveau a la capacité de nous tromper permet à Lucrèce de présenter sa théorie tout en s'assurant de ne pas pouvoir être détrompé. En effet, même si, par exemple, sa théorie sur la façon dont les atomes se combinent est erronée, cela confirme toutefois sa thèse qui affirme que le cerveau peut interpréter de façon incorrecte ce que les sens saisissent.

Afin d'expliquer la physique du monde, Lucrèce résume sa théorie à deux grands principes fondamentaux. Il résume le premier principe ainsi : « [...] *nothing can be created from nothing* » ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 7). Le monde n'a pas pu être créé à partir de rien : il n'existe aucune intervention divine. Un atome « naît » car il est la réaction de deux autres atomes (ou plus) qui existaient précédemment. D'après Lucrèce, les premiers animaux, de même que les premiers humains, ont jailli de la terre suite à l'amalgame d'autres éléments qui se sont combinés ensemble (Lucrèce [50 B.C.E.] 2008, 160). Plus les atomes se combinent différemment et de manière diverse, plus le monde se complexifie et de nouveaux arbres, plantes, animaux, etc. sont créés ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 46). Le second principe est le suivant : « *Nature forbids that*

anything should perish » ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 9). Cela vient compléter le premier principe et indique qu'un objet ou un être ne peut être détruit, puisque les atomes qui le composent sont indestructibles et reprendront forme en se recombinaut avec d'autres atomes (Lucrèce [50 B.C.E.] 2008, 10). Ainsi, Lucrèce serait en accord avec l'adage : Rien ne se perd, rien ne se crée, tout se transforme.

De plus, Lucrèce affirme que la complexité de l'Univers ne repose que sur l'existence matérielle des choses, le spirituel n'étant qu'une création accidentelle de l'humain ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 72). L'auteur croit qu'il n'existe pas de « but » derrière la façon dont le monde a été créé, il ne s'agit que d'accidents et de complexification des atomes ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 123-4). C'est pourquoi le monde spirituel, tel que mentionné précédemment, est dangereux pour l'homme puisqu'il le maintient dans la peur et l'insatisfaction. D'abord, Lucrèce argumente que les Dieux ne peuvent intervenir dans le monde des vivants puisque si nous ne pouvons les percevoir avec nos sens, il leur est impossible de communiquer avec nous ou d'influencer nos vies ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 141). La même logique s'applique à la vie après la mort. Selon Lucrèce, les gens sont effrayés par la mort, car ils ont peur de ce qui vient ensuite. La peur de la mort est un puissant outil de manipulation dont se servent abondamment

les dirigeants politiques et religieux. C'est seulement par l'observation du monde naturel et par l'éveil de ses sens qu'il est possible de se détacher de ce faux monde spirituel (Lucrèce [50 B.C.E.] 2008, 7). En somme, la moralité doit, selon Lucrèce, prendre racine dans le monde matériel et dans l'être humain plutôt que dans ce monde spirituel et religieux inventé ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 73).

Lucrèce divise le monde en différentes sections, chacune nous permettant de mieux comprendre ce dont le monde est fait. D'abord, l'auteur affirme que le monde n'est composé que de deux éléments : la matière (*matter*) et le vide (*void*) ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 15). Leurs combinaisons sont infinies ; certains objets peuvent être composés de plus de vide et moins de matière, les rendant plus légers, alors que d'autres, plus lourds, possèdent plus de matière et moins de vide. La matière peut être éclatée en matière plus petite jusqu'à l'unité minimale : l'atome. L'atome est indestructible ; lorsqu'il est séparé des autres atomes, il continue « d'exister » et se recombine avec d'autres atomes ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 13).

De plus, Lucrèce affirme que le monde naturel est divisé en « essence » et « accidents ». L'essence est ce qui ne change pas, ce qui est statique. Par exemple, l'essence de l'être humain représente sa nature et Lucrèce argumente que celle-ci est la capacité

humaine de raisonner ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 16-17). L'accident, quant à lui, ne fait pas partie de la nature d'un objet ou d'un animal, mais est plutôt le résultat d'un enclenchement de situations. Dans le cas de l'être humain, l'essence serait la capacité de raisonner et l'accident tous les événements de l'histoire. Ces derniers ne sont pas inscrits dans notre biologie, mais sont plutôt des coïncidences et des choix faits par les humains (Lucrèce [50 B.C.E.] 2008, 17).

Enfin, Lucrèce divise l'être humain en trois parties : le cerveau (*mind*), l'esprit (*spirit*) et le corps. Ce sont ces trois fractions de l'être qui forme l'homme ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 74). Alors que la première gère la psychologie, la seconde représente l'énergie et la troisième le physique. Ces trois parties sont interdépendantes, l'être humain ne peut en être un s'il est séparé de l'une d'elles ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 79). Afin d'illustrer son propos, Lucrèce utilise la métaphore de l'œil. Selon l'auteur, le nerf, l'œil et le cerveau doivent être tous les trois fonctionnels et connectés afin de permettre la vision ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 81). Toutefois, il est essentiel de noter que l'homme est plus que la somme de son cerveau, son esprit et son corps ; ce sont ces trois qui, ensemble, forment l'essence de l'humain ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 79).

L'application de la physique dans la « meilleure façon de vivre »

Cette compréhension du monde n'a pas, pour Lucrèce, qu'une fonction scientifique. Selon l'auteur, il est impératif que l'homme qui a compris le fonctionnement du monde naturel l'applique à sa vie humaine. Grâce à nos sens, il est possible de vivre une vie épicurienne. Cette école de pensée, pour Lucrèce, se décline en deux parties : la sagesse et le plaisir.

Premièrement, comprendre le monde naturel grâce à nos sens nous permet de différencier notre vraie essence des constructions sociales accidentelles qui nous obligent à vivre d'une certaine façon. Par exemple, lorsque l'homme comprend que la peur de la mort n'est pas naturelle, mais plutôt un outil de manipulation utilisé contre lui, il devient alors en mesure de s'en séparer et d'ainsi vivre avec contentement (Lucrèce [50 B.C.E.] 2008, 6). La crainte de la mort est donc un accident, et non une partie de notre essence. L'homme peut ainsi se distancer du contrôle qu'exerce son monde sur lui et vivre une vie « frugale et contentée » ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 100). Si l'ensemble de la société avait la capacité de surpasser sa crainte de la mort, le prestige de mourir en martyr et le désir d'immortalité n'aurait pu lieu d'être. Les guerres connaîtraient sans doute

moins de victimes ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 72). En somme, cesser de craindre la mort permet à l'homme de comprendre que son être n'est pas une entité d'une importance démesurée et de relâcher l'attachement qu'il accorde à son corps ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 100).

Cette vie est la meilleure pour Lucrèce, car elle nous permet d'avoir une paix d'esprit. L'homme comprend alors qu'il sera jugé pour ses actions dans la vie qu'il vit présentement, et non dans ce monde spirituel obsolète. Il comprend également qu'il n'y a rien de spirituel après la mort ; il s'agit d'un événement inévitable. Tel qu'affirme Lucrèce : « *A certain end of life is fixed for men. There is no escape from death and we must die* » ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 100). L'homme dans son ensemble disparaîtra, mais les atomes qui le composent, étant indestructibles, se recomposeront avec d'autres atomes ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 8).

La sagesse est également la capacité de comprendre que l'amour est une construction sociale. L'amour nous restreint dans nos chances d'atteindre la « meilleure vie » et ce, pour trois raisons. D'abord, l'amour nous mène au désir, à l'envie, à la jalousie et à l'insatisfaction. Ces émotions vont à l'encontre de la vie frugale et contentée qui est, selon Lucrèce, la meilleure qui soit ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 181). D'ailleurs, l'insatisfaction provient surtout de ce besoin de faire « un » avec l'autre personne.

Bien évidemment, il nous est impossible de devenir « un », nous resterons à toujours deux personnes ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 130). De plus, l'amour pour un autre nous fait craindre d'avantage la mort. L'homme qui aime ne veut pas voir la personne qu'il aime partir avant elle et le laisser seul. L'homme peut également avoir peur d'être séparé à jamais de celle/celui qu'il aime une fois dans la mort. Ainsi, l'amour mène à la peur la plus dramatique de la mort (Lucrèce [50 B.C.E.] 2008, 131). Pour l'auteur, l'amour est également une construction sociale et culturelle, qui nous éloigne de notre véritable nature. Toutefois, selon Lucrèce, le sexe est naturel et donc, fait partie de notre essence. L'attraction entre deux personnes est un choix délibéré et donc, il est possible de contrôler le genre de relations que l'on souhaite entretenir ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 130). À propos du sexe, Lucrèce affirme que le sexe nous permet de « profiter des bienfaits sans en vivre les côtés négatifs » ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 130). Ainsi, le sexe s'avère l'alternative idéale puisqu'il procure un plaisir qui n'est en aucun cas lié aux émotions négatives de l'amour, telles la déception, la haine et la jalousie.

De plus, pour Lucrèce, la vie épicurienne passe par les plaisirs et la liberté de les satisfaire. Toutefois, Lucrèce mentionne qu'il ne s'agit pas de tous les plaisirs qui doivent être recherchés. Ce qui mène au bonheur,

ce sont les plaisirs qui ne demandent aucun attachement. Pour faire référence à l'amour et au sexe, Lucrèce affirme, tel que mentionné précédemment, qu'il faut éviter les plaisirs liés à l'amour, car ceux-ci impliquent des conséquences négatives telles que la dépendance et l'envie. De l'autre côté, le sexe procure un soulagement et un plaisir qui n'implique aucune émotion négative. En somme, les plaisirs qui mènent à la douleur doivent à tout prix être évités. C'est en vivant avec contentement que l'on peut accéder aux réels plaisirs (Lucrèce [50 B.C.E.] 2008, 131).

La pensée de Lucrèce dans un contexte politique

Afin de bien saisir la pensée politique de Lucrèce, il est impératif de comprendre le « mythe » par lequel l'auteur explique le passage de l'homme de l'état individualiste à la société romaine. Tel que mentionné précédemment, les premiers humains auraient jailli du sol pour ensuite se reproduire entre eux. Ces premières générations d'hommes étaient dépendants de la nature, ne pratiquaient pas l'agriculture, n'obéissaient à aucune loi et ne craignaient pas la mort (Lucrèce [50 B.C.E.] 2008, 163). Ils étaient, selon Lucrèce, plus forts que les hommes modernes. Puis, ils auraient développé des outils, dont le feu et le métal, et se seraient groupés en unité familiale

([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 165-166). Pour la première fois, les humains se mirent à développer des signes d'empathie et de compassion, ces gestes devenant les balbutiements des principes de justice. Enfin, les relations entre humains se complexifièrent ; on vit apparaître les contrats entre deux individus ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 168). Alors que l'on admirait précédemment les gens beaux, forts et intelligents, l'arrivée de l'argent transforma cette admiration. On associa le prestige à la richesse et au pouvoir. Les gens se mirent à en vouloir à ses rois puissants et à renverser leurs régimes ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 168-169). Puis, par fatigue et chaos, les populations acceptèrent consciemment de se soumettre aux lois en place. Lucrèce comprend que les sociétés ne sont pas idéales et qu'elles sont plutôt à l'image des choix conscients de ses citoyens ([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 171).

Suite à la description exhaustive de Lucrèce vis-à-vis l'arrivée des sociétés et des gouvernements, il est important de se questionner sur le point suivant: est-ce que le gouvernement est naturel ou artificiel? À ce sujet, il existe deux théories. La première affirmerait que les gouvernements et autres structures qui gèrent les relations entre humains sont tous artificiels. Puisque Lucrèce affirme que l'essence de l'homme est au niveau individuel, et non social, alors tout ce qui découle de cette dite essence est forcément accidentel

([50 B.C.E.] 2008, 163). Ainsi, ce sont des coïncidences et des choix conscients de l'homme qui ont mené aux systèmes politiques actuels, ou romains. La seconde théorie est plus nuancée : les gouvernements sont un découlement naturel de l'essence de l'homme. Ainsi, la description que fournit Lucrèce de l'évolution de la vie de l'homme vers la cohabitation en société est logique et cohérente. L'homme ne pourrait jamais reculer et revenir à l'état « initial », soit la vie individualiste nomade. À cet égard, je crois que la deuxième théorie s'avère plus juste. En effet, il serait approprié d'utiliser la métaphore des atomes pour comprendre la nature humaine. Les atomes sont l'essence ; ils sont la forme la plus simple et se composent de manière infinie pour former de nouveaux éléments. Certes, ils peuvent être détruits, tels que des villes ou des empires, mais finissent toujours par se recomposer, et ce, dans une fraction de seconde. L'homme est similaire ; il est un individu au stade initial, mais ne cessent de se combiner de manière de plus en plus complexe. Et l'atome ne demeure jamais isolé longtemps, il cherche à se grouper à d'autres atomes afin de créer des entités complexes. Bien sûr, cela est « physique » et non spirituel, et tel que le dit Lucrèce, il n'y pas de « but » derrière ces formations d'atomes complexes, c'est simplement ainsi que l'Univers fonctionne. Mais l'homme ne fait pas exception ; il

n'est qu'un élément dans la complexité du monde et il semble vouloir agir comme l'ensemble des éléments.

De plus, la première hypothèse de Lucrèce, basé sur sa théorie de la création du monde, affirme que l'homme existe d'abord à l'état individuel plutôt que communautaire. Ainsi, la société ou la communauté n'est plus ni moins qu'une collection d'hommes qui se joignent de façon consciente. Les hommes doivent prendre conscience individuellement de la manipulation qui existe dans l'État au sein duquel ils font partie, notamment en ce qui a trait à la crainte de la mort, et doivent remédier de façon individuelle à la situation. Lucrèce ne croit pas qu'un individu puisse affecter le choix d'un autre individu. Son poème sert ainsi à éveiller chaque homme individuellement afin qu'ils comprennent les constructions sociales et autres accidents de l'histoire qui affectent leur vie. Ces constructions sociales contiennent notamment les rôles de genre (*gender roles*), la manipulation des gouvernements et le prestige associé à certains tissus ou couleurs de vêtements.

Conclusion

Ainsi, Lucrèce aborde la physique du point de vue sensoriel ; c'est en observant le monde avec nos sens qu'il nous est possible d'en saisir les principes fondamentaux. Par ailleurs, les

sens nous permettent de nous dissocier des constructions sociales dont la religion et la spiritualité afin de comprendre que l'Univers n'est que matériel et que notre vie ne revêt pas une importance particulière. Tout n'est que matière ou vide, dont notre être qui est composé du corps, de l'esprit et du cerveau. De plus, grâce à nos sens, Lucrèce comprend que l'ensemble du monde qui nous entoure peut être résumé en deux points, soit que rien ne provient de rien et que rien ne peut être détruit. Ainsi, l'Univers physique composé des éléments décrits ci-haut est soit ainsi par nature (essence) ou par accidents et coïncidences. Grâce à nos sens et notre compréhension du monde, il est possible de vivre une vie épicurienne à travers les plaisirs et la sagesse. Cette dernière représente une vie contentée et frugale ; il faut à tout prix se détacher des émotions négatives telles que le désir, le prestige et l'envie. Il incombe à chacun de rechercher les plaisirs (tels que le sexe) qui ne mènent pas à la douleur.

Enfin, cette réflexion proposée par Lucrèce sur le monde physique et la place de l'homme dans cet Univers mène également à un questionnement sur le monde politique. Le monde politique ne fait peut-être pas partie de notre essence, mais est certainement une évolution naturelle. Les hommes, tels que les atomes, cherchent constamment à se combiner à d'autres



afin de complexifier leurs composantes. Ainsi, Lucrèce, malgré de nombreuses erreurs de compréhension du monde physique, présente une quête qui s'avère universel et qui traverse les époques : comprendre l'Univers qui nous entoure afin de nous comprendre nous-mêmes.

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graduating, Frédérique plans to pursue a graduate degree with a study of indigenous social movements and their influence on democracy. Ancient Greek philosophers have always fascinated Frédérique, specifically the way they perceived the biology and physics of human life, as well as their embryonic notions of a socially-constructed world.

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Why Child Armies Persist:

The Sobering Case of the Lord's Resistance Army

By Patricia Faucher

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Author's Note:

Given the danger of conducting field research in volatile conflict zones, it is understandable that authors in the field of insurgencies have had difficulty gathering empirical data, compared to other subjects. Furthermore, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is particularly notorious for its secrecy in revealing its objectives to the outside world, making it even more difficult to theorize and find out what has kept it going for so long. In obtaining research, some authors used better methodologies than others. This paper is based on a generalized account of the information gathered, which may or may not have relied on data obtained through questionable methods. For example, interviewers who established a relationship of more than a month would be more likely to obtain more information and honest accounts than researchers who interviewed ex-child soldiers after only three days for example. It is important to establish a relationship with interviewees so they can feel comfortable in divulging honest accounts of the

atrocities they may have committed and the crimes they may have witnessed. Also knowing that the interviewer will not offer any form of compensation in return for information is more likely to produce an accurate account, rather than one in which the interviewee knows what the interviewer wants to hear, given that they are offering foreign aid. Over the course of my research, I also encountered a great problem in overcoming generalizations made by authors. While it is understandable why strategies and tactics employed by armed groups would be clumped together, understanding them requires a case by case analysis.¹

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Children are increasingly used in guerrilla warfare, oftentimes by both insurgent and counter-insurgent forces. It is becoming more important to study child soldiers because they represent a renewable supply of forces for armed rebel movements. This abundant supply of children makes it easy for armed groups to form their own little wars. Their young age makes them prone to physical and psychological manipulation in armed groups that have little or no legitimate purpose. This recruitment stands in contrast with voluntary service from late adolescents and adults, which requires an understanding of an

¹ In utilizing the term 'armed group,' I include rebel groups, militias, and government sanctioned paramilitaries



armed group's legitimate purpose.

Most children are abducted from their homes and villages, and they may be as young as four years old. Female child soldiers who do not take part in combat are often used as sex slaves, although the rules on sexual activity vary from group to group. More than half of the world's 300,000 child soldiers fight on the African continent, which raises the

question as to why child soldiers persist (Dallaire 2011, 104-5). The use of child soldiers is an increasingly popular phenomenon with illegitimate and legitimate armed groups for a number of reasons. Even states of the developed world encounter the question of how young is too young for combat?² Further, what

² The U.S. and Canadian governments start voluntary recruitment at 16 years for military service (United Nations Treaty Collection, 2000)

determines the effectiveness of child soldiers? I propose that child soldiers are effective in violent movements and insurgencies due to their lack of sophistication and social development. I posit three hypotheses in this paper to investigate why child soldier armies persist by examining the means that maintain the lack of social development, keeping child soldiers effective in insurgencies and armed rebel group movements. The three hypotheses isolate the use of drugs, use of religious and spiritual practices, and weak state structure, which enable or increase the effectiveness of armed groups made up mostly of children. Prior research done on these factors is laid out in the first part of the paper. In the second part of the paper, I present the case of the Lord's Resistance Army to investigate the applicability of these factors in explaining why it has persisted as the longest-lasting child soldier group.

The Lack of Moral Cognizance through Drug Use

Many armed groups administer drugs to children in order to increase their efficiency on the battlefield. (Singer 2005, Dallaire 2007, Wessells 2009).³

3 The types of drugs administered depend on the region and availability. Cocaine, barbiturates, and amphetamines are often mixed with alcohol and other substances. Drugs produced locally such as khat (strong stimulant originating from eastern Africa), whether from traditional or contemporary use, are forced on child combatants until the child becomes dependent (Singer 2005, 81; Wessells 2009, 76).

The effects of drugs reduce cognizance and the moral capacity to determine whether an act is right or wrong, and by impairing their fright mechanism, they bolster a child's sense of immunity from harm (Singer 2005, 80-1).⁴ These effects serve to raise the confidence level of children on the battlefield, while absolving them of the need to question the rightness of their actions (Dallaire 2011, 135). A former Sierra Leonean child soldier named Musu said, "that is how they are brave to do all these things, without the drugs they cannot do it. Because I cannot stand and see my mother and kill her! But because of the drugs you can't recognize who is standing in front of you" (Dallaire 2011, 144).

Commanders may also force drugs on their young troops to decrease the children's ability to feel fear or pain, as is the case in groups from Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka and Myanmar (Singer 2005, 107). The inability to feel fear or pain also serves the group by protecting its most valuable assets – adults and more experienced soldiers – by making a child willing to clear anti-personnel land mines (Dallaire 2011, 135). Moreover, children become dependent on the armed group as

4 'Further' is used to indicate the pre-determined difference between developed cognitive processes (adult brain), and developing cognitive processes (child). Children are less likely to have developed their sense of morality since this is dependent on time, environment, and learning, in addition to possessing an underdeveloped sense of risk. (Singer 2005, 80-1)

the source of the drugs they have become dependent on (Singer 2005, 89). Drugs also serve as an effective tool in terrorizing local populations because villagers fear the sight of drugged, violent, irrational children wielding guns (Wessells 2009, 76). However, not all armed groups allow drug use (Wessells 2009, 76).

Religio-spiritual Affiliation and Indoctrination

Different forms of indoctrination are used by different groups and are undertaken when new recruits are at their weakest (Singer 2005, 72). Armed groups may use religious or spiritual indoctrination because of the ease with which new recruits adopt the group's religious or spiritual practices, given their familiarity with certain components. Belief in spirits as the origins of disease and natural events are widespread in sub-Saharan Africa where Islam and Christianity are predominant (Wessells 2009, 147). Spirits are believed to control events and people's lives, provide protection, and wreak havoc (Wessells 2009, 148). Rituals become important to alleviating ills, which include war (Wessells 2009, 148-9).

While the desire to survive in a rebel group is the greatest determining factor for obedience, so is

socialization. Religious/spiritual indoctrination is an effective means of retaining recruits by creating cohesion in the absence of a legitimate cause and without public support (Singer 2005, 100). It may also serve as a cohesive factor in further differentiating the 'us' versus 'them' dichotomy, whereby the group's values allow group members to condone violence (Singer 2005, 72). It realigns and suppresses the children's old values with the values of the new social group (Wessells 2009, 65).

Armed group rituals include killing family members in front of others and desecrating the bodies of those they have killed in an unusual way, whether it be drinking or eating the remains. This has been carried out in Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Peru, and Mozambique (Singer 2005, 74). The purpose of this is to bind the recruit to the group because in committing such acts they are rejected from their communities and thus cross the 'ultimate moral boundary' where the only ones like them are those in the armed group (Singer 2005, 74; Dallaire 2012).

Armed group spiritual practices appear to be of importance in quelling the initial feelings of terror and emotional instability felt by new recruits during their first combat missions (Wessells 2009, 74-5). This is combined with on-the-ground direction given through the commander's

threat of brute force or death unless the children carry out a mission or task, which leads to obedience and a boost in morale (Wessells 2009, 75; 77). A Colombian girl who entered combat at the age of 12 with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (the Spanish acronym is FARC) illustrates this point: “Seven weeks after I arrived there was combat. I was very scared. It was an attack on the paramilitaries. We killed about seven of them. They killed one of us. We had to drink their blood to conquer our fear. Only the scared ones had to do it [...]” (Wessells 2009, 75).⁵ In believing in supernatural powers and protection from spirits, children may be able to quell their natural fears in combat because they follow a macabre set of rules to avoid making the spirits ‘unhappy’ (Wessells 2009, 77).

The Absence of Legitimate Ruling Structures

The reasons that failed or weakened states are more likely to have child soldiers are incredibly complex. Colonialists dramatically changed or created ruling structures in order to suit their economic interests (Brown 2004, 33; Uvin 1998, 14-5).⁶ Precolonial ruling structures

were determined by age. The elders ruled over the young, and maturity indicators such as puberty and marriage were used to determine when children could enter combat (Singer 2005, 9-10). In brief, colonialism, with its extractive economic activities and authoritarian and corrupt ruling systems, which further politicized ethnicity, added to the effects of the Cold War and combined to play a role in weakening African states (Crawford 2002, 24).⁷

Contemporary factors also account for the exacerbation of pressures on the state, such as globalization, the demands of a growing population on a state with limited resources, and the availability of small weapons (Singer 2005, 40; 53-4; 84).⁸ What used to be wars

7 Globalization and economic activities (or lack thereof), such that they are being used to fund insurgencies while sabotaging the state's ruling structure (i.e. Coltan mining in the DRC, diamond mining in Sierra Leone, coca in Colombia (Singer 2005, 50-1)), and have changed the nature of peasant insurgency where rebels no longer lose themselves within the population, but rather use them as targets and bleed them of resources; in addition to weak economy and unemployment as factors for 'voluntary' recruitment are topics of interest for a future investigation and outside the scope of this paper.

8 The availability of small weapons (including rifles, land mines, light machine guns, grenades, taucos, and light mortars) has multiplied in the last thirty years because of changes in surplus, cost, design, and public policy of weapon manufacturing states (Machel 2001, 122; Dallaire 2011, 136; Wessells 2009, 18). Small weapons account for two million deaths in Western Africa within a decade, and 46 out of 49 African conflicts were fought by exclusively using small weapons (Singer 2005, 46; Wessells 2009, 18). When the Cold War ended, it was cheaper to auction off the oversupply of weapons to Africa, or gift them to Soviet proxy states, than it was to destroy them (Machel 2001, 122; Singer 2005, 48). Private bidders, of whom 40-60% were illegitimate organizations, bought and redistributed these

5 Account from a Colombian girl who entered combat at the age of 12 with the FARC to Human Rights Watch.

6 Such as Portugal, Great Britain, France, Belgium, and Germany (Brown 2004)

fuelled by political or religious ideologies are now also driven by economics, beginning with the withdrawal of economic and 'political (military) support' from East and West during the Cold War (Singer 2005, 50; Lemarchand 2009, 224). The number of civil wars doubled when the Cold War ended, and there would begin a continuous wave of civil wars to the extent that these extended conflicts have meant that generations of children in these states have lived in environments of perpetual violence. This

weapons (Singer 2005, 48). This is the case with the end of any war. Weapons used by the U.S. in their involvement in the South American conflicts of the 1970s and in Somalia 1999 ended up with Colombian guerrillas, Kenyan armed groups and other eastern African states (Machel 2001, 122). Weapons manufacturing industries increased their production of small weapons and decreased their market prices. In Uganda one can purchase an AK-47 (Kalashnikov) for the same price as a chicken (Singer 2005, 48). The design and manufacturing of small weapons also evolved. Plastic makes weapons lighter to carry at 10.5lbs. The design, such that the AK-47 now only has nine moving parts, makes it easier to learn how to use, maintain, disassemble and reassemble. The AK-47 is a hardy weapon itself, fitted for life in guerrilla warfare where these weapons need to be hidden often (Singer 2005, 46-47). Former and current child soldiers have boasted about how efficient they are in taking care of and using their weapons such as this account of a young adult of when he was abducted in northern Uganda: "I did learn some things when I was with the rebels. I learned how to shoot, how to lay anti-personnel mines and how to live on the run. I especially knew how to use an AK-47 twelve-inch, which I could dismantle in less than one minute. When I turned 12 they gave me an RPG, because I had proved myself in battle" (Machel 2001, 119). The dynamic of the arms trade also changed. In the past, sales were made directly with governments or large weapons manufacturers. This enabled greater control on who was buying what. However, in the last two decades, there is less control on who is buying what as governments (such as the U.S.) and manufacturers have sold their weapons through private dealers who will sell to anyone (Machel 2001, 123). International efforts to control this rise in unaccountability were botched in 2001 by the U.S. National public policies and by states housing a participative weapons manufacturing industry (Singer 2005, 137-8). Given that weapons may enhance the effectiveness of child soldiers, it may be a possible intervening effect on the effectiveness of child soldiers as weapons have evolved.

creates conditions such as poverty and unemployment in which they are either more likely to volunteer or be abducted into armed groups (Singer 2005, 43; Dallaire 2011, 106; Wessells 2009, 48). Political stability is difficult to achieve when there are continuous insurgent threats, even if the state has resources to fight them (Dallaire 2011, 104-5).⁹

Singer bases his position on Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler's Greed-and-Grievance Theory, in which civil war, or other conflicts, are fuelled by groups fighting for access to economic resources, such as natural resource extraction activities (Singer 2005, 50; Collier and Hoeffler 2000). The resulting effect is the creation of a fertile ground in which insurgent and counter-insurgent movements recruit children as troops. Civil wars and regional conflicts have placed pressure on the stability of political institutions, while also undermining local structures, such as the family unit.

9 Civil wars which have led to a new type of guerrilla warfare, where children are used, and where members of these armed rebel groups are taught combat training strategies and tactics. However, these strategies and tactics vary with different armed groups, according to length of training period, methodology and situational context. To provide an idea of the tasks undertaken by child soldiers, the diagram below shows child soldier tasks in the DRC: (Source

The Case of the Lord's Resistance Army

The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is an armed group led by Joseph Kony that started in northern Uganda. Since independence, north versus south tensions created by colonialism were politicized depending on which side a president's loyalty stood (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010, 4). Partisanship for central and southern Uganda came at great costs for the north (especially for the Acholi people), in terms of security and economic activities when Yoweri Museveni's rebellion was successful in ousting Milton Obote's presidency (Brown 2004, 35; Allen and Vlassenroot 2010, 6). Different northern rebellions formed as a result of Museveni's ascension to the presidency in 1986. From the Holy Spirit Movement, the LRA would emerge and evolve to become the longest lasting guerrilla group in Africa (Amnesty International 1997, 5). Early on, its position was that of protecting the Acholi people from Museveni's transgressions. As Museveni began targeting the northern population, accusing them of siding with the LRA rebels, so too did the LRA accuse northern Ugandans of being traitors. During this time, the LRA received significant support from the Sudanese government, as the LRA was helping the Khartoum government in its war against the SPLA, which would

eventually form the South Sudan government (Amnesty International 1997, 7). The Sudanese government was then forced to sign a peace agreement that evicted the LRA from its refuge in South Sudan (Hollander 2007, 218). The LRA was forced to abandon its Sudanese-government-protected bases and moved into the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic (Atkinson 2010, 207; Allen et al. 2010, 284). However, the LRA has remained active in parts of south-west Sudan and has become increasingly involved in the present South Sudan crisis (Allen et al. 2010, 288; AlJazeera 2014). With the pre-LRA guerrilla experience of its leader and senior commanders, the LRA boasts more than 28 years of successfully evading intense national and international counter-insurgency efforts (Branch 2010, 38-9). "Kony is not just surviving, he is skilfully terrorizing. Whatever one thinks about Joseph Kony, it is a remarkable achievement" (Allen et al. 2010, 288). What is remarkable is that at any time, the LRA is made up of approximately 90% children (Achvarina 2006, 129; Haer et al. 2011; Titeca 2010, 61). In the second part of this paper I investigate if the three factors: the use of drugs, use of religious and spiritual practices, and weak state structure may explain the effectiveness of child soldiers in the LRA case.

Does the LRA indoctrinate new recruits by drug use?

Many armed groups may use drugs and alcohol to enhance the lack of moral cognizance and alleviate psychological tendencies detrimental to the battlefield for children. The Lord's Resistance Army, however, does not. No evidence was found directly linking the LRA to drug use. But few sources explicitly stated that the LRA does not use drugs or alcohol (Schomerus 2010, 95; Haer et al. 2011, 425). The LRA is often placed among other armed rebel groups which use drugs and alcohol in child soldier literature. I therefore felt the need to investigate further.

I contacted Micheal Wessells, professor at Columbia University and expert on children in conflict, who was not able to provide a confirmation. Wessells was unsure if the LRA had taken drugs during their years in the Sudanese "birthing camps." Wessells directed me to Cheryl Heykoop, PhD candidate in Child Conflict Studies with her fieldwork focusing on Ugandan children. Again, Heykoop did not have a definitive answer and directed me to Erin Baines from the LIU Institute for Global Issues, and PhD candidate Theo Hollander at the Refugee Law Project. Baines responded: "The LRA does not smoke, drink or use drugs, it's against their religious beliefs and vision" (Erin

Baines, e-mail message to author, June 5, 2013). Hollander responded that he had not come across any evidence in his research: "I have done extensive interviews with very many former LRA combatants, and never have I heard of any drug use. Quite on the contrary, cigarettes, alcohol and any other kind of narcotics were highly forbidden in the LRA, the use of it warranting serious caning or even execution. I have heard of stories where child soldiers used to grow weed, but they traded it with Arab forces. They weren't allowed to smoke it themselves" (Theo Hollander, e-mail message to author, June 6, 2013). Hollander provided me with a part of his thesis research, a 226-page document of an in-depth interview conducted with a former child soldier who had risen in the ranks of the LRA and with whom Hollander had built a relationship of trust. In the document, Norman Okello provides his insider's account showing the LRA did not allow drug use. Growing the drugs but not consuming them may confuse academic researchers in the field, which perhaps explains Wessells' uncertainty. Okello reports,

I started to tell him [a UPDF commander] the story about the uniform, which had nothing to do with my rank. I told the commander that I had traded it at one point for

some marijuana that I was growing myself. This was when we were still in Palataka (LRA base in Sudan). In the LRA it was strictly forbidden to smoke anything, but they didn't mind us growing marijuana. The Arabs on the other hand, they didn't have our restrictions and their desire for marijuana, which they called Quat, was boundless. Since we didn't have a money economy I had to trade the marijuana for something and if there was one thing that the Arabs had in abundance, it was military gear of all kinds. Uniforms, guns, compasses, boots [...] (Hollander 2007, 174).

Therefore the position that drug use enhances the effectiveness of child soldiers in reducing their moral cognizance and childhood perceptions in combat cannot be made in the case of the LRA. Forbidding drug use may be strategic because the LRA wants to create soldiers who are primed for combat without having to rely on drugs. Through its use of violence in and control over combatants, the LRA has been able to create intrepid soldiers without having to deal with the side effects and cost of drugs. Thus, abstinence from drug use may enhance the

effectiveness of child soldiers in the LRA given its particular 'teaching' methods (Vinci 2005, 371).

Religio-spiritual Indoctrination Increases Child Soldier Effectiveness

Whether Kony or LRA recruits actually believe in the "spirits" will not be investigated in great detail. What is of importance, rather, is how the LRA's use of spiritual practices serves to meet its objectives and group function. Contrary to media accounts portraying the LRA as a lunatic-cult, the LRA's use of religious and spiritual practices is strategic (Wlordarczyk 2004, 2). It is certainly not the only armed group to use religion. For example, the U.S. military uses religion as a medium in which politics and culture are integrated (Wlordarczyk 2004, 4).

The effect of religious and spiritual indoctrination serves to enhance the effectiveness of children in the LRA through different strategic functions: establishing group structure, enforcing discipline and obedience, keeping up morale, and creating cohesiveness within the group. While researching to support this, I came across a thesis analyzing the LRA's effectiveness due to its strategic use of religious and spiritual practices as viewed through a slightly different lens. Haer et al.

micro-analyze how the LRA has persisted by examining cohesion and compliance. In countering greed-and-grievance theories on new African wars, Haer et al. offer that micro-level analysis of the workings of the LRA provide a better explanation than macro-level explanations.

Cohesion and Compliance

Haer et al. investigated why the LRA has persisted and accumulated a representation of 90% children. At the micro-level, the authors combined political analysis with psychology. They apply human resources management theory (HRM) to determine what could contribute to compliance and cohesion in a group where the majority of recruits are abducted. Along with other authors, they established that while the LRA may have come into existence because of the grievance caused by Museveni's war in the north, political grievance does not explain why the LRA has carried on given that its political objectives are non-existent. The LRA has changed its political goals over time and has rarely communicated them with other national or international actors. The group's political goals have also been characterized as irrational, and it does not have support from the local population (Haer et al. 2011, 418). Even ex-combatants appeared to be confused as to what were the political goals of the LRA (Haer et al. 2011, 418; HRW

2003, 23). Thus grievance-greed theories do not seem to fit, and a new theory is needed to explain why the LRA's internal compliance and cohesion persists despite the changes in political goals and external conditions. Haer et al. use HRM to explain how strategies employed by (legal) organizations create a united and compliant workforce and may be applied to illegal organizations (2011, 418). The strategies used are to increase the cost effectiveness of the group, recruit competence, parallel goals between organization and recruit, and commitment to the organization (Haer et al. 2011, 418). The four main ways in which these strategies work are through careful selection of recruits; training and socialization to ensure values and goals between individual and organization match; promotion and assessment of recruits and rewards, which modify behaviour; and compensation and benefits to increase commitment to the organization (Haer et al. 2011, 419-20). This is where the strategic use of religious and spiritual activities comes in (Titeca 2010, 61).

Unlike legal organizations, however, the LRA does not provide incentives to join the organization, nor does it allow recruits to remain out of their own volition. Rather, the LRA forces recruits to stay within the organization through the use of violence (including death) and intimidation. The level of violence is

highest for new recruits in that they are threatened with death if they attempt to escape. They are made to partake in killings of those who have tried to escape or have behaved in a way contrary to the values of the LRA. From the moment they join, the violence attaches itself to them and quickly becomes a part of them as they are forced into 'kill or be killed' situations. However, Haer et al. posit that violence and fear are not the only reasons that recruits remain with the LRA. There are other psychological and contextual factors at play. In different studies, such as Banholzer's, 50% of ex-LRA child soldiers said they identified with the organization. 20% stated there was a time when they actually preferred to remain with the LRA instead of escaping.

Notwithstanding the data indicating that thousands of children have escaped the LRA, the LRA does implement strategies which enable it to persist (Haer et al. 2011, 422-3). The LRA is selective in its recruiting of children. Nighttime raids are carried out in villages or on boarding schools. Each soldier is given the task of capturing four children (Haer et al. 2011, 423; Hollander 2007, 61). If they are not successful, they are punished. The selection process begins on the march back to camp, where the older ones are kept until needed to carry supplies, while the very young are almost immediately released.

The LRA targets adolescents between 12-14 years of age for a number of reasons (Haer et al. 2011, 423). The physical stature of the newly abducted also plays a role in the selection process. Bigger children are perceived to be able to escape easily, thus not worth the bother, while smaller children make for better field combatants (Haer et al. 2011, 423). This type of recruitment suits the LRA in that it is cheap, easy, and effective. Costs are lowered because no incentives are given to new recruits (Haer et al. 2011, 423). Numerous other authors have mentioned the abundance of children in Uganda and surrounding states including Burundi, Rwanda, CAR, and DRC (Singer 2005, 77; Dallaire 2011, 136-7; Rosen 2005, 62; Nichipork 2000, xii; 3; 12). The supply of children is not a problem for the LRA. This is also demonstrated by the ease with which they kill or expel a child (Haer et al. 2011, 423).

Costs are also kept low because children are easier to manipulate, control, and model, which is why the LRA focuses on the 12 to 14 age category. According to Vinci, child soldiers also create a fear factor on enemy forces because of their "fearlessness and disregard for human life" (Haer et al. 2011, 424). However, this position fails to consider that the children are acting out of their own volition in choosing either to kill or be killed if they do

not follow orders (Titeca 2010, 61). While most children choose the former, I believe it is an overgeneralization to state that they have disregard for human life. Those born into the LRA, however, bear a different set of morals and values (those of the LRA), so compared to the general population, they may, in fact, “disregard human life” (Vinci 2005, 368).

Adopting the value and behaviours of the LRA are an important part of the recruitment stage, where the LRA forces the suppression of old value systems and undertakes a process of ‘socialization’ to create greater cohesion. The LRA does this by literally beating the old values out of the new recruits. It enforces negative incentives (threat of/or violent punishment/death) through training, tight social control, and through rites and rituals (Haer et al. 2011, 424). As Titeca states, the military aspect of the LRA cannot be seen to be separate from its religious backbone. Both must be taken together in order to analyze the LRA’s strategy (Titeca 2010, 61). In terms of tight social control, the new recruits are kept under 24-hour surveillance by older rebels who are threatened with death if they let any of the recruits escape. This tight control creates a mind-set which becomes responsive to the talks and preaching by Kony of the spirits and their all-seeing-eyes. To avoid punishment by commanders, new recruits in turn learn how

to regulate any emotions such as fear and sadness. This is strategic in that these emotions are destabilizing to the group’s cohesiveness (Haer et al. 2011, 424). Violence is a key component of the socialization process. Beginning on the first day (of being abducted), the children receive brutal beatings as part of initiation. Those who do not survive the beatings are seen as unfit to join the ranks of the LRA. The beatings, which are part of the rites, create and maintain the norms of the LRA to the point at which the children become highly controllable (Haer et al. 2011, 425).

In addition to internal control, the LRA exert external social control by physically displacing the newly-abducted youths far from their villages. The LRA does this by zigzagging through the bush to create disorientation and by marching long distances until they reach base (Hollander 2007, 10). Often prior to abduction, the LRA will force children to commit atrocities on their own families or villages. The group is mobilized into small, independent units. Yet tight social control and socialization continue even once recruits have proven themselves to be worthy rebels. “Kony announced that from now on, all the new recruits who had participated in the battle would no longer be seen as unholies. They had proven their valour in battle and they had to be treated as such. [...] The rest (those not

injured and taken to Control Altar for medical treatment) were taken to begin their final initiation rite into the LRA” (Hollander 2007, 119). The spiritual rules create an “us” versus “them” dichotomy. They link the child soldiers to the primal unit and provide justification for “purifying” civilians (Hollander 2007, 119).

Commanders get to know their recruits and take note of where they came from. On certain missions, commanders may decide to target a village from where one of their rebels comes. That rebel is forced to commit atrocities such as abducting other children or killing members of his or her own family, severing the child’s connections to the next of kin or the village (Hollander 2007, 12). This is part of the LRA’s strategy to prevent escape (Haer et al. 2011, 425). Killing, abductions, and looting represent the ‘normal’ way of life in the LRA. It becomes the child soldier’s alternate home, given that many believe they cannot return to their own families because of the violence they committed (Haer et al. 2011, 425).

The third method outlined by Haer et al. concerns rites and rituals. The rites are similar from unit to unit in that, after the first killings, new recruits are forced to perform a ritual on the very body of the person they have killed. They are made to believe they will be haunted by the spirit of the deceased if they do

not stay within the protection of the LRA (Haer et al. 2011, 426). The fear of these spirits are apart from those leveraged by Kony. Kony’s use of spirits in his rhetoric allow him to detect when there is someone thinking of escaping. This is why rituals applying Mooya and shea butter are performed – to make child soldiers traceable through the long lasting scents of the oils. The rituals, which are a mix of Christianity and indigenous Acholi tribal religion, provide some familiarity to the new recruits. Kony’s charisma has taken him far in being able to present himself as a godlike figure and control the group through ritual (Haer et al. 2011, 426). Moreover, as the ‘sole possessor of the spirits,’ Kony is the highest spiritual and political leader of the LRA (Wlordarczyk 2004, 13; Hollander 2007, 150). The group’s spiritual practices remain intact even when it is forced to abandon camp and re-settle elsewhere (Hollander 2007, 99). This provides stability and continuity in the group’s structure.

Another factor that contributes to cohesion and compliance are promotions. While the LRA does not give any tangible rewards, it rewards “good” behaviour through promotion. Promotion, in turn, means child soldiers have greater access to food, are less often beaten, more often given weapons, and have authority over other combatants (Haer et al. 2011, 426). ‘Wives’

are awarded to high-ranking commanders (Haer et al. 2011, 428). Recruits move from being carriers to standbys (guards/watch persons) to commanders (Haer et al. 2011, 426). The child soldiers are thus more likely to commit to the organization since their lives in the bush have improved. They feel a sense of establishment and control in having more power. Having rank provides a sense of purpose and the ability to loot and obtain what they want in the bush, whereas these would have been denied in their original home situations (Haer et al. 2011, 427).

Discipline and Obedience

Spiritual indoctrination serves as the legitimate authority and dictates incentives for obedience (Titeca 2010, 62). Kony's "ten commandments" are the foundation of the LRA's spiritual guidelines. While rules change over time, going against any of the commandments results in severe punishment and death (Wlordarczyk 2004, 14). Rules set out by the spirits not only control behaviour in combat but also in other situations. For example, everything done in the camp and in the battlefield has to be carried out quickly. If a recruit takes too long to fetch water or gather wood, the child is killed. The children learn to move at 'ninety-nine speed' in both domestic and battlefield situations (Hollander 2007, 65). Speed is critical for battlefield fighting, such

as loading or assembling an AK-47. Training occurs on and off the field. Child soldiers are taught to be on the highest alert and to respond to tasks with the highest attention. Keeping them in this constant state may increase their efficiency because they are continuously trained to maintain their discipline and tactile efficiency when it comes to various tasks. In counter-insurgency operations this is important, since it trains them for situations in which they must defend the camp if caught off-guard, or it prepares them to be efficient in abandoning camp and regrouping later.

There are spiritual rules which appear to have no logical basis or tactical advantage, however. For example, children have to stand regardless of the situation on the combat field, even if the LRA is coming under heavy attack by enemy forces. On the one hand, this rule may be strategic in that it induces fear and confusion in enemy forces. On the other hand, the inflexibility of this rule can result in a higher attrition rate when the LRA is hopelessly out-matched. One former child soldier remarked, "[...] waiting for our enemies to approach. We were not allowed to sit or lie down. Instead we were told to face our enemy while standing and we were given the firm order that whatever happened we were not to retreat" (Hollander 2007, 78). But there may be rare instances when the rules are broken. "[...] [Captain Ojara] was the

nicest commander in the LRA. He truly cared for his soldiers and he always wanted us to survive the battle. When we first walked into the ambush, he allowed us to take cover and wait for reinforcements, instead of just sending us into our deaths like so many other commanders would have done” (Hollander 2007, 139). Obedience takes precedence over the lives of child soldiers. If rules are not followed, brute force is used (Hollander 2007, 78). “There were rules for everything. I knew that, in order to survive, I should better learn these rules quickly [...]”, said one former soldier (Hollander 2007, 42). Life in the LRA is not as black and white as some accounts would indicate, however. In order to survive, the smarter recruits differentiate between ‘flexible rules.’ They sometimes eat discarded potato peels in order to make up for a lack of food, which violates the ‘sacred rules’ that are not to be broken.

The more time child soldiers spend in the LRA, the more they realize battle outcomes are not determined by the spirits or witch doctors, but by real factors such as being outnumbered or the lack of proper defence positions (Wlordarczyk 2004, 5). “It seemed that we left a couple of hundred dead behind us, and this time there was no one to blame for our defeat, but our own poor defences. We realized then that the enemy forces were too many and

we were constantly outnumbered and outgunned. So we had to find another way to defeat them [...]”, observes one teenager (Hollander 2007, 92). Even though child soldiers may come to realize the spirits are a fabrication, they continue to follow the rules given the violent consequences otherwise. Another interviewee reports, “Again, it was clear that the holy Shea oil did not have the power to prevent bullets penetrating, as Kony had told us so often. Yet, I continued fighting without any fear, because I believed that the moment that I became afraid would be the moment I would be shot. [...] My goal was to kill as many people as possible and not for one single moment did I lose faith in our victory” (Hollander 2007, 114).

Morale

The effect of spiritual practices in the LRA may serve to increase morale in the in-group. It serves as a shared connection between recruits and commanders, is linked to positive benefits such as time off, and celebrations, such as Christmas. Spiritual activity was also the medium through which Kony connected as a leader with his army.

Soldiers often looked forward to Fridays and Sundays because it was during these days that soldiers were given a break from hard military exercises. The sermons were also

seen as “interesting” and “inspiring”. “Kony could really talk. Not only did he talk long and loud, he also talked in a way that triggered something in me. He got me aroused and excited about our mission,” said one youth (Hollander 2007, 44). A charismatic leader, Kony inspired recruits into action without them really knowing what they were fighting for. Another soldier in Kony’s army says, “The LRA was a deeply religious movement, skipping the prayers was only allowed when there was a very good reason. I actually never wanted to skip them. The prayers always filled me with energy and motivation. After the prayer sessions, I always wanted to go back to Uganda to deliver our people from the tyranny of Museveni” (Hollander 2007, 99). Speeches brought a sense of legitimacy with which the soldiers accepted their missions. “It wasn’t long before I started to cheer together with the thousands of others trying to outdo some of the new recruits who sat close to me”, said another former soldier (Hollander 2007, 44). Again, it is not so much the question of rationality of the beliefs and practices, but the effects of these beliefs and their strategic significance (Wlordarczyk 2004, 6).

Religious and spiritual activities also increase the sense of belonging and personal satisfaction or sense of self-worth. Spiritual activities may act as a catalyst to enable this transition:

I believe that it was during the ceremony that followed my training that my transformation into a soldier began, said one former soldier. “It was as if the civilian in me was dying, and in its place a guerrilla was awakened. I could feel that the spirit had invoked something in me. I started to really believe in Kony’s Friday prayers and I began to behave like a soldier. I became very aggressive, especially to other new recruits. Occasionally, I witnessed a brutal execution of someone who had tried to escape, and I wasn’t as horrified by it as I was when I witnessed my first killing. I started to see it as normal; I even started to believe my commander when he said they deserved it. [...] The only life that was still sacred for me was my own (Hollander 2007, 50).

The effect of spiritual and religious indoctrination may have a short to medium term effect on increasing the morale effectiveness of child soldiers, depending on the length of time they remain in the LRA. Many recruits die before their second year in the LRA, meaning they do not live to see the day where they would begin to rationalize that the spirits

are a deception (Hollander 2007). Furthermore, the effect may also vary between abducted recruits and those born into the LRA, given that the latter have not been exposed to any other world-view than that of the LRA.

Mobilization and Legitimacy

The LRA's religious and spiritual practices are not completely different from those of northern Ugandans, which are a mix between Christianity and traditional Acholi spiritual beliefs (Wlordarczyk 2004, 6). This may have served as the basis for the LRA's legitimate claim in wanting to protect the Acholi people (at least until the LRA turned against them) (Wlordarczyk 2004, 9). While a major difference between the Holy Spirit Movement and LRA was that recruits joined the HSM voluntarily. The failure of the HSM may have deterred northern Ugandans/Acholi from taking up arms and joining the LRA. Kony may have faced a civilian population that had higher levels of skepticism about being able to take on the NRA (Wlordarczyk 2004, 9). Thus, his continuation of the spiritual practices started by Alice Auma Lakwena, HSM leader, may have been part of his strategy in trying to attract and retain recruits to his movement (Wlordarczyk 2004, 9). Although it is widely disputed that Kony received the blessings from Acholi elders, as he claimed in earlier days, this may have been

part of his strategy in legitimizing his seat of power in order to strategically use spirituality to build the LRA into an effective armed rebel group (Wlordarczyk 2004, 8).

In his pre-battle speeches, Kony used God in order to mobilize his forces:

The enemy that you will face in the coming few days is battle hardened and they will have superior numbers. But those infidels fight without the Lord in their minds and that is why we will win the battle. God will protect the holiest of us and those who will not survive this campaign, are not worthy to fight for the Lord's army in the first place. We are not infidels like our enemies. Today you are going to conquer our enemies and as a proof of your victory, I want you to take back with you at least one enemy's testicle. Those who have the nerve to come back without a testicle will suffer the consequences (Hollander 2007, 151; 109).

Again, we see the use of spiritual indoctrination used in combination with the threat and use of force.

The effects of religion combined with military strategy are indirect and direct on non-LRA members. The traditional Acholi belief in spirits is used as a terrorizing tool against the local population (Titeca 2010, 60). The local population became the outsiders while the LRA saw itself as the insider 'holy group.' The LRA's interaction with the outside group is thus dictated by its moral code (Titeca 2010, 66).

At the Control Altar in September 1996, Kony delivered a speech to the soldiers who would be going into battle. He reassured them that the Ugandan army was no match and that they could do anything they wanted to not only enemy forces but the northern Ugandan population as well. Kony justified his soldier's future atrocities on the basis that civilians were breaking the LRA's holy rules. "They would learn that breaking our law was a crime and criminals had to be dealt with. So in addition to being an army, we were also a police force." This group of combatants would be sent to Aboke to abduct more than 100 girls for the purpose of marrying them to higher-ranking commanders (Hollander 2007, 125-6). In doing this, Kony's objective was to garner the attention of international actors including the media. The extreme violence employed and the atrocities committed would serve to become the LRA's own public relations campaign. The LRA's

use of rites and rituals also has an effect on enemy forces in the image it projects. Accounts from UPDF and SPLA soldiers confirm the resulting intimidation, and use of certain rituals themselves. "When we detect the enemy [the LRA] here, unlike other wars, it takes between ten and thirty bullets to kill them! Whenever they start fighting, they are not themselves – they become something else," one UPDF soldier told Titeca (Titeca 2010, 69-70).

There is rationality behind what appears to be irrational military tactics as they serve to confuse, terrorize, and immobilize civilians. An example of this is how rules dictated by Kony changed depending on the circumstances and time. There are three examples of such rules while the LRA was in south Sudan and northern Uganda. One, it was forbidden for civilians to cross the road. Two, civilians were forbidden from working or displacing themselves on Fridays. Third, civilians were forbidden from riding bicycles. The first and third laws were population immobilization strategies that controlled civilian movement through fear, so they could not alert the UPDF of the LRA's movements. The second adopted Islamic law in keeping with the influence from the Sudanese government (Hollander 2007, 33). "Back in those days killing was so common. [...] Anyone we caught crossing

the street was killed, often by the most horrible means”, said a former LRA soldier (Hollander 2007, 33).

These means were effective in terrorizing and displacing the local populations. If it was known an LRA group was coming through a particular region, people would quickly abandon their villages (Hollander 2007, 36). From July to August 1997, for example, more than 180,000 people were displaced (IDPs) from Gulu district (Amnesty International 1997, 6). In using their violent punitive methods, the LRA successfully branded itself in such a way that it would not have to pillage a village in order to obtain resources; instead, it would encounter one empty of inhabitants who often left behind goats, chickens, and their plantations of cassava (Hollander 2007, 36). “I didn’t see the village before the fighting started, but it must have been market day, so we really got everything,” said an LRA member. “There were many goats, chickens, ducks and even cows and pigs. Except for the pigs we took all the animals” (Hollander 2007, 124). The LRA would use their spiritual laws to justify everyday acts of terror against civilians. “Some of our laws concerned animals that were not supposed to be kept or eaten. These included dogs, pigs, and sheep. Whenever we saw any of those animals we would kill them, and if we found their owners [...] sometimes we would just

beat them severely, but in most cases we just killed them,” said an ex-LRA soldier (Hollander 2007, 127). ‘Irrational’ killings served the strategic purpose of displacing hundreds of thousands of peoples (Titeca 2010, 60). “If we found someone on a bicycle, we would hack off his legs and cut off his buttocks. [...] If we found that somebody had been talking to the army, we would cut off the lips so that they could never speak again. In this manner we set very clear examples as to what our laws contained,” reports a former child soldier (Hollander 2007, 127-8). In this way, the LRA’s smaller units were able to cause great population displacement because their reputation would precede their arrival and cause panic in the local population, even though civilians outnumbered them (Titeca 2010, 60).

Thus the effect of the LRA’s religious and spiritual practices may increase the effectiveness of child soldiers through strategic implementation, as first posited by Haer et al. However, this cannot be separated from the use of brute force and acts of violence. Taken on its own, if the LRA indoctrinated its recruits using traditional (non-violent) spiritual and religious methods, the effectiveness of its school-age troops would most likely not be at the level that it is seen here. Because of Kony’s interpretation of local spiritual activity and religions, the

LRA's own religious indoctrination prescribes violent methods. Furthermore, the LRA's local spiritual roots enabled it to be better understood by the local population and its recruits when they operated in northern Uganda and South Sudan.

Absence of Legitimate Ruling Structures Heightens Child-soldier Effectiveness

Compared to other African states that lost support from Cold War powers, post-Cold War Uganda became a strong state because it was within a region of 'concern' to Western powers because of their new weariness of Islamic extremism. The strength of the state, however, was only superficial. Uganda was weakened by its war with Tanzania and its 5-year civil war, to the point that the national average for poverty was 56% in 1992. This was eventually reduced to 31%, but the north remained extremely poor (Mwenda 2010, 45). Mwenda presents a similar argument to another academic researcher, Uvin, in that it was not so much the strength of the state at play, but the hollowness of its political legitimacy and institutions as well as politicization of ethnicity encouraged by foreign aid, which fuelled the conflict in Rwanda as it did in Uganda (Mwenda 2010, 45; Uvin 1998, 224-238). Museveni's National Resistance Movement

(NRM) was able to use foreign aid as an instrument to stay in power because of the opportunity provided by the LRA threat (Mwenda 2010, 45). When the NRM took over power in 1986, it sought to rebuild the collapsed economy and state in order to gain its legitimacy. There was a high level of violence, as basic state functions were inept at maintaining justice and control over the angered civilian population (Mwenda 2010, 46). The NRM was able to restore greater order in areas where it had political support (southern Uganda), reducing violence and allowing people to return to work. But this was not enough to restore the economy. The NRM was hostile in 1986-87 to international financial institutions and instituted economic policies that shrank the economy and increased inflation. It was only when the country could no longer get financial support from its previous Soviet Union ally that it turned to the West. The West was open to helping the Ugandan government as long as it met conditions set out by international financial institutions, which included austerity measures and structural adjustment programs (SAPs). The Ugandan government conceded out of desperation (Mwenda 2010, 47). From 1987 to 1990 the government obtained \$650 million USD per year in foreign aid, which produced 7% economic growth. From 1990 to 2005, the amount

was increased to \$738 million. The government was relying heavily on foreign aid (Mwenda 2010, 47).

The NRM, a former guerrilla group on its own, tried to build its legitimacy through institution building at the same time as having to deal with the war in north Uganda caused by the evolution of rebellions, from UPDA to the HSM to the LRA. Added to the country's troubles was the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which was killing up to 40% of the National Resistance Army force in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Mwenda 2010, 47-8). In this way, both the northern rebellion and the HIV/AIDS pandemic undermined the NRA's efforts to establish formal military structures. Because of this, commanders began to drive on forward with the war instead without concentrating on solidifying the military structure (Mwenda 2010, 47). They began controlling economic resources for their own ends while avoiding accountability (Mwenda 2010, 48). At the same time, officer salaries dropped as the state had to cut back on health care, education, and pensions for the deceased officers' families in order to meet IMF demands. In the absence of institutional checks, there arose numerous illegitimate opportunities for those in command, leading to the creation of army enterprises. Over the years, the army business as rampant in the whole military establishment, which would mean

consolidation of political power for Museveni (Mwenda 2010, 48).

Then the government launched Operation North in 1991. It was an aggressive counter-insurgency operation that almost destroyed the LRA. Regional influences, such as the end of the Cold War in 1990, affected its outcome. The U.S. realigned its global concern from threat of communism to Islamic extremism, so when El Bashir took over the Khartoum government in 1989 and aligned with the National Islamic Front, the U.S. began funding rebel groups, primarily the SPLA which Uganda also assisted. In return, Khartoum funded the LRA, supplying it with arms and training bases in South Sudan to fight the SPLA as well as Museveni's forces (Mwenda 2010, 49). From this point, the LRA no longer needed public support from the Acholi population, which in turn changed its military and political strategy. It became increasingly indiscriminate on its targets. At the same time, because of the war, Museveni gained by aligning himself with the U.S. in its fight to curb Islamic extremism in the region. From 1992 onward, the Ugandan government took on the IMF and World Bank's liberal reforms, which externalized policy and budget allocation with a predictable result: the economy was liberalized and the state shrank in size, which had an effect on the NRM's traditional sources of legitimacy

in that it could no longer obtain as much patronage (Mwenda 2010, 49).

However, this did leave Museveni free to pursue his own political and military agenda. He was able to get away with a one-party system while international donors were pushing for multiparty systems elsewhere. And he had the funding to send his military after other interests in northern Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan and the DRC. Museveni was able to carry on with patronage through the military budget leading to extreme corruption in the late 1990s. The war had provided him with justification for replenishing the defence budget, as he was able to manipulate international donors. Museveni was aggressively pro-military-patronage, but not keen on negotiations with what he saw as 'irrational insurgents' (Mwenda 2010, 50).

The result was the ongoing division between the southern-biased government and the northern Acholi population, even though they were not supportive of the LRA. Museveni received additional support after the U.S. and U.K. put pressure on international financial institutions to increase defence spending because of the 'war on terror,' increasing Museveni's stronghold on national and regional military policy. Uganda became known as a success story in post-conflict reconstruction, but this hid the fact that the success was wholly dependent on foreign aid and

was helping corrupt political and military practices (Mwenda 2010, 51). This included invading mineral rich DRC to have access to its resources, which were poorly controlled under Mobutu's own corrupt military establishment. This plundering allowed Museveni to have control by rewarding his army via patronage (Lemarchand 2009, 228; Mwenda 2010, 52). Because there were so many ghost soldiers whose steady paychecks went elsewhere, this greatly weakened the actual combat effectiveness of the army. For example, an audit done before Operation Iron Fist showed that the division destined for combat had only 1,500 soldiers instead of the expected 7,200 troops. The estimate of the LRA was 2,000 soldiers. In contrast to Museveni's 12,000 personal escort army unit, this demonstrates the total lack of interest in protecting the northern population and achieving military victory. In 2003, the units going into battle lacked basic military equipment such as ammunition and food. The UPDF (NRA previously) was being massacred by the LRA which was incredibly mobile by comparison. The number of IDPs went from 350,000 to 1,800,000 in a matter of months during the Operation Iron Fist. Instead of containing the rebel threat, the weak military forces allowed it to expand to other regions, affecting more civilians, which in turn increased donor funding to "protect the civilian

population” (Mwenda 2010, 52).

This was also a way for the Museveni government to separate the northern population from the rebels, which it suspected of collaborating with the LRA. It was effectively colonizing the north. International donors were finally getting wind of government and military corrupt practices and forced Museveni to investigate, which he did and fired a number of officers. But Museveni, like Mobutu, learned how to play the international game, and hid the proceedings of the investigation (Mwenda 2010, 53). So with donor funding, Museveni was able to increase economic activity along ethnic lines in central and western Uganda, while letting the war destroy economic activity in the north and northeast regions (Mwenda 2010, 53). This, in turn, ensured political support from southerners, especially during the 1996 presidential elections. The government played up the threat of the north, and propagandized that it would take over the government in order to secure votes. The war became a symbol which the government used to threaten the population, in that if it stayed in power, it would contain the war. The war also became an excuse to curb democratic processes such as freedom of speech, quelling the opposition by threat of imprisonment, claiming they were rebel supporters (Mwenda 2010, 54).

Because of the LRA’s activity in the north, the international community turned a blind eye on the government’s human rights abuses, and even increased funding support despite prosperity in the south. The north was suffering greatly, being forced into IDP camps with incredibly impoverished conditions, which were not protected from LRA attacks and abduction raids. A camp of 1,500 IDPs would be protected by a government sponsored militia of 14 soldiers. Sometimes the soldiers would protect themselves from the LRA by hiding within the masses of people in the camps. Two examples of the severity of LRA attacks are the cases of Barlonyo and Acholi Pii, where the LRA murdered over 300 people and abducted hundreds of children (Mwenda 2010, 55). Camp conditions in addition caused on average 1,000 deaths per week. In a twisted way, humanitarian aid contributed to this by distributing some supplies to the camps, which allowed the government to keep the northern population in them, instead of taking the responsibility of defending them, and absolved it from consequences in not providing basic camp security (Mwenda 2010, 56).

In 2006, the Juba peace negotiations began to take place with the new South Sudan government as mediator. This allowed a period of relative peace, but it was based on false presumptions that the

Museveni government would negotiate a settlement. On the LRA side, international arrest warrants from the International Criminal Court for Kony and his top commanders kept him from entering peace negotiations. Museveni was rather interested in keeping good relations with South Sudan, which is why he conceded to the peace talks. But it continued to antagonize every wrong move the LRA made in the peace process, as a way to sabotage the process (Mwenda 2010, 57). Thus the inadequacy and illegitimacy of the Museveni government created conditions in which the LRA could thrive. The illegitimate government structure in this case increases the effectiveness of armies that use child soldiers, by weakening the state's security forces.

Conclusion

This paper substantiates two of the three hypotheses posed to support my thesis that child soldiers are effective. Their effectiveness in LRA, however, cannot be explained by drug use because it is forbidden. The LRA's interpretation of religious and local spiritual practices, which includes justification of its constant use of brute force and violence, may increase the effectiveness of its children in combat. The use of religion combined with military tactics serve to provide a sense of legitimacy to the rebel movement, while increasing cohesion and promoting obedience.

These qualities are essential to any army. Lastly, the absence of a strong state may also increase the effectiveness of child soldiers in the LRA, given that a combination of the historical politicization of ethnicities and the government leader's illegitimate quest for power have weakened the state's military to the point where it cannot effectively combat the LRA.

These findings, however, must be taken with caution. They speak to an incredibly complex story that is not, for the most part, explainable by certain mainstream theories, such as greed-and-grievance. Internal factors are at play, such as historical politicization of ethnic divides, which caused economic discrepancies between north and south, not to mention the regionalization and borderless movement of armed rebel groups and government forces. On the ground, in terms of effectiveness, the LRA's strategy and use of violence was inherited from previous rebel groups. While the LRA was active for the two decades (which was the timeframe covered in this research paper), it had four decades' worth of experience in guerrilla warfare. The illegitimacy of the movement was not able to garner support from adults. However the LRA is highly strategic in using children from ages 12 to 14 as combatants and in continuously regenerating the supply of children either through abductions or in-camp births. The renewable

supply of children is an important factor in explaining why child soldiers are so effective – they come in large numbers and are replaced in large numbers in states that do not have the means to protect them. In my opinion, the LRA has evolved from a resistance movement to a warlord organization. The failed peace negotiations as well as the International Criminal Court’s hunt for Kony and his top commanders may provide enough incentive for them to keep the violence going to ensure their survival in the bush. It is extremely challenging, however, to investigate a case that is so obscure.

What is important for policymakers is realizing this complexity, rather than resorting to overgeneralized and inaccurate misconceptions concocted by inept researchers and the media. Furthermore, as this paper established, in order to conduct effective counter-insurgency operations, it is important to not apply general findings on individual armed group cases. Research must be undertaken on a case-by-case basis in order to come up with an effective and tailored counter-insurgency strategy.

Patricia Faucher already holds a bachelor’s degree in psychology from McGill University, but she pursued a political science degree at Concordia because of her strong interest in public policy and international relations.

She has worked for non-profits in clean energy and does volunteer research in public health. She is from everywhere, having moved ten times before she was 18 when she ‘settled’ in the great city of Montreal. Patricia has long had an eclectic mix of interests in astronomy, vegan cookery, political strategy, physics, and social justice. She wrote this paper because she wanted to challenge her professor’s position, which maintained that children were not effective as combatants. Because child soldiers had also been a long-standing interest, and because the “Kony 2012” campaign had greatly unnerved her in its oversimplification, Patricia sought to debunk the myths surrounding child armies and show how complex the issues truly are.

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Fallacy of Abstraction:

David Hume and the Restoration of Context to Politics

by *Rafael Sordili*

John Pocock is one of the founding members of the Cambridge school of historiography, a school that introduces elements of historical methodology to the study of political philosophy. From his observations of the practice of philosophy, Pocock identifies one fundamental error being committed within the discipline. For him, the very nature

of the philosophical method dictates that philosophers engage with the objects of their study—ideas and immaterial concepts—from an excessively abstract point of view. The problem, however, is that such a standpoint causes philosophers to lose touch with the concrete reality surrounding the object, generating an ever increasing level of abstraction that, in turn, results in the complete detachment of philosophical theory from actuality. In other words, philosophers end up discussing each other's conjectures about the objects more than the objects themselves. Pocock sees this process as problematic. He believes that it is necessary for philosophy to abandon its lofty perch and to reintroduce concreteness to its *praxis*.

For him, this goal can be achieved with the incorporation of elements of historical methodology into the discipline, such as material and factual evidence. Historiography has the potential to counter some of the more deleterious effects of excessive abstraction and to restore the idea of context into the work of philosophers. The purpose of the present essay is to take the reader through a Pocockian exercise in which the work of the Scottish philosopher David Hume is enlisted in order to explicate and expand on Pocock's ideas regarding the relationship between history and philosophy. I believe that Hume anticipates some of the methodological preoccupations and questions raised by Pocock. I will attempt to prove that Humean theoretical methodology dialogues not only with other philosophers but also with material history. Hume is no stranger to the practice of employing context for clarifying excessively abstract concepts, and he does so by incorporating historical elements to his political philosophy.

Pocockian Methodology

In the article "Texts as Events," John Pocock narrates an anecdote that illustrates very well the problem that he sees is plaguing the discipline of philosophy ([1987] 2009, 118). The year was 1976, and he had been invited to participate in two conferences commemorating

the bicentennial anniversary of the death of David Hume. Pocock remembers being surprised by the apparently injudicious use of the Scot's ideas by the philosophers present at the conference. They were throwing Hume's name and theories around with regard for neither the adequacy nor the precision of the terminology. In fact, Pocock recounts that "[. . .] to say 'Hume says' meant using the word Hume as little more than a trigger that set in motion various language games they desired to play" ([1987] 2009, 118). In other words, the philosophers seemed to share a common language which they used to communicate with one another, a language in which words like 'Hume' or 'Humean' acquired a very specific meaning that was completely devoid of connection to any type of context or facticity. The philosophers at the conference did not seem to care about the historical circumstances in which David Hume was immersed. They took Hume's name in vain, merely for the sake of qualifying or strengthening their own rhetoric. For Pocock, the academicians committed an error that is common in the field of philosophy: engaging with an object on a purely intellectual and abstract level. Philosophers in general tend to believe that it is perfectly reasonable for them to strike up a conversation with their counterparts from the past. In this instance, the case of Niccolò Machiavelli is well known. After a laborious day

of work, the Florentine would dress up in robes and retreat to his study where he would spend the night entertaining “conversations” with the likes of Cicero, Plato and many others of his idols from antiquity.¹ That Machiavelli is able to converse with the ancients is only made possible because of the methodology employed by philosophy, one in which thought and abstraction take precedence over any other attribute of the object of study. In that sense, any chronological disparity that might exist between these philosophers and their interlocutors places no hindrance on the belief that a dialogue across time is actually possible. For Pocock, it is usually the case that to philosophy “[. . .] ‘history’ denotes a condition in which processes go on, and which may be discussed independently of the narrative of what these processes have been” ([2004] 2009, 140). The philosophical method takes the continuum of history and breaks it into smaller units. These units, which are by definition artificial, constitute nothing more than human abstractions, tools created to facilitate the process of thought. Such tools are engaged with by philosophers independently and with complete disregard for their original interconnectedness. The object of philosophy is deprived of its concrete reality and rendered into nothing but a hollow abstract concept. Therefore, it is at the level of abstraction that a conversation between two

philosophers located in two different historical periods can take place.

For Pocock, this veritable “will to abstraction” that characterizes the philosophical method is directly responsible for the creation of a myth deeply entrenched in the imagination of the West: the belief that Western philosophy makes up a tradition that is unique, self-contained, and detached from material history. The origins of this myth come from the idea that a “Great Conversation” has been taking place in the West in which philosophers have been relentlessly reading and commenting on each other’s work since time immemorial. Pocock does not deny the existence of a Western tradition. On the contrary, he recognizes that there is indeed a group of thinkers whose work has repeatedly been the subject of scholarship in the West for centuries. He does, however, challenge the myth of the tradition.

A tradition is nothing more than a culturally sanctioned behavior or habit. It is a way of doing things that is shared by all the members of a given culture. In this sense, therefore, the Western tradition is simply “[. . .] a body of thinkers to whom we have grown into the habit of paying attention and a number of viewpoints from which they appear interesting to us” (Pocock [1962] 2009, 4). In other words, what came to be called the Western tradition is, in fact, an

intellectual tradition comprised of a restricted group of thinkers from different eras of history whose body of work has been—and most likely will continue to be—the object of study for philosophers for centuries.

Another long-standing myth challenged by Pocock is the idea of a “Great Conversation” (2003, 317). According to him, the existence of dialogues taking place across time is a further misconception present in the Western tradition. Such dialogues are made possible by the methodology of philosophy and, as such, given sanction by the tradition itself. They operate through the attempt of somebody in the present (not necessarily the present of this essay, but any present in the string of succeeding presents which comprise the course of time) to engage in conversation with somebody else who belongs to the past. Much argumentation is not necessary to demonstrate that such exchange is fundamentally impossible. According to the very definition of the term dialogue—from the Greek *dialogesthai*, meaning ‘to converse with’—a conversation entails the participation of two or more individuals (Timmerman and Schiappa 2010, 17). Therefore, there cannot be a discussion if one of the parties is either not present or not able to offer a retort. In that sense, dialogue with the past becomes nothing but a tool of heuristics, a way for

scholars to either parade their erudition or to persuade their colleagues. Nevertheless, just for the sake of argument, let us assume here that diachronic dialogue is indeed plausible, and that it is supposedly possible to engage in conversation with the past. For Pocock, even if philosophers have in fact interacted with long-dead counterparts, their exchanges have always been much more related to the reality of the conversationalist in the present than to the one in the past. Pocock writes, “[. . .] there is [. . .] a history of philosophers not being philosophers twenty-four hours a day and receiving information and inputs, both philosophical and non-philosophical, from beings inhabiting the same social and historical moments as those in which they happen to live” ([1980] 2009, 52). The idea imparted by the previous passage is that philosophers exist within an immediate context, and that this context is a source of stimuli far greater than the past could ever be. No matter how hard one tries to engage with the past, the truth is that one is inevitably rooted in one’s own present. In that sense, the interlocutors located in the present are fundamentally conversing with their own time much more than they could ever engage with any other epoch.

A further refutation of the notion of dialogue across time lies in the impossibility of diachronic translation. The idea here is simple: an

intellectual work is conceived within a very specific context to which it belongs. This context, which is social, historical, and political, informs the particular message that the work is attempting to convey. Any alterations in the contextual variables of the work are inevitably bound to cause the original message intended by the author to be lost. The passage of time constitutes the major source of such alterations. It fundamentally transforms the contextual variables of intellectual works to the point that the original message can be quite feasibly consigned to oblivion. In this sense, therefore, there is absolutely no manner in which philosophers from one time can attain the exact meaning of a message composed in a time not their own²—a fact that in no way prevents philosophers from trying, much to the detriment of the original message.³

A corollary to the problem of diachronic translation is what Pocock calls the “Tradition of Intellectualizing.” This is a tradition characteristic to the discipline of political philosophy and refers to the employment of abstractions for the purpose of making complex political phenomena more intelligible and easy to comprehend by philosophers. The objects of study of political philosophers are the political processes that occur within societies. Such processes are by nature extremely complex, making them most challenging for philosophers

to comprehend in their entirety. The only way to deal with the intricacy of political phenomena, therefore, is to attempt to reduce the complexity of reality in order to make it more easily readable. This is achieved through a process of intellectualizing. Just as was done to the continuum of history, philosophers will make use of abstractions to abridge political reality. They will simplify physical existence, turning it into a mere artificial model aimed at facilitating their comprehension (Pocock [1962] 2009, 5). The Western philosophical tradition has, so far, been geared towards these abstract models. Political philosophers have been expanding and building upon each other’s models since the onset of the “Great Conversation.” The problem, however, is that such representations produce an ever increasing level of abstraction that has been insidiously taking over the scholarship.⁴

Excessive abstraction is exactly the phenomenon that Pocock observed taking place among the philosophers participating in the two conferences mentioned above. Nonetheless, he has a proposition that could rescue philosophers from their own web of intellectualization. According to Pocock, the only way to counter the advance of abstraction in philosophy is by incorporating elements of historical methodology into philosophical inquiry. With regards to their methods, historians

hold the need for contextualization as the most important element in the apprehension of their object of study. Contrary to their philosophical counterparts, historians privilege context over abstract thought. Their focus is on the contingencies—social, historical, political, and so on—surrounding the objects. For them, “[. . .] ‘history’ is a name for events and processes that may be said to have happened and can be narrated and interpreted, possibly as still going on” (Pocock [2004] 2009, 140). In other words, historians consider their objects as completely immersed in a complex process that takes place in an ever-succeeding continuum of time. This is a continuum that has its origins far into the past, but that also projects itself through the historian’s present, as well as into the historian’s future. This is the fundamental distinction between history and philosophy: while philosophers focus mostly on sets of abstractions that reduce the complexity of phenomenon to a more intelligible level, historians make that very complexity their objects of study. The work of the historian, therefore, has the potential to complement that of the philosopher. Historicity could serve to counter the ill effects of extreme intellectualization. By exposing the relationship between the abstract philosophical constructs and the concrete reality in which they are inescapably immersed, history restores proper diachronic context to philosophy.

Humean Methodology

In the previous section, I presented Pocock’s idea that historical methodology can complement the excessively abstract work of philosophy. In this section, I will take us through an intellectual exercise, in which I apply Pocockian theory to the political thought of David Hume. The idea of this exercise is to show that the Scottish philosopher already anticipates some of the epistemological issues raised later by Pocock. Hume moves beyond the mere intellectual dialogue with other philosophers. He makes use of historical elements as a means to complement his political theory. However, before I proceed, a disclaimer makes itself necessary: Hume was a prolific writer who studied a great number of different subjects; if I am ever to keep my analysis brief, I need to restrict the focus of my argument. My methodology, therefore, is to take the *Political Essays* as my primary source and frame my investigation around Hume’s narrative about why political communities form and are maintained. So let me begin.

In the essay “On the First Principles of Government,” Hume reveals how remarkable it is for him to observe the effortlessness that marks the establishment and perpetuation of governments. He draws attention to the “easiness with which the many are governed by the few;

and the implicit submission with which men resign their sentiments and passions to those of their rulers” (Hume [1742] 2006, 16). For him, experience shows that people are prone to choose to live under the rule of a government and that once a government has been established, it is more likely to remain in place than to be overthrown. In fact, governments do not usually find many obstacles to their rule, and their subjects seem to accept domination with surprising ease. This is perceived by Hume as an extraordinary phenomenon ([1742] 2006, 16). According to him, there is no reason for subjects to accept any government which they dislike. After all, “FORCE is always on the side of the governed” (Hume [1742] 2006, 16). Hume means this in the literal sense of numbers: the ruled element of a political community is always in a situation of majority when compared to the rulers. The “many” could, therefore, easily overthrow any government if they so desired. And yet most of the time they refrain from doing so. From this observation, Hume moves on to investigate upon what principles the authority of the few is based.

The most important of Hume’s explanations for the stability of governments is what he calls the “principle of opinion.” It is clear for him that, since force is always on the side of the subjects, rule, therefore, is necessarily supported by the opinion

of the ruled ([1742] 2006, 16). So governments are based on voluntary subjection. Hume divides this principle into two kinds: opinion of interest and of right. The relevance of the principle of opinion for our investigation is that it serves as an illustration of the double nature of Humean theoretical methodology. Hume’s conception of the principle of opinion arises from his dialogue with other philosophers from the past, in particular, John Locke and James Harrington. But it is also based on his study of recent British history, most notably the question of the legitimacy of the Stuart line after the Cromwellian revolution. Let us, then, expand our discussion of the different types of principle of opinion: of interest and of right.

Hume defines the opinion of interest as “[. . .] the general advantage which is reaped from government [. . .]” ([1742] 2006, 16). The idea here is that people tend to consider political communities as advantageous. The reason behind that consideration is the fact that an established government has the power to offer protection to its subjects. Protection of the subjects in the sense of the physical integrity both of themselves and of their families, as well as their economic interests, most importantly, their property. Hume also implies that there is a sense of convenience expressed in the adherence of subjects to a political community. This

means that citizens support the government because by doing so they delegate to the public body the fulfillment of tasks and obligations which they do not wish to take upon themselves. Some such tasks, which are essential for the survival or the community, could be public administration (maintenance of infrastructure), enforcement of the law (police force), and protection from foreign invaders (armed forces). The essay "Of the Origin of Government" expands this idea of interest a bit further (Hume [1742] 2006, 20). It states that among the main purposes behind the establishment of civil society is the dispensation of justice (Hume [1742] 2006, 20). According to Hume, social order "[. . .] is much better maintained by means of government" ([1742] 2006, 21). In other words, the only way to bring peace and discipline to a community is by the establishment of a government. The principle of opinion of interest, therefore, justifies the subjection of the citizens to a government on the basis of the benefits they receive from the public body.

Another principle upon which governments are founded and maintained is the opinion of right. According to Hume, this principle is subdivided into two distinct categories: the right to property and the right to power. Let us start with the first one. The opinion of the right to property justifies the existence

of government based upon the protection of private property. In this sense, the allegiance of the subjects is based on the government's capacity for safeguarding their possessions. Now, to the attentive observer, this explanation should immediately raise a problem: there seems to be an overlap between this explanation just given of the opinion of the right to property and that of the opinion of interest. In both cases, the public body is rendering a service to the individual citizen; and in both cases the service can very well be that of protection of private property. What, then, is the difference between the two? Unfortunately, Hume does not offer a proper elucidation for this apparent contradiction present in his theory. In fact, he glosses over the subject and quickly moves on.

A respected scholar of the Scottish Enlightenment and a specialist of Humean thought, Knud Haakonssen, proposes a hypothesis for this dilemma that seems plausible enough (Haakonssen 1989). Hume considers the opinion of the right to property as a distinct category because he is responding to the theories put forward by James Harrington in *The Commonwealth of Oceana*. Published in 1656, the book tells the story of a utopian republic with a constitution that supposedly contains the ideal form of government for England. Harrington sees a correlation of proportionality

between property and political influence. For him, “[. . .] an overbalance in dominion or property to the whole people [. . .] is incompatible with popular government; for to popular government it is essential that power should be in the people, but the overbalance of a nobility in dominion draws the power to themselves” (Harrington [1656], 72). The idea here is that there needs to be an equilibrium when it comes to the possession of private property within the political community, for a society without economic equality cannot achieve political equality. For Haakonssen, Hume dislikes Harrington’s proposal and rejects it on the grounds that it goes much too far (Hume 2006, xxix).

Nevertheless, I believe there is yet another level to this explanation and that Haakonssen fails to touch upon a crucial reference that Hume makes. The Harringtonian hypothesis is based on the following passage, which is stated by Hume immediately after the brief description of the opinion of the right to property: “A noted author has made property the foundation of all government; and most of our political writers seem inclined to follow him in that particular” ([1742] 2006, 17). The passage makes two distinct references: (1) “a noted author,” who places property at the center of a political founding; and (2) “most of our political writers,” who tend to follow the noted author.

It seems to me that Harrington could very well be ranked among the plurality of authors alluded to by the second reference. After all, as I have demonstrated above, the question of private property is indeed central to his political theory, which leaves us the question of the “noted author.” It is my belief that that author is none other than John Locke. In his *Second Treatise of Government*, Locke states that “[. . .] the common-wealth comes by [. . .] for the preservation of the property of all the members of that society, as far as possible” ([1689] 1980, 47). For Locke, one of the main reasons for the founding of political communities is the preservation of the private property of the citizenry. Hume agrees with this element of Lockean theory. He clearly affirms that the opinion of right to property is “sufficiently understood [. . .] in all matters of government” ([1742] 2006, 17). He, therefore, enlists the political philosophy of John Locke in support of his own theories.

I have demonstrated so far that David Hume attempts to dialogue with the political theories of both James Harrington and John Locke. In that sense, the Scottish philosopher fulfills the first level of philosophical investigation: he is attempting to engage in abstract exchanges with thinkers not of his own era. However, other than perhaps attesting to Hume’s erudition, this demonstration does not yet

support my claim that he anticipates the Pocockian demand that political theory should be complemented by the methods of historiography. In order to buttress my contention, I still need to demonstrate the interaction between Hume's work both as a philosopher and as a historian. Let us then continue with our investigation.

The other sub-type of opinion of right is the opinion of right to power. The idea of such opinion is that nations have the highest regard for governments or rulers who have been in place the longest. In other words, rulers who have been ruling for some time have the right to keep on ruling for as long as they wish. The right to power is unique when compared to the other rights. It is the only right that has the "sanction of antiquity" (Hume [1742] 2006, 16). The more ancient a regime, the more legitimacy it will possess among its subjects. Hume sees this notion of a historical legitimacy as exercising at the same time a positive and a negative influence on the life of governments: positive in the sense that it strengthens the claim for the legitimacy of governments that are well established and negative because the right to power is also the most prone to suffer the threat of faction. Let us imagine the following scenario: the ruler of a given political community bases his legitimacy on the fact that he and his family have been ruling for centuries. His rule

is, therefore, justified on the basis of right. Imagine now that a new element is introduced into the political community: another family claims the throne. This new family has an alternate narrative for the history of the nation. They claim, for example, that their lineage is older than that of the current ruling family, and they demand that the throne be handed over to them. In this case, the alternate claimants to the throne constitute a faction. Hume considers factions extremely dangerous for political communities. According to him, "when men act in a faction, they are apt, without shame or remorse, to neglect all the ties of honor and morality in order to serve their party" ([1742] 2006, 17). In other words, factions based on opinion of right have the potential to bring to the fore the strongest passions and create the most embattled militancy. Their powerful centrifugal push has the power to gravely destabilize the government. Factions can even generate a type of civil war in which both sides refuse to offer terms of surrender and fight until the opposing side is completely vanquished.

As a political theorist, David Hume is well aware of the dangerous consequences that can arise from a dispute between factions. However, such awareness is not restricted to his political thought. It is also present in Hume's work as a historian. One of such works is the *History of*

England, the uncontested *magnum opus* of Humean historical study. The *History* is fundamentally influenced by the theoretical framework introduced in the *Essays*, regardless of its publication 10 years after. Allow me to illustrate the investigation with a brief discussion of the period that marked the end of the Tudor dynasty and the transference of the English throne to the House of Stuart, a period greatly admired by Hume. The Tudors had risen to power in the mid-15th century from the military campaign known as the War of the Roses. Since the Tudors had assumed the throne through conquest, their claim to power was more related to might than to an opinion of right. For that reason, the Tudor *regnum* in England was marked by political uncertainty, and plots to dethrone the Tudor family dotted the land. The transition to the House of Stuart after the death of Elizabeth I Tudor had all the ingredients to generate a great deal of turmoil. Yet Hume informs us that “the crown of England was never transmitted from father to son with greater tranquillity, than it passed from the family of Tudor to that of Stuart” ([1778] 1983, 6). The reason for the apparent ease with which power was transmitted between the two houses was the fact that the Stuarts held a claim to the throne that was based on right. James I was seen by his subjects of the monarchy as the rightful heir to the Crown. For

that very reason “[...] the whole nation seemed to dispose themselves with joy and pleasure for his reception” (Hume [1778] 1983, 6). With this seemingly peaceful transition, the realm managed to preserve its integrity as a political community.

Conclusion

The interaction between Hume’s theoretical work and his study of British history brings us back to our proposed exercise. We have seen so far that the political theory of David Hume is complemented by his engaging in dialogue with other philosophers not of his time, notably John Locke and James Harrington. In that sense he can be subjected to a Pocockian critique and accused of committing the error of over-intellectualizing the objects of his theory. However, we have also seen that Hume combines his theoretical propositions with a deep and informed analysis of England’s history. This argument can be questioned on account of the lack of evidence as to whether it is the theory that is indebted to the history or vice versa. In any case, there is an undeniable exchange occurring between Hume the political theorist and Hume the historian. Historical anachronism impedes me from concluding this study with the affirmation that Hume undertakes a Pocockian standpoint in his work. Furthermore, I cannot conclude this inquiry by affirming

that Humean methodology prefigures its Pocockian opposite number. But I can conclude that it is evident that Hume is not a completely abstract type of philosopher; rather, his political theory dialogues with, and even incorporates, elements of his historical studies. Therefore, Humean theoretical methodology dialogues not only with other philosophers but also with material history.

The methodology introduced by David Hume surpasses the realm of theory. The Humean model has many practical applications that are extremely relevant to our time. In the 20th century alone, the victims of regimes operating solely according to abstract ideas could be counted by the millions. By employing material history as a lens through which claims based on abstraction are judged, Hume demonstrates the need to restore the notion of context into the realm of politics. We should perhaps adopt a more Humean standpoint in the politics of the 21st prevent our future from repeating the horrors of our past.

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Notes

1 - *This anecdote is narrated by Machiavelli himself on a letter written on December 10th ambassador Francesco Vettori, in which he recounts the following: "When evening comes, I return home and enter my study; on the threshold I take off my workday clothes, covered with mud and dirt, and put on the garments of court and palace. Fitted out appropriately, I step inside the venerable courts of the ancients, where, solicitously received by them, I nourish myself on that food that alone is mine and for which I was born; where I am unashamed to converse with them and to question them about the motives for their actions, and*

they, out of their human kindness, answer me. And for four hours at a time I feel no boredom, I forget all my troubles, I do not dread poverty, and I am not terrified by death. I absorb myself into them completely” (Machiavelli [1513] 1988), 93).

2 - *Although this idea of the impossibility of a diachronic dialogue is fairly straightforward, it is in no way free of contention. A philologist, for example, could argue that the same problem of interpretation would occur with any text translated from another language. A linguist, on the other hand, could even question the capacity of language itself to convey proper meaning. In that sense, Ludwig Wittgenstein goes even further. In aphorism 210 of the Philosophical Investigations, he states: “But do you really explain to the other person what you yourself understand? Don’t you get him to guess the essential thing? You give him examples, – but he has to guess their drift, to guess your intention.” The previous passage calls into question the capacity of a message to properly convey an intended meaning. According to Wittgenstein, an author is incapable to communicate meaning in its entirety, the message always falls short of the original intention of the author. For that reason, it is*

up to the reader, or interlocutor, to fill in the gaps with elements of his or her personal interpretation. That entails that, in the end, the “essential thing” of a message, its original intended meaning, is left up to the guesswork of an external party. Nevertheless, however interesting this linguistic discussion might be, we cannot forget the fact that Pocock is a historian and not a linguist. As such, he is not necessarily interested on the limitations of discourse. His focus is simply on the diachronic dynamics of such discourse. For that reason, I will refrain from delving further into the linguistic argument. For more on this see (Wittgenstein [1953] 2009).

3 - *In his article “Meaning and Understanding,” (1969) Quentin Skinner points out two basic errors that can occur during the process of diachronic translation: Anachronism and prolepsis. He defines the first as the imposition upon a writer of content external to his or her original intended meaning: “A given writer may be “discovered” to have held a view, on the strength of some chance similarity of terminology, on some subject to which he cannot in principle have meant to contribute” (Skinner 1969, 7-8). The second, prolepsis, he defines and considering an author the*

conscious precursor of future developments that he or she could not have possibly predicted. In the words of Skinner, it occurs when: “the historian is more interested — as he may legitimately be — in the retrospective significance of a given historical work or action than in its meaning for the agent himself” (Skinner 1969, 22). For more on this, refer to (Skinner 1969).

4 - Skinner emphatically agrees with Pocock on this point: “The [intellectual] history thus written becomes a history not of ideas at all, but of abstractions: a history of thoughts which no one ever actually succeeded in thinking, at a level of coherence which no one ever actually attained.” See (Skinner 1969, 18). Nevertheless, the continuous escalation in the levels of abstraction within the Western philosophical tradition has occasioned the creation of models that profess totalizing accounts of historical development and progression. Such models stretch reality extremely thin, to the point of them losing touch with facticity and common sense. For Pocock, when these totalizing historical models came to be “[. . .] imposed upon the historiography of the actual experience and events, [. . .] they [. . .] became monsters [. . .].” A good example one of such monsters originated in the theories of Karl Marx. Marxism is problematic because

it provides a pre-determined orientation to the progression of history. According to the Marxists, the endpoint of history is socialism, and absolutely every single event that takes place in human history is, in one way or another, pointing towards the fulfillment of that eschaton. See (Pocock [1980] 2009, 53).

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Harper's Gambit: *Canada's Foreign Policy in Palestine*

by Lyndsay Roach

Canada has a unique position on the global stage. It is an active player in international politics, and has built a good reputation as a neutral middle power. It has a strong history of multilateral relations, operating through international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Commonwealth of Nations. Canada has extremely close ties with the United States (U.S.), but still respects its relationship with its former colonizer Britain. This

sometimes leaves Canada conflicted when the U.S. and Britain do not see eye to eye. Since Stephen Harper was elected Prime Minister in 2006, Canada's foreign policy has drastically shifted. Harper has put into effect a more forceful attitude towards foreign policy that pushes Canadian values abroad. Moreover, he has increased military spending and has shown willingness to participate in NATO-led missions in Afghanistan and Libya (Smith, 2012, 21-3). One of his traits as Prime Minister which stands out is his devout support for Israel. Canada has always been closely allied with Israel, but has always maintained a neutral stance when it comes to the Arab-Israeli conflict, mirroring the U.S.'s adamant support for Israel (Smith 2012,

24). Harper has taken a different approach towards the conflict than past prime ministers. He made sure that Canada was the first of Israel's allies to suspend aid to the Palestinian Authorities and cut contact with Hamas until they agreed to Harper's demands, including the recognition of Israel and the commitment to non-violence (Barry, 2010, 198). The annual \$25 million sent to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was reduced by one third, but \$10 million was still given to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (Barry, 2010, 198). However, Harper's government made it clear that no direct funds would be sent to an organization like Hamas, which was declared a terrorist organization in 2002 (Barry, 2010, 198).

This decision gave a firm signal to the international community. At face value, it appears to be a pro-democratic stance as well as an anti-terrorism message to the Palestinian Authorities and other countries in the Middle East (even though Hamas was democratically elected). After this decision, he was criticized by Arab and Muslim groups for being 'un-Canadian' and for not dealing with the issue at hand, when Canada should be helping Hamas make the steps towards becoming a respected political organization (Barry, 2012, 198-9). Surely when making this 'pro-democratic' move, the interpretation of this decision was

considered: how it appeared to Arab populations, how it appeared to the international community and how it appeared to the Canadian population. When there are so many factors at play, why did Harper decide that Canada should stop giving aid to the Palestinian Authorities? The following will attempt to explain the angle from which Harper could have been coming by using a combination of Robert Putnam's 'Two-Level Game' theory and 'constructivism' from international relations theory. First, the theories will be defined. Then, they will be applied to the Palestinian-Israeli case, and, finally, they will be critiqued on where they fall short.

The Two-Level Game

Robert Putnam offers the metaphor of the 'two-level game' as an explanation of decision making that goes deeper than the simple realization that foreign policy affects domestic policy and vice versa. While he commends his predecessors on the subject, he is quick to critique their outdated and what he calls "generic" observations (1988, 430). Some of the issues he had were the focus on institutional structures and the focus on interdependence, which overshadowed the portrayal of domestic politics as globalization increased (1988, 431). In addition, he points out that it is wrong to assume all actors in the executive agree on which are the most important factors of domestic

politics and international politics (1988, 432). His final issue is that the preceding theories offered only explanations of the links between national and international politics, and they neglected to consider what happens when there are multiple countries involved in the process (1988, 433). Fortunately, unlike his theorizing forefathers, Putnam's two-level game metaphor is still relevant in today's decision making.

Putnam's metaphor begins with the national level: domestic groups pushing their agendas on the government, while the government hopes to meet these domestic goals at the same time as maximizing their development on the international level (1988, 434). He continues by describing a national representative (or "player") around a table (or "board") making foreign policy choices each with their own "strategies" to obtain their respective goals (1988, 434). Then Putnam categorizes the decision making into Level I, which is the negotiating phase; and Level II, which is the ratification phase, where the mere the existence of Level II affects the negotiating process of Level I (1988, 436). Moreover, the actors that have influence over Level II can be any group: for example, the Senate, interest groups or simply public opinion (1988, 436). This being said, the degree to which an issue is available to the public and the ability of domestic ratification

of international policy may seem to imply that this metaphor is only applicable to democracies. However, Putnam clarifies by saying that he means that there is a sense of counting "votes" when it comes to the ratification process (1988, 436-7). Furthermore, he adapts the concept of goals to what he calls "win-set" (1988, 437). A player's win-set is the minimum set of necessary goals they are willing to accept at the end of the agreement (1988, 437). The larger each player's win-set is, the higher the chances that their goals with overlap, and each player's win-set must overlap in some way for there to be a resolution to the negotiations (1988, 437-8). He addresses the possibility of any of the player's "cheating" another player by pointing out that players will make promises they cannot keep if they are expecting to negotiate with those same players in the future (1988, 438-9). If a player fails to meet the expectations that they are supposed to meet, then they will be left out of future negotiations, especially with a more powerful player (1988, 434). Moreover, the relative size of each win-set can allow for joint gain, but can also allow for certain players to manipulate others (1988, 440).

If one of the players has a smaller win-set then they are more likely to settle. One of the dilemmas that most players are faced with is that it is hard to know what other players

are thinking and what is expected of them domestically (1988, 452). Only clever players know when to seize the opportunity to make a “move” that will influence future moves of other players in their favour (1988, 434). This model that Putnam has presented for policy making is capable of explaining current international politics, but he focuses mainly on policies regarding economic interests and neglects aspects such as military interests. Also, this model does not consider urgent decision making which would be needed in a time of crisis. Putnam’s two-level game gives a fair explanation of policy making, but a more theoretical and less pragmatic lens is needed to fill in the gaps.

Constructivism

Constructivism is relatively new to the realm of international relations, starting in the 1980s and really taking form in the 1990s. The basis of the theory is that our social reality is “constructed” (Sinclair, 2010, 8), placing an emphasis on history and the impact of how we perceive ‘society’ in international politics (Kauppi, 2010, 277). It promotes the idea that our identities and interests are constantly changing because we are being influenced by new experiences every day (Weber, 2001, 60). One of the main ideas in constructivist theory is ‘inter-subjectivity’ which means “shared by people” (Kauppi,

2010, 280). We interact in relation to one another, meaning actions are social when there is someone to witness the action; therefore, actions that are not witnessed have no social value (Sinclair, 2010, 8). While interacting with each other we develop collective ideas or norms. These collective ideas become institutionalized into laws, social services, and political structures (Kauppi, 2010, 280). Where the theory lacks precision is that not all societies perceive themselves the same way. While there are certain international norms, not all societies agree with these norms and therefore it is hard to enforce international law. This is relevant to the Arab-Israeli conflict in terms of sovereignty. If sovereignty is inter-subjective and not all the states involved recognize or perceive each other as sovereign states, then it will be harder to come to an agreement when conflict arises (Kauppi, 2010, 286). In this case, the sovereign state’s identity would depend on another’s perception of it and vice-versa.

Our ability to construct our social reality is not infinite (Sinclair, 2010, 10). We can be limited by physical factors, such as economic classes, social boundaries and laws. There are also people whose job is to maintain the status quo of these limiting factors (Sinclair, 2010, 11). This works similarly when talking about international standards. There are certain factors that can limit a state

in its foreign policy making, which means that sometimes it may not be the choice of a particular state to not participate in international politics. Even if, as according to constructivist theory, the world structure is a changing entity, it does not mean that the repertoire of international norms is endless. For example, there are certain human rights violations that will simply never be tolerated by any member of the UN. However, the structure of international politics can influence the identities and interests of states (Kauppi, 2010, 277). If a particular state has a goal in mind but has to adhere to a certain set of international norms, then the decision makers in that state may debate on whether or not it is in their best interest to satisfy the desired international standards. Moreover, this motivates more countries to behave democratically so that they can participate in joint gain which can be related back to Putnam's concept of win-sets. Together, Putnam's two-level game metaphor and constructivist theory are adequate tools to help understand Harper's policy choice regarding aid to Palestine.

Application of Theories

It is not new for a Canadian prime minister to feel strongly about Canada-Israel relations. In 2005, Liberal Prime Minister Paul Martin said in a speech "Israel's values are Canada's values" (Freeman-Maloy,

2006). However, Canada's relationship with Israel goes back further than 2005 to when Israel declared its independence in 1948. Canada's close relationship with Israel may sometimes be ignored by the Canadian public because the important role Canada played in establishing the state of Israel is often forgotten.

In May of 1947, Canadian Undersecretary of State for External Affairs and future Prime Minister, Lester B. Pearson, was chairman of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), and Canada's representative to the committee was Supreme Court Justice Ivan C. Rand because he had a neutral position on the matter (Engler, 2010, 21-2). Canada was involved in the committee both because of its relationship with Britain and the U.S., and its obligation as a member of the UN (Bessin, 1973, 16). At the time, Canada still hung on to its British roots, but wanted to make a reputation for itself in the international community and wanted to build the stable relations with the U.S. that it has today. The discussion about establishing the state of Israel was at the beginning of the Cold War, when tensions were high between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This made Western countries cautious about making decisions concerning countries in the Middle East. Hence, giving Jewish refugees land in the region

not only had moral implications but also strategic implications. Having a Western ally in the region was in the best interests of the U.S. and therefore, it was in the best interest of Canada as well. It was necessary to ally with countries that share moral values, and more importantly shared democratic values. Pearson himself was raised Protestant and supported Canada's identity as a part of the British Commonwealth (Engler, 2012, 18). His Christian roots made him feel passionately about Jewish issues because of common Zionist values (Engler, 2010, 21). Therefore, it was logical that he would want Canada to be a part of the discussions about the Jewish refugee crisis because of his personal feelings towards the Holy Land. Moreover, it made sense for Canada as a whole to be part of the discussion because it was starting to build its identity as an active member of the UN that stood for democratic values and peaceful resolutions. Constructivist theory would argue that Canada interacts with other countries based on how it perceives itself in the international community. Also its emphasis on the importance of history would suggest that, since Canada sees itself as having historical ties to Israel, it will continue to have close ties to Israel. They share common goals and values and both see international issues from a Western perspective.

It is for these reasons, in part, that

Harper would decide that Canada should cut ties with Hamas. The Canadian government does not see Hamas as sharing the same values as Canada, and from Harper's standpoint, Hamas appears to be a threat to Israel. However, from the Palestinian point of view, it is Israel that is a threat to them because they, the Palestinians, are the ones being displaced. As the head of the Canadian government, Harper is acting based on how he sees the countries involved in the situation, and how he sees Canada in relation to these countries. As a member of the international community, he is concerned with what other countries do, especially the U.S. because they are strong supporters of Israel. So after Israel stopped giving aid to Palestinian Authorities and he realized that the U.S. and the European Union (EU) were going to do the same, Harper decided that Canada should not only do the same but do it before any of Israel's other allies did (Barry, 2010, 198). This shows the international community that Canada agrees with the decisions of the U.S. and the EU, and in addition still wants to be seen as a leader when it comes to issues involving Israel. Furthermore, Canada wants to show that it will not tolerate terrorist organizations, and that it does not support governments that maintain opposing values. This is a more assertive move than Canada usually makes, which

demonstrates to the U.S. that Canada does not need to follow its lead while showing Israel that Canada is still one of its strongest allies.

These reasons justify Harper's decision by satisfying Canada's goals in the international sphere, but what about domestic goals? As the government in power changes, foreign policy changes but Canadian representatives still go into making decisions with the idea that they have a certain national identity to uphold internationally and domestically. Putnam's two-level game suggests that Harper would also be motivated by domestic politics to make this decision. Canada's Jewish population is around 371, 000, many of which feel a strong link to Israel (Barry, 2010, 192). Leading up to the 2006 elections, Harper wanted to broaden his support base past the traditional conservative Anglo-Protestant voters. He aimed his campaign towards ethnic minorities, including the Jewish minority, to gain support from groups that he believe shared the same social values as the Conservative Party (Barry, 2010, 191-2). However, by shifting his platform in favour of Israeli interests, Harper would deter the Canadian Arab population from supporting him. While the Canadian-Arab population is twice the size of the Jewish population, they tend to engage less in politics (Barry, 2010, 193). Another influence on

Harper's foreign policy are Jewish lobby groups, such as the Canadian Council for Israel and Jewish Advocacy (CIJA). For example, CIJA gathered from surveys that there was a declining support for Israel among Canadians. Since conservative Christians are most supportive of Israel, CIJA encouraged Harper to highlight the pro-democracy aspect of siding with Israel to regain support (Barry, 2010, 194). Jewish Lobby groups can be considered part of Putnam's Level II of decision making. They have domestic influence over foreign policy decisions, because if Harper were to stray from his pro-Israeli stance he would get criticized by these lobbyists. He must take this into consideration when dealing in international politics.

Since Canada is closely allied with the U.S., they have similar win-sets. The U.S. is an avid supporter of Israel. Therefore, if Harper shifts his policy decisions the way he has, then he is also favouring Canada's relationship with the U.S. According to the two-level game metaphor, Harper's decision to cut off ties with a terrorist organization and to shift Canadian foreign policy towards a stronger pro-Israel platform was influenced by the gain of domestic support being linked to Canada's aligning its interests with those of the U.S., specifically those of supporting Israel and fighting the 'war on terror' (Freeman-Maloy, 2006). However,

this also affects Canada negatively in terms of its relations with other Middle Eastern countries. Although Hamas is a democratically elected political group, internationally it is still not treated as a legitimate political actor because it fails to comply with other democratic norms that should be consistently upheld even after an election. The decision to stop giving aid to Palestinian Authorities and to cut off contact with Hamas was viewed negatively by surrounding Arab countries. For example, Harper was criticized by the Canadian Islamic Congress for “blindly following the lead of Washington and of the influential pro-Jewish lobby” (Barry, 2010, 198). However, Hamas should also be more motivated by this to make political compromises assuming they want to have future negotiations with Canada. Conversely, if Canada started making decisions that do not fall within the win-set of certain Arab countries, then those countries may not want to deal with Canada in the future or may become openly hostile towards Canada. It is difficult to say if it would be Canada or the Arab countries in the Middle East that would suffer more consequences from poor relations with each other.

Where the Theories Fall Short

The main issue that remains unexplained is why Harper seems to dismiss the fact that his decision creates a negative image of Canada in the Arab world. The two-level game and constructivist theory explain why Harper would have made the decision to the Palestinian Authorities, but it does not offer an explanation for why the possible downsides are worth the risk. On one hand, the two-level game metaphor would dictate that Hamas would want to meet the standards asked of them, so they can take part in international politics and decisions regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On the other hand, it would say that Canada should want to avoid cutting ties with that part of the world in the interest of having future negotiations in the region. Moreover, the issue of perceived statehood is unexplained. The existence of the state of Israel depends on the international community recognizing it as a state. However, since Hamas is not a respected member of the international community, it does not matter that it does not recognize the state of Israel. While constructivism offers the explanation that the legitimacy of a state is an idea we construct, it does not explain the limits in which this is true. The state of Israel is a shared idea among some political bodies, but not all. The fact that Hamas does

not recognize Israel as a legitimate state does not affect UN members' perception of Israel. Constructivism does not take into consideration that there is a balance of power and certain states' opinions have more influence than others. Any political body that refuses to recognize Israel as a legitimate sovereign state is risking their influence in the international community rather than having a negative impact on Israel's ability to be an influential state.

Both the two-level game metaphor and constructivism explain the behaviour of the decision maker, as well as the motivations that come from the links between foreign and domestic politics. However, they do not take into account each individual decision maker. Obviously, Canadian prime ministers are going to conduct politics within the norms of Canadian society, but the personal beliefs of each prime minister will undoubtedly influence his policy-making. For example, when Lester B. Pearson was involved with UNSCOP, William Lyon Mackenzie King was prime minister and did not feel the strong need for Canada to help solve the Jewish question. He simply wanted Canada to follow Britain's lead on the matter to avoid tensions abroad and conflict at home (Bessin, 1973, 13). Consequently, King never officially recognized the state of Israel while he was prime minister (Bessin, 1973, 14).

Finally, what is left to be explained is why Harper is only swayed by one side of public opinion. According to Putnam's Level II of decision making, public opinion falls under the ratification phase. Since the pro-Israelis have influence over Harper's foreign policy, why do pro-Palestinians not have influence? In the early 2000s, there was an uprising in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip which led to harsh repression of the Palestinians on the part of the Israeli military (Freeman-Maloy, 2006). This led to anti-Israel sentiments among university students and the Centrale des Syndicates du Québec boycotted Israeli products (Freeman-Maloy, 2006). Moreover, an opinion poll of Harper's policies towards Israel showed that 45% of Canadians disagreed with his stance, while only 32% agreed (Barry, 2010, 202). In addition, 77% of Canadians surveyed want Canada to remain neutral in the situation (Barry, 2010, 202). This shows that around the time of the decision, many Canadians would have been against it. Neither the two-level game nor constructivist theory can give an explanation for why Harper would choose to satisfy the demands of one domestic opinion over the other. Nevertheless, foreign policy is continuously changing, and now Canada is taking more initiative with regards to the Palestinian issues.

Conclusion

Harper's decision to be the first of Israel's allies to suspend aid to Palestinian Authorities had many political implications and was not a favourable decision in the opinion of some Canadian citizens. However, he did have domestic or foreign motivations. Putnam's two-level game metaphor explains that the decision was motivated by the aspect of gaining the vote of pro-Israel Canadians combined with strengthening Canada's position in world politics as a strong ally of the U.S. In addition, constructivism explains that Canada would naturally take a pro-democratic anti-terrorism stance because of its history of having a Western perspective of world politics. The aspects these theories fail to explain are when it comes down to the individual decision maker and how Harper's Christian roots may influence his foreign policy choices, especially regarding countries that share his personal values.

With the uprisings in the Middle East in the past few years, it would be beneficial to come up with a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In recent developments, Canada has decided to give \$5 million to the Palestinian Authorities to help initiate Palestine's economic development (Clark, 2013). This would make Canada the first country to give money to this economic development fund that is


being planned by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry (Clark, 2013). This shows that Canada now wants to rebuild friendlier ties with Palestinian Authorities at the same time as have an important role in the peace process. Although the Palestinian Authorities were still denied observer status at the UN, they have gained the respect of the Canadian government who seems to now be willing to continue to contribute to Palestine's development (Clark, 2013).

It is impossible to say for certain what influenced Harper's decision to rebuild ties with Palestinian Authorities. If all the ideological factors are shed, it appears that Harper's main goal is to reform Canada's world image as one of leadership. As the shape of world politics changes with time, it is wise to change with it. Canada should step out of the United States' shadow and create its own influence, which is what it seems like Stephen Harper is aiming for, without damaging the Canadian-U.S. camaraderie. Hopefully future developments between Israel, Palestine and its allies will not only interest their international audience but also provide it with a relieving solution. However, as quickly as relations between Canada and the Palestinian Authorities changed for the better, there is always the real possibility that they could still change for the worse.

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Condorcet the Misunderstood: *Berlin's Concepts of Freedom Illuminate the French Enlightenment*

by Anna Spieser

As citizens of Western democracies, our daily lives still bear the influence of the Enlightenment. Our political systems are heavily indebted to the Enlightenment thinkers' analyses of the different kinds of government. Most importantly, what they understood to be our inherent rights as individuals are still enshrined in our constitutions. Whether it is in the

form of the Bill of Rights or in that of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, these values are still considered to be our most precious political possessions. The importance of such texts, however, goes beyond that associated with tradition. Indeed, more recently, soon after the United Nations was created, a Universal Declaration of Human Rights was introduced and the UN is committed to the promotion of universal values of liberty, respect, equality and sovereignty to this day. Consequently, in spite of its apparent temporal remoteness, the Enlightenment movement is relevant in understanding both the foundations and the goals of our societies. In addition to this, the Enlightenment's inherent contradictions are still felt today – perhaps even more so. As such, the United Nation's declaration of Human Rights has been adhered to by societies that were not only completely foreign to the Enlightenment, but, more often than not, colonized by “enlightened” nations. As a result, to some extent, the Enlightenment vision of our rights has been imposed on the world. The paradox of the Enlightenment's philosophy is that, in spite of its dogmatic tone and pretension to have offered a solution to the problems of humanity, the values it advocated were often in conflict with each other. To wit, how can equality exist without impeding our freedom? How can tolerance

and respect for other cultures withstand the test of rational comparison with absolute claims? These apparently conflictual values are especially pertinent to analysing multicultural societies today. Whether multiculturalism exists *de jure* – as it does in Canada – or *de facto* – as it does in France, it raises questions about our institutions being conceived out of truths once regarded as timeless and how this ideological absolutism is affected by the realities of change.

Because an exploration of all the concepts dear to the Enlightenment would go beyond the aim of this essay, I have decided to focus on one of its key notions: freedom (or liberty, both words will be used interchangeably¹). I will use Berlin's two concepts of liberty as the theoretical framework of my exploration of what freedom meant to Enlightenment thinkers. In order to refrain myself from making general claims, I will narrow my focus on two authors whose views on liberty apparently differ in how it is to be realized. I will analyze liberty in the writings of Rousseau and in those of Condorcet with a specific emphasis on the latter. In doing so, I hope to demonstrate that the Enlightenment's apparent

dogmatic understanding of liberty did not plant the seed of tyranny that later offered a rationale for the ills of the twentieth century. Freedom was already conceptualized then as an absolute right that could only exist in a relative state. Consequently, it appears that the conception of value-pluralism that was theorized in the twentieth century was already central to the Enlightenment, especially to the work of Condorcet.

In "Two Concepts of Liberty," Isaiah Berlin examines two different notions of liberty: negative and positive. He acknowledges that many more definitions of freedom have been recorded throughout time, but argues that these two have influenced human history more than any other (2002, 168). Negative freedom is defined as a lack of interference. As such, it is "involved in the answer to the question 'What is the area within which the subject [...] is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other person?'" (2002, 169). Because negative freedom is understood in terms of lack of restriction imposed by others, voluntarily or not, negative freedom can only exist to a certain extent. In response to Berlin, Quentin Skinner argued that negative liberty is only relevant in the sense that the lack of constraints (or freedom *from*) leads to a freedom *to* act as one wants to (2002, §3). Consequently, if negative freedom is

1 I have decided to use both words interchangeably for two reasons. First of all, Berlin, whose work I draw heavily upon, used these words in that manner. Secondly, my paper is limited to the study of thinkers who wrote in French. As a result, they used the word "liberte" that has come to be translated into both freedom and liberty in the English language.

to exist outside of a conceptual vacuum and to be equally distributed amongst mankind,² each individual liberty has to be restricted by the liberty of others because “the liberty of some depends on the restraint of others” (Berlin 2002, 171). If this is true, then all members of society are necessarily both free and restrained at once, because one’s restraint is the only guarantee to the other’s freedom and vice versa. Berlin’s argument in favour of negative freedom is grounded in the belief that at least some human goals (and the actions ensuing from these goals as they are pursued) conflict with each other, which makes them incommensurable (2002, 216). As a result, Berlin holds that it is better to have rival objectives that can never be fully actualized than to have one human goal fully realized at the expense of its rival. As such, it is better to have a multitude of mitigated liberties than a clear separation between those who are free *from* the interference of others and those whose freedom has been crushed by the liberty of others. If one is to accept the premise that no one lives in complete isolation from society and that no two individuals have the exact same aspirations, it therefore has to be true that negative liberty can never be

² Throughout this paper, I will use the word “mankind” in the most inclusive sense. As a result, mankind will be used as representing the human race in its entirety, representing both men and women. While I have tried to use gender neutral language as often as possible, I have decided to keep the word “mankind” because I believe that it is central to the Enlightenment and can be used in an inclusive manner.

absolute and is always the result of a compromise between different wills.

Positive freedom, on the other hand, is to be understood as the answer to the question “What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?” (Berlin 2002, 169). Positive freedom is therefore synonymous with determining what one does because one expresses who they are through their actions. In this respect, the main difference between negative and positive freedom is that positive freedom presupposes that individuals have an essence that needs to be realized through their liberty to act. Positive freedom, however, is necessarily an expression of reason. Berlin indeed argues that positive freedom is not the realization of all of one’s desires, but only the realization of what one *ought to desire* (2002, 194). The distinction between what someone may desire and what they *ought to desire* is essential to understanding positive freedom; if people desire what they cannot have – because of natural limitations for instance – they are not free, but slaves of their own making. Someone may desire to have the ability to fly. Because human beings do not have wings, however, such a desire is bound to be a chimera. From a positive liberty standpoint, to desire something that one cannot have, such as the ability to fly, is akin to self-imposed slavery.

Positive freedom is the ability to determine one's actions in relation to one's personal desires. If, however, one desires something that she cannot have, then she is not free to act upon the realization of her desire. Because, in such an instance, one is no longer free to act in such a way, one's freedom is crushed by unreasonable passions. Accordingly, positive freedom is not the freedom to do what one wants to do, but to do what reason wants one to do. The pairing of liberty and rationality is the natural consequence of having the need to examine desires and to dissociate all irrational desires from those that people ought to have. The appeal of positive liberty resides in the fact that once individuals have identified what they ought to want, they can be absolutely free. As Berlin remarked, however, presupposing that there are desires that people ought to have and desires that ought to be dismissed after examination requires that agents are aware of their essence as people (2002, 173). If their essence only appears to them after a rational examination, it is free from passions and, therefore, applies to all of mankind alike. It is in this suggestion that Berlin identifies the allure and danger of positive liberty. Once one has defined what the essence of mankind is, one can logically be convinced that the solution towards the realization of their essence is universal "for, if I am rational, I cannot deny that what is right for me must, for

the same reasons, be right for others who are rational like me" (2002, 191). The problem with such a claim is that it can legitimize the imposition of my solution upon those who are not enlightened enough to know what they ought to desire, but would see the righteousness of it had they been enlightened. Positive freedom necessarily impedes on negative freedom whose premise is grounded in an actual equality of freedom, whereas positive freedom guarantees a potential equality of liberty that can only exist once the rational solution towards the realization of mankind has been implemented.

Berlin originally introduced his two concepts of liberty during a lecture in 1958. As a result, the inescapable association of positive liberty to the existence of a "final solution" necessarily reminded his audience of the Nazis' final solution and of all of the horrors that ensued. Because positive freedom contains the danger of potentially restricting the freedom of all, Berlin contended that it should be rejected in favour of a more benevolent form of freedom: negative freedom. Another way in which the dichotomy between positive and negative freedom may be expressed is through the prism of means and ends. While negative freedom is a means enabling the pursuit of other ends, such as happiness or equality, positive freedom is both a means and its own end. It is the freedom to

work towards a complete liberation of the self. In this respect, the end of positive freedom is liberty itself.

I will now turn to how liberty was understood during the Enlightenment and discuss how both concepts of freedom co-exist in these texts. I have decided to select works at both ends of the spectrums – that is to say, works in which the idea of liberty was central, but in which the two notions of liberty proposed by Berlin may apparently be read as pushed to the extremes.

Rousseau's *Discourse on Inequality* is not a work on freedom per se; it explores how inequality spread amongst individuals. In order to do so, he hypothesizes an original state of nature. As a result, it is important to note that Rousseau's liberty does not presuppose an essence of mankind. Contrary to the human essence as understood by positive liberty, Rousseau's vision of mankind's original freedom and equality may nonetheless be seen as a universal essence in itself. As such, the freedom of individuals is neither an end nor a means. In the state of nature, humans only distinguish themselves from animals³ to the extent that people are free agents: that they consciously decide to acquiesce

³ « ce n'est donc pas tant l'entendement qui fait parmi les animaux la distinction spécifique de l'homme que sa qualité d'agent libre. La nature commande à tout animal, et la bête obéit. L'homme éprouve la même impression, mais il se reconnaît libre d'acquiescer, ou de résister » (Rousseau 1996, 87).

or to resist is apparently the only thing that separates them from animals. This, however, is not enough to argue that Rousseau's understanding of liberty is similar to that defined as negative liberty by Berlin. In the state of nature, according to Rousseau, all human beings are completely free, completely equal and completely happy (1996, 113). It is so because they rely exclusively upon their instincts. Rousseau's state of nature is composed of individuals, not societies. He goes as far as to say that there is no family in the state of nature (1996, 92). According to him, women meet men, they both satisfy an instinctive urge and leave each other once that urge has been satisfied. As a result, if a woman were to become pregnant, her child would not have a father in the social sense.

In addition to this, Rousseau argues that a mother's role is initially similar to that of female animals. The mother raises her young until they are capable of securing their own survival. In this respect, the mother's role is seen as exclusively utilitarian, not emotional. Given that Rousseau's agents in a state of nature are driven solely by their instincts – which are good – the relationship of a mother to her child is not one of transmission of knowledge; it is solely one of protection. As soon as the children are able to use their own instincts towards the securing of their survival, they leave their mothers forever

(Rousseau 1996, 92). Rousseau does not exclude the possibility of mother and child eventually accidentally meeting again, but if such a situation were to arise, he claims that the mother and the child would not recognize each other. The absence of any form of society in Rousseau's state of nature is crucial for it to be seen as an absolute state of freedom.

Indeed, Rousseau's ideal freedom is a freedom *from* reason in which mankind solely answers to its instinctive needs. Such a freedom cannot exist in society because too frequent an interaction between the same people leads to the creation of languages, and languages cannot exist independently of reason⁴. His demonstration that language cannot be dissociated from conceptualization is rather powerful: to imagine a general tree is indeed to imagine its most common characteristics and to start to actually visualize it in detail is to depart from the notion of the tree towards the imagination of a specific one (Rousseau 1996, 94). Consequently, as soon as mankind starts to form societies – no matter how small – it starts to invent languages and thus loses its instinctive liberty to the plague of reason. In this respect, Rousseau's notion of liberty can only be understood as a freedom *from* – the others, languages or reason

4 «pour ranger les êtres sous des dénominations communes, et génériques, il en fallait connaître les propriétés et les différences ; il fallait des observations, et des définitions, c'est-à-dire de l'histoire naturelle et de la métaphysique » (Rousseau 1996, 94).

– and therefore, as a negative liberty.

The negative freedom that is inherent to the state of nature is the true cause of the original equality between all individuals. Rousseau argues that even if some men or women were to make some progresses in the sciences and to improve their lives according to modern standards, the lack of transmission of that knowledge to future generations means that individuals will continue to be born equal. However, Rousseau himself acknowledges that this state of nature is merely a hypothesis that is useful towards the understanding and conceptualization of the causes of inequality, not an historical account of the development of mankind (1996, 78). In emerging out of that hypothetical state, the real break from equality to inequality – or from the state of nature to civil society – takes place with the introduction of property.⁵ Rousseau argues that to introduce the right of property is to introduce a type of right that differs from mankind's natural rights (1996, 116)

In order to understand how society creates property and therefore, inequality, I shall go back to reason increasing as humans are brought together. As soon as people form a society, they develop languages and

5 «Le premier qui, ayant enclos un terrain, s'avisa de dire : Ceci est à moi, et trouva des gens assez simples pour le croire, fut le vrai fondateur de la société civile » (Rousseau 1996, 107).

thus, develop their reason; the development of reason leads to foresight, an ability that mankind lacks in its state of nature;⁶ foresight leads to the awareness of one's interest and one's interest leads property and inequality. Property is what creates the rich and the poor; it is also what separates them. As the gap between the owners and the workers widens, new needs that enslave individuals are created. In this respect, Rousseau's negative liberty tends to resemble a positive one since freedom is lost as people start needing what they do not need naturally, which puts all of them in a state of dependence. The worker relies upon the cultivation of the owner's land for survival; but, most importantly, the rich need the poor to continue to benefit from their services and to remain rich (Rousseau 1996, 117). The dependence of the rich on the poor leads to the second stage of inequality: that of the powerful and of the weak. Being aware of the insecurity of their situation, the rich – who had everything to lose – institutionalized their position and imposed it on the poor through laws, thus officially depriving the poor of their natural liberty. In doing so, the powerful subject the weak and exclude them from political government and decision making. Rousseau argues that this leads to a third stage of slave and master

(1996, 128). In a surprising twist, Rousseau then goes on to argue that such a state of inequality actually re-introduces equality. Indeed, inequalities in terms of wealth and power persist, but the condition of slave is equally shared by everyone. As such, this second kind of equality is not pure like that of the state of nature, but the result of excessive corruption because it is only achieved through the denial of mankind's natural right – freedom (Rousseau 1996, 131).

Having examined the relationship between liberty and equality in Rousseau's discourse, Berlin's view of negative freedom becomes questionable. If the excesses associated with positive liberty were sufficient for Berlin to reject it, the relativism of negative freedom surely is enough to argue that such a freedom does not actually exist. Rousseau's original freedom only exists so long as perfect equality survives; his freedom is a freedom *from* inequality and *to* be what one ought to be. This natural liberty ceases to exist when mankind stops being completely independent. As soon as that liberty is no longer absolute, it means that an individual is both free and dependent. But can one ever be truly free in a state of dependence? In his response to Berlin, Skinner argued in favour of the introduction of a third concept of liberty which seems to corroborate the idea that there may in fact not be a negative liberty. According to this

6 Foresight being « une précaution fort éloignée du tour d'esprit de l'homme sauvage qui, comme je l'ai dit, a bien de la peine à songer le matin à ses besoins du soir » (Rousseau 1996, 115)

third concept of liberty that originated in the 17th century, it follows from the mere knowledge that one's liberty is dependent upon the goodwill of others that one lives in servitude (Skinner 2002, §35). This would support Rousseau's argument that no natural – or negative – freedom exists in societies because inequalities make the experience of freedom precarious as a result of its dependence upon others. As a result, when Berlin says that “freedom is obedience, but, in Rousseau's words, ‘obedience to a law which we prescribe ourselves,’” it is only so because Rousseau believes that there are no alternative kinds of freedom for societies (2002, 183); and that a social contract therefore needs to be established to guarantee some form of equality. As soon as a contract designed to maintain some equality is established through a compromise, reason becomes the guiding principle of what is just and what is not. As a result, the freedom of individuals belonging to societies is necessarily one that relies upon at least some rational thinking which transforms it into a positive liberty.

I shall now move on to discussing the notion of liberty in Condorcet's *Sketch* because he “has been seen, since his death in 1794, as the embodiment of the cold, oppressive Enlightenment” (Rothschild 1996, 1). His notion of liberty does appear to be that of the positive freedom described by Berlin. In the tenth

epoch of his *Sketch*, Condorcet indeed seems to place all of his hopes in “the true perfection of the human mind” (2012a, 126). He also describes the progresses of the sciences with exaltation: “everywhere during this stage we see reason and authority fighting for supremacy, a battle which prepared and anticipated the triumph of reason” (2012a, 84). His bias in favour of reason is especially evident when contrasted with the language that he uses to describe what existed prior to this scientific revolution: “hypocrisy filled Europe with butchers and murderers” and “the monster of fanaticism” was angered by the progresses made by reason (2012a, 82). There is no doubt that Condorcet saw reason as a liberating force; it was his answer to “the intolerance of the priests, their struggle for political power, their scandalous greed and moral depravity” (2012a, 63). However, his “cold” faith in rationalism is not enough to claim that Condorcet would go as far as to condone the excesses associated with positive freedom as described by Berlin.

There is a definite sense of universalism in Condorcet's *Sketch* that suggests that he believed that if reason had been a liberator to European nations, it logically followed that reason would deliver the rest of mankind as well. Furthermore, Condorcet seemed to suggest that an enlightened minority could accelerate the

education of the masses. Because the rational character of the liberation associated with positive freedom implies that every human will eventually reach the same conclusion on their own albeit at their own pace. Working towards that liberation need not be on hold until all members of society have achieved rational enlightenment independently. The fact that Condorcet saw the enlightened minority as a vector of progress for humanity as a whole is reminiscent of Berlin's argument that positive freedom legitimizes the dangerous imposition of a rational solution on the uneducated by their educated counterparts. The mission to enlighten—and therefore, to liberate those enslaved by irrationality—that is present in Condorcet would give weight to the claims of those who see him as an early proponent of rational tyranny. Indeed, Condorcet was certain that the “moment approaches when, no longer presenting ourselves as always either tyrants or corrupters, we shall become for them [meaning the inhabitants of Asia and Africa] useful instruments or generous liberators” (2012a, 128). As such, it is easy to blame Condorcet for wanting to “manipulate men, to propel them towards goals which [him] – the social reformer – sees” (Berlin 2002, 184). He has actually been criticized for being a supporter of the tyranny of reason even in his own time. When a plan for public instruction that was based on a report

made by Condorcet was proposed to the Convention in 1792, “its fundamental conception and principal provisions were attacked as contrary to equality and republican virtue, an insidious effort to replace the corporate tyranny of priests with that of an aristocracy of savants” (Baker 1989, 207). This illustrates that, from the beginning, Condorcet's opponents detected a potential slide towards totalitarianism in his thinking.

In more recent times, some have argued that Condorcet was a precursor to neo-Malthusianism due to the fact that he hypothesized that the world's resources may one day become too scarce to accommodate the size of its population. André Béjin argues that Condorcet had conceived this possibility, but that, contrary to Malthus, he did not believe that a virtuous restraint was the solution to this problem since there was no moral foundation (in the religious sense) that should restrain mankind's enjoyment of sexual pleasures (Béjin 1988, 350). Béjin goes as far as to argue that Condorcet may have been an advocate of eugenics as this was a step further towards the progress of the human mind.⁷

7 On artificial insemination, « Nulle considérations, d'autre part, sur les dangers d'emprise médicale ou autre, qui pourraient résulter de la diffusion de ce procédé de fécondation. Condorcet n'est pas plus sensible aux éventuels risques d'une politique de 'perfectionnement de l'espèce humaine'. A une telle politique notre auteur assigne deux objectifs principaux. D'une part, augmenter la durée moyenne de la vie. (...) Deuxième objectif, encore plus résolument 'eugéniste' : perfectionner les 'facultés humaines', non seulement physiques mais également intellectuelles et morales. »

In “An Illusion with a Future,” John Gray analyses how the belief in progress has led to the illusion that science may be the source of salvation for mankind. Since the belief in progress as we have inherited it started during the Enlightenment, his critique of the belief may be applied to Condorcet, too. Gray argues that the mistake made by the believers in the progress of science is rooted in the fact that they believed that this progress could be “replicated in other areas of human life. [Where] human knowledge changes, but human needs stay much the same” (2004, 13). However, to suggest that human needs are constant is akin to suggesting that there is in fact such a thing as a timeless human essence. This assumption weakens Gray’s critique. If there are indeed “species-wide goods and evils” (2004, 13), then how is it an error to work towards the accomplishment of these goods and the eradication of these evils?

Gray’s, Béjin’s and Berlin’s works seem to be influenced by the fact that they lived through or were born after periods during which the rational progress of mankind had been used to defend the oppression and killing of millions of people. This is illustrated in Gray’s claim that “the Nazis certainly rejected Enlightenment values of human equality, personal liberty, and toleration; but they affirmed the

Enlightenment idea that a new humanity without the flaws of the old could be created” (Gray 2003, 16). As a result, their understanding of Condorcet and the Enlightenment is at least partially historicist. J.G.A. Pocock argued that “in language, it must be declared, we have to be content with saying both less and more than we mean” and as such, to understand Condorcet as a precursor of modern tyranny is a legitimate interpretation of a text and corpus of ideas (2009, 40). However, I would like to analyze what Condorcet *meant* as opposed to what his *Sketch means*. While it is evident that a reading of Condorcet’s work *a posteriori* corroborates the idea that he may be seen as a cold rationalist prone to the authoritarian drifts inherent to positive liberty, I believe that Condorcet would have abhorred these dangerous by-products of his thinking. I further believe that my claim that Condorcet rejected the ills associated with positive liberty is supported by Condorcet’s own writing. This is why I will now focus on what Condorcet meant as he was writing and not on what his writings may mean depending on how people have chosen to interpret them. In order to do so, I propose to use a method inspired by the one developed by Pocock in *Political Thought and History, Essays on Theory and Method*. It will necessarily be more contextual than the approach advocated by Pocock to the extent that I

(Béjin 1988, 352).

will focus on Condorcet's writings and life to illuminate his texts and not so much on how he was understood by his contemporaries. My objective is to determine whether Condorcet really was convinced of the idea of liberty as it was later developed by Berlin as positive liberty.

In order to do so, I will first analyze to what Condorcet's rational freedom was a response. Throughout the *Sketch*, reason is presented as the liberation from prejudices and obscurantism but, more importantly, from inequality. Indeed, it appears that Condorcet believed that superstition had been used throughout time to oppress the majority. As he broke down history into chronological stages, he pointed out that superstition had been a means to oppress the majority as early as the first stage of history during which

[W]e can detect the first signs of an institution which had contrary effects upon human progress; which has enriched science with new truths, whilst propagating error [...] I refer to the formation of a class of men who are the depositaries of the principles of religion, of the practices of superstition, and often even of the secrets of legislation and

politics. I refer to the separation of the human race into two parts: the one destined to teach, the other for believing (2012a, 11).

This implies that, contrary to Rousseau's premise that there existed an ideal state of general equality, Condorcet believed that knowledge had always been used by a minority in the pursuit of its own interest. Consequently, the progress of reason is not so much a way to impose his view upon the world as a solution to a problem that does not exist; it is a way to mitigate an inequality that exists *de facto* and that Condorcet believed to be an affront to mankind's natural rights. To go back to Berlin's claim that positive liberty presupposes a human essence, there is indeed the notion of a human essence in Condorcet.

However, the human essence according to Condorcet is that people have natural rights that cannot be opposed, these rights having the particularity of being multiple and not necessarily commensurable. He lists mankind's natural rights as follows: "(1) personal security and liberty; (2) security of, and freedom to own, property; (3) equality" (2012b, 175). The very idea of the human essence according to Condorcet is therefore one in which natural rights are conflictual values. Put otherwise, "the

universal truth in which he believes is a truth about the respect for rights. His dogma, that is to say, is that one should never impose one's dogmas on other people" (Rothschild 1996, 691). The notion that even what he believed to be universal truths had to be constantly questioned is best illustrated by his views on instruction. His belief that knowledge is a key towards independence is only rivalled by his conviction that children should be educated in a non-biased way, that is, without the imposition on young impressionable minds of political or moral truths, but through teaching them how to think critically about everything. He believed that providing people with such an education was to give them the tools necessary in order to not be a prey to "the deceit of charlatans" and therefore, to make them more equal (Condorcet 2012a, 132-3). Consequently, Condorcet's desire to enlighten the uneducated masses is not designed to force rational beliefs upon his contemporaries, but to arm the weak with the tools necessary to combat those who have used irrational claims to oppress them throughout time.

Condorcet has also been blamed for his unbridled optimism regarding the progress of science and for the ideal and secular salvation that it seemed to offer to mankind. In this respect, Gray's view on progress is particularly interesting in

understanding Condorcet. Gray argues that "the modern faith in progress is the offspring of the marriage between seeming rivals – the lingering influence of Christian faith and the growing power of science" (2004, 11). As a result, the hypothetical salvation that may be the result of the progress of science might be the result of his education by the Jesuits. What I am suggesting is that Condorcet may have unintentionally internalized the notion that a salvation must exist because the society in which he was educated had believed so for over a thousand years. The notion of salvation in the progress of science may have been conceived as a possibility that would have been just as remote from coming into existence as that of the final judgement in the eyes of someone questioning the truth of the scriptures. This hypothesis seems to be supported by Condorcet's writings; he appeared to not be sure of what he meant when he said that "the perfectibility of men is indefinite" (2012a, 145). This is illustrated by his explanation on the two different meanings of the word indefinite. Condorcet was therefore not sure that progress was indefinite because it is unlimited or because he personally could not conceive of its limits (Baker 2004, 64). In addition to this, some have argued that this optimism in the progress of science as a way to save humanity can also be seen as an expression of his frustration

with his situation at the time during which he wrote the *Sketch* (Baker 2004, 61). Consequently, his belief in salvation through science may be seen as a consolation to the fact that the reality of the French Revolution and the Terror that ensued was bitterly disappointing to him.

Condorcet's views on liberty may be said to be inconsistent, but they certainly do not legitimize the tyranny theorized in Berlin's positive liberty. Condorcet abhorred tyranny and despotism and this is true of the tyranny of rationality described by Berlin, too. This is why Condorcet believed in the truth of his principles while at the same time believing that his truths were only "provisional" and, as such, may be seen as errors in the future (Baker 2004, 62). Rothschild corroborates this idea when she says that "a world in which everyone has the same opinions is for Condorcet a true horror" (1996, 681). In order to better understand what Condorcet meant by liberty, his notes on the subject – notes that were not incorporated into the *Sketch* – are rather illuminating. Contrary to Berlin's unitary vision of positive liberty, Condorcet's liberty is essentially plural: there is social freedom, political freedom, and personal freedom (Cahen 1914, 386-94). In order to be truly free, Condorcet believed that an individual needed to be socially free, enjoying both personal and political freedom (Cahen 1914,

590). His definition of social freedom is the combination of personal and political freedoms in society. Political freedom refers to the right to participate in the elaboration of the rules that govern society as a whole. It is, however, not enough to participate in the decision making process to be socially free; if a majority were to establish rules that were deemed oppressive by the minority, social freedom would not exist. This is why for social liberty to exist, it has to be combined with personal freedom. Personal liberty, however, is a kind of negative freedom to the extent that it is the liberty not to be constrained by common rules that conflict with natural liberties.⁸

Condorcet's views on the different kinds of liberty that are necessary for people to really experience freedom supports the claim that he is not guilty of giving in to the temptations of rational tyranny. Analyzing what he has written about the difficulty to reconcile theory and practice further illustrates that Condorcet was anything but an early advocate of the dangers of positive freedom. Condorcet argued that "in all the arts, truths of theory are necessarily

8 «Ainsi la liberté sociale est la conservation de la liberté naturelle dans l'état de société, la liberté politique est la conservation de la liberté sociale dans la formation des lois qui doivent assujettir certaines actions au vœu de la majorité. (...) J'appellerai liberté personnelle la liberté sociale considérée comme séparée de la liberté politique, c'est-à-dire celle qui n'est gênée que par des règles communes qui ne seraient point un atteinte à la liberté sociale » (Cahen 1914, 590).

modified in practice” and that such an awareness should enable us to “avoid the mistakes into which a clumsy application of theory might lead us” (Condorcet 2012a, 115). As a result, the hypothesis according to which reason can lead to universally applicable truths; and that this application would not be problematic regardless of the fact that it would, in all likeliness, corrupt personal freedom seems to be very far from what Condorcet actually believed in.

Finally, I believe that it is necessary to consider how Condorcet reconciled his beliefs with his own life. Condorcet believed that “the idea that there exist a hundred thousand unhappy people around us is a painful experience just as real as an attack of gout” (Condorcet cited in Rothschild 1996, 682). Consequently, it seems quite inconceivable that, in a search for some greater rational good, Condorcet would have been willing to sacrifice the temporary happiness of a people – no matter how delusional that happiness might be – if it had meant turning happiness into sorrow. During his time in hiding, Condorcet wrote a letter of advice to his daughter that he included in his testament. This letter is a true illustration of Condorcet’s capacity to feel empathy and to value it. Indeed, Condorcet told his daughter that “this gentle sensitivity, which can be a source of happiness, originates in the natural feeling which

makes us share the sorrow of all sentient beings. Preserve this sentiment in all its purity and all its strength” (2012c, 199). What really separates Condorcet from the tyranny of rationality is that he does not embrace one of its necessary premises as defined by Berlin. Berlin argued that for positive freedom to exist as self-mastery, the human personality had to be split into two: “the transcendent, dominant controller, and the empirical bundle of desires and passions to be disciplined and brought to heel” (2002, 181). For Condorcet, feelings were natural and, as such, should not be constrained for the same reason that natural liberties ought not to be denied to mankind: they are both natural and, therefore, inherent to mankind’s essence.⁹

As a result, it is remarkable that the defence of Condorcet can be found in the very same text that would condemn his exaltation of rationality as a source of tyranny. Indeed, Condorcet fought with equal strength for the respect of natural rights that were not necessarily commensurable, the most obvious conflict being between freedom and equality. While Condorcet did not theorize the pluralism of value in the manner of Berlin, his writings, political fights in favour of the equality of rights of women and black people,

9 «La nature de l’homme sont les attributs qui le distinguent des autres êtres » (Cahen 1914, 584).

and his empathy for the misery of others all seem to indicate that he was already acutely aware of what is now called value-pluralism. He already knew that there was not a single value that could be deemed the highest value of all; he knew that conflicting and yet equally important values, such as freedom and equality, needed to co-exist. Condorcet believed that “zeal for the truth is also one of the passions” (2012a, 128). The use of words such as “zeal” and “passion” that carry pejorative undertones suggests that complete devotion to the truth was no more desirable than other forms of fanaticism.

In using Berlin’s two concepts of liberty to study Rousseau and Condorcet, it appears that both authors’ apparent understanding of liberty greatly differed. Rousseau’s freedom was inherent to the original state of mankind and could only be corrupted in the formation of societies through the loss of equality. On the other hand, because Condorcet’s idea of freedom is directly linked to the progress of science and of reason, his notion appears to be exclusive of other values in the first place. However, after careful examination, it becomes obvious that Condorcet’s liberty can only be understood in relation to other values, specifically happiness and equality. As a result, although they start from opposite perspectives, both Rousseau and Condorcet seem to value liberty


for the same reason: it is the necessary premise towards securing other natural human rights. Hence, freedom is valuable to the extent that it helps create societies in which every individual is emancipated from the oppressions that peoples had gone through before the seventeenth century and that still existed in their time. To strip the Enlightenment writings of the certainty of their tone is to discover that the authors were already aware of the inherent difficulty of creating a just society. The difference between their understanding of the values that make for a good society and our understanding is that we know of too many atrocities that were committed in the name of these values. As a result, we cannot subscribe to these values with the same unswerving optimism as they did.

Anna Spieser is from Strasbourg, France, and came to Concordia to work on a double major in political science and film studies. She is completing her last semester in summer 2014 before heading to law school at the University of Toronto where she was accepted for autumn entrance. She recently won the William K. Everson Award in Film Studies for constant devotion to academic excellence in her field. Anna’s interest in the Enlightenment was sparked by the unabated conflict between universal values and respect for other cultures. Upon reading

Condorcet, she was amazed at how visionary he was, but also knew that his writings had sometimes been understood to legitimize behaviors that many would find morally reprehensible. Anna says that, in a way, this paper was her modest attempt at redeeming Condorcet by presenting his work in the positive light by which she understands him.

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Cette révolution dite tranquille...

La nationalisation hydro-électrique au coeur de la Révolution Tranquille

par Marc Cordahi

“Une décote coûterait au trésor public québécois plusieurs centaines de milliers de dollars à court terme”,

préviendrait Monsieur Marquette, professeur d'économie à l'Université de Montréal (Richer 2014). La situation des finances publiques est telle que seul un remède drastique pourrait possiblement éviter au nouveau gouvernement libéral d'affronter les conséquences financières négatives d'une décote des grandes agences de notation de crédit. Ces agences déterminent le niveau des intérêts à déboursier sur les emprunts fait par

Québec. L'article de *La Presse* conclue que le remède idéal pour apaiser les sociétés de crédit et alléger les finances publiques serait de privatiser une portion d'Hydro-Québec. Ce fut la Révolution Tranquille qui donna naissance à Hydro-Québec et à travers une série d'événements complexes permit à l'État québécois de devenir un véhicule pour tous les redressements socio-politiques nécessaires à son avancement (Gagnon et Montcalm 1990, 52). Un petit retour en arrière dans le berceau moderne de l'État québécois est nécessaire pour comprendre l'importance d'Hydro-Québec et de retrouver un des plus beaux acquis de la Révolution Tranquille : le projet de nationalisation de l'électricité de 1962.

Ce projet d'envergure était l'une des premières tâches pour moderniser le Québec. Alors que dès le début du XXe siècle l'Ontario accomplissait une nationalisation de ses ressources énergétiques, le Québec était toujours dépendant de monopoles privés régionaux. Cette situation se répercutait directement dans l'offre de service, les diverses entreprises produisant de l'électricité d'ampères différents, de taux différents et opérant uniquement en anglais dans un contexte culturel purement francophone (Sauriol 1962, 23). Cet article démontrera qu'Hydro-Québec et le projet de nationalisation de l'électricité était vraiment au cœur de la Révolution

Tranquille en approchant cette série d'événements sous quatre facettes importantes : la relation professionnelle complexe entre Jean Lesage et René Lévesque qui a permis de trouver un juste milieu entre le conservatisme et le populisme québécois; la campagne électorale de 1962 qui donna au peuple québécois la chance démocratique de se prononcer en faveur du projet; le financement original qui a permis de démontrer qu'une nationalisation est possible sans nuire aux marchés financiers et finalement, le nationalisme québécois à travers l'émergence du français comme langue de travail où il sera dorénavant possible de travailler en français au Canada.

Jean Lesage et René Lévesque

La mort de Maurice Duplessis met fin au chapitre de la "grande noirceur", et ce, après des années de règne sur la société québécoise (Thomson 1984, 13). Il s'en suit la Révolution Tranquille, terme qui a été utilisé par un journaliste du *Globe And Mail* pour décrire les premières grandes décisions de l'administration libérale de Jean Lesage après son élection en juin 1960 (Thomson 1982, 2). Jean Lesage a certainement été l'un des architectes principaux de la Révolution Tranquille avec son "équipe du tonnerre" qui comprend, notamment, le journaliste René Lévesque qui se voit confier le ministère des Richesses naturelles (Godin 2005,

14). Le duo composé de René Lévesque et Jean Lesage naviguera avec habileté la série d'événements complexes menant à la nationalisation de l'électricité durant les temps agités de la Révolution Tranquille.

Jean Lesage avait plusieurs qualités pour diriger la "belle province": une intelligence aiguisée par la faculté de droit de l'Université Laval, une apparence charismatique, une énergie bouillonnante, beaucoup d'ambition et une voix qui résonnait durant les débats politiques (Thomson 1984, 35,43-49). En 1945, son entrée en politique fédérale sera perçue de manière positive et il trouvera rapidement une place au sein du cabinet libéral fédérale où il se voit remettre le ministre des *Northern Affairs* et des *Natural Resources* à 41 ans (Thomson 1984, 50). Quand le gouvernement fédéral libéral de Louis St-Laurent sera défait en 1957, Jean Lesage remplacera Georges-Émile Lapalme à la tête du Parti libéral du Québec (Thomson 1984, 55).

Jean Lesage, même avec ses tendances conservatrices qu'il a héritées de la politique fédérale et son aisance dans le monde du droit et des affaires, est en faveur de la transformation sociale du Québec après le règne de Maurice Duplessis. Il demeure, malgré tout, un fervent capitaliste qui croit en la concurrence des marchés et il devra se faire convaincre par René Lévesque pour

entreprendre des projets à tendance socialiste comme la nationalisation de l'électricité (Thomson 1984, 104). Le cabinet de Jean Lesage bourdonne d'activités et certains ministres se sentent exclus et mis de côté par d'autre "diva" à la personnalité plus foncée et populiste telle que René Lévesque (Thomson 1984, 107). L'éclosion de discours ou d'entrevues en faveur de la nationalisation de l'électricité polue les relations au sein du cabinet et envenime la relation entre Jean Lesage et Lévesque, tous deux continuant malgré tout à entretenir un grand respect mutuel professionnel. Ayant l'habitude d'une politique canadienne plus conservatrice, Lesage prend son temps pour s'acclimater à l'idée d'une nationalisation de l'électricité, et ce, bien que René Lévesque le pousse continuellement à faire avancer son grand projet.

La question de la nationalisation sera finalement débattue au Lac à l'Épaulé en septembre 1962 au caucus du cabinet pour en arriver à un consensus final (Lévesque 2007, 235). Paul Gérin-Lajoie, le ministre de l'Éducation, et Pierre Laporte, ministre des Affaires municipales, appuient le projet de nationalisation. George Marler, par contre, étant membre du conseil de la Trésorerie, sera en désaccord avec le coût élevé de la nationalisation et la potentielle réaction négative de la communauté financière pour un projet dit "socialiste" (Lévesque 2007, 237). Jean

Lesage, quant à lui, cherchait un consensus dans son cabinet, car il devait trouver un compromis entre le conservatisme financier et l'engagement populiste de René Lévesque.

Le chemin de René Lévesque n'a pas été facile pour arriver à la tête du ministère des Richesses naturelles et devenir le grand champion de la nationalisation de l'électricité en 1962. Après une carrière fructueuse en tant que correspondant de guerre et ensuite avec son émission journalistique *Point de Mire* sur Radio-Canada, il sera élu d'arrache-pied dans le comté de Laurier et amorcera sa deuxième vie en tant que nouvelle "star" dans le gouvernement libéral de Lesage (Godin 2005, 10-18). René Lévesque voulait changer les choses et il n'avait pas l'intention de se faire élire pour la forme. Pour Lévesque, la nationalisation était un projet qui lui tenait énormément à cœur.

"Hydro-Québec, c'est la seule chose vraiment à nous", avait-il dit à Lesage; "Ton futur aménagement hydraulique devrait lui être confié." René Lévesque part en tournée pour convaincre la population du bienfait de sa politique de nationalisation. Il inscrit à la craie sur sa carte, comme à l'époque de *Point de mire*, les principaux enjeux financiers de la nationalisation avant d'en répéter une fois de plus les bienfaits. Par ce fait, il voulait secouer le légendaire laisser-faire de ses compatriotes, agiter leur

fierté nationale et banaliser leurs peurs, leur ignorance et leur manque de confiance qui les empêchaient de s'approprier leur domaine hydro-électrique (Godin 2005, 128). C'était une véritable coalition populiste qui se formait pour contrer le lobbysme des milieux des affaires. Bientôt, René Lévesque aura dans sa poche tout ce que le Québec comptait de syndicats agricoles et ouvriers, dont la CSN de Jean Marchand, de groupes sociaux et étudiants, de sociétés patriotiques, etc. (Lévesque 2007, 233). En août 1962, André Laurendeau écrit : « M. Lévesque est le moteur et M. Marler les freins. Il faudra choisir entre la grandeur et la compromission, entre la peur de la grande finance et le courage politique » (Godin 2005, 142). Ce passage en dit long sur les relations complexes entre le monde conservateur des finances et l'avancement de la société québécoise préconisé par Lesage et Lévesque.

Au lendemain de la rencontre au Lac-à-l'Épaulé, le cabinet sanctionne la décision de soumettre au peuple l'étatisation des compagnies d'électricité. Il y aura une élection référendaire sur la nationalisation de l'électricité le 14 novembre 1962 avec un Jean Lesage apaisé et un René Lévesque triomphant, mais modeste (Godin 2005, 145). C'était le duo professionnel entre Lévesque, le fonceur, et Lesage, le prudent, qui permettra d'avancer le projet de nationalisation et de trouver

un juste milieu entre le conservatisme et le populisme québécois.

La campagne électorale de 1962

La campagne électorale de novembre 1962 introduira le slogan nationaliste fétiche des années 1960 de la Révolution Tranquille. Le slogan massue de la campagne libérale devient donc “Maintenant ou jamais! Maîtres chez nous” (Lévesque 2007, 512). C’est évidemment la nationalisation de l’électricité qui, en rendant les Québécois maîtres chez eux, leur apportera le meilleur des mondes. “Maîtres chez nous”, un cri du cœur dont Jean Lesage et René Lévesque feront un cri de ralliement, traduit de façon saisissante la longue quête d’autonomie d’un peuple soumis depuis 200 ans à la volonté d’un autre. Jean Lesage donne le ton à la campagne qui résonne comme un écho de la polémique des années 30 : “C’est une lutte entre le peuple et le trust de l’électricité. Celui qui est pour le trust est contre le peuple du Québec et celui qui est pour le peuple est contre le trust” (Lévesque 2007, 150). Le “trust” dont parle Lesage, c’est le centre financier St-James et l’anglais omniprésent; le “peuple”, c’est le Canadien-français sous-scolarisé qui livre le lait et le pain dans les beaux quartiers anglophones. La nationalisation permettait au peuple québécois de

retrouver leur identité culturelle à travers l’industrie de l’hydro-électricité.

Le programme électoral du Parti libéral était clair : “On ne remplace pas 30 000 actionnaires par plus de 5 300 000 sans consulter ces derniers” (Lévesque 2007, 512). Jean Lesage et son équipe demanderont à l’ensemble de la population de leur donner un mandat clair et précis pour leur permettre de poursuivre la nationalisation des 11 compagnies d’électricité privées, dont la *Shawinigan Water and Power Company*.

Le 14 novembre 1962, les libéraux de Jean Lesage augmentent leur majorité en passant de 51.4% à 56.5% du vote populaire et de 51 à 63 sièges à l’Assemblée Nationale. Ils sont ainsi reconduits au pouvoir avec une forte majorité (Thomson 1984, 123). Jean Lesage et René Lévesque déclarent qu’ils ont reçu un mandat sans équivoque pour la nationalisation des compagnies d’électricité. André Laurendeau, du Devoir, louange le nationalisme dynamique et constructif des libéraux et Gérard Pelletier, éditeur de *La Presse*, déclare une victoire pour la démocratie québécoise (Godin 2005, 152). Le duo Lesage-Lévesque était le moteur nécessaire pour le déclenchement d’une campagne électorale axée sur la nationalisation de l’électricité. Ce pari démocratique leur a permis de garder de saines relations au sein du cabinet et de laisser la population

québécoise avoir le dernier mot sur le projet de nationalisation.

Le Financement

Le financement précaire du projet de nationalisation était un grand obstacle pour convaincre le milieu des affaires et le reste de la population québécoise de la possibilité d'une nationalisation réussie. L'intégration des compagnies privées au sein d'Hydro-Québec permettait de réaliser d'importantes économies d'échelle. L'existence d'un seul siège social, l'uniformisation des procédures et des méthodes et un découpage géographique plus rationnel permettaient de réduire considérablement les frais d'administration (Chanlat 1984, 49). La nationalisation était une occasion de récupérer les vingtaines de millions de dollars de dividendes distribués chaque année aux actionnaires des compagnies privées et les quinzaines de millions versées au gouvernement fédéral à titre d'impôt sur le revenu auquel Hydro-Québec n'était pas assujetti (Chanlat 1984, 51). La récupération de ces montants devait contribuer à défrayer en partie le coût de la nationalisation, évalué à 600 millions (Thomson 1984, 258).

Pour maintenir un climat propice aux investissements, il était préférable qu'Hydro-Québec face l'acquisition des actions des compagnies privées de gré à gré que d'exproprier

directement les compagnies impliquées (Thomson 1984, 269). Les multiples chantages et mesquineries du syndicat financier canadien, basé à Montréal et composé principalement de la Banque de Montréal et A.E. Ames, poussent René Lévesque à chercher l'argent nécessaire aux États-Unis. Ces prêts n'ont d'ailleurs pas pris longtemps à trouver preneur sur les marchés New Yorkais. Lévesque récolta à travers un groupe de New York, incluant Halsey Stuart et Chase Manhattan, les 300 millions de dollars nécessaires, malgré le fait que jamais depuis la Première Guerre mondiale, les Américains n'avaient prêté une telle somme à l'étranger (Thomson 1984, 269-270). Cette attitude tranche avec les relations hostiles et négatives du syndicat financier canadien. L'autre moitié des 600 millions de dollars nécessaires sera assumée en dette et en actions privilégiées (Thomson 1984, 271). Lévesque parvint à naviguer de manière habile le milieu sinueux des affaires canadiennes et trouva des alliés dans les marchés New Yorkais.

Le 22 février 1963, le gouvernement envoie ses offres officielles aux actionnaires accompagnées d'une date limite fixée pour le 19 avril 1963 (Thomson 1984, 277). Peter Thomson, l'actionnaire principal de la *Shawinigan Power and Corporation* conclut que l'offre du gouvernement est juste assez haute pour être acceptée sans avoir

à entamer des procédures dispendieuses visant à contester la décision. La date butoir du 19 avril arriva et les actions des sept compagnies hydro-électriques furent transférées à Hydro-Québec (Thomson 1984, 278). Le reste des compagnies suivront à leur tour. Le financement était une étape importante dans la nationalisation. En délaissant les syndicats financiers canadiens, les architectes du projet démontrent que l'argent n'a pas de couleur et qu'une nationalisation est possible sans nuire aux marchés financiers.

Le nationalisme québécois : le français au travail

La Révolution Tranquille servit d'éveil à la population québécoise qui commençait à exprimer et discuter des problèmes culturels de la "belle province" francophone et spécialement de l'avancement de la place du français dans le milieu des affaires québécois. La domination économique des anglophones était, en effet, perçue par les francophones comme un handicap à leur épanouissement culturel (Lévesque 2007, 238).

En 1962, la place occupée par les francophones dans le monde des affaires du Québec est loin de refléter leur importance numérique réelle dans la population. L'industrie de l'électricité ne fait pas exception à cette règle : les anglophones

accaparent la plupart des postes d'administrateurs (Chanlat 1984, 52). À la Shawinigan, la plus importante des compagnies privées, seuls cinq sièges sur seize au conseil d'administration sont occupés par des francophones. À quelques exceptions près, les francophones sont exclus des postes de direction générale, de finance et de génie (Chanlat 1984, 53). Cette omniprésence des cadres supérieurs anglophones, unilingues pour la plupart, impose l'anglais comme langue de travail aux quelques francophones occupant des postes de commande et à la majorité des subalternes. Seul le personnel au plus bas de l'échelle a la possibilité de travailler en français. Cette opportunité s'accompagne de l'obligation de recourir à l'anglais pour remplir les multiples documents des compagnies et pour désigner les termes techniques. La situation d'Hydro-Québec est différente au moment de la nationalisation : 79% au niveau de la direction et 98% au niveau des cadres ont recours au français (Chanlat 1984, 55). Longtemps tolérée, l'attitude du secteur privé en ce qui a trait à l'usage du français comme langue de travail devint de plus en plus inacceptable. L'une des priorités du gouvernement Lesage était d'intervenir afin de favoriser les francophones ayant les compétences nécessaires pour accéder aux postes de commande.

La réalité de la francisation dans l'industrie hydro-électrique ne fit pas l'unanimité. Vers la fin de la campagne de nationalisation, René Lévesque devait encaisser une autre critique de la part d'un financier anglophone qui, au cours d'une réunion intime dans une résidence cossue du West-Island lui lança : *"But Lévesque, how can people like you imagine you can run Shawinigan Water and Power?"* (Godin 2005, 160). Cette altercation en dit long sur les relations tendues entre conquérant anglophone et conquis francophone durant la dure période de la Révolution René Lévesque s'était fixé comme règle d'embaucher le plus de francophones possible.

René Lévesque s'était fixé comme règle d'embaucher le plus de Francophones possible. Les conseillers de René Lévesque dressèrent la liste des dirigeants qui seraient remerciés en vertu de trois critères : l'âge, le niveau de compétence et le bilinguisme. À la Shawinigan, 23 des dirigeants durent partir, dont le patron Jack Fuller (Godin 2005, 163). Une fois le projet de nationalisation accompli, Hydro-Québec doubla presque son personnel de 8 900 à 14 000 employés. Le nombre d'abonnés total augmenta de 590 000 à 1,4 millions, la puissance installée de 3,7 à 6,2 millions de kilowatts et le nombre de centrales, de 9 à 50 (Godin 2005, 164).

Ce n'est qu'après des débats animés que la décision de la francisation l'emporta. Avec une telle politique, la proportion de francophones nouvellement recrutés s'éleva progressivement à 99%. Cette entrée massive des francophones et le départ plus important des anglophones augmentèrent chaque année (Chanlat 1984, 87). Le caractère essentiellement francophone de la relève y est pour beaucoup dans le succès de la francisation. Peu à peu, le français devint la langue d'usage dans les communications internes, qu'elles soient verbales ou écrites (Chanlat 1984, 88). Une leçon essentielle de la Révolution Tranquille : il est désormais possible, en Amérique du Nord, de parler gestion et technique en français. La langue française prend de l'expansion durant la période de nationalisation de l'électricité avec Hydro-Québec et sert d'éveil pour le nationalisme québécois.

Conclusion

Aussi bien au niveau du duo Lesage-Lévesque, de l'importance démocratique de la campagne de 1962, de l'ingéniosité en terme du financement et finalement de l'avancement de la cause nationaliste québécoise par la francisation légitime du milieu de travail et des affaires au Québec, la période de la nationalisation de l'électricité au Québec nous a permis de voir comment cet événement est au cœur de la Révolution Tranquille.

Un retour au présent nous force à confronter une situation actuelle forte différente. Dans la foulée des commentaires sur la privatisation d'une partie d'Hydro-Québec, *La Presse* annonce que la société d'état versera un dividende immense de 2.2 milliards de dollars dans les coffres du gouvernement du Québec (Arsenault 2014). Notre mémoire a tendance à oublier nos anciennes batailles chaotiques qui ont menés à nos grands acquis d'aujourd'hui. Le même Parti libéral qui s'est battu, il y a 50 ans, pour nationaliser ce domaine, songe maintenant à en privatiser une partie afin d'éviter une décote des sociétés de crédit et repayer la dette publique, et ce, en recevant 2.2 milliards. Cette dérive tranquille vers la droite politique et économique décrit depuis quelques années une réalité de la société, des marchés financiers, des sociétés de crédits et, plus spécifiquement, des partis politiques. René Lévesque, qui n'était certes pas à l'abri des problèmes avec son propre Parti québécois, démontre une grande clarté et une lucidité prophétique lorsqu'il prévient que:

Tout parti politique n'est au fond qu'un mal nécessaire... Mais les partis vieillissent généralement assez mal... Ils ont tendance à se transformer en église laïque... À la longue, les idées se sclérosent et c'est l'opportunisme

politicien qui les remplace. Tout parti naissant devrait à mon avis inscrire dans ses statuts une clause prévoyant qu'il disparaîtra au bout d'un certain temps. Une génération? Guère d'avantage (Lévesque 2007, 312).

Cet article nous démontre l'importance de se souvenir des batailles politiques, économiques et culturelles livrées et gagnées par nos ancêtres québécois. Hydro-Québec est l'un des plus beaux acquis de la Révolution Tranquille et il ne faudrait jamais que les partis politiques, syndicats financiers et sociétés de crédit nous le fassent oublier. Nos élus actuels devraient se rappeler du grand courage qui a été nécessaire afin de faire face à tous ces obstacles avant d'entreprendre des démarches pour vendre des parts de cette société d'État. Les importants événements de la Révolution Tranquille et du projet de nationalisation de l'électricité au Québec nous en ont convaincus.

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Nietzsche and His Battle Against Nihilism

by Daniel Rhodes

Friedrich Nietzsche is regarded as a giant in the field of existentialism (Solomon 2001, 1). When one studies the man and his work, it appears that Nietzsche is a pessimist, one who believes that humans are doomed to nihilism and narcissism. However, it may also seem that Nietzsche is a cynic: he thinks nihilism is the route that people will eventually take. This essay will contend that Nietzsche intended to provide a framework for humans—through the study of Greek tragedy and other devices, such as Socratic logic—to

enable them to avoid nihilism. Nietzsche's most famous quote may well be that 'God is dead,' implying that in the absence of divinity, anything is permitted, and everything is pointless. However, there is another possible interpretation of the statement. It may reveal Nietzsche's faith in humankind, namely, its ability to appreciate beauty, truth, goodness, and to critically question the abuse of those aesthetic and humanist ideals. While it is certainly true that any human can do anything and that great suffering has come from this fact, it is a fallacy that everything is permitted and that everything is pointless. The actual and potential greatness of an individual—and, by extension, of humankind—derives from the individual's pursuit of meaning and the questioning of all things. Nietzsche contends that life can be seen as meaningful,

despite the potential non-existence of God. Whether we killed God, or whether God never existed to begin with, is irrelevant to this contention. Everything is meaningful, and everything must be questioned.

Nihilism and the Creation of Purpose

It is certainly a legitimate fear that when people disbelieve in a supreme God—which is to say, that they disbelieve that life has an ordained purpose—they can and will do anything they please, regardless of the consequences. In other words, in the absence of a moral authority, consequence is meaningless. In this context, Langsam notes that “Nietzsche does not kill God, he simply announces his death, and similarly Nietzsche does not attempt to destroy morality, he simply notes its imminent demise.” (Langsam 1997, 237). When one considers nihilism – the belief that there is no innate purpose to life – and the idea that everything is permitted, one could argue that those who take up the counter position are also able to do anything they please. We therefore have a potential point of contention that when everything is permitted due to a purposeless existence, we can use that to argue that we need to forge our own destinies. Thus, it becomes possible to argue that in the absence of meaning, we must create our own purpose. However,

this is not a sufficient argument against nihilism, nor is it an objective stand against the problems that nihilism brings. Nietzsche believed that suffering was a natural part of life, that it was unavoidable and also necessary for growth. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, he tries to explain that the Greeks understood this, and yet—due to their adoration of Dionysus—they could go on living despite this knowledge (Gillespie 1995, 205). This is the first step to overcoming nihilism: the realization that life’s meaning is elusive does not automatically mean that everything is permitted. This belief does not conclude that because purpose is absent, a person should become a narcissist. Instead, “[t]he strong or healthy will aim not at self-preservation but at self-overcoming” (Gillespie 1995, 203). Narcissistic and nihilist thought is innately oriented toward self-preservation and is inherently self-serving. If nihilism were the central aspect of a society, then the notion of community and treating others well would be pointless. Therefore, either the definition of nihilism is innately self-serving, or the definition of community is incorrect.

Nietzsche’s philosophy actually argues against the notion that nihilistic thought is innately self-serving. As an aesthetic moralist, he put real value in the works of others and their effects on people as a whole. Nietzsche himself was

interested in fixing problems that he saw within the culture. After all, Nietzsche lived at the beginning of the industrial revolution. The effects of the Renaissance were in decline, and perhaps a marked decrease in artistry is what Nietzsche feared. Duncan contends that Nietzsche was hoping for a “rebirth of tragedy”; it was not only required and possible but also existed already in the works of Immanuel Kant and Arthur Schopenhauer (Duncan 2007, 49). That Nietzsche would be persuaded by arguments made by Schopenhauer is not a surprise, given Nietzsche’s affection for the musical arts and his attachment to dance and the artistic movement of the body. Kant, on the other hand, is more elusive. He wrote extensively about both the political schema we tend to follow and the concepts of freedom and society. Kantian logic weaves a common theme of guarded optimism, which runs counter to most of his predecessors and, in fact, runs counter to many political philosophers who came after him (Gomberg 1994, 537). Kant and Socrates held firmly to the belief that the universe is aimed toward ‘the good,’ whereas Schopenhauer took the opposite path vis-à-vis this particular belief. Unlike Socrates, though, Kant stated clearly, as did Schopenhauer, that there are limits to what we humans can discover (Duncan 2007, 51). So it is here where Nietzsche decided to weigh in, and in his embrace of

pessimism, he became paradoxically optimistic. By giving a voice to pessimism with a view to renewing the art form of tragedy, Nietzsche hoped to heal the culture he saw as being eroded by nihilistic and Apollonian thought. He wished to renew Greek-style tragedy and to enhance its rebirth in order to soothe and heal the culture by having it accept the pessimism necessary for growth (Duncan, 2007). Here Nietzsche saw his solution—by altering nihilism—and here he attempted to give life to a new form of Greek tragedy, albeit more as mid-wife than a procreator.

The Birth of Tragedy is a celebration of pessimism and all its unwanted yet unavoidable glory (Duncan, 2007; Reginster, 2009). In order to understand Nietzsche’s singular outlook on nihilism and how he fought it, one must understand that he saw something of value in dark pessimism. Unlike Kant, who rejects pessimism, and unlike Schopenhauer, who resigns himself to it, Nietzsche embraces pessimism and even “celebrates” it (Duncan 2007, 66-67). Thus, in adopting a pessimistic outlook and seeing culture through a dark lens, Nietzsche could bring meaning to the meaningless world. In this view, our world is one in which the occurrences of tragedy are as inevitable as they are necessary for cultural growth. Humans are drawn to tragedy; they are the engines of their own self-destruction.

In this way of thinking, Nietzsche sees artistic expression of tragedy as culturally necessary because art will teach us the lessons we must learn. These lessons are not “offered” so we may avoid our respective fates; rather, learning these lessons enables us to better deal with the consequences once our fate has found us. Tragedy will occur; it is inevitable; our mortal selves cannot escape it. It is through tragedy that we ultimately see ourselves for what we truly are, and through the beautiful illusions we tell through poetry, music and other art forms, we cast away these illusions to reveal the heart and truth of the matter at hand. *Memento mori*. We all die. Our fate is inescapable, so Nietzsche contends that people must therefore create, enhance, and add works to the library of life before they go on their final journey.

According to Duncan, Nietzsche embraced Schopenhauer’s pessimism and yet could not follow in the footsteps of his idol. To see the world in a Schopenhauerian light was to conclude that one should just resign oneself to fate (Duncan 2007, 67). Nietzsche himself believed that one should not fear pessimism nor resign oneself to it. Instead, it is something one should embrace. Consequently, Nietzsche attempted to give nihilism a purpose. In seeing the world as pointless and embracing pessimism, Nietzsche hoped to give rise to a new generation of

tragedy, which would in turn heal the culture. Through expressive art, especially music and more importantly dance, Nietzsche believed that an individual could contribute to a society through dance. Dance, according to Hutter, has an extended definition that includes yoga, martial arts and other activities of a similar nature (2006, 191). Dance and music may even reduce the suffering innate to life as “[m]usic here, as always, appears to be a direct language of the will,” and dance is “one of the chief practices of justice toward oneself as well as toward others” (Hutter 2006, 197; 195-196).

Aesthetic Morality

There remains a logical flaw in the concept of “everything is permitted” and the concomitant belief that with no superior being to humanity, the self becomes the highest form. Omitting the possibility of the existence of other equal life forms is one of the flaws, but a greater and more immediate error is this: if all humans as a group are the highest form of life, it does not follow that a particular individual would be superior to the group. Would not all humans be equals under this logic? This train of thought should look to conscious creatures as equals; more specifically, if there is no God above us, why should one assume that other people matter less than oneself?

This self-as-highest-form notion is a *non sequitur* born out of narcissism. Rational thought would conclude that the opinions matter—or, at a minimum, the actions of others which have direct effects on ourselves. The beliefs of others matter because they affect the landscape within which we ourselves live; thus, they affect us directly. Therefore, not everything is permitted. As Aristotle writes, we are “political animals,” so we do not exist just for ourselves. We also exist as part of a larger human community. From Plato and Aristotle to John Rawls, a sense that humanity belongs in communities is an idea amongst philosophers that is likely to endure. It requires a gigantic leap of faith to go from the idea that there is no superior being above humanity to the idea that the individual self is the highest form. It essentially ignores the arguments that other beings of equal capabilities have equal value.

This brings the discussion to Nietzsche’s aesthetic morality. Despite our existence as non-solitary beings, Nietzsche has a different sense of morality, one that opposes a traditional morality based on good and evil. He argues that those who create dialogue those who create artistic designs, music, or expressions of the self, outwards and projected into our world—have a higher value as members of society than those who do not contribute

to the world (Langsam 1997, 236). Langsam argues throughout the article that Nietzsche is not attempting to destroy existing concepts of morality; rather, Nietzsche sees morality as individualistic. Each of us will develop our own moral sense. In his work *Beyond Good and Evil*, he deconstructs the common view on morality in his time, commenting on what he sees as the failings of morality and the degradation of existing values in the modern era. He attempts to provide an alternate view in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (Kaufmann 1968, 182). This view is one of aesthetic morality, which, if understood and embraced, would enable society to heal itself through philosophy (Hutter 2006, 41-42).

Aesthetic morality can be viewed in the following light: if there is no reason or purpose for our earthly presence, then we must create our own purpose. In this way, those who create cultural dialogue become intrinsically more valuable than those who do not participate in the creative process. This proposal is the core of Nietzsche’s specific variation on aesthetic morality, though it is not the core of all other forms of this philosophy (Langsam 1997, 236). Nietzsche’s aesthetic morality becomes another way of avoiding the nihilist trap: where nothing matters, there is no authority, anarchy reigns, and people may as well do what they feel like doing and promote their

own interests at the cost of others. If purpose can be redefined as the imperative to create our own sense of purpose, then nihilism can be seen to have no place in any society. Nietzsche championed the arts, with a focus on music and Greek drama. Greek tragedies reveal acts of nihilism, murder, wholesale carnage, and the triumph of evil. However, the artist shows the audience the inner workings of such actions, showing them to not be so anti-human after all. Art can empower the audience by showing them that the triumph or failures of those we would think reprehensible are actually the triumphs or failings of those not so far off from ourselves. Artists compel us to ask deeper questions—even if the artist is only creating the piece to win a prize or for other selfish interests—and help us come to deeper understandings of the so-called truths of society and human relations. All human systems are potentially open to abuse for the self-serving gains of those who use them. Sartorius states that “trust” is needed for governments to govern, and this notion of trust can be extended to all human systems of power, including art-forms (1981, 17). The power system itself is a “one way street,” but when this power is used correctly, it benefits society at large (Sartorius 1981, 17). A sense of meaning can be found in the arts, a meaning that transcends generations. For Nietzsche, it was within

the Greek tragedies and musical arts that he found the most solace against the prospect of nothing, a hope that nothingness was not all there was.

It was the prospect of meaninglessness that troubled Nietzsche to his core. He saw growing Western decadence, growing nihilism, and growing narcissism, and he despaired because he believed these “developments” had the potential to end culture. It is culture that Nietzsche held up as humankind’s highest achievement. Envisioning a potential end to culture, he became deeply troubled. Through philosophers and musicians such as Schopenhauer, Wagner and others, he saw hope. Schopenhauer showed Nietzsche that pessimism must be fought against, but, unlike Nietzsche, Schopenhauer saw only sadness and pessimism in society (Duncan 2007, 47). Nietzsche saw tragedy, pessimism, and in these beliefs that he embraced he saw hope for a renewal of culture through Greek tragedy, music, dance and other art forms. This is Nietzsche’s aesthetic morality, where culture is rated higher than humanity. Controversial to its core, Nietzsche’s philosophy affirmed a celebration of nihilism, a rejection of decadence, and a rejection of any moral value that diminished culture, life, and growth.

A major issue within aesthetic morality is that Nietzsche believed

that morality was intrinsically life-denying (Reginster 2009, 54). He attempted to balance his love for aesthetics against his belief that morality denies life. This is based on a conclusion that if morality denies life, then life is primarily immoral. Thus, Nietzsche's nihilism is rooted in the fact that humans, and especially philosophers, cannot attain their highest beliefs nor maintain their highest values because life inevitably forces a choice between morality and living (Reginster 2009, 54). Nietzsche's concept of the will-to-power is where this concept is further explored. He uses the will-to-power to move us from self-preservation to self-overcoming (Gillespie, 1995, 203).

Life Affirmation and Will to Power

Nietzsche is a life-affirming philosopher whose position, at first glance, seems at odds with his discussion of nihilism and the will-to-power. However, the life-affirming aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy and the will-to-power go hand in hand. The more difficult aspect is showing the link between nihilism and life affirmation. This is done through the device of the will-to-power, as nihilism and the will-to-power are connected. Schutte contends that Nietzsche does not just attempt to combat nihilism but he also foresees a coming wave of nihilism, and his writings

are meant to move us beyond the point of meaninglessness (Schutte 1986). Nihilism is a natural growth point for us, and there is one more link in the chain of growth, one that takes us past nihilist tendencies.

According to Schutte, Nietzsche saw a world in the grip of Apollonian logic (1986). This type of rational thought, without a primal instinct to fall back upon, makes us alienate ourselves from one another, and, worse still, will lead to a culture that rejects all moral principles. In order to battle against this, Nietzsche sought to embrace nihilism through a Dionysian philosophical approach, in order to heal the culture by promoting the celebration of tragedy (Schutte 1986, xii). This view is enhanced by the thought that achievements that are held high by the Western lifestyle include philosophy. Despite this, a conclusion certain Western philosophers reach is that life is meaningless (Schutte 1986, 38). Thus, as we saw in Reginster (2009)—and we can see a similar vein of thought in Schutte (1986)—Western philosophy and morality is expressively life-denying, even life-resenting. Nietzsche does not state that morality, or the concepts of morality, end life. What he is stating is that moral structures place restrictions upon life that otherwise would not be present. Moral truisms often do not hold up to the test of time, and people tend to break from morality in order to achieve their

Dionysian desires. This is how morality is life-negating. To Nietzsche, humans look to superior beings for moral truths because humans understand that they will not be able to hold themselves to these truths without guidance, and even with guidance they will all too often fail to adhere to their own codes of conduct.

In *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche moves through many reasons for the human belief in God or gods. Reginster conveys to us that Nietzsche believed that the stronger a belief system is, the more likely it is to be false. Moreover, the strength of metaphysical explanations is expressly tied to our psychological need to find meaning in an otherwise meaningless existence (Reginster 2009, 41). It is here that the will to power plays its pivotal role in combating nihilism. Nietzsche believed that one could overcome the depressing nature of the thought that life is meaningless—in spite of knowing this to be true—through the will to power. This would be the final test to combat nihilism, allowing the will to power to become a life-affirming process (Schutte 1986, 69). Therefore, instead of avoiding nihilism by attributing the purpose of life to God, or purpose in life to morality, Nietzsche would instead suggest the confronting of nihilism, and overcoming it by an affirmation of life for what life is: a beautiful, aesthetic process filled with

tragedy, one that helps humans grow in an all-too human fashion.

Could nihilism and life-affirmation be connected? It would be easy to state that because the will to power can be tied to both concepts, nihilism is tied to life-affirmation. However, this is not the case. A small leap of faith is required to do this, and this leap is one that Nietzsche himself had trouble with. The answer, and the leap of faith required, lies in the way in which Nietzsche defines nihilism. He defines morality as life-condemning (Reginster 2009, 46). Moreover, he asserts that this fact invariably compels philosophers—who wish to see the highest values of morality realized, while also realizing that these highest values are unattainable—to inevitably become nihilistic themselves, due to the meaninglessness of their efforts. Hence, it is not nihilism that is life-affirming. Nihilism, in Nietzsche's mind, is the response to the insolubility between traditional morality and life-affirmation. It is in overcoming nihilism that one can (and should) see value in life. And if one, through the will to power, can overcome nihilism seen in this way, the person should be able to see that life is something to be celebrated. In other words, if life-affirmation is not worth holding as a value, then nihilism has carried the day, for if one promotes life as meaningless, then nothing has meaning.

Through the will to power, one can adopt a life-affirming philosophy. By moving away from simple preservation and moving towards the overcoming of our difficulties and the creation of our own purpose, we are, as Nietzsche says, human in everything we do. We must continue to create art, poetry, music and dance in order to survive. It is through our creative impulse that the greatest ability of humanity is displayed, and what Nietzsche would argue, it is when we are at our highest value to society. It is only through a twisted irony of history that distorted versions of the will to power, *Zarathustra* and *Übermensch*, were used to promote a genocidal campaign by the fascist regime of Nazi Germany. However twisted that was, it is not without a double irony of Nietzsche's own love for Greek tragedy. It is as if Nietzsche's life and works in promoting life-affirmation and love for tragedy met together on a scale too horrific to describe. However, this too is another story in our tragic human history. The irony that a man as life-affirming and life-promoting as Nietzsche could have his writings twisted to fit a specific life-denying ideal shows the methods certain humans will use to promote their interests. This is nothing new. People considered great are often misquoted and misused to carry out agendas counter to what they themselves would support. Karl Marx, had he lived longer,

would have seen his theories being put to the test, in a distorted form, by Lenin and eventually Stalin. To cite an American example, currently Tea Party Republicans are guided by writings such as those by Robert Nozick in his *Anarchy, State and Utopia*. While the basic tenants Nozick advocated are present and the rhetoric similar, the overall movement bares little resemblance to his writings and essentially misuses the work to fit its own agenda.

Nietzsche and Freedom

The final point addresses Nietzsche's ideal of freedom, for without defining freedom, much of this discussion—in true nihilist fashion—becomes meaningless. In combating nihilism, the first step is to determine whether we are even free to decide how we live our lives. If we are not free, then there is no purpose beyond that which is given to us, and, therefore, there is no meaning to the things we ourselves choose to do. According to Schulte, Nietzsche states that “freedom exists within destiny as the freedom to become who one is” (1986, 71). Freedom is seen as one's ability to self-discover and to grow emotionally. Discovering who we are in our own internal struggle for meaning is more important than discovering what it is we want in our external struggle for success and material gains.

In one respect, Nietzsche is opposed to the question, “What do you want?” and is more interested in the question, “Who are you?” This is a question asked many times throughout the cult classic *Babylon 5* (Straczynski & Netter, 1996). These questions, as defined by Straczynski & Netter, represent the dichotomy between evolution through obtaining one’s desires and growth through internal power. In Nietzsche’s terms, the internal power would be his concept of will-to-power, and the second question would be the most relevant. However, Straczynski & Netter would contend that it is not possible to obtain one’s desires—or to answer the question, “what do you want?”—without ignoring the other question “who are you?” To detail what one wants, and seek out the material or goal of desire, one must ignore self-discovery as a sacrifice towards that goal. To achieve self-discovery, a person must sacrifice many of his or her internal desires in order to discover what drives them. Under Nietzsche’s freedom, we should be trying to answer the second question; through this quest, this “freedom”, we will eliminate nihilism. We will have given ourselves a purpose: self-discovery. Answering the question, “who are you?” would entail sacrificing many material desires, but would entail achieving many emotional ones, too.

Emotional desires are where Nietzsche separates music from other art forms. Nietzsche describes non-musical forms of art as being “plastic arts,” in that they “represent reality,” whereas music not tied to lyrics is said to “express reality” (Duncan 2007, 60). That means that music is, in Nietzsche’s mind, a purely emotional art. While other art forms may also be emotional, they are mainly reflections of aspects of our daily lives. Music is more primitive, instinctual, so it “plays” our emotions. This likely explains Nietzsche’s love of music and dance as separate from other forms of artistic expression. It also shows us that Nietzsche thought that in trying to become free to discover who each of us are as individuals, we must be free to experience our full emotional range, an ideal perhaps best achieved through music. Emotional freedom is the freedom to explore oneself without the constraints of the decadent morality of the Western world and the freedom to overcome nihilism through Dionysian exaltation—these are Nietzsche’s highest goals. Whether or not Nietzsche personally achieved these goals will remain unknown to all but Nietzsche himself.

Conclusion

Immanuel Kant believed freedom to be something more complex than the traditional view of free will. He defined freedom as choices that we

make that are not tied to our earthly needs or desires. In Kant's opinion, satisfying our needs, such as our need to eat, is not a form of freedom and, in fact, we are not acting freely while doing so (Rohlf 2010, 5.4). Thus the only freedom we truly have is intellectual and creative freedom which Kant calls "the categorical imperative" (Rohlf, 5.1). Following this idea, given the choice, few of us would want to be "proles" which are people acting only to satisfy the desires needed to survive (Orwell 1949). Similarly, Nozick postulated that if given the choice between a dream machine (a machine that gives the illusion of being in heaven) and reality, most people would choose to live in reality (1974, 42-44). In this vein, Nietzsche as an opponent to nihilism would likely agree that humans do not want to become a mass of Orwellian "proles" or slaves to their needs, devoid of meaningful thoughts.

Nietzsche would say that desires are not to be ignored. He was, in fact, a strong opponent of Kant's dualism between determinism and freedom (Schulte 1986, 71). Dionysus must be respected, for Dionysus represented our emotional desires. This view of Dionysus begets the question, to what extent do we allow ourselves to act upon our egoistic tendencies? Is nihilism the path we should move along? Nietzsche

would argue that it is not the path upon which we should travel.

Aesthetics and the love of aesthetic morality drove Nietzsche to combat both nihilism and narcissism. The late Alan Watts, a famed contemporary aesthetic philosopher had much to say on the subject of nothingness, and indirectly on the nihilist viewpoint. In one of his speeches, Watts states: "So if you really [...] go the whole way and see how you feel at the prospect of vanishing forever. Have all your efforts, and all your achievements, and all your attainments turning into dust and nothingness. What is the feeling? What happens to you?" (Azedia, 2013). Watts goes on to say that nothingness is the natural state of things, and the fact that we exist at all is to be celebrated. In this regard, Nietzsche would likely have agreed with Watts' assertion that we, the something that has arisen from nothing that will also return to nothing, must celebrate our existence. Aesthetic morality dictates that art, existence, music and dance are things to be held up in high regard. These ideals are our expressions of freedom, Nietzsche's concept of freedom. That freedom means we are at liberty to determine who each of us is (Schulte 1986, 70-72). The first species to create music and the first species to dance for the pleasure of dancing must celebrate these creations. While many of us may not

share Nietzsche's devotion to aesthetics, we can all appreciate the beauty of aesthetic morality. It may not be suited to a society's every need, and it is certainly not a solution to many problems that arise when contemplating questions of social justice. Yet aesthetics are an important aspect of our daily lives, and despite rising levels of nihilism, there is hope that aesthetics will continue to shape our lives. Devotion to Dionysian ideas and the development of our creative side is important, even though there will always be those of us of a more Apollonian nature. And we would do well to take heed of Nietzsche's warnings and his teachings. Tragedy, as a tool for healing, dies when Dionysus is absent from society. But tragedy as a reality is born by ignoring our desires, so by ignoring our Dionysian impulses we tempt fate to bring real tragedy upon us.

Perhaps Nietzsche's message is ultimately this: society provokes an Apollonian, obey-the-law, rational response, and a bias away from the Dionysian impulse. This impulse becomes the corrective response to this Apollonian imbalance, which is a righting of the psychological, emotional, and spiritual ship. The modern urban citizen needs to be reminded that a regimented, law-abiding civic life is a killer of the spirit. The modern citizen must, metaphorically, learn to dance in the Dionysian way. A contemporary


citizen needs a regular infusion of the bliss and abandon that Dionysus expects and that releases the soul from its social prison.

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Subordinating the Real: *A Critique of Modernity through Niemeyer and Scott*

by Spiro Metaxas

A prevalent feature of the modern era involves a long list of political ideologies, especially since the French Revolution of 1789. However, some proponents in contemporary literature believe that ideology has reached its end, or at the least has narrowed its scope (Bell 1971; Fukuyama 1992). Two recent

authors, James Scott and Gerhart Niemeyer, do not hold those respective views. Both of these authors, I contend, hold considerable similarity in their study of modernity and, especially, of the strategies of modern statecraft which directly concern the character of ideological movements. In what is to follow, I intend to explain and draw critical commentary on the definition of ideology provided by Niemeyer in *Between Nothingness and Paradise* and the thorough description of "authoritarian high-modernism" in the work *Seeing Like A State* by James Scott.¹ Here I hold that high-modernist

ideology (defined below), which Scott explains through his own observations, has substantial philosophical connections to the definition of ideology given by Niemeyer. What is most significant about the connection between these authors concerns how they both view the limitedness of ideological thinking, specifically with respect to how ideology—namely modern ideology as exposed by Scott—acts as a coercive intellectual substitute to other viable epistemologies and manners of life.

The argument I intend to clarify concerns the nature of high-modernist ideology as a “Second Reality,” that is to say, as a version of the “real” which ought to serve as the structure from which human beings—and the environment which surrounds them—are engineered for purposes suited best for the modern state—allowing for the possibility of deception in regard to state-planning.² A common point to be explored concerns how particular elements of modern ideology have meted out, by virtue of itself, various ways of life and epistemic alternatives to practical affairs (to be elaborated below). In order to make this argument as satisfactory and as clear as possible, I analyze the subtle aspects of high-modernist “faith” which Scott describes through numerous examples. However, I should stress that I shall not cover all the examples presented in his book, as they have,

more or less, the same underlying significance. In conjunction with discussing the cases that Scott provides, I proceed to unpack the definition Niemeyer offers concerning the term “ideological” (or, ideology) because it will serve as a framework for examining parallels with respect to authoritarian high-modernism.

What is Ideological?

This section will critically examine the definition of ideology as given by Gerhart Niemeyer. The theoretical extraction to follow will do best to serve the cause of cross-analysis later on with James Scott’s take on high-modernist ideology. In similar fashion to Maben Poirier’s commentary on this definition, I intend to reveal the philosophical underpinnings of each of the four clauses. With this in mind, Niemeyer explains

[t]he term ‘ideological’ refers to the subordination of contemplative theory [*theoria*] to the *libido dominandi*, which manifests itself in the building of closed systems around dogmatically willed ‘positions,’ in reductionism of both scope and materials of analysis, and in the determination to substitute an intellectually fabricated ‘Second Reality’ for the reality given to man (1971, 141).

In the first clause, “[t]he term ‘ideological’ refers to the subordination of contemplative theory [*theoria*] to the *libido dominandi*,” Niemeyer describes an oppositional relationship that involves the critical yet passive attitude embodied in the contemplative thinker as one which is subordinated and in contrast to the “aggressive attitude” of the *libido dominandi* (Poirier 2006, 2).³ Thus in the first instance, what is ‘ideological’ entails both an oppositional attitude and a desire to “dominate, control, and eventually transform” (Poirier 2006, 1). This desire to control is an imaginative and forceful attempt put forth upon the world the ideological thinker’s own idealism. In this fashion, the modern ideologue acts upon the disorderly world with her respective representations and imaginings of what constitutes the emphatically “real” world. I would like to stress here two key concepts to which I believe Scott implies in his work. One concept is the denial of an alternative approach to reality (i.e. of a plausibly articulate and natural reality beyond that which the state or an ideologue wishes to impose). The second concept is the modern state’s use of power and its desire to implement its ideological policies. In section II, I will take up these concepts again. Therefore, they do not need to be expanded upon here, only kept in mind.

Taking up the first clause for further examination, I would argue that

Niemeyer is trying to make clear that both types of desires (for truth and for power) have different inherent outcomes. The former can be likened to the discipline of philosophy: it is passive in its acquiescence of theoretical knowledge from the given reality of which humans find themselves within. In regards to this connection between ‘rational man’ and the political process, Niemeyer expresses that “rational man considers politics a matter of action within a world which he knows not to have made himself” (1971, 141). Consider, then, that politics is active and contemplation is passive for the reason that it does not assert itself to be ‘against’ the world, nor does it attempt, supposedly, to create “phantasmal” realities by denying any existence of an *a priori* reality. In this respect, contemplative thought is synonymous with the role of philosophy (Poirier 2006, 1). As such, it is a discipline that aims to determine the limits and order of the given reality.

The ideologue has a precise attitudinal quality of aggression and hostility to the world, which she views as chaotic, evil, disorderly, and can be made ‘right’ through the ambitions of human action (Niemeyer 1971, 141; Poirier 2006, 12-13). The reason behind this need for ordering and simplifying is best characterized by the *libido dominandi*—absent as it is from the ‘contemplative’ thinker (Poirier 2006, 1). I believe

this characterization also reflects the contrast between the desire for truth or understanding by way of contemplation against the noxious desire to control. These differ from the perspectives of the skeptic or the apathetic, as the former set (contemplation and the libido) are actively pursuing an end. With this we come to understand why the ideologue—such as the technologist or revolutionary leader—desire's to dominate the presumably chaotic world by which she is engulfed (Poirier 2006, 2).

This brings us to the second clause: “...*which manifests itself in the building of closed systems around dogmatically willed 'positions'*” (141, emphasis mine). What does a “closed system” mean? Given the above description of the will to truth embodied in contemplative theory and the will to power as an aggressive need, it is understood that the ideological thinker creates systems that are to be representative of an imagined and subjectively planned order. As such, this entails a system which is “non-referential” because it does not attempt to conform to any pre-existing ordered reality (Poirier 2006, 3). The ideologue does not believe in such a pre-given reality. The will of the ideologue is that which offers the motivation to perfect a presumably ‘chaotic’ world. As the ideologue does not believe in a given, ordered reality, her creative imaginings become the only reference point for true order.

To this point, the imagined system has nothing external for reference. But the ideological thinker has now made manifest a self-contained order, as this version of reality is now the only total reality that is comprehensible. In this ontological sense, the totality—that is, the imagined system—which has been willed from the ideologue conforms to nothing outside of itself. However, if we are to assume that a pre-given, naturally ordered reality exists, what the ideologue has created is simply a partiality of what can be called real and has, consequently, negated all other potentially useful or intelligible elements of the pre-given world that are closed off. This makes for a satisfactory segue into the next clause.

As the ideological thinker attempts to fabricate her own proper order, doing so requires certain means. These means (e.g. strategies, methods, or physical devices) are somehow limited. Thus, it is “...*in reductionism of both scope and materials of analysis*” which define the inherent nature of the ideological process (Niemeyer 1971, 141, emphasis mine). This means that the ‘scope’ of the fabricated world is constricted to the ideological thinker’s imaginings. Moreover, the methods and tools applicable for this fabricated world’s creation and analysis are limited. For instance, instead of the contemplative thinker’s recognition of the given reality’s empirical

and deductible truths, whereby she comes to understand the world as it is given to her for observation, the scope of such a theoretical venture is limited to analyzing solely the closed system it is bound within. As such, limited are the materials (or means) able to be employed to create and understand the 'new' world, not to mention whatever is negated by the partiality of the closed system. As this is the case, so too does the ideology limit the materials in which to properly assess certain problems that present themselves into the system. ⁴

The final clause in Niemeyer's definition summarizes the purpose towards which ideological thinking is oriented. He states this, "...and in the determination to substitute an intellectually fabricated 'Second Reality' for the reality given to man" (141, emphasis mine). The key word here is "determination." This aims to show the most basic intention of ideology: the whole *modus operandi* of the ideological thinker is the creation of over-arching systems, systems which their knowledge as a specialized type and their ideals and principles come to dominate. Observe also the term "substitute", for as was discussed above, assuming there is an ordered reality pre-given to humanity, the modern ideologist denies it, full stop, and instead is determined to construct a world whose "order" corresponds to her aspiring system. The ideologist's

denial is also shown clearly in this final clause (Poirier 2006, 2).

Considering High-Modernism and its Distinctive Aspects

We will now summarize the four elements James Scott raises as definitive characteristics of high-modernism because they are "necessary for a full-fledged disaster" that is to describe the modern crisis (Scott 1998, 4). Before considering the individual elements, Scott grants us a sufficient description of the high-modernist project: it is observed to include a deeply-held conviction, "one would even say muscle-bound faith," in regards to the Industrial and Enlightenment beliefs in the precepts of science and the ability of technology and reason to advance humanity. The project is also devoted to the idea of "linear progress," the notion that humanity is constantly progressing to some defined purpose (Scott 1998, 4).

The first element involves "the administrative ordering of nature and society" (Scott 1998, 4). Scott expresses how the tools of such administrative ordering can have two real applications. These applications concern the benefit of "our welfare and freedom as they are to the designs of a would-be modern despot. They undergird the concept of citizenship

and the provision of social welfare just as they might undergird a policy of rounding up undesirable minorities” (1998, 4).⁵ Scott considers throughout his book how this ordering has failed in many respects and on several occasions (for example, the simplification procedures implemented as a tool of modern statecraft). One case, which will be elaborated on in the coming section, is scientific forestry in the 19th-century. In this, the aim of legibility has had repercussions on the very environment the state set out to control for its interests (i.e. for profit and efficient output and production).

The second element concerns “high-modernist ideology” (Scott 1998, 4). This ideology expresses a certain faith (not certainty) towards the use, role, and legitimacy of “scientific and technical progress,” which is described as “strong” and “muscle-bound” (Scott 1998, 4). It points to a particular ‘techno-optimism’ which would assert, as an article of faith, that scientific and technical methods could provide a certain salvation for the development of economic and social interests by way of social engineering. Despite technological failings, the faith that underlies high-modernism only serves to reinforce the use of further technological advancement to rectify the past. As a final note, Scott cautions that this faith in science and technology should not be

conflated to undermine “scientific practice” as a whole; rather, the “uncritical, unskeptical, and thus unscientifically optimistic” disposition which this “faith” expresses is the object of investigation here, as this faith in “comprehensive planning” has detrimental effects on “human settlement,” food production, and the environment (Scott 1998, 4).

The third element is “an authoritarian state that is willing and able to use the full weight of its coercive power to bring these high-modernist designs into being” (Scott 1998, 5). Thus, Scott describes both the state’s desire and its capacity, for it is “willing and able.” The state holds these means through its legitimate monopoly on the use of force.⁶ However, by virtue of the fourth element below, the use of force need not be used at all, given civil society’s inability or diminished capacity to withstand the plans of the high-modernist state.

As such, the fourth and last element Scott describes has to do with the incapacitation of civil society’s resistance and immunity from these high-modernist plans. Civil society is now under the veil of high-modernist ideology, or, if not under this deliberate influence, it is in a power relation which subordinates it from resisting more overt manners such as coercion, brute force, or dominance, while such civil society becomes dissolved in this particular

fashion.⁷ For instance, the general weight of civil society, in terms of social and political power, is diminished during times of strife, political instability, insurrection, or heightened security and surveillance. However, during times of relative stability, civil society may still come to be called “prostrate.” Even more so, civil society can be disengaged from the political sphere altogether, either voluntarily or involuntarily, and holding no substantial power for change.

Scott also takes note of those who can be said to operate this ideological scheme called high-modernism. He refers to these purveyors of high-modernism as the “avant-garde among engineers, planners, technocrats, high-level administrators, architects, scientists, and visionaries” (Scott 1998, 88). This list includes people of some considerable skill, which is to say, technical training in very specific and specialized fields. Hence, the knowledge they have at hand when constructing their projects is unavailable to the general populace, or, it is obscure and henceforth an epistemic disadvantage to those who are ignorant or “uneducated” in this respect. More notably still, “they envisioned a sweeping, rational engineering of all aspects of social life in order to improve the human condition” (Scott 1988, 88). Scott is drawing reference to the craftsman of the modern utopian projects.⁸ With this, we can begin

to intuitively draw connections between Niemeyer’s stance on ideology and that of Scott. Furthermore, there is a telling explanation of the radical authority inherent in high-modernism. The aim and method of this authority includes “the improvement of the human condition with the authority of scientific knowledge and its tendency to disallow other competing sources of judgment” (Scott 1998, 93). This leads to a marginal horizon of epistemic possibilities which holds ‘scientific’ knowledge in high-esteem to the detriment of other methods of analyzing and knowing. This brings to mind the “reductionism of both scope and materials of analysis” to which Niemeyer so aptly drew attention to (1971, 141).

In the following section, I turn to giving a more pointed argument regarding the connections between Niemeyer and Scott, drawing on the numerous and descriptive examples Scott delivers to illustrate the high-modernist ideology in practice. Additionally, the concept of *mētis* will be expanded upon as it draws a firm conjunction with Niemeyer’s view of ideology and what it neglects to consider. More specifically, *mētis* will provide the answer concerning what is both reduced in scope and ultimately ‘subordinated’ by the will to dominate—namely, experiential knowledge.⁹

Technical Knowledge Dominates: High-Modernism and the Building of “Second Realities”

In this section I will provide an analysis of Scott’s understanding concerning what he calls “high-modernism.” I aim to expand on the question of whether or not Scott’s description concerning high-modernism overlaps Niemeyer’s. It is an inquiry into the concept of ‘Second Reality’ and if the same aggressive determination is found within the authoritarian high-modernist state as Scott may suggest. For this end, I believe we must look more closely to the problem of context, which the high-modernist state neglects to account for due to its “building of closed systems” and its “ideological faith” in said schemes.

Does high-modernism fabricate a ‘Second Reality’? If so, to what end does it fabricate it? These questions should propel us to examine first how the state uses its principles of high-modernism. The first example Scott provides is scientific forestry. With this example, Scott’s emphasis on legibility comes to the fore. However, it is not precisely this concept I aim to unravel. The issue at hand is the discussion of the German utilitarian state, with its proper aim of exploiting nature (i.e. the forests for its commercial gain). Once German scientific

forestry was implemented, the process by which extraction and exploitation took place was drastically changed. I am here concerned with the philosophical underpinnings of this process as it relates to the motives of the *libido dominandi* to the determination of creating for itself a new order (i.e. a ‘Second Reality,’ apart from the one given in the original and naturally-diverse forest).

The greatest indicator of this ‘determination’ was the introduction of mono-cropped forests, which replaced the mixed forests originally in place. Without going into the elaborate detail to which Scott treats his readers, suffice it to say there was a new “attempt to create, through careful seeding, planting, and cutting, a forest that was easier for state foresters to count, manipulate, measure, and assess” (Scott 1998, 15). The key word to emphasize is “easier.” The logic of simplification will render itself to be quite important for the high-modernist state. This is in fact what I take to be the end to which high-modernist ideological thinking directs itself.¹⁰ As such, the *given reality* in this instance should be viewed as the mixed forest. The calculated and crafted mono-crop of the German foresters – who are employed by the state and are the ones who introduce a ‘new’ forest to the old land—is one that is considered suitable for the state’s primarily commercial ends.

With this, the diversity of the forest was decimated by the gross misrepresentations and miscalculations of the high-modernist state who failed to account for the natural vitality, left undocumented and eclipsed.

Through the use of scientific methods and technologies, the German foresters implemented procedures to simplify their environment, thus effectively and efficiently lending to its increase of power over the land. This, of course, came with certain repercussions that disabled, almost ironically, the ultimate profit goal of the foresters themselves. However, what can be taken from this, in connection to Niemeyer's quotation, is the subordination present against the rural peasantry and their way of life by the German state's desire to control for their own best interests and the subordination of the mixed forest itself. Further, the 'scope' to which the state narrowed its focus greatly neglected to account for the diversity and richness of the given forest which it aspired to control, and by virtue of this, the livelihood of the peasantry (Scott 1998, 13). Ultimately doing this reveals a determinacy by the State—an embodiment of the *libido dominandi*—to create for itself a narrow, calculated version of what it considers real. Further, Scott explains that the attempt to regenerate the forest's natural order failed to achieve this goal. The given reality of order

(i.e. natural biodiversity), which included many presumed 'trivialities' on part of the German foresters, was, in sum, vital (1998, 21). Consequently, the myopic scope of scientific forestry, at least at the time, could not avert planning failures.

Above I have illustrated one of Scott's examples that I believe draws a connection towards Niemeyer's quotation on ideology. I continue below into another illuminating example in Scott's project. The discussion on the architectural visions of city-planning found within high-modernist thought shall be developed because it draws a more pointed example of high-modernist ideology in practice.

Coming now to the discussion on city-planning, we are offered a general view into the quite deep philosophical connection linking Niemeyer to Scott. The antagonism's held between Le Corbusier and Jane Jacobs reflect, in large part, the overall essence to which high-modernist faith, as a faith in technical knowledge, has with the more context-oriented and exclusive experiential knowledge. That is to say, where Le Corbusier's city planning reflects the modernist view of efficiency, order, and the clearance of perceived clutter, Jacobs would come to view vibrancy of communal life in close-quarter living as an avenue of city-planning most conducive to comfortable urban living,

best reflective of the natural process of sociality (see Jacobs 1961). These two epistemological positions will come to illustrate for Scott the culmination of his project. As for Niemeyer, the subordination which is present for elements of contemplative theory, as dominated by the will to power's desire to create order from chaos, seriously jeopardize and neglect other possible approaches towards understanding. Moreover, this section will also provide an additional argument sustaining the hypothesis that high-modernist ideology, through technical ventures in city-planning, reveals the "deceitfulness masking the need to control" (Poirier 2006, 18, endnote 2).

The city-planning of Le Corbusier made a strikingly deceitful attack on the informal public space. Presumably Scott would state that this 'attack' was not wholly deceitful, yet certain to come given the high-modernist faith. However, the term 'deceitful' here is meant to convey the ulterior motives of Le Corbusier as a city-planner for the state. Taking into account his "second principle of the new urbanism, 'the death of the square,' this principle granted that the state could accrue power over civil life and society (Scott 1998, 121). It was intended to do so by filtering out possibilities of civil mobilization and riot, ultimately a bane to the state's existence (Scott 1998, 121). It is also, I believe, an evident

illustration of how the state can come to diminish the civil society over which it is governing, lending to society's prostration. It is found in regulating the 'public sphere' by way of designing out traditional social areas, such as public squares, and instead fabricating a landscape which best suits the interests of authoritarian high-modernist states: open, legible, and anti-social. It betrays the organic society which Jacobs would invariably favour over the calculated and planned designing which high-modernism shuffled in. The capital city of Brasilia, Brazil, was blind to include the "desires, history, and practices of its residents" (Scott 1998, 125). This is a forceful contrast which illuminates, in general, the impracticality and impossibility of sustaining a "natural order" among social relations and community without the input of how social relations among peoples with shared identities, spaces, and experiences, actually take place. The uncritical belief in Le Corbusier's potential, stemming from technical experience, evidently trumped and imposed itself upon the social experiences of people who had to live within the confines of his ill-planned and inorganic society.

This section has undertaken to reveal the instances in which high-modernist planning, both in the forest and city, reflect the ideological elements which it set to implement and act upon. Moreover, there are

connections that are to be deduced from these examples in connection to Niemeyer. For instance, in both of Scott's cases, we see the state (or its workers at least) impose its will to control, manipulate, and govern (the *libido dominandi*) onto an organic, diverse, and given order, both found in the forests and in the city. In the former, the natural order of the forest is analogized as the given landscape that ought to have been understood before any aggressive undertaking. As it was not understood to its full extent, even in the purview of "scientific" knowledge and technology, the scope and methods applicable to such a scheme were sufficiently lacking. This draws parallels to Niemeyer, and not simply nominally: in the absence of the high-modernist faith and its aggressive yet myopic view, the undertakings of scientific forestry may have never arisen. Furthermore, in the instance of city-planning for Brasilia, Le Corbusier's narrowed scope and utopian vision for efficient, organized, and aesthetically-pleasant designs, neglected, as ideologists do, to factor in the given totality of the environment and its inhabitants.¹¹ It is clear that such a plan failed to account for the varieties of customs favoured by human beings living in a community (i.e. to live in closer quarters, to have access to public spaces where the meaning of 'sociability' may be actualized). Of course, the grand design of Le Corbusier eclipsed such

facts for the worse, and, as a result, the intended improvement and progress for the Brazilian people failed.

Mētis: Local Practicality and Experiential Knowledge Subordinated by the State

Through the process of high-modernist statecraft, it becomes evident to Scott that a vital and more humane approach to social and political life has been altogether undermined. The approach that Scott advocates is held within the concept of *mētis*, an ancient Greek term related to 'wisdom,' or to 'devise,' as in, to plan. To better illustrate this concept, alternate forms of knowledge will be provided.

Scott describes *mētis* as a practical, context-bound, type of knowledge. It is what would be named by Aristotle, 'prudential knowledge,' or *phronesis*. This epistemological approach counters what ancient Greeks—namely Plato and Aristotle—would have called *episteme* and *techne* (Scott 1998, 313). These latter concepts have more to do with deducible conclusions derived from "hard-and-fast" principles that are able to be applied universally (Scott 1998, 319). What does this universality mean? Scott proclaims "this universality means that knowledge in the form of *techne* can be taught more or less completely as a formal discipline." Thus, as it

is a universal approach to gathering and transmitting knowledge, so it may not fully appreciate the subtlety of context the same as *mētis*. This context-bound methodology found in *mētis* underpins the manner of understanding to which non-ideologist thinkers attribute to the world (i.e. the locals, the artisans, the experienced, as they interact with worldly phenomenon and its varied problems). It is not to say that these non-ideologists resist systemic planning full stop, but rather that the subtlety of their approach allows the environment to reveal itself (i.e. through contemplative and experiential means), much rather than an imposition of a plan upon it, or further, a denial of any other methods to exist, clearly echoing the words of Niemeyer regarding ideology's "reductionism of both scope and materials of analysis" (Niemeyer 1971, 141). For example, take the case of German forestry given by Scott. If *mētis*-friendly approaches were used rather than a faithful implementation of scientific methodologies and technologies, the natural order of the forest, its bio-diversity, the essential roles of insects, dead trees, shrubs and presumed trivialities playing out in the whole organism may have been saved. Thus, large-scale disaster could have been avoided. In sum, the entire natural order is undermined due to the neglect of state-employed workers—workers with specialized skill following a process with

meticulous precision and calculation that served wholly unnecessary and superfluous to what was already given. To stress the point, it should be said that their modern technical and 'scientific' knowledge proved fatal to the organic and nuanced nature of their environment. What is taken from this plainly is that the natural order to be found within the forest could not have been replaced, nor represented, even through the scientific foresters attempted to do so. This false representation of diversity failed to imitate the richness of what was already present before human action interfered. But how does this relate to Niemeyer's definition of what is ideological?

When looking at the concept of *mētis* which Scott advocates to us against the backdrop of what has already been explicated, a certain dichotomy takes shape. In the first clause, Niemeyer had articulated a schism and, ultimately, a form of subordination between 'contemplative theory' by the *libido dominandi*. This is the difference between the desire for truth and the desire for control. Although Scott does not use this vernacular explicitly, I contend that this issue between 'truth' and 'power' is still present in different terms. The embodiment of the 'will to power', *libido dominandi*, is evidently upheld by the high-modernist planners (i.e. those skilled enough, and with enough power, to

impose their proper schemes upon the world and others). In the various examples given above, there is a constant dialectical theme present: the would-be ‘planners’ come to implement and subordinate some facet of nature with their creative schemes of order, simplicity and rationality. Yet once implemented, something fascinating takes shape—nature unhappily subdued begins to revolt, as if the artificial order is rejected by the object of control. In the instance of forestry, the natural order and unaccounted for variables combined to form a modern planning disaster.

Further, in the case of high-modernist city-planning for Brasilia, Le Corbusier, so engrossed by the idea of simple lines, wide-open spaces, and “formal order and functional segregation...did so at the cost of a sensorily impoverished and monotonous environment— an environment that inevitably took its toll on the spirits of its residents” (Scott 1998, 126). Indeed, this type of city-planning, a classic top-down approach, neglected to include within its high-modernist vision the experiential knowledge and customs of the residents’ particular understanding of urban life. Scott would agree here, as well as Niemeyer, that the ‘Second Reality’ which was planned in an imaginative yet ironically limited vision was, to the core, “impoverished” on account of its lacking prudential reasoning and any sort of

common-sense. Jane Jacobs, an acclaimed author on urban planning, contended the same logic: order is not a product of administrative ordering and artificial simplification. Rather, it is “embedded in the logic of daily practice” (quoted in Scott 1998, 136). As mentioned above, the nuance of life is overlooked by the failures of ideological thinking; whereas, to take the side of Jacobs, approaching planning with common-sense and openness to understanding the manners by which subjects live may prove to be the difference between failure and success. The instrumental use of *mētis*, however, could not have saved Brasilia. In fact, by its own logic, Brasilia would not have even been imagined.

There is an over-arching theme that holds both Scott and Niemeyer together. Simply put, the theme is a telling insight into the history of ideological thought: the subordination of experiential knowledge manifest in Scott’s discussion of *mētis* to the determined and wilful libido dominandi incarnate in high-modernist planning. This is a desire which combines its stubborn and misplaced use of science (*episteme*) and technology (*techne*) with a state-derived force to accomplish its task of fabricating ‘Second Realities’ known as modern utopian projects.

Taking another example pointing to high-modernist ideology and

human engineering, when Scott explains the Soviet ideology embodied by Lenin and the Bolsheviks, he touches on a term, *kultura*, which reveals an aspect of high-modernism as it most aptly regards the management of human behaviour. Even more, it represented the creation of a “new man” (Scott 1998, 195). As Scott emphatically elaborates to the reader, this vision embodied in the concept of *kultura* held “a new code of social ethics” to abide by and to be (Scott 1998, 195).¹² It arguably denotes a perfectionist and authoritarian strategy that limits the functions and thoughts of the citizenry in the attempt to subjugate their *modi vivendi* for the determination of an ideological utopian result. Here, almost evidently, the envisioning and creation of “Second Realities” is revealed (i.e. modern utopian societies)—drawing the connection between Scott’s description of high-modernist faith and Niemeyer’s view of ideology much closer. In all the cases given, a recurring theme is disclosed: the high-modernist state, defined so by its faith in the tools of science and technology and further still by its occasional use of brute force to implement and actualize said faith, is also negligent to the ‘givenness’ that surrounds it. In these cases, what are ‘given’ are the biologically-diverse and mixed German forests, the traditions, customs, and habits of the Brazilian people, and, in the case of the Bolsheviks, the way

of life of the rural peasantry. In them could be found diversity, a more comfortable and naturally evolving (or sustained) order, and of course *metis*—an epistemic foundation to which the high-modernist faith could not account for by virtue of itself. It is as though technical and scientific knowledge came to the fore as practical and experiential knowledge were eclipsed—thus an entire approach to reality along with them.

Conclusion and Afterthought

This essay highlights that the work of James Scott and Gerhart Niemeyer has relevant and profound connections. In the cases which were espoused by Scott, although there remain others, the uses of high-modernist ideology held similar to Niemeyer’s: the state, with its desire to control rather than that to acquire knowledge of nature and people, utilizes different methods and schemes to bring about its visions. Ultimately, there were connections drawn on all four clauses of Niemeyer’s view. The *libido dominandi* characterized best by the administrative ordering and the use of force by the modern statecraft drew a firm parallel from both authors. Next, for the fact that high-modernist faith reveres scientific and technological methods, while casting from its view the essential role of experiential knowledge synonymous with *metis*, is also in accord with the works of both Scott and Niemeyer.

By virtue of high-modernist planning, the determinacy of fabricating “Second Realities” while denying other vital spheres of human life and nature proved to be the fatal quality inherent to the ideology. In bringing this rich definition of ideology to the foreground, with the concrete examples of high-modernist ideology explained by Scott, there is little discrepancy between these two authors’ views regarding the process, effect, and purpose of ideological thinking.

In the present day context, the use of technology and the belief in scientific progress is arguably high and increasing. In many societies, modern technology is used as a means of communication, information, transmission, and convenience. Despite its multiple uses for people, these same technologies can be used—and in fact are used—as a means of surveillance, documentation, labeling, identification, and marketing. In its worst forms, as seen in recent years (to little surprise perhaps) governments have exploited the use of Internet and mobile device communication for security reasons, and, in a cynical yet very real sense, for the monitoring and social engineering of human beings. The elements of high-modernist ideology, then, ought to be a cautionary tale of the uses and abuses of state power to the detriment of human environments, human tradition, knowledge, social relations, and the alternative

“materials of analysis” that can be used to overcome many practical problems that arise in the harmonious entanglement of human sociality.

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Notes

1. Gerhart Niemeyer, *Between Nothingness and Paradise*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1971); James C Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, (Yale University Press, 1998). Note to the readers: I will use the terms “authoritarian high-modernism” and “high-modernist ideology” interchangeably.

2. *I would like to add parenthetically that the modern state is not, by far, the only fabricator of 'second realities', though for this paper, it is at the forefront.*
3. *The "passive attitude" mentioned here refers to a very distinct meaning: it means to say that the contemplative thinker is acted upon by the world, as the world reveals itself to him, rather than him taking an active, outward determination to act upon the world, or it's supposed chaos.*
4. *The materials here can be explained as different strategies to approaching certain situations. For example, in the case of scientific forestry, due to high-modernist ideology pervasive within the operation of forest management and legibility, other avenues for the exploitation of natural resources was neglected. Instead of first coming to understand the importance of all the presumed trivial objects within the forest vital for its well-being and natural order, a new legible order borne from distorted use of scientific and technical methods was negligently pursued.*
5. *Here Scott is explaining that it is not solely for better or worse, but the possibility of it becoming worse for the modern liberal citizenry is worrisome. The "policy" he refers to can be interpreted as a subtle reference to the Third Reich policy of rounding up unwanted minorities, esp. Jews, handicaps, homosexuals, etc, for the concentration camps and ghettos, though it need not go this far necessarily. The Third Reich simplified this process by collecting information on the ethnic backgrounds, among other things, of its citizenry. Again, here Scott is expressing a caution which should be taken toward state administrative power.*
6. *Martin J. Smith expands on the use of bureaucracy and legitimacy, as well surveillance, terror, and regulation, by modern states. For a detailed look, see Martin J. Smith, *Power and the State* (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillian, 2009).*
7. *For more on the theoretical variances of power, see Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View*, 2nd ed (Palgrave MacMillian, 2005)*
8. *It can also come to mean 'prudential knowledge' as Aristotle may hold. This concept is often called phronesis, meaning practical or prudential wisdom. It is an intellectual virtue, in contrast with episteme and techne, to which an individual must undergo a certain process*

of maturation, or “experience”, before gaining such a virtue of the mind. Notably, it deals with particulars, and not universals. See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Joe Sachs (ed), (Newburyport, Massachusetts: Focus Philosophical Library, 2002), 1142a.

9. Scott would agree here as well, as he comes to view legibility as a teleological concern for state control. Although it is of course not the only end, it may be held as the highest (i.e. most important).

10. The totality here is present in the negation made on Le Corbusier’s part. The identity of the Brazilian people, with their “desires, history, and practices” was left out of the equation (Scott, 125). The vision of Le Corbusier was only a partiality of the whole. The reality he attempted to fabricate for the others was, perhaps unintentionally, a ‘Second Reality’ detached from the one the Brazilian people were historically comfortable with.

11. The “new man” meant “the Bolshevik specialist, engineer, or functionary”-- all presumably have technical expertise with the ability to formulate and engineer schemes to supplant what is deemed unfit for the cultivation of a new order, in the instance of the Russian

Revolution, a communist utopia. Scott, 195.

12. Here the work of Eric Voegelin influences this line. See Eric Voegelin, “The Eclipse of Reality”, in Maurice Natanson, (ed.), *Phenomenology and Social Reality: Essays in Memory of Alfred Schutz*, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970) 185-194.

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