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Policy inAction: Diversity, Politics and Policy Dynamics in the Contemporary Period

Volume I

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As aspiring political scientists and policy makers, we searched high and low for this journal's title. We wished to create a name that would effectively capture our mission to better elucidate the intricacies of the policy process and to illustrate that policies are not solely the stuff of theory textbooks, but possess the powerful potential for tangible and powerful impact. Consequently, Policy *in*Action reflects our view that policies directly impact, as well as implicate, those for whom they are designed. At times, they do so successfully, while at others, they fail to achieve their initial aims.

Policy design and implementation are not static activities. They require active participation, interactive dialogue, and feedback from our fellow men and women. This is how this journal came to being. The Policy *in*Action Journal is the birth child of the First Graduate Student Conference held at Concordia University by the Political Science Department, in April 2012. The topic chosen for this year’s discussion was: “Diversity, Politics, and Policy Dynamics in the Contemporary Period.” Through the organization of the Policy *in*Action Conference, our aim has been to foster dialogue and academic exchange between students of different disciplines regarding the complex dynamics of class, ethnicity, race and gender, as well as the influence of domestic and international forces. Ultimately, we are interested in how these key factors impact policy change in the contemporary period. The Policy *in*Action Conference was also an opportunity for students from different universities and disciplines to come together and present and discuss their most recent work.

The Policy *in*Action Journal also reflects our desire to contribute to the lively academic debate on the subject of diversity from both an international and multidisciplinary perspective. A more nuanced analysis on the various aspects of diversity can shed light on policy failures of the past and inspire the policies of the future. Fundamentally, we espouse the view that such a worthwhile exercise will lead to a healthier and more sustainable political future. The journal attempts to undertake this challenge by presenting a mielu of topics interrelated with diversity. From a Canadian perspective Jacqueline Lemieux chronicles the issue of land claims between British Columbia's First Nations and government from a historical perspective while presenting alternative modes of solution to those groups' grievances. Lemieux warns of a bleak future in British Columbia in terms of First Nations’ land claims in the face of a solely
economic agenda of the province’s present government. Itzel Rodríguez Rosales explores the dynamics of body and identity politics at work in an U.S-based reproductive health program (APRI) for women in the Peruvian Amazon. She critically examines the pursuit of APRI’s rights-oriented reproductive agenda, and analyzes the contradictions that arose during the implementation of the program, one that entailed the convergence of powerful local and international forces. Set against the backdrop of the global reproductive rights movements, the paper offers poignant insights into the future of women’s rights and global development.

Utilizing a historical perspective, Katherine Rossy delves into Nazi pronatal and antinatal policy responses to the dramatic drop in population following the First World War. Insightfully interpreting posters from propaganda magazines, Rossy elaborates on how demands for greater numbers of “racially pure” Germans were countered with the harrowing policies adopted against those deemed as non-Aryans. Contextualized within an analysis of pronatal policies in Germany’s surrounding states, this paper offers a frightening look at the coldly calculated actions adopted during the misogynistic and patriarchal Nazi Regime. Jonathan Lang provokes the query; to what extent has the common language of French facilitated minority integration? Using the case study of the Montreal Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jewish communities, Lang unpacks measures of integration as well as analyzes the dynamic that has developed from Quebec’s emphasis on ‘interculturalism’. He concludes that the answer is perhaps not as self-evident as might be assumed, and that factors beyond linguistic ones must also be considered for explaining outcomes.

Randy Pinsky provides a critical assessment of Sierra Leone's Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program, an initiative launched during the country's decade long civil war as part of the Lomé Peace Accord. Pinsky explores and critically assesses many of the program's limitations, and astutely challenges common assumptions and misperceptions regarding the rehabilitation of this particular population. Additionally, Pinsky also evaluates the program's pitfalls along a more nuanced gender dimension, with particular attention to the challenging rehabilitation of female soldiers. Marat Grebennikov presents a provoking paper in which multiculturalism in Europe is branded inherently flawed where the raison d’être of multiculturalism in Western democratic societies is fundamentally at odds with modern capitalism. The postwar European welfare state is doomed to fail by Grebennikov in the face of an
ethnically heterogenous society where mutual trust based on strong cultural and religious work ethic are no longer possible.

With this diverse array of articles, we hope to provoke, inspire, and intrigue readers as to the ever fluctuating world of policymaking - of policies that remain not on legislative paper, but rather are “inAction”- for better or worse. Ranging from domestic to international contexts, you are sure to find something that will pique your interest. We proudly present to you Concordia University’s inaugural Political Science Graduate journal.

Policy InAction Coordinating Team
Acknowledgments

We would like to thank everyone who has helped make this Journal possible, including our families and friends. A special thanks goes to the faculty of Concordia's Department of Political Science, in particular, Dr. Csaba Nikolenyi, Dr. Francesca Scala, Dr. Jean Francois Mayer, and Dr. Peter Stoett. We would also like to thank PhD candidate, Jeremy Speight for his advising and support. Thanks to Shiva Safari for her meaningful student testimony regarding Dr. Price, in memory of whom this journal is dedicated; and to all administrative staff, in particular Jeannie Krumel and Julie Blumer. Lastly, we would like to warmly thank all students that participated in the Conference.
In Memoriam Dr. Everett Price

Dr. Everett Price worked at the Department of Political Science for over forty years. During his long career he served in almost every possible administrative office of departmental leadership: he was past department chair, director of the graduate program, undergraduate advisor… a reliable and trusted colleague whose experience and wisdom we have been so fortunate to benefit from. Of all aspects of departmental life, the Masters Program in Public Policy and Public Administration was the closest to his heart. Not only did he play an instrumental role in championing the cause of creating this new and unique program but he has also worked ever since on novel ways to keep it fresh, competitive and attractive to new students from all over the world. Indeed, admission to the MPPPA program has become much sought after by students from all corners of the world, such as Latin America, Europe and the Middle East, many of whom were
personally recruited by Everett himself. This year, the Department will celebrate and preserve his legacy, and his many years of devoted service to the graduate program, in a variety ways. First, we will launch an international graduate double diploma with his alma mater, Sciences Po Grenoble. This was a project that Everett worked on for a very long time and that we are now able to implement. Second, we will create a graduate fellowship in his memory that will be awarded to students enrolled in the MPPPA program. Third, we will build a partnership with the provincial government to provide internship opportunities for our students there, another project that Everett dreamt of establishing for so long. Last, but certainly not least, in collaboration with the Political Science Graduate Student Association, we are bringing to you this first issue of Policy inAction, our graduate student journal comprising papers that were presented at the first international graduate student conference that has ever been held and hosted by our graduate students. As you turn these pages and engage the arguments presented, you will also partake in remembering and preserving the legacy of a remarkable man, a passionate citizen, a devoted teacher, and a wise friend.

Csaba Nikolenyi
Professor
Chair, Department of Political Science

Dr. Everett Price - Reflections from a former student

I have much praise for Dr. Everett Price, yet now that I have just a few words to express myself, I feel at a loss for how to sum up the uniqueness of this person.

Dr. Everett Price was much more than a professor or a mentor I had the privilege of having while being a student at Concordia University. His philosophy of life, his attitude and wisdom made him an inspiration that I held onto even after having graduated from University. I will never forget his professionalism, kindness, insight and especially the passion he had for teaching his students. During the ten years that I’ve had the privilege of knowing him, he always made me feel intelligent, worthy and capable. Whenever I spoke to him, I was reinforced by the belief that there exists no dream that I cannot fulfill and he taught me that it is never too late to change my path and start anew.
I can recall a few times when I visited Dr. Price in his office for guidance, imagining that the world was about to cave in because I had in some way not met my own expectations. No matter how serious or how irrelevant a problem I had was, Dr. Everett Price would shrug and simply smile. He would lean back in his chair, fold his arms and look at me silently, with an amused look on his face he would finally speak and utter something as simple as: “So?” That simple statement and his relaxed demeanor always made me understand that in fact nothing irreparable can or will ever happen.

Whenever I was in trouble academically or professionally, the first person I would think of and turn to was him. Even when I was living across the globe in the Middle East, I would consult him by email.

I am thankful that Dr. Everett Price has had a role in shaping me as a person. I will always cherish his memory and I am certain that hundreds of students think and feel exactly as I do. One lesson which I will keep close to my heart all my life that Dr. Everett Price taught me is: one must never cease to believe in oneself.

Shiva Safari
BA Political Science 2006, MBA 2010

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**Everett Price: MPPPA Founder, Student Mentor, and Political Observer**

It is entirely fitting that the editors of this volume of proceedings from the Policy inAction graduate student conference have decided to dedicate it to the memory of Dr. Everett Price. He was in many respects the founding agent of the MPPPA programme, and his positive contribution to the careers of hundreds of civil servants and others with that degree after their name is palpable today. Professor Price was always fascinated by what our students were up to in Ottawa; he would impart his observational wisdom upon them as he simultaneously kept himself abreast of the most recent developments in public policy through their many internship reports, public presentations, telephone conversations, and the occasional lunch at Dundee’s or elsewhere. He was also supportive of students who wished to operate outside the conventional box and helped them seek internships with NGOs and other civil society groups. (He would display similar levels of individual concern and encouragement for the thousands of students he saw as an undergraduate advisor for over a
It was all part, I suspect, of his grander vision of a just and tolerant, multicultural Canadian society managed primarily by people with adequate training and respect for the vicissitudes as well as the unique opportunities presented by public service. Dr. Price could certainly be cynical about political motivations, machinations, and manipulation. He would be especially pleased that the essays in this collection demonstrate an awareness of the rough edges of political life. But under that learned surface beat the heart of a kind who wanted nothing but the best for his many students and colleagues, and I am sure he would be very proud of this collective effort, which represents a milestone on many career paths.

Peter Stoett
Professor, Department of Political Science
Comprehensive Land Claims in British Columbia: 
A Worthwhile Pursuit? 
Jacqueline Lemieux 
Masters Candidate in Public Policy and Public Administration 
Concordia University

Abstract 

The 1973 Calder decision by the Supreme Court of Canada marked the beginning of a new era of government-aboriginal relations in Canada. With Frank Calder’s recourse to litigation, the perennial and unsolved issues of land claims, Aboriginal title and self-government were projected into the national political consciousness. In response, the federal government instituted that year a land claims policy that would encourage the negotiation and settlement of modern treaties between the Crown and Canada’s First Nations.

In British Columbia, the situation was unique and complex: Aboriginal title had been denied since before Confederation, and unlike with most of Canada, the lack of treaty history meant that almost all of the province’s territory had competing claims of rightful ownership. This essay details the specific experience since 1973 in the context of the B.C. comprehensive land claims process. Almost forty years later, the remarkable lack of progress and costs associated with the land claims settlement endeavour have led many to reject the current approaches. For the governments of Canada and British Columbia, reaching treaties has entailed surrendering such commodities as land title and legislative authority. Without the fundamental reform of the current process, or a meaningful search for alternative approaches, comprehensive land claims settlements will remain frustratingly elusive in B.C.

Biography

Jacqueline Lemieux is a student in the Masters program of Public Policy and Public Administration. Her prior education includes an International Relations degree from the University of Calgary, with a minor in French as a result of studying history at Université Laval in Quebec City. In the pursuit of a diversified undergraduate experience, Jacqueline also studied at the University of Economics, Prague, and spent a year falling in love with Montreal studying political science at McGill University. Her interests in Aboriginal affairs and Immigration policy drew her to Concordia’s MPPPA program, and Jacqueline hopes to find an internship related to these fields.
Introduction

From before Confederation to the present, Aboriginal peoples of British Columbia have had a unique status in the Canadian federation. Their historical exclusion from the provisions of the Royal Proclamation meant that their administration was not originally a federal responsibility, and that the provincial government could deal with Aboriginal title and land claim issues as it saw fit. As such, British Columbia did not engage in treaty-making as the federal government did, and Aboriginal title was ignored for a century. When the prospect of a national policy for Aboriginal assimilation was proposed in 1969, B.C. bands rose up to fight for their recognition and protection as distinct peoples. The Calder decision, rendered by the Supreme Court in 1973, changed the course of Aboriginal policy in Canada: a national land claims policy was instituted, with the absence of treaties in British Columbia to be remedied with Comprehensive Land Claim Agreements (CLCAs).

What has been achieved in the four decades since the beginning of the Comprehensive Land Claims process? This is the question at the basis of this essay, which will be answered by considering the evolution of Aboriginal affairs in British Columbia—with reference to the Canadian context—from Confederation to the present day. Overall, the two levels of government dominate the treaty process, and since the objectives of Aboriginal bands largely run contrary to government priorities, the process has been effectively stalled in most cases. Only through recourse to litigation have B.C. Aboriginals succeeded in offsetting the established power dynamic, but this course of action has only compounded feelings of hostility between negotiating parties. Alternatives to the current approach must be sought if comprehensive land claims are to be settled in British Columbia. This essay considers several alternatives, including litigation, interim measures, and the B.C. Treaty Commission as a third-party mediator.

Historical Background: Confederation to the 1973 Calder Decision

From the point of contact with Europeans to the mid-twentieth century, the legal situation of Aboriginal peoples in B.C. was one of forced submission and the rejection of title by Crown representatives.

A key event from this early historical period was the late entrance of British Columbia into the Canadian federation in 1871. Four years prior, at Confederation, the government of Canada had inherited the provisions of the Royal Proclamation of 1763.
Significantly, the Proclamation stated that “title to Indian territory was not to be considered extinguished or transferred merely by conquest or occupation but only through voluntary cession” (Roth 1999). The federal government was thus responsible for Canada’s Indians, as per the Constitution Act of 1867. Since British Columbia was not a part of the federation at this point, B.C. Aboriginals were to remain under the control of the provincial government.

Ultimately, the policy trajectory followed by the provincial government did not diverge radically from the federal government, since both maintained the submission of Aboriginal peoples and envisioned eventual assimilation. The federal government did, however, undertake a process of treaty-making from Confederation into the early twentieth century, which conferred upon treaty bands certain benefits in exchange for land (Standing Senate Committee 2008). Aboriginals in B.C. were excluded from this process, and so it was during this period that permanent movements of resistance on the part of Aboriginal bands were sparked in response to their perpetually undefined and unacknowledged status. Christopher McKee writes that B.C. Aboriginals have been protesting their collective neglect for over a century (Dacks 1997), refusing to relinquish their entitlement to land.

Though consistent, Aboriginal resistance in B.C. did not yield concessions on the part of the government, and formal organization and fundraising for land claims purposes was banned prior to the 1951 (Roth 1999), preventing the fragmented voices of dissent from uniting. This changed unequivocally in 1969, when Jean Chrétien, then Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs in the Trudeau government, issued a White Paper. This document proposed the abolition of the Indian Act and an end to the special relationship between Aboriginals and the Canadian state. The result would be full equality and undifferentiated citizenship. The prospect of assimilation—construed as a certainty—galvanized Aboriginal peoples across the country; a concerted effort for rights and recognition could be discerned for the first time. In the case of B.C., the changed strategy of resistance of the Nisga’a would have the most lasting implications for the subsequent nature of government-Aboriginal relations.

The Nisga’a, a First Nations band of the northwest coast of B.C., were the first to press their claim to litigation (Miller 1998). Their case was brought to the Supreme Court of Canada, and in 1973 the “Calder decision” established that Aboriginal title pre-existed the assertion of British sovereignty in the province (McKee 2000). This
landmark decision had a great effect on Canada-wide Aboriginal policy. The Trudeau government instituted a land claims policy, and in 1974 the Office of Native Claims was established within the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC). Land claims—either specific or comprehensive—renewed the process of treaty-making with Aboriginal peoples. Specific land claims applied to those Aboriginal bands that had already concluded a treaty with the federal government, regarding the fulfilment of responsibilities or compensation for past unfulfilled duties. Since British Columbia was mostly without such treaties\(^1\), comprehensive land claims would be pursued “based on the assertion of continuing Aboriginal rights and title that have not been dealt with by treaty of other legal means” (Standing Senate Committee 2008).

From the earliest history of contact to the Calder decision, the most important issue for Aboriginal peoples in B.C. was establishing the Aboriginal title that should never have been denied. Certainly, there was opposition to the paternalistic and restrictive Indian Act, but until 1973, Aboriginal title was pursued as the most crucial injustice in government-Aboriginal relations. Frank Calder’s successful recourse to litigation held great symbolic significance for Aboriginals in B.C. and the rest of Canada, since it showed that the current power arrangement was not unshakeable, and that Aboriginal affairs could be approached differently.

Once Aboriginal title was recognized by the Supreme Court, negotiations with broad and varying objectives should have begun in earnest in B.C. However, as McKee demonstrates, the provincial government consistently failed to recognize title until 1991, “sequestering itself until overwhelmed by a combination of legal requirements, political imperatives, and historical precedents” (Miller 1998). The cycle of continued frustrations and stalled action was eventually broken with the establishment of the British Columbia Treaty Commission (BCTC) in 1993 by the First Nations Summit, the federal and the provincial governments (Hurley 2009B). Added to two other advances at the federal level—the constitutional protection of Aboriginal peoples’ rights since 1982 and the enactment of the 1986 Comprehensive Land Claims Policy promising to “provide certainty and clarity of rights to ownership and use of land and resources”—it seemed as though both levels of government were finally on board to moving forward in the relationship with Aboriginal peoples (Department of Justice, Standing Senate Committee 2008).

\(^1\) Treaty Number 8 extends partly into northern British Columbia from Alberta.
From the Nisga’a Treaty to the Delgamuukw Decision

The Nisga’a comprehensive land claim settlement, although enacted in 2000, is not considered within the B.C. treaty process context. Nevertheless, many aspects of the negotiation and post-settlement process have informed other negotiating tables in B.C., as well as the decision for some First Nations to opt out of the treaty process.

The issue associated with the Nisga’a treaty with the most serious implications is that of the extinguishment of Aboriginal title. It is almost ironic, but mostly disheartening that the recognition that was sought for so long was soon being measured and commoditized, to be surrendered in return for other rights in the negotiation process. Ultimately, the agreement stipulated that Nisga’a Aboriginal title would be extinguished, and eight percent of the claimed land would be awarded, in exchange for such provisions as limited self-government, taxation and justice rights, a cash settlement and release from the Indian Act (Roth 1999). The Nisga’a final agreement was the first in the country that explicitly extends Section 35 protection (Constitution Act, 1982) to land rights and self-government in the same agreement (Hurley 2009A).

Scholars have varied on their responses to the Nisga’a treaty. In general, it is portrayed as a very positive step for Aboriginal peoples, especially within the comprehensive claims landscape, where successful completions have been far lower than anticipated by many. For example, in 2004, BCTC Commissioner Mike Harcourt said that within the next three to five years the province would see fifteen treaties completed (Penikett 2006). There have been two completed treaties 9 (BC Treaty Commission). Tom Flanagan is a supporter of the Nisga’a treaty: in the second edition of his controversial book First Nations? Second Thoughts, Flanagan writes that he approves of the provisions that require the Nisga’a First Nation to pay taxes, to own its land, and for the Charter of Rights to apply while the Indian Act does not anymore. However, he acknowledges the arguments of unconstitutionality of the agreement, since it accords power outside the jurisdictional divides of Sections 91 and 92 (Flanagan 2008).

To refer to the two of the themes of this essay, both the recourse to litigation and the influence of power dynamics are quite evident in the Nisga’a treaty. For one, the eventual outcome, an agreement that is generally seen as positive, owes a great deal to the Calder decision of 1973. The use of litigation arguably allowed the comprehensive land claim to be possible at all, and the self-
government provision was an added victory. With regards to power dynamics, the Niga’a concessions demonstrate the implicit deference to provincial and federal government prerogatives. Even if the final agreement was to represent unprecedented gains, they were won by the terms set within the government.

This idea of a government advantage became abruptly apparent on December 11th, 1997, when the Delgamuukw decision was rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada. In this, another landmark decision, it was established that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 did apply to British Columbia, and that Aboriginal title had never been extinguished (Roth 1999). Suddenly, there were grave doubts that too much in the way of Aboriginal title had been surrendered in the soon-to-be ratified Nisga’a agreement, and that the federal government was not in the position to demand extinguishment of rights. Mary Hurley writes that observers believed the same Aboriginal title status could have been achieved from a “modified rights” approach that would have exhaustively defined Nisga’a Section 35 rights. Such suspicions are rampant in the discourse surrounding the implementation of the Nisga’a treaty, and at the time, it became less of a “benchmark”—as Tom Flanagan suggested—than a warning. The treaty process was then irrevocably tainted, and treaties were perceived as a “certificates of conquest”, taking rights rather than granting them (Roth 1999).

Overall, and especially since the Delgamuukw decision, uncertainty has reigned. Paul Rynard argued that the treaty deserves support, countering the public view that “too much” had been given to the Nisga’a First Nation, but rather that far too many concessions were demanded by the federal and provincial governments. He went on to charge that Canadian political and corporate elites were not interested in dealing with evolving concepts of Aboriginal rights to land (Rynard 2000) These arguments are revelatory of a balance of power that was stacked in opposition to Aboriginal interests. For one, Canadian public opinion—when mentioned at all—is often characterized in the literature as hostile or suspicious, which surely only detracts from the responsible government’s commitment to just and progressive treaty negotiations. Secondly, the reference to entrenched political and corporate elites alludes to a dynamic somewhat removed from the main government-Aboriginal relationship focused on here, but showing that factors were in action for the preservation of the status quo (of politics or business) in British Columbia.
Over a decade later, doubts endure regarding Nisga’a, and the B.C. Treaty process has hardly advanced. Gurston Dacks argues that the Delgamuukw decision hardened the position of both the provincial and federal governments, contributing to the recent impasse. For one, the ruling allowed for the possibility that First Nations are in possession of extremely valuable land and resources, where Aboriginal title can be proven to exist. The costs of compensating bands for such resources would be beyond the provincial capacity to pay. Furthermore, since the Supreme Court did not “definitively compel” the governments to change their offers, they have not done so, gauging the costs as too high for this (Dacks 2002). Since First Nations now expect more from governments, the result is paralysis at the negotiating tables.

What can be learned from the Nisga’a Treaty experience and legacy, with regards to the B.C. treaty process? For one, the risks of litigation and treaty negotiation are perhaps deemed as comparable: the former approach has led to monumental advances in Aboriginal legal position in Canada (in addition to other Supreme Court decisions not discussed here), and has influenced treaty negotiations in favour of better recognition of Aboriginal rights. However, the costs of litigation are enormous, and there is the possibility of unfavourable rulings. The negotiation approach, then, is characterized by a lack of trust in the commitment of governments to the principles of mutual recognition and respect—the expectation is that self-interest or a preservation of the status quo will be pursued by governments. This approach is also prohibitively expensive. Since First Nations feel as at a disadvantage against the two levels of government with either approach, hesitation to act in any direction is understandable, even if important and unprecedented gains could be achieved, as they were with the Nisga’a Treaty.

The Prominent Issues of the Negotiation Process

This section will concentrate on subsequent comprehensive land claims negotiations in British Columbia, explaining the issues at stake. The “issues” refers to the prominent objectives or principles of the treaty process, flavouring the political discourse and guiding action on the part of the three main participants.

The first major issue of comprehensive land claims is self-government. For the Nisga’a to secure a degree of constitutionally-protected self-government in the 2000 treaty was a momentous step, and there were attempts to facilitate the possibility of attaining this goal during the constitutional conferences of the 1990s. With the failure of the Charlottetown Accord, though, self-government was not
entrenched in the constitution (Hurley 2009A). Nevertheless, self-government seems to have found its place in the negotiations: the Government of Canada now states that it recognizes the “inherent right of self-government” as an existing Aboriginal right under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The government prefers that this right be clarified through negotiations, and not through “lengthy, costly” litigation (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada). Negotiations were opted for in both the cases of the Tsawwassen and the Maa-nulth First Nations, resulting in final agreements with self-government exhaustively defined. Many of the current outstanding agreements-in-principle have self-government provisions (Hurley 2009A).

Self-government is most often framed as an approach that would empower First Nations. However, two points are worth making here. Firstly, there is a concern originating in Aboriginal communities that self-government only empowers specific creations of the Indian Act, Band Councils. These governments have sometimes been charged with elitist governance and self-interested action at the expense of community well-being (Dacks 1997). Next, Aboriginal self-government can be pursued outside the context of the B.C. treaty process. A case in point is the Westbank First Nation near Kelowna, B.C., which obtained self-government in 2003 (Alcantara 2008).

Overall, it is clear that self-government is available at the negotiating table and outside of the treaty process, and First Nations are vigilant now—especially thanks to the Delgamuukw decision—so that “blanket extinguishment” of Aboriginal title does not accompany self-government provisions (Hurley 2009B). Although self-government is not to be considered indisputably good in all hands, it is certainly a worthwhile objective for B.C. First Nations. Fortunately, they are not forced to remain in the B.C. treaty process to reach this point; the appeal of self-government cannot be wielded as leverage to ensure continued Aboriginal involvement in the arguably dysfunctional process.

The next issue has the potential to become very prominent in upcoming years, that is, the relationship between land claims and economic development. Based on the official discourse of the B.C. treaty process, settlement of comprehensive land claims is the key to unlocking economic development in British Columbia, by virtue of the inclusion of First Nations “in the broader economy” (Cairns 2001) and the end of uncertainty over resource ownership.

Stemming from the Delgamuukw Supreme Court decision of 1997, the province must recognize potential Aboriginal title over lands
not yet settled by treaty, and from the Haida Supreme Court decision of 2004, the province must meaningfully consult with First Nations about any projects for economic development set to take place on potential treaty land. Furthermore, the interests of the affected Aboriginal group should be accommodated, and the consultations should take place in good-faith on the part of both parties (Alcantara 2008) These two decisions illustrate the fact that Aboriginals in B.C. have the potential to become major economic players if they land settlement includes their title over such land and resources. This helps to explain the remarkably slow pace of treaty negotiations: the province is clearly forestalling the official recognition of title and delaying a shift in the balance of power. In the meantime, small measures of economic development are being pursued, in part to appease a frustrated Aboriginal population.

The tension between land claims and economic development is not new—the provincial NDP government of the late 1990s vowed that it would not yield any more than five percent of the total area of British Columbia to land claims, in line with the Aboriginal proportion of the total population (Dacks 2002). The stakes are high, and the assumption that the balance of power is permanently weighted toward the government is contestable: B.C. Aboriginals consider the land base as the foundation of their future economic prosperity and the factor that will permit their survivals as respective communities. Furthermore, Supreme Court judgments, including Delgamuukw and Haida, have tended to recognize Aboriginal entitlement. Whether the dynamic will be settled through the B.C. treaty process, litigation or other methods remains to be seen, but if the province’s lack of serious commitment to negotiations holds, litigation may be the popular recourse.

A third issue at stake in the B.C. treaty process is prominent in rhetoric and quite understated in practice: the objectives of mutual recognition and respect. The amount of agreements that have been concluded on the character of the relationship between governments and Aboriginal peoples suggests that upholding these objectives is of great significance: in 2005 the tripartite Transformative Change Accord was enacted, on the provincial level the “New Relationship” accord was signed, and in 2006 the Unity Protocol Agreement was signed among First Nations leaders (Hurley 2009B). The “New Relationship” was part of B.C. Premier Gordon Campbell’s remarkable turnaround regarding Aboriginal affairs—in 2000 he had contested the Nisga’a Treaty as unconstitutional and vowed to protect B.C. sovereignty against Aboriginal claims (Penikett 2006). His “New Relationship” accord was signed by leaders of the regional Assembly
of First Nations, the First Nations Summit and the Union of British Columbia Chiefs, and although addressing the relationship was conceivably politically significant, the accord made no specific commitments for treaty negotiations. Overall, this accord reflects the general sense of mutual recognition and respect in British Columbia: superficially pleasing, projecting brotherhood and consensus into the relationship, but ultimately hollow, underwritten by suspicion and frustration.

The B.C. Treaty Process Experience

The idea of underlying frustration is certainly evident in the experience of the B.C. treaty process. To give a few specific examples, B.C. Aboriginals are aggravated by continued alienation from their land while land claims settlements are pending, the protracted nature of negotiations, and the exorbitant costs associated with the process (Hurley 2009B)—in some cases, the amount of funds borrowed from the federal government has equalled or exceeded the amount set to be received with a settlement (Alcantara 2008). The general discontent is best illustrated by the fact that in 2009, forty percent of B.C. First Nations were not participating in treaty process at all. Do these frustrations and abandonment of negotiations reflect a flawed process or unfeasible objectives? Viewing the B.C. treaty process experience as an exercise in power relations leads easily enough to the conclusion that the current impasse has been designed, or at the very least that the impasse suits the objectives of the federal and provincial governments.

If attention is turned now to the two levels of government involved in the B.C. treaty process, perhaps it is unfair to portray them superficially as two imposing powers in cahoots—there have certainly been important actors, such as Gordon Campbell, within these structures. Government representatives like him put a face on the B.C. treaty process, relentlessly articulating desires for progress. However, the sum of general governmental action speaks volumes compared to the isolated rhetoric of any one Premier or Indian Affairs Minister. The impression given is of two levels of government consistently engaged in obstructionism, motivated by self-interest and paternalistic mindsets.

In his analysis of the governments’ role in Aboriginal policy, Jonathan Malloy takes issue with the “contradictory mandates” of both governments. In the context of comprehensive land claims, the governments act as Crown representatives and negotiators over land claims and self-government. Simultaneously, they are responsible for coordinating government policies that affect Aboriginals (Malloy 2001)
How could this conflict (or confusion) of interest be rectified? Especially since the motives of both levels of government have been described here as rational and self-serving, the “double identity” Malloy describes is problematic, from the outset.

Evidence of power dynamics in the government-Aboriginal relationship is pervasive. In terms of spending responsibilities, the federal government bears most of the cost of concluding treaties, while the province has a great deal of revenue to be potentially lost if Crown lands are transferred to First Nations (McKee 2000). These are both either real or potential negative revenues, but demonstrate that financial authority is currently concentrated within government. With agenda-setting, the federal government is in charge: for B.C. First Nations that hope to launch comprehensive land claims negotiations, they must first satisfy established criterion to prove that they have legitimate claim to land (Alcantara 2008). The federal government, then, has the power to deny entry into negotiations altogether, if a First Nations band does not provide acceptable evidence to support its claim. This leads to the power dynamic of the comprehensive land claims negotiations, which favours the governments, and more specifically, Western legal practices. Aboriginal claimants must “adopt Western forms of knowledge, proof and discourse if they want negotiations to proceed”, including the hiring of white, English-speaking anthropologists, linguists, historians and lawyers to prove their cases (Alcantara 2008). Finally, the sense of identity of governments versus Aboriginals in the comprehensive land claims context is incompatible: while Aboriginal leaders see themselves as engaging in nation to nation discourse based on equality between First Nations and the Crown, government leaders see themselves as “representatives of the Crown meeting with minorities within Canada” (Alcantara 2008).

The examples of disconnection and fundamental imbalance are endless. Alcantara also views the overall dynamic in terms of power relations, arguing that the two levels of government, as “dominant actors” benefit from the current regime where there is a lack of treaties, so their action is directed toward the maintenance of their “preference”, the status quo (2008). Dacks’ (2002) argument is similar: “The governments of Canada and British Columbia seem confident that they do not need to offer First Nations more at the land claims negotiating tables, provided that they can contain the frustrations that the First Nations feel as a result of this lack of movement”.
Following these arguments and this essay’s depiction of the B.C. treaty process—with two levels of government disproportionately influential at the expense of Aboriginal influence—perhaps it is relevant to ask whether government-Aboriginal relations should be based on equal standing. This is not addressing any imbalances between the federal and provincial governments, but just their stances towards Aboriginal representatives. There seems to be no compelling reason why the espoused principles of mutual recognition and respect cannot be applied to this situation. Aboriginals in the treaty process should be able to expect to be treated with dignity. Certainly, it would be possible to include examples of Aboriginal leaders that engage in obstructionist behaviour, or that display a lack of respect for the negotiations or the government representatives, but the intention here is to emphasize the dominant role of the government, not examples of behaviour of the dominated.

Also casting Aboriginals as dominated in the relationship with government, Alcantara argues that they have no choice but to continue negotiating until viable alternatives to the B.C. treaty process emerge (Alcantara 2008). The figure of forty percent of B.C. First Nations as absent from the treaty process suggests that meaningful alternatives have surfaced, perhaps accelerating the downfall of the B.C. treaty process as “verging into irrelevance given its inability to generate actual treaties” (Penikett 2006).

**Alternatives to the B.C. Treaty Process**

The growing popularity of alternatives to the B.C. treaty process is partly evidence of its growing reputation as dysfunctional, but also encouraging evidence that some manner of progress is possible outside of the comprehensive land claims route. The alternative of *litigation* has been discussed; although fraught with risk and financial cost, seemingly the most important gains for Aboriginal rights have been made through appeals to the Supreme Court. It is argued that litigation may be the only tool powerful enough to unblock the current impasse (Dacks 2002). Certainly, the more recent Supreme Court decisions in 2004 regarding Haida nation and the Taku River Tligit First Nation have shown that comprehensive land claims are not the only way to protect B.C. Aboriginal interests in traditional land. In these decisions, the court ruled that the Crown must meaningfully consult with Aboriginal groups and seek to accommodate their interests (Alcantara 2008).

Another alternative to the treaty process is the use of *interim measures*. These focus on the resources or sectors that are being neglected or underused during the negotiations period, such as co-
management of wildlife on Aboriginal land, or resource management to ensure that the land is not stripped of its potential while Aboriginals remain alienated from it (Dacks 2002) On one hand, it may be charged that the province supports interim economic measures in order to shirk its duty to resolve Aboriginal title and land claims definitively—in order to continue benefitting from its ownership and authority over resources. On the other hand, interim measures relieve some of the stress of unfinished claims, while allowing some development and progress that will hopefully advance the state of the Aboriginal communities involved.

Another avenue that has increasingly been pursued by First Nations disenchanted with negotiations is that of bilateral agreements. For example, the Carrier Sekani First Nation of B.C. withdrew from the treaty process after thirteen years in 2007 and signed with a private company to develop resources on their lands (Alcantara 2008). The downside to this alternative measure is that the gains made are not permanent and are limited in scope (perhaps to the extraction of one natural resource). Nevertheless, actual progress is seriously lacking in many Aboriginal communities, so a move beyond impasse is welcomed. A last alternative to the treaty process was mentioned above, that is the pursuit of self-government arrangements outside a comprehensive land claim. Negotiations would be more easily carried out, since they only involve the Aboriginal community representatives and the federal government. Self-government overall is seen as a way to break out of the status quo and hopefully enhance local capacities to govern and develop effectively (Alcantara 2008).

What is encouraging about the alternative measures is that they are fundamentally constructive, with objectives of economic, political and social development—the ideas projected are not about undermining the Canadian state or confronting it through protest or civil disobedience. Despite repeated failures on the part of the governments to offer and secure for Aboriginals a defined stake in their futures—which has led to the ultimate abandonment by many of the government sanctioned treaty process—Aboriginal objectives have remained consistently constructive. Drawing attention to this is worthwhile, to reveal that the despite persistent letdowns and enduring critical-level problems on Aboriginal reserves and among communities, there is leadership showing steady resolve and flexibility as it seeks to secure a better future.
Beyond the B.C. Treaty Process

In this last section, the current status and legacies of the B.C. treaty commission are considered. To begin, several observers of the general comprehensive land claims issue recommend that greater weight and influence be accorded to other actors. Beyond the governments and Aboriginal claimants, “third parties” have not made a very notable impact on the overall process. Above, corporate actors are referred to, as consistently applying pressure “to demand that the lands of Aboriginal peoples be brought into the familiar and predictable reach of Crown sovereignty and Canadian property law” (Rynard 2000). As a force acting in favour of the status quo, it is understandable that governments would cater to the commercial and industrial elites. Public opinion as a force affecting the process can also be considered here: as mentioned, the literature describes Canadians in general as a static body of suspicious and separated interests. A tendency to favour paternalistic practices is also evident, Canadians want controls to be imposed on the funds awarded to Aboriginal communities in settlements (Penikett 2006).

The third party that is seen as most disappointing for its lack of action in the treaty process is the B.C. Treaty Commission itself. Its establishment in 1993 marked the beginning of the treaty process in the province, but since then it has been likened to the Governor General of Canada by one treaty negotiator; it is a “public figure with mainly ceremonial duties”. Tony Penikett argues that the BCTC has great potential, if only it were more financially independent and more seriously involved in negotiations (Penikett 2006). The presence of another actor at the negotiating tables could help influence the atmosphere in favour of more meaningful participation, demonstrations of respect and recognition and overall democratization.

A significant, and negative, legacy of the B.C. treaty process is the failures of implementation. A 2008 report by the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples concentrated on this issue, offering several recommendations to remedy the perceived problems. The lack of federal structures and organizational capacity to manage the implementation of modern treaties must be addressed; policy and practice must better reflect the nation to nation relationship that treaties represent; an independent review body separate from the Department of Aboriginal Affairs should be established, such as the Auditor General’s office, which would report to Parliament (Standing Senate Committee 2008).
The Nisga’a example illustrates how such recommendations would be useful: despite self-government provisions and great independence afforded by their treaty, social, political and economic challenges remain beyond the signing of the final agreement. A report from the (formerly named) Department of Indian Affairs also acknowledges that the government should be more involved in the implementation phase; working in “partnership with Aboriginal signatories”, setting objectives, monitoring progress and taking remedial actions as required (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 2009). Such an approach would make the conclusion of a treaty less comparable to a divorce, where all ties of partnership and good will are severed. Ultimately, B.C. Aboriginals and Canadian governments will always be linked; a high level of respect and recognition should be the aim not just in the negotiations process, but also beyond.

With regards to current issues, it is worthwhile to draw attention to the November, 2011 decision of B.C. Premier Christie Clark to break with the “decades-long pursuit of treaties with First Nations, saying that the process has failed to deliver either economic growth for aboriginal communities or security for business investors”. Her government’s focus will instead be on striking economic development deals with Aboriginal leaders who are “willing to do business”. (Hunter 2011). In this essay, the use of interim measures—like for economic development—was considered an appropriate strategy for dealing with the obstructionism of government at the treaty tables. However, shifting all attention to economic development is a troubling notion, since it demonstrates that the province intends to maintain its hold over land and natural resource development. Some First Nations will certainly benefit from the strategy, but overall, the provincial government will reinforce disconnection and conflict.

In 2002, Dacks hypothesized about this very possibility and the consequences that would follow. His argument is obviously relevant here, namely that a decision by the “provincial government to abandon the negotiating process or drive First Nations away from it by lowering the existing level of its offers—offers that First Nations already consider inadequate”—would lead to an increased recourse to litigation for the recognition of title, the heightening of social tensions and exacerbated uncertainties related to resource development (Dacks 2002). Applied to the current situation, it seems that the province is confidently engaging in brinkmanship. The absence of other actors that can influence negotiations and general public discontent is shrewdly capitalized upon here by the Premier; B.C. can obviously show almost no commitment to the treaty process
at very little political cost, and the pursuit of economic development, especially during a recession, will never be opposed too strongly, it seems. This strategy is not surprising based on the analysis in this essay, which demonstrates the predominance of economic motivations for the government and the remarkable power the government has to pursue its own interests within the B.C. treaty process or outside of it. Even those vague principles of recognition and respect can be manipulated to mean almost anything; the Premier could certainly argue now that she intends to maximize the recognition of Aboriginal rights by pursuing economic development alongside First Nations communities.

Hopefully the current issue does not come across here as a trade-off between economic development and participation in the B.C. treaty process. Ultimately, the provincial government’s actions exhibit a lack of accountability to First Nations, a lack of commitment to concepts of justice and the principles of mutual recognition and respect that are supposedly the foundation of the B.C. treaty process, and a lack of interest in the sustainable future of Aboriginals in Canada. The dismal socioeconomic indicators and overall lower standard of living reflect directly on the leadership of Canadian governments. That alternatives continue to be sought on the part of government that do not involve meaningful engagement in treaty negotiations is both disheartening and exasperating.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the British Columbia treaty process can be characterized similarly to the historical relationship between Aboriginal peoples in B.C. and the two levels of government, as tension-filled and a consistent showdown between conflicting interests. In considering the historical evolution of government-Aboriginal relations, it becomes apparent that the relationship has not been exclusively competitive over the past generations. A first example followed the Calder decision in 1974, when the Trudeau government recognized the importance of Aboriginal title by implementing a land claims policy. A second example was with the tripartite establishment of the B.C. treaty process in 1993, when comprehensive land claims would finally address and institutionalize Aboriginal inclusion and recognition in Canada. These two examples of responsiveness and goodwill, however, are greatly overshadowed by the suspicion, self-interested action and exasperations that have characterized most relations between the two levels of government and Aboriginals in B.C. Although Aboriginals today have a much more varied set of tools at their disposal to address the lack of defined title
of rights—such as self-government agreements, the recourse to litigation or bilateral agreements—they remain fundamentally disadvantaged in relation to the authorities of government.

The outlook for the future of the B.C. treaty process seems quite bleak, if the exclusively-economic agenda of Premier Christie Clark is considered. However, there is a great deal of potential for the tide to turn, and for the power dynamic to reach a more balanced position. Through litigation, Aboriginal communities may gain the right to the vast tracts of British Columbian territory that they lay claim to—and upon which future economic development will be based. Meanwhile, alternative measures can be pursued to help empower Aboriginal communities from the bottom-up. Outside of Aboriginal communities, the BCTC can assume its role of mediator more vigorously, so that the treaty process is not definitely abandoned. Finally, public opinion could become less resentful, and even constructive. The two levels of government have a hold on the process now, but this does not have to continue to be the case if other centres of power such as these are exploited to the fullest.
Bibliography


Identity Politics of the Reproductive Body: 
Implications for Indigenous Women’s Empowerment in the Peruvian Amazon

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Abstract

In this paper, I explore the dynamics of body and identity politics at play in reproductive health programs, and what they mean for women’s and, by extension, communities’ empowerment. By looking at APRI, a United States-based nonprofit reproductive rights organization who encouraged women to perceive themselves as entitled and capable of exercising choice while promoting the transformation of local gender dynamics, I attempt to elucidate the contradictions created by pursuing a rights-oriented reproductive agenda while facing international pressure to reduce poor women’s fertility, as well as its implications for women’s empowerment. This case study focuses on the female body as an active subject who chooses, rejects or transforms reproductive interventions according to their local logic. It concludes that women’s empowerment starts in the core of the individual and is poorly captured by quantifiable metrics. It also highlights the great potential for transforming the present order that lies in the process of raising awareness, promoting debate and reflection and negotiating various identities.
Biography

Itzel Rodríguez Rosales is currently in her second year in the Master’s in Public Policy and Public Administration (MPPPA) program at Concordia University in Montréal, Québec. She has a bachelor’s degree in International Development and Anthropology from McGill University and a bachelor’s degree in Actuarial Math from ITAM University in Mexico City. Her research interests include Latin American marginalized communities and women’s empowerment. She did research and field work for a multicultural project in Peru, Bolivia and Canada on gender issues and globalization. The project studied the survival and resistance strategies of women in the sex industry and their access to health services, in order to develop policy recommendations for the Health Equity agenda for Canada’s engagements with developing countries and for a participatory Trafficking National Action Plan in Peru and Bolivia. As a final part of the MPPPA program, she intends to intern for a community-based organization or social enterprise that focuses on gender issues.

Introduction

Reproductive rights movements are stereotypically associated with urban, white, middle-class, ‘emancipated’ women. However, indigenous women have identified reproductive and sexual rights as a matter of life and death (Bant and Girard 2008, 248). For these women, gaining bodily autonomy constitutes not only a safekeeping of their personal integrity, but also a higher political status, as this paper will argue. Female bodies are the site where reproductive rights ultimately are actualized or infringed. Therefore women’s lived experiences, their understanding of reproduction and the meanings they assign to their gendered practices have important implications for women’s empowerment. This composite of their subjectivity constitutes the most appropriate context for understanding the effect that reproductive interventions have on indigenous women’s identity and agency.
In this paper, I explore the dynamics of body and identity politics at play in reproductive health programs, and what they mean for women’s and, by extension, communities’ empowerment. By looking at APRI, a United States-based nonprofit reproductive rights organization who encouraged women to perceive themselves as entitled and capable of exercising choice while promoting the transformation of local gender dynamics, I attempt to elucidate the contradictions created by pursuing a rights-oriented reproductive agenda while facing international pressure to reduce poor women’s fertility, as well as its implications for women’s empowerment.

The first section will cover the theoretical concepts that will be used in the analysis. Here I will specify the way I use the term ‘identity politics’ as an analytical framework, and how it relates to reproductive body politics. Then I will incorporate those concepts into the framework of policy design and social constructions of target populations and examine how this theory can explain the impact of reproductive programs on women’s empowerment. At this point, it will also be appropriate to briefly discuss some theories of empowerment. In the second section, I will apply those theories to analyze the outcomes of the reproductive programs carried out by the aforementioned NGO working in the Peruvian Amazon and their effect on women’s empowerment. The case will be looked at from its two competing objectives. First, when the program’s goal is implicitly understood by its donors to be fertility control, women’s identity will be constructed as dependent and powerless and thus their subordination will be perpetuated. Second, reproductive programs whose goals are the promotion of women’s rights, as intended by the directors of APRI, will construct women as capable agents and therefore will be more likely to foster their empowerment.

Identity and Body Politics

The study of women’s reproductive health, both from a needs and a rights perspective, requires an understanding of how identity politics converges with body politics. As poor women, especially in developing countries, are disproportionately the targets of population control programs, any discussions on reproductive rights invariably will make reference to the female body as the contested site where dimensions of culture, identity and power intersect and are experienced by women. As Margaret Lock (1998) in reference to Butler (1993) writes: “[t]he female body, being a potent but malleable signifier, inevitably becomes a forum around which sex and gender relations are delineated” (178). Using body politics as a theoretical frame, we can approach the female body simultaneously
as an object and subject of political contestation: the reproductive body as the object of surveillance and control, and women’s bodies as the subject of resistance and negotiation towards such regulatory practices.

In the most general sense, identity politics refers to the political stance that arises from the personal experience of an identity status such as gender, ethnicity, race, class, sexual orientation, etc. (e.g. Parker 2005; Bickford 1997; and Sandoval 1991 cited in Bernstein 2005). More specifically, identity politics has been used descriptively to understand the processes that create particular ascribed and/or chosen identities. This construction of the self is seen as the result of our experiences and interactions with other entities in a given social, political and economic order (e.g. Butler 1990; Young 2005; and Gitlin 1994; Phelan 1989; Fraser 1997 cited in Bernstein 2005). Also, the analysis of identity politics as a political phenomenon has been used to explain and predict the effectiveness of identity-based social movements in bringing about social change. While obviously both aspects are interrelated, it is the potential, if any, of identity politics to transform the social order that has been most contested. In this paper, identity politics will inform my analysis not so much as a source of political activism, but as an important catalyst in generating self-awareness, which is critical for the process of empowerment and a precondition for political activism.

Mary Bernstein (2005) provides a comprehensive synthesis of the scholarship on identity politics and shows that most debates center on three potential pitfalls: essentialism, demonization and victimization. Charges of essentialism refer to the idea that an identity status is taken to be essential rather than socially constructed. This criticism is based on the idea that essentialized identities confine themselves into ever narrowing categories, limiting the ability of their advocacy groups to form alliances with others and work toward a common vision of social justice (Bernstein 2005, 51). Similarly, demonization of the oppressor and victimization of the subject assign both parties a false identity that produces and reinforces antagonisms and results in sterile contentions, informed by taken-for-granted blame and prejudice (Parker 2005, 56-57). Therefore, critiques of this view argue that equating groups to their claimed identity, for instance as a marginalized culture, could be used by dominant groups to represent themselves as ‘defendants,’ thereby providing legitimation for increased regulations over the oppressed groups (Bernstein 2005, 50).
The reply to the above arguments is straightforward and simple: one cannot and should not take identity claims at face value, but rather we must empirically observe the distinct deployments that a subject strategically chooses for a particular purpose (Bernstein 2005, 67). Several writings on identity (e.g. Young 1990, Taylor 1989 and Kymlicka 1995 cited in Bernstein 2005) demonstrate how activists understand their identities to be socially constructed through a shared history of oppression. Despite being marked by difference, membership to a group does not preclude commitment to larger common goals (Bernstein 2005, 51). Thus, it is possible to have several intersecting identities, for instance as female, rural, indigenous, Amazonian, etc., without effacing particular differences by connecting diversity through becoming aware of their common lived experiences.

Yet another more refined version of this critique comes from the post-structuralist school, whose concern is not essentialism but the consequences of deploying categorizations. Post-structuralism puts emphasis on how discourse, as a form of power, not only constructs reality but also reinforces power relations. In this way, the use of essential categories in identity politics constitutes in itself a form of regulation that, instead of working towards social change, strengthens the existing forms of power (Bernstein 2005, 56). As Butler (1990) argues, the deconstruction of “women” as a category will enable us to really challenge the “figure of the feminine, awaiting the inscription-as-incision of the masculine signifier for entrance into language and culture” (147-8). Thus by marking difference, we may be inadvertently reifying the power relation between categories. This awareness is important in questioning whether the design and practice of reproductive rights programs conceive “the fixity of gender identity as an interior depth”, that is, women as a fixed category, and in doing so perpetuates the subordinate position of women within the local, national and global social order (Butler 1990, 148).

Butler (1990) describes “performative” identities as the continuous making of gender meanings by the re-enacting gender constructs (149). Performed identities, either strategically or otherwise, create opportunities to challenge those constructions, move beyond social categories and improve the group’s political status. To strategically perform gender roles in order to further political goals is indeed a compelling notion. Yet, in the context of Amazonian women, the degree to which women are able to deploy performative politics is seriously limited, because the infringement of their reproductive rights constitutes an immediate attack on their bodily integrity. Thus, we must consider to what degree women can
avoid social categorizations in their struggle to reaffirm their reproductive rights, considering not only their particular socio-historical order, but most importantly, that identity politics in the context of reproductive health is, first and foremost, lived in the body. We will see that, even with a limited space for performative politics, meanings from (somewhat) externally assigned categories are not fixed and “unidirectionally imposed on the stigmatized, rather [they are] negotiated or contested” (Anspach 1979, cited in Bernstein 2005, 60).

Yet another relevant critique of identity politics comes from postcolonialism and third-world feminisms. Mohanty (1991) warns us that ‘women’ as a universal category of analysis is a nuanced form of essentialism, one which tacitly takes Western middle-class women as the norm and by doing so, neglects and erases women’s specific geography, history, culture and class. As Mohanty (1991) puts it: “The homogeneity of women as a group is produced not on the basis of biological essentials but rather on the basis of secondary sociological and anthropological universals” (56).

In order to address those caveats, we will examine the identity politics of reproductive female bodies along the lines of post-structuralist thought, as a social construct that, while externally imposed to some degree, is also chosen, negotiated and contested. Also, I will borrow Young’s (2005) concept of “body experience”, which “aims to describe subjectivity and women's experience as lived and felt in the flesh” in order to shed light on Amazonian women’s social location, material conditions and daily lives as the locus of identity formation (4).

Identity politics as described above will help us understand the internal processes of identity construction, and the causes for the selective embrace or rejection of identities. It is clear that the ways that reproductive rights initiatives are experienced by women produce identities and meanings. But we also need to understand the mediation between the personal/experiential realm, in which the dynamics of identity, difference and recognition are played out, and the systemic processes within reproductive initiatives that reproduce or challenge the subordinate positions of target populations. In other words, what are the pragmatic effects of socially constructed identities on agency and empowerment? One framework capable of illuminating those connections is policy design theory, to which we now briefly turn.
Policy design theory emphasizes that the social construction of target groups has an important effect on the types of policies directed to them. Understanding the configuration of socially constructed target populations explains the design of policy content, the choice of instruments and the rationales of legitimation (Schneider and Ingram 1993; Schneider and Sidney 2009). The representation of target groups as both inputs and outputs of policies creates implicit criteria from which those policies are evaluated. This criteria serves to assess whether addressing a target group’s needs is considered to be in everybody’s best interest, a matter of justice or charity, or if it is represented as an undeserving claim and burden for society (Schneider and Ingram, 1993). This framework also determines whether policy instruments and tools build capacity by facilitating access to services and fostering learning, or whether they further dependency by virtue of the fact that they are control-oriented and application-based (Schneider and Ingram 1993). Schneider and Ingram (1993) argue that policy sends “messages to target populations that inform them of their status as citizens…the types of groups people belong to, what they deserve from government, and what is expected of them” (340). In turn, the instilment of such messages has an effect on governability and patterns of political participation (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 340). Certainly, the political behavior of target populations results from the internalization of socially constructed identities (re)produced by policies (Schneider and Sidney 2009). Their model aims to explain the effects of identities constructed throughout the policy process in maintaining target groups’ positional power in the political game. In turn, this position predicts target groups’ political orientation and access to the decision-making process (Schneider and Sidney 2009).

Policy design theory, however, does not explain the process by which identities constructed by policies are internalized by the individual. Moreover, although this framework does not conceive categories as static and target populations as passive, it still fails to address the process by which target groups can shape and adopt new identities. In this aspect, identity politics complements policy design by incorporating the internal processes that allow the individual and the collective to contest and transform the identities created by policies.

The model developed by Schneider and Ingram (1993) locates the political power and images associated with a target
population along a scale that ranges from high to low power, and from positive to negative images (335-6). The typology of target populations associates both “deviants” and “contenders” with negative images, thus making them more likely to receive burdens. However, deviants—with little political power—have almost no control over those burdens adjudicated to them, while contenders—with much more political power—contrive to receive some concealed benefits and burdens that are more symbolic than substantial (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 339-40). The other two categories, “advantaged” and “dependents”, are both associated with positive images. “Advantaged” groups also have high political power and so are able to largely shape their benefits, while “dependents”, though somewhat positively regarded, are also constructed as powerless and thus have little influence on the content and format of the benefits they receive, and therefore, such benefits are often mostly symbolic (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 337-8).

As we will see through the case study analysis, Amazonian women have been traditionally constructed as dependent and powerless. Though not overtly associated with harmful images, they have, nonetheless, been negatively perceived as poor women producing more poor people. Additionally, programs that are working towards a shift in the construction of indigenous women’s identity towards the positive images associated with advantaged groups are also the ones more likely to achieve women’s empowerment (as manifested, at least, in their regional politics). As I mentioned before, identity politics looks at the internal dynamics of identity construction, while social construction takes those identities as the independent variable that determines the choice of policy and the political participation of target groups. My aim is to use a case study to illustrate how a shift in the social construction of indigenous women from dependent to advantaged is critical for their empowerment. However, the premise of this move assumes not only the willingness of policy designers to construct new identities, but also women’s internalization of these new identities. In other words, a prior process of self-awareness is necessary before efforts of mobilization at any level can take place. Let us now turn to a discussion of the personal dimension of empowerment and its link to political participation.

*The Empowerment Path*

As the name indicates, ‘empowerment’ derives from ‘power’. Parpart et al. (2002) propose the understanding of empowerment as an ‘exercise of’ rather than ‘possession of’ power (3-4). They argue that “[e]mpowerment must be understood as including both individual
conscientization (*power within*) as well as the ability to work collectively, which can lead to politicized *power with* others, which provides the *power to* bring about change” (Parpart et al. 2002, 4, emphasis in original). Along the lines of post-structuralists’ conceptions of power, this model situates the process of empowerment not as transcending, but rather as inscribed in the existing power structure (Parpart et al. 2002, 4). Therefore, we must acknowledge that national and global systems impose gender-specific institutional, material and discursive constraints that circumscribe the space where individual and collective empowerment takes place.

As far as this paper is concerned, if empowerment is seen as the removal of someone else’s power *over* women, we risk falling into the traps of essentialism, demonization and victimization. The potential for transformation is far greater if we instead focus on the process of raising *power within* women and *with* others. For Rowlands (1995), empowerment starts with the awareness or understanding of the power dynamics at work in our life’s circumstances and involves insight on our personal and collective history that places us in our present time and place (103-5). Overlapping the concepts of Rowlands (1995) and Parpart et al. (2002), we see that this ‘critical consciousness’ is the source of the ‘*power within*’ ourselves that enables us to develop the skills and capacities to gain control over our life circumstances. Exercising our skills to make choices, whether on a large or local scale, strengthens our confidence and makes us able to support others. Sharing this *power with* others leads to the harnessing of the collective ‘*power to*’ transform our environment, which in turn broadens our understandings of ourselves as subjects of our own history.

While the process articulated above describes the practices for individual and group empowerment, it overlooks the external obstacles that may hinder the empowerment process. Gaining access to the decision-making process grants the power to transform our environment. Prior to that, however, it is crucial to move away from the dependent categorization of indigenous women. Advancing reproductive rights for women constitutes a bridge between bodily well-being and gaining participation in the political process. This in turn entails recognizing and promoting the right and capacity of Amazonian women to make autonomous choices (in this case, reproductive choices). Since the issue of choice is paramount in this process, we must therefore inquire into what liberties and opportunities are available for Amazonian women to make choices, and how the capacity of women to make their own choices is valued.
Yet, choice, like empowerment, does not take place within the personal realm alone, it is in fact circumscribed by power structures. To be sure, when policy practices systematically treat target populations as helpless, needy, disenfranchised individuals, as Schneider and Ingram (1993) point out, people internalize that message, which ultimately determines what options they see available and what rights they feel entitled to. Thus, it is also critical to address structural, institutional, material and discursive constraints in order to move along the empowerment path. As Martha Nussbaum (2000) succinctly puts it: “the various liberties of choice have material preconditions, in whose absence there is merely a simulacrum of choice” (53). In order to tackle the material barriers to empowerment, Nussbaum (2000) proposes that the political goal of policies should be the development of central human capabilities based on universal values. She defends the universalizing basis of her approach against charges of being paternalistic, westernizing and culturally blind, by taking the capability (not the functioning) as the political goal, thereby focusing on liberty and the possibility to make choices. Nussbaum (2000) assesses that a “commitment to respecting people’s choices hardly seems incompatible with an endorsement of universal values... at least [with the] universal value of having the opportunity to think and choose for oneself” (51). True recognition of a woman’s right to make her own reproductive choices would entail then recognizing that each woman is constituted as an end in and of herself.

In short, a positive shift in the social construction of indigenous women has to take place simultaneously in 1) the minds and “body experiences” of women in which personal identity dynamics unfold, as well as in social relations within the community; and 2) in the images, rationales and goals that inform policy design. Moreover, for reproductive policies to be rights-based and empowerment-oriented, it is fundamental that each woman is conceived as an absolute end in her own right, not as an instrument for other ends, whether it be population growth control, national prosperity, community development or family well-being.

I have tried to map some important personal and structural conditions in the dynamics of identity construction that can have an impact on women’s empowerment. However, a number of complex issues deserve to be mentioned. For example, how is the process of raising ‘critical consciousness’ initiated and by whom? Can and should social programs guide, teach or show target groups how to become empowered? If so, can paternalism and Westernization be avoided? How can the donor, the planner or the analyst transcend their own powerful position and reach out to the target group? How
can this model of empowerment account for differences and specific social locations? How can identity awareness avoid victimization without denying people’s grievances from histories of oppression? As an attempt to answer these questions, I will explore these issues, looking from different angles at what APRI accomplished in the Peruvian Amazon, who was involved, how they did it and how they talk about it.

**Promoting Reproductive Rights in the Peruvian Amazon**

The ‘Amazonian Peoples’ Resources Initiative’ (APRI), founded in the department of Loreto, Peru in 1995, is a US-based nonprofit reproductive rights organization that works at the grassroots level in association with Minga, a Peruvian women’s health organization. In 2004, APRI was unable to secure sufficient funding and ceased to be active, although Minga continues to carry out most of their initiatives. APRI defines itself as “a community-based health and development organization” whose mission is “advancing reproductive rights and gender equity” through “interventions aimed at improving the environmental, social, and economic conditions of the indigenous populations in the Peruvian Amazon” (Sypher et al. 2002, 196). The organization’s values are rights-oriented, as stated by one of the directors: “[a] fundamental principle of APRI’s work is that the ability to make reasonable reproductive health decisions is dependent on the exercise of all human rights— civil, political, economic, social, and cultural” (Dean et al. 2000, 220). The details of APRI-Minga’s activities will be documented from four academic articles written by researchers and practitioners who participated in the planning, direction and/or implementation of the programs carried out by APRI (Dean et al. 2000; McKinley 2003; McKinley and Jensen 2003; Sypher et al. 2002). Dean et al. (2000) provide an overview of the activities, challenges and prospects of APRI after five years of being funded. McKinley (2003), the director of APRI for almost a decade, writes an impressively self-aware account of the work of APRI and the contradictions that occur in the encounter between global and local in terms of rhetoric and the practice of reproductive health. The other two articles (McKinley and Jensen 2003; Sypher et al. 2002) present a critical media study of APRI radio program broadcasts and discuss the role of alternative media as a vehicle to open spaces for feminist discourses on reproductive rights. Although these pieces do not represent the bulk of literature on the topic, they were selected because they offer in depth coverage of one NGO’s activities during the decade they worked for women’s sexual health in Peru, and their articles include descriptions and analysis made by directors, implementers and researchers involved.
APRI was funded in 1995, one year after the International Conference on Population and Development held in Cairo—a landmark in the global reproductive health movement. Cairo, as it is simply referred to in gender and development discussions, had a major impact on the field of women’s health rights because it was the first time that human rights advocates, scientists, humanists, political leaders and local representatives gathered together and put forward feminist voices into the public debate of body politics. It was also remarkable because reproductive health was proclaimed as a human right (Harcourt 2009, 41). It has been recognized that population programs have been largely unsuccessful in affecting family size, mostly because they have neglected to address the conditions that could tackle high fertility rates, such as access to education, increased female workforce participation and economic opportunities. Thus, Cairo endorsed a shift in the focus of population programs to improving child and maternal health, sexual and formal education and elevating the status of women (McKinley 2003). The definition of reproductive rights pronounced in Cairo, that informs APRI’s goals states: “Reproductive rights...rest on the recognition of the basic right of couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of their children and to have the information and means to do so, and the right to attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health” (Programme of Action at the International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, 1994, cited in Dean et al. 2000, 219).

APRI-Minga has four main projects: 1) training a network of community *promotoras* (promoters) in fifty-two Amazonian communities. These networks are made up of girls and women who work with other women in their communities and that have shown leadership skills and an interest in APRI’s mission; 2) a radio program for Amazonian communities that uses entertainment-education strategies to facilitate access to reproductive health information and to create a public forum for community debate; 3) opportunities for intercultural (indigenous/mestizo) and bilingual education at elementary, secondary and professional levels; and 4) income-generating community-based development opportunities (Dean et al. 2000, 220). I will discuss the first and second projects in more detail later to identify the specific goals they seek.

Besides endorsing in their mission a ‘post-Cairo’ rights-oriented approach, the above listed activities of APRI also points to an approach that constructs indigenous women as capable of developing the skills necessary to make their own reproductive choices. Let us briefly highlight the nature of the instruments and
tools selected by APRI and identify their correspondence to Schneider and Ingram’s (1993) construction of target populations. According to Schneider and Ingram (1993), advantaged groups are viewed as intelligent and deserving citizens, and thus it is expected that policy choices will provide information tools that foster learning and capacity building so that policy recipients feel motivated to make good choices and take appropriate action voluntarily (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 339). Indeed, the promotoras project of APRI seeks to train women with the purpose of building their reproductive knowledge and analytical capacities so that they can lead discussion groups on issues of reproductive health and local gender relations (Dean et al. 2000, 223). In addition, one of the radio broadcasts’ objectives is the dissemination of health information through the convergence of specialized and lay knowledge. The radio broadcast also utilizes tools that are designed to promote awareness, critical thinking, discussion and dialogue among community members (Sypher et al. 2002, 196). Similarly, the education and income generating programs specifically target indigenous girls’ challenges to access and continue secondary education. Their programs are intercultural and bilingual. They emphasize local relevance and are co-designed jointly with the communities in order to promote public participation and parental involvement in children schooling. Therefore, the investment in human capital that these programs promote is an indicator that APRI works toward constructing indigenous people as a powerful and positively regarded category. And so, promoting the productivity and autonomy of indigenous peoples is regarded as a fruitful contribution to the public good.

In practice, however, empowering indigenous women to make autonomous choices is often an onerous goal. It requires a long-term commitment, coordinated efforts and patience that are not always possible. As a result, the rights-based approach articulated at Cairo has often been reduced to population control programs. As far as APRI is concerned, implementation of the Cairo agenda “simply means that women know their bodies, understand how they function, and respect themselves…but the external evaluation teams who periodically visit [our organization] view this as an impoverished, underexploited, or dishonest version of Cairo” (McKinley 2003, 50). Reproductive initiatives that are rights-based often struggle to secure funding because donors, governments and international agencies demand to see quantifiable results (Dean et al. 2000, 224). Due to the pressure to obtain financing, an understated yet penetrating force subordinates the discourse of rights to the imperative of lowering fertility rates. We will return to this discussion later, but in order to
understand the rationale behind the urge to control population growth, I will now provide an overview of the national and regional context and will briefly examine how past policies have dealt with this pressure.

The department of Loreto is vast, making up over one fourth of Peru, an area comparable in size to Germany. However, it is accessible only by plane or boat and so is physically and culturally isolated from the rest of Peru. It is a very diverse region with 26% of the total indigenous population of the Peruvian Amazon (INEI/UNICEF 1997) and over 66 different indigenous societies and languages, forming a total of almost 900,000 inhabitants (Dean et al. 2000, 221). For the past quarter century, Loreto’s population grew a modest 2.34% (UNFPA 2000). The average fertility rate in Loreto is 5.3, though amongst indigenous groups, it ranges from 9 to 12.4. The average infant mortality rate in Loreto is 68 per 1000 live births; however, it ranges from 101 to 153 per 1000 for indigenous groups (INEI/UNICEF 1997). In contrast, the fertility rate in the department of Lima from 1997–2000 was 2.0 in urban areas and 3.6 in rural, and the average infant mortality rate was 17 per 1000 (INEI 2001). In rural areas, where approximately half of the population of Loreto resides, access to public services is very limited (Dean et al. 2000, 221), and many communities have no electricity or running water (McKinley and Jensen 2003, 188). Unlike in other, more densely populated parts of Peru, in Loreto, the offices of NGOs are smaller and significantly less well-funded (McKinley 2003, 45). As indicated by these challenges, Loreto, due to its size and isolation, still awaits much of the development that has taken place in the rest of Peru.

Just before the Cairo conference, Peru’s coercive approaches to population control during the Fujimori’s administration in 1995 generated international uproar for its abuses, manipulation and misinformed procedures executed without proper consent and due follow-ups (Coe 2004; Sims 1998). This included an aggressive campaign that imposed numerical targets for sterilizations in the poorest areas of Peru, a campaign ostensibly designed as a socioeconomic developmental tool for poverty reduction (Coe 2004, 60-4). Indeed, a manager from the Minister of Health blatantly justified this campaign arguing that “the fertility rate among poor women is 6.9 children, they are poor and are producing more poor people. The president is aware that the government cannot fight poverty without reducing poor people’s fertility” (cited in Coe 2004, 61-2). This type of campaign corresponds to the ‘dependents’ social construction of target populations identified by Schneider and Ingram (1993), where the rationale used to legitimize its procedures and goals was that
indigenous people needed those interventions “for their own good”, and to achieve the public purpose of “fighting poverty” (339). Matching the construction of target groups as dependants, these policies’ neglect to properly inform women about their rights, the nature of certain procedures and their consequences, and dismiss women’s explicit consent as an unnecessary practice. Ultimately, this indicates that indigenous women were represented as ignorant, needy and unfit to make good choices. For instance, very poor, illiterate women, many of whom were not informed that the procedure was terminal, were offered food and clothing if they agreed to the procedure (Sims 1998). The fact that the alleviation of poverty was supposed to be tackled not by improving the living conditions of the poor, but by controlling the reproduction of poor women delivers the message that poverty is the fault of poor women for having so many children. Represented as backward, irrational hyper-fertile women, incapable of restraining themselves, indigenous women’s fertility is thus constructed as a burden for society, which justified the use of aggressive policy instruments in the past.

Schneider and Ingram (1993) argue that the rationale for delivering positive policy to dependants is not usually instrumental to the public interest but relies more on justice-oriented legitimations (340). In this case, Fujimori tried to frame the campaign as the “population’s right to access family planning” and thus justice-oriented (Coe 2004, 62). However, where there was no medical malpractice, procedures were often coercive, misinformed and manipulative and so those drastic interventions, experienced by many women as a burden rather than a benefit, ended up being justified instrumentally to be in the country’s best interest.

Cairo’s rhetoric about elevating the status of women notwithstanding, when it comes to implementing Cairo, McKinley points out that “the evocative and persistent nature of Malthusian anxieties about numbers, even in enlightened circles, raises the question whether the population lobby is centrally concerned with women’s empowerment and poverty reduction” or whether the real agenda is to lower fertility (McKinley 2003, 34). APRI’s directors speak of their programs as committed to empowerment, but regret that funding pools are disproportionately allocated to service provision programs (Dean et al. 2000, 224). In spite of upholding rights-oriented goals, in order to secure funds, they must manage the “pressure to show results, but proving rapid and quantifiable returns is often at odds with the true spirit of participation and partnership” (Dean et al. 2000, 224). Moreover, it has been widely recognized that population growth rates naturally fall as literacy, sexual and formal education,
and employment opportunities for women increase (McKinley 2003). However, as Nussbaum would argue, conditioning funding for such goals on the promise of reduced fertility is equivalent to stating that women are not ends of their own, and that making education, jobs, or health services available to them is not a goal worth pursuing by itself.

Similarly, McKinley (2003) laments: “As someone who searches for and accepts money every day from population programs, I am painfully aware that the money is sent, ultimately, to limit the fertility of the women with whom we work” (50). How does the picture look if the expected outcome of APRI’s programs is the effective reduction of family size? And how does it impact empowerment outcomes as well? Sadly, when we look at APRI only from the perspective of fertility reduction, its programs are deemed a failure. That may partly explain why McKinley (2003) decided to omit her organization’s name (APRI) but instead referred to it as “X” throughout the article. She adds:

Ambitious interns needing the rugged field experience “X” affords them in their climb up the population world are dismayed when they discover that we do not actually influence (even with gentle persuasion) people’s family size decisions or offer clinical services at all (McKinley 2003, 50).

A closer look into the promotoras project reveals ambivalent results. The rationale for investing in the promotora’s human capital, through consciousness-raising and vocational skills workshops, is that it will have a multiplier effect in their communities when the promotoras go back and share what they have learned with a network of eight to thirty women. Moreover, promotoras are key leaders because their nuanced understanding of local women’s experiences makes them the most suited to decide the format and orientation of workshops. They also provide an indispensable input in the design of income generating projects and in the selection of content of the radio programs and discussion forums. However, on the ground, the expectation that promotoras will stand out as role models is challenged because their life situation is frequently less than ideal. During a ceremony to inaugurate two radio stations where all the promotoras, local staff and directors gathered together, McKinley (2003) recalls:

I share a coconut with Mecha (mentally noting that she is the one with ten children who raises my red “pop” flag), I slurp juicy pineapples with Marga (whose husband publicly thrashed her with burning firewood so she couldn’t come to the workshop), and chat amiably with Maruja (the single
mother whose little sister ran away with the soldier and whose cousin died of AIDS). My mental list goes on (46).

APRI’s programs have had little effect in reducing fertility, which has never in fact been a primary objective, as their “gentle persuasion” approach shows. Moreover, APRI’s orientation has also been contentious with two of the so-called ‘best practices’ in the field of reproduction. One of these practices is skilled care delivery by a traditional birth attendant, which is aimed at reducing child and maternal mortality. In this regard, McKinley (2003) comments about the case of Lucia, one of their promotoras who, in spite of attending many workshops on this topic, “had no intention of seeking services from the public health sector” and just had her eighth child at home attended by some of her older children (48). The second practice that local staff avoids is community-based contraception distribution, and instead APRI’s staff “prefer to empower women to seek contraceptive services from the public health sector” (McKinley 2003, 48). And in fact, in other villages where the local facilities for the distribution of contraceptives do exist, women generally prefer to seek contraception services from health clinics that are days away by river from their homes (McKinley 2003, 49).

One may wonder why women are not willing to avail themselves of the services provided. Does this in fact confirm that they are irrational, perhaps bound in obsolete cultural traditions? The short answer is that although the parteras program’s goal is to promote women’s access to maternal and infant health services, indigenous women who have traditionally used family and local support for birth labor may reject the representation of child birth as a process that requires external intervention, as it will be discussed below. Similarly, despite the efforts to facilitate access to contraceptives within the community, this initiative may be rejected when close monitoring of women’s reproductive lives is linked to the delivery of contraceptives. But in order to analyze these issues deeper, as I will do shortly, we first need to explore several understandings of how indigeneity, reproduction, kinship systems and the medicalization of female bodies is experienced by women through the lens of identity politics. McKinley (2003) provides detailed narratives of the aforementioned women and situates them in their historical and socioeconomic context. By doing so, she is able to elaborate a grounded, interpretive and nuanced perspective of the identity politics that inform indigenous women’s choices in Loreto. I will briefly expand on some of her most conclusive points and then return to the discussion on the ambivalences perceived towards the “best practices” in reproductive health mentioned above.
First of all, a notion of indigeneity is one of the fundamental subjectivities at play in the dynamics of difference and identity for women in Loreto, and it bears an important influence on their reproductive choices. On the one hand, indigenous identities have recently gained considerable prestige in global population forums where—although “the term ‘indigenous’ as a metaphor for uncontrolled fecundity and female political powerlessness” is not entirely eclipsed—there has been a growing recognition, respect, and even idealization of indigenous knowledge and culture (McKinley 2003, 41). In Cairo, great efforts were made to include the participation of ‘local’ voices (which are very often used as a proxy for ‘indigenous’), partly as a sign of legitimacy but also as a real attempt to build ‘global-local’ partnerships (McKinley 2003, 39). In a climate where reproductive health is now being framed as an issue of women’s empowerment, it makes sense to construct the image of the ‘local’ women who were sponsored to attend Cairo as having a “grassroots, poor-but-becoming-empowered face” (McKinley 2003, 38). On the other hand, in Peru, the psychological cost of a history of colonialism, systematic marginalization and unequal economic development is a legacy of internal racism that has maintained its own assembly of symbols and meanings of indigeneity. McKinley (2003) observes that “there is a strong tendency to repudiate one’s local-ness the closer one gets to the actual locus of being local” (39).

When everyday experience in a country’s life portrays indigenous people as poor, ignorant and backward, those indigenous identities will be obviously rejected. For instance, McKinley (2003) narrates the visible annoyance that promotoras manifested on an occasion when wealthy donors visiting APRI were not able to distinguish them (promotoras, or “in their words— profesionales”) from the program participants (i.e. “real indigenas”) (40). In Loreto, where indigenous identities have not been commonly used as a political platform, the space for performative politics feels very limited (McKinley 2003). Instead of attempting to deploy or transcend the category of ‘indigenous’, promotoras engage in a form of flight by seeking to be distinguished as ‘profesionales’, a category constructed in virtue of their training and education. Faced with such dazzling embodiments of white cultural values (i.e. educated, wealthy, philanthropic donors) it would be indeed extraordinary to see those few promotoras authentically abiding in their indigenous identity. In contrast, indigenous identities are valuable and indeed embraced in other circles, for instance in international forums, where performative politics of indigeneity, as a careful and strategic display of ‘otherness’ can be a useful resource to reinforce the authenticity of their folk knowledge, or as a transnational appeal for autonomy when faced
with assimilationist regulations (McKinley 2003, 42). Even essentialist portrayals of indigenous identities are deployed, although in nuanced ways, by foreign development planners. For instance, McKinley (2003) admits as much about the directors of APRI in their quest for funding: “We use our ‘expert’ knowledge of local (i.e., exotic) indigenous practices to situate ourselves as privileged cultural insiders who can credibly carry out the brokerage between global and local” (40).

Closely related to the construction of local/indigenous knowledge is the introduction of parteras or traditional birth assistant (TBA) practices into global population programs. The endorsement of TBA corresponds with the trend in women’s health movements towards childbirth de-medicalization, but also with the desire of incorporating “local staff teams who can serve as credible culture brokers among ‘hard to reach’ (read: fertile), underserved (read: politically powerless) groups” (McKinley 2003, 48). However, the presence of a diversity of women in global population conferences does not automatically translate to a diversity of positions amongst the people that those ‘locals’ represent. In fact, it is not surprising that sponsors prefer sponsoring locals who share their views, especially (but not exclusively) regarding abortion (McKinley 2003, 36). In the Loretan context, the use of a (formally trained) partera is, generally, not a traditional practice in most riverine villages because, given its geography, the TBA would have to travel days on boat to reach the locality. In fact, a TBA is usually called only when there are clear complications and in many cases she arrives too late (McKinley 2003, 48). Instead, the network of support in rural parts of the Amazon takes place within a very particular kinship dynamic that assist the process during, before and after childbirth (McKinley 2003, 48).

Returning to the case of Lucia, the promotora who had her eighth child at home, her alternatives were: 1) to fetch a TBA—who, coming from far, is not necessarily a ‘local’ to Lucia; 2) to seek public health services—which were available and relatively close; or 3) to have her child at home just as she had the previous ones. Lucia chose the third option. Here it is worth analyzing whether her exercise of choice constitutes a sign of empowerment. To elaborate this discussion, let us refer to Nussbaum’s (2000) caveat that all choices have material preconditions, and that choices must be enabled not only by providing the service but also by developing women’s capacity to actually use those services. We can argue that if the use of a TBA was unlikely, at least there were public health services available. However, remembering the above discussion of the recent forceful reproductive interventions sponsored by the government and
the rationales behind it, it is crucial to recall that Lucia’s interaction with public health professionals—who usually espouse an urban, middle-class perspective towards fertility—would require her to muddle through the stigma of her female indigeneity, which defines her as an ignorant, recalcitrant, multi-birthing, poor woman (McKinley 2003, 48). Lucia internally negotiates her “body experience” which, on the one hand, tells her how she is perceived by the Peruvian bureaucracy, while on the other hand, gives her the confidence that, after eight childbirths, “her body knows what to do” (McKinley 2003, 48). In this way, her ‘performativity’ as an experienced female body moves her beyond imputed categories of irresponsible, irrational indigena. For Lucia, her re-claiming of reproductive practices constitutes a form of empowerment, albeit circumscribed by her limited options.

Regarding the APRI staff’s reluctance to provide community-based contraception and their preference to instead encourage women to seek them through the public sector, it may at first appear to contradict what I have just pointed out about the identity politics involved in public health services. However, a great deal of surveillance and monitoring is necessary for community-based contraception services to be effective, and for the organization’s practices to remain accountable (McKinley 2003, 49). Thus, privacy considerations prompt most indigenous women to prefer traveling far and deal with a (likely) patronizing bureaucracy to obtain contraceptives than to have a peer monitoring their sexuality and contraceptive practices. Thus, local staff avoids offering this service as “monitoring coexists uncomfortably with programs stressing choice, equity, and horizontality, when ‘peers’ are responsible for the surveillance” (McKinley 2003,49).

Another issue that can only be questioned through a nuanced perspective of the identity politics of age, gender and indigeneity is the assumption that all adolescent pregnancies are unintended and a sign of poor self-esteem. Teen pregnancies are not condemned by relatives and indigenous society as they are by outsiders (McKinley 2003, 52). In fact, grandmothers usually help take care of the child in cases where the father is absent. Otherwise, most adolescents that enter into conjugal unions and early pregnancies do so because of the independence and higher status in their community and extended family that starting a new family offers them, an opportunity that other options, such as staying in school, cannot yet offer to young girls in Loreto (McKinley 2003, 53).
As research studies on fertility and human development show, the directors and academics who wrote about APRI’s activities suggest that improving the living conditions in the area will cause fertility rates to drop (McKinley 2003; McKinley and Jensen 2003). Yet, as for what accounts for the decision of many Amazonian peoples to have a large family, they do not address directly. Nevertheless, we can speculate that the rationale for having few children—in order to provide them better care and education so that they have greater opportunities to find employment and thrive in life—makes little sense in the local context of Loreto, which is an isolated and largely rural area, where having many children means extra hands to work in the fields and to contribute to the sustenance and future security of elderly parents. Moreover, with high rates of illiteracy and a very small economy, investing in the education of Loreto’s youth does not guarantee that they will secure future employment opportunities as a result.

What does empowerment mean for women in this context? The previous discussion of the seeming contradictions in the endeavor of promoting indigenous women’s reproductive health reveals that although there may be government and internationally-funded schools and health facilities, choices will feel limited for women as long as “internalized oppression… restricts the options that people perceive as available and legitimate” (Rowlands 1995, 105). Let us now review how APRI has tried to expand those perceived options by fostering critical awareness and women’s capabilities.

A Mediated Transformation of Social and Gender Relations in “Bienvenida Salud!”

Since 1997, APRI has broadcasted a radio program called “Bienvenida Salud!” (Welcome Health) that reaches about 800,000 people in the Amazon. The program, a type of popular entertainment-education, has the goal of encouraging reflection and debate on reproductive health themes, local politics and gender relations. The program consists of socio-dramas (short radio-novellas), community histories, testimonials and interviews, news reports from communities, contests, raffles and regional music. Its target audience is mainly rural, indigenous women from 15 to 40 years of age (Sypher et al. 2002, 196). The authors explain that the rationale for targeting this age range of women lies in the fact that women in rural communities typically have at least one child by the age of 17. The social construction of women informing this program is illustrated in Sypher et al. (2002), when they write:
Women in Loreto are responsible for a myriad of reproductive and productive activities. Women's responsibilities and time constraints diminish the likelihood that they will attend to health messages that are not readily available, easily comprehensible, and locally relevant (197).

The role of the promotoras in the effectiveness of the broadcast is critical because they complement the radio campaigns with interpersonal communication and peer education during the monthly workshops that they convene in sixty-five five indigenous Amazonian communities. Being elected by their communities to participate in APRI, promotoras infuse the radio campaigns with credibility, authority and relevance. They not only stimulate reflexive processes and debate, but also gather input from the community that serves as a feedback for subsequent radio content, using those experiences to produce plays, socio-drama scripts and manuals, and to conduct workshops (McKinley and Jensen 2003,180). Let us note that the instruments of this approach stimulate the community to get involved because their input is not simply valued but indispensable for the relevance of the radio program. Sypher et al. (2002) emphasize the co-creation of content with the communities of study "who were empowered to name their own worlds and speak in their own voices" and they assert that as a result, the researcher and the researched have "joint ownership of ethical responsibilities and social change" (194, 203).

APRI's commitment to social and gender relations transformation notwithstanding, if they continue to be funded, the producers' team must make sure that they can demonstrate a measurable increase in the audience's knowledge in the use of contraceptives and safe motherhood (McKinley and Jensen 2003, 187). Indeed, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, who gave APRI $225,000 in 1999 towards Bienvenida Salud!, do not describe the program as working towards the advancement of reproductive rights, women's empowerment or the elimination of gender inequalities; in fact, the words 'rights', 'empowerment' and 'inequality' are not present in their announcement. Instead, emphasizing what they call "urgent health needs", they state that the program's goal is "to promote family planning, prenatal and postnatal care, and education initiatives that are designed to enhance opportunities for community development" (B&M Gates Foundation, 1999). This shuttle between the rhetoric of rights and that of needs reflects a similar shift back and forth between justice-oriented and instrumental rationales used to legitimize claims for women's reproductive health. This distinction is critical for women's empowerment: a rights-oriented health agenda would
regard women’s sexual and reproductive health initiatives as ends on its own, while a needs-based approach, such as the one espoused by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, subordinates these goals (even if inadvertently) to particular definitions of family wellbeing, community development or national priorities.

The transformation of social politics and gender relations, as well as the fundamental women’s empowerment required for it, are slow processes whose outcomes are hard to quantify. Given the socially constructed nature of meanings, conclusions are only “reflexive and interpretively flexible regarding the effects of entertainment-education interventions” (Sypher et al. 2002, 202). In order to observe the impact of Bienvenida Salud! on inciting social change after two years of broadcasting, APRI conducted a large-scale survey, sampling 614 respondents in twenty communities, half listeners and half not, and using participant observations, field notes, in-depth interviews and thousands of letters that they received over the life of the program (Sypher et al. 2002, 198-99). The results showed that they have managed significant penetration into the villages’ social system. With very low levels of literacy and scarce electricity, communication through mostly collectively owned, battery-powered radios is at the center of the mediascape in the Amazon. Some of the listening takes place in homes but most of it is communal, which ties it closely to social practices. In fact, communal listening reflects the same gender and kinship order present in society. That is, group listening takes place in gender segregated locations, which are organized by male community leaders (e.g. the teacher and the mayor). However, even groups exclusively composed of women do not automatically constitute a free forum for all female voices. The internal dynamics of exclusion-inclusion and power structures are also present within female listener groups. Identity politics, in this case, revolves around age. Middle-aged women speak the most while the other two generations, adolescents and elderly women, stay silent. Adolescents do not yet have the position to question the societal order represented by the elderly in the group. In contrast, senior women feel the need neither to challenge nor to justify the social system. The age hierarchy determines the role women play in female discussion groups, for “it is the powerful who do not have to speak, and the powerless who clamor for representation and interlocutory status in the new, mediated public sphere” (McKinley and Jensen 2003, 193).

Butler’s (1990) concepts of ‘performativity’ explain how the power of discourse creates the very spaces that it regulates. And it does so through the ritualistic performance of social actions. The
generational boundaries demarcate the limitations of voice forums, where local discursive powers determine who can speak and what can be said. Nevertheless, young girls do communicate, alternatively, by writing letters to the program. In this way, they can raise concerns that cannot be voiced in public, not even in an all-women discussion group, such as sexual abuse by teachers or children’s rights (McKinley and Jensen 2003, 194). The letters received constitute a written testimony of women’s lived experiences, personal narratives infused with an intimate tone that is unusual outside the private space (McKinley and Jensen 2003, 194). Furthermore, despite common knowledge that they are intended to be shared in a public sphere, none of the letters are anonymous (McKinley and Jensen 2003, 196), a fact that displays a political performative form of public space appropriation. Male leaders also write to the program, using the impersonal style that is characteristic of Peruvian bureaucratic communications, a choice of style that is also emblematic of their male discursive power (McKinley and Jensen 2003, 195-96). Although the male voice remains formal as opposed to the earnest tone of female writers, male interest in partaking in the radio discussions—whose main target audience are women—is a sign that gender relationships are under transformation.

Overall, however, indigenous women’s participation in this media space is not tantamount to real power within the decision-making process. The focus of the radio program is to stir the power within, by raising voices with the potential to awaken a critical consciousness, and then gather power with others by facilitating communal spaces for debate, mutual learning and support. Despite indications that indigenous women’s perceptions of themselves are shifting, the leap to a democratic pattern of political participation still remains a distant reality. Yet, by focusing on individual’s minds as the site of power, the dialogical practices that are taking place at the local level are creating a “critical consciousness” that can link together the embodied experiences of women across villages. Because the content design of the radio program takes women’s “body experience” as a knowledge base in matters of health, reproduction and gender inequalities, women realize the commonality of their experiences across villages. This realization has the potential to build a united and strengthened gender consciousness, which in turn, represents a sign of a visible, albeit slow, move towards the power to change social and gender relations.

This media initiative is moving away from the categorization of indigenous women as helpless and irrationally attached to harmful traditions and towards a construction of their identities as agents
capable of understanding their situation, voicing their concerns and devising their own solutions. This is evidenced in a number of ways. For instance, the program outreaches to women, usually a mechanism used amongst the ‘advantaged’ groups. Also by co-producing the content, their voices and different positions are the guidelines to review, contest and negotiate population planning and gender-based development discourse (Sypher et al. 2002, 182). Masculine identities are being negotiated as well. As mentioned above, men listen to the program too. Feedback from their letters and discussion groups’ reports revealed that they too contest and often complain about their portrayal in radio stories. For example, on one episode about a drunken abusive husband, men “felt ashamed, and decided to write their own socio-drama telling their side of the story” (McKinley and Jensen 2003, 190). That input was later incorporated into the program by changing male images from negative to transitional roles. In that manner, identities are performed and transformed through concerted dialogues that show that gender identities are not essential cores, but rather fluid sets of meanings susceptible to deconstruction and change. Additionally, although the disproportionately male leadership in indigenous movements has often neglected to prioritize women’s concerns on the political agenda (Bant and Girard 2008, 248), feminist discourse in Loreto is taking an indigenous format. In the Peruvian Amazon, what was before considered “women’s talk” now makes up the issues discussed during prime time in a top-rated radio program, Bienvenida Salud! In this way, the identity shift that is being promoted enables the capability to see oneself and one’s social location, to perceive more available options and to mobilize to create a new reality. The feminist slogan “the personal is the political” evokes the manner in which gaining reproductive autonomy in the most personal of realms is, in and of itself, a very political practice.

Conclusion

I have explored the dynamics of women’s multiple identities (gender, indigeneity, age, local-global) and their convergence in the reproductive body as both the site of contestation and the locus of empowerment. Empowerment was understood as a multi-dimensional process that first takes place at the core of the individual stripped of all identities, or—in other words—at the point where all identities intersect. By looking at the activities of a reproductive rights organization dedicated to promoting women’s empowerment, I observed the limitations of such an enterprise when faced with material constraints, global and national pressures around the prospect of leaving the reproduction of the ‘wrong’ kinds of people
unchecked, and a sociohistorical reality that has left these communities at the very margins of power with a legacy of racism and inequality. Nevertheless, I have also explored the potential and possibility of transforming the present order through a process of raising awareness, stirring debate and reflection and negotiating the partially externally-imposed identities. I focused on the female body as an active subject, choosing, rejecting or transforming reproductive interventions according to their local logic. And I explored the possibility of revealing and strengthening new collective narratives that can help reconstruct identities as empowered rather than powerless.

Though I have used reproductive health and reproductive rights somewhat interchangeably, they are not the same. For reproductive health initiatives to be more than solely the provision of services but also contribute to women’s empowerment, they need to be committed to the strengthening of rights. They need to construct women’s health as an end on its own and represent women as subjects entitled to the right to exercise their choices. In turn, it is indispensable for their choices to have real material foundations to be able to support a social transformation. A shift as such in the policy paradigm will hardly come from above, given the fixation with the numbers game of population control. Although already existing in global rhetoric, the shift needs to be actualized from below. Yet, first and foremost, it needs to be summoned from within.
Bibliography


Ideology in the Warfare State:
An Analysis of Attitudes towards Women and Childbirth in Nazi Family Policy
(1933-1939)

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Abstract:

It is tempting to consider Hitler's seizure of power on January 30, 1933 as a caesura in German history, particularly in light of the nightmarish Nazi laws and policies implemented in the years leading up to the Second World War. Cataclysmic social, political, and economic crises were commonplace in interwar European welfare states, however, where dwindling birthrates and shifting population demographics permeated domestic policy and led to the introduction of pronatal laws. This article examines the ways in which depopulation concerns took on a radically different connotation in the Nazi “warfare state”, where the uniquely harrowing implementation of pronatal and antinatal policies between the years 1933 and 1939 became the crux of the Nazi worldview. Through a careful investigation of Nazi family policy, it becomes evident that a link can be forged between pronatal and antinatal policies- a connection that would serve to reinforce and legitimize the Nazi ideology of women and childbirth.
Biography

Katherine Rossy is pursuing her Masters in modern European history at Concordia University in Montreal, Quebec. Her graduate thesis examines French occupation policies toward German women and children during the immediate postwar German situation in 1945. Katherine is currently serving as President of Concordia’s Graduate History Students’ Association, Faculty Director of Arts and Science of the Graduate Students’ Association, and Editor of Concordia’s History in the Making Review. She is also a member of the Golden Key International Honour Society.
It is tempting to consider Hitler’s seizure of power on January 30, 1933 as a caesura in German history, particularly in light of the nightmarish laws and policies that targeted “racially impure” minorities such as Jews, Slavs, Afro-Germans, Gypsies, Communists and Marxists, Jehovah’s Witnesses and homosexuals in the years leading up to the Second World War. Nazi Germany was not the only European nation that was saturated with paranoia and intolerance, however. Cataclysmic social, political, and economic crises were commonplace in interwar European welfare states, where dwindling birthrates and shifting population demographics permeated domestic policy and led to the introduction of pronatal policies that promoted human reproduction (Flora and Heidenheimer 1981, 19). Depopulation concerns took on a radically different connotation in Nazi Germany, however, cleverly called a “warfare state” by British clergyman Archbishop William Temple during Churchill’s wartime coalition government in Britain (Flora and Heidenheimer 1981, 19).

Since Nazi authorities believed that the birthrate of “racially pure” Germans was steadily decreasing, Hitler implemented a series of antinatal policies designed to discriminately limit the growth of the interwar German population. 2

During a speech at a women’s exhibit opening in Berlin in March 1934, Joseph Goebbels, the Reichsminister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, insisted that “in 1900, two million babies were born in Germany. Now the number has fallen to one million ... In the last fourteen years, Berlin’s birthrate has become the lowest of any European city” (Goebbels 1933, 1). Drastic efforts must be taken to prevent the German population from declining to three million inhabitants by 1955, Goebbels continued, since “the government is determined to halt this decline of the family and the resulting impoverishment of our blood” (Goebbels 1933, 1).

The years of 1933-1939, that is, from Hitler’s seizure of power to the eve of the Second World War, were dominated by a medley of pronatal and antinatal laws and policies designed to increase the birthrate of “racially pure” Germans while eliminating that of persons deemed “racially impure” by Nazi authorities. The repopulation of “racially pure” Germans became the crux of the Nazi worldview much to the detriment of the “racially impure”, as those who were not considered “ideal” members of Nazi society were subjected

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2 It is imperative to note that my use of inflammatory and offensive terms like “racially pure” and “racially impure” are Nazi terminologies. These concepts will be placed in parentheses throughout my article in order to distinguish between my ideas and those that were central to Nazi ideology.
to a destructive worldview laced by anti-Semitism, anti-Bolshevism, and a murderous expansionist policy called Lebensraum. According to Jill Stephenson, a leading historian on women in the Third Reich, “ideal” Nazi society was composed of the German mother, the German soldier and the German farmer (Stephenson 1981, 69). Careful analysis of Nazi family policy and natalist propaganda, such as the cover page of the official Nazi magazine for women in Figure 1, exposes recurrent militaristic, maternal, and agrarian motifs that compose Stephenson’s (1981) trichotomy of ideal Nazi Society.

While pronatal policies and propaganda served as a powerful medium by which “racially pure” Germans were cast as ideals of Nazi society, antinatal policies and propaganda persecuted those who were deemed “racially impure”. This led to a polarization of the Nazi population and set the precedent for some of Hitler’s most horrendous atrocities. In this regard, one can argue that Nazi attitudes toward women and childbirth were culminated by natalist policy. The purpose of this article, therefore, is to investigate the ways in which pronatal and antinatal policies reinforced and legitimized one another’s ideological intent in order institutionalize Nazi attitudes toward women and childbirth.

![Figure 1](image-url)
Cover page of NS-Frauen Warte (1937/1938), the official Nazi Party magazine for German women. Notice that Jill Stephenson’s trichotomy of ideal Nazi society is depicted through the motifs of the German mother, the German soldier, and the German farmer.

Part I

Policies and Propaganda: A Methodological Conundrum

The creation of the National Socialist Ministry of Propaganda and Enlightenment in March 1933 by Reichsminister Joseph Goebbels led to a radical restructuring of modes of communication and expression, particularly with regards to political propaganda (Welch 2002: 28). For the purpose of this investigation, it is crucial to note that propaganda analysis is by no means an innovative methodology. Theoreticians had long ago recognized its influence and persuasiveness as an apparatus of power.

In his essay “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation)”, Louis Althusser distinguishes between two types of state apparatuses. The first, an Ideological State Apparatus, is defined as a set of certain “distinct and specialized institutions” that include varying religious, educational, political, and cultural components; these apparatuses can coexist amongst one another, occupy a “private domain”, and use ideology to realize their objectives (Althusser 1971, 143-144). The second apparatus, according to Althusser, is a Repressive State Apparatus, a distinct phenomenon in that there can only exist a single Repressive State Apparatus in the “public domain” that uses violence to achieve its objectives (Althusser 1971, 143-144). Thus, while there can only be one Repressive State Apparatus, such as the Nazi Ministry of Propaganda and Enlightenment, there can be a “plurality” of Ideological State Apparatuses, which may explain why there were so many propaganda mills in Weimar Germany following the First World War as opposed to one central propaganda organization in the Third Reich.

Nazi propaganda, then, must have been composed of various sub-elements. In an interview titled “Confessions of the Flesh”, Michel Foucault elaborated his theory of l’appareil d’état (state apparatus). An apparatus, according to Foucault, is a “heterogeneous ensemble” that establishes relations between discourses, institutions, and philosophies to express “the said as much as the unsaid” (Foucault 1980, 194-195). Theodor Adorno’s work on American
fascist propaganda and anti-Semitism offers crucial insight into Nazi propaganda frameworks as well. Adorno (1994) argues that fascist and anti-Semitic propaganda speeches create unrealistic imagery that attack “bogies rather than real opponents”; by completely lacking “discursive logic”, fascist propaganda links together ideas that are vaguely similar and devoid of rationality (222-223).

Antonio Gramsci’s model of cultural hegemony also offers crucial insight into the mechanisms behind Nazi propaganda. For Gramsci (2010), fascism does not emerge from the dominance of political and economic ideologies and interests; rather, it springs from the total control of all spheres of society through the promotion of a national aim, a phenomenon he calls “cultural hegemony” (179, 169, 137). Together, these foundational theories create a lens through which one can filter his or her understanding of prewar Nazi natalist policies and propaganda. By considering how political propaganda mediated policy and ideology, one can begin to understand how Nazi pronatal and antinatal policies served as a powerful vehicle of feminine marginalization.

Although Nazi pronatal and antinatal propaganda and policies converge at one particular point in their attempts to control female reproductive capacities between 1933 and 1939, analyzing them in a single framework is nevertheless a daunting task. The historiography on German women in the Third Reich is dynamic and constantly in flux. Scholars continually challenge and re-interpret the contentious discourse about German women as perpetrators, victims, and active and passive agents during one of the most destructive regimes in modern history. The episteme on women’s roles in the Third Reich do converge at one particular point, however. It posits that the Nazi Regime was intensely misogynistic and patriarchal, and that Nazi leaders sought to repopulate the Aryan race by driving women out of the public sphere and into the domestic one.

Although the blatant misogyny of the Third Reich is a constant variable in the historiography on German women, analyzing the numerous points of contention on women in the Third Reich generates a conundrum. Failing to acknowledge the misogynistic nature of Nazi ideology would be an egregious historical omission. Attempting to historicize it, however, would veer dangerously close to labeling German women as victims. The renowned scholarly rivalry between leading Nazi women historians Claudia Koonz and Gisela Bock captures the essence of this methodological conundrum. According to Koonz, the “Nazi conscience” was the driving force
behind the expulsion and extermination of German Jews, as the implications of this “secular ethos” only extended to “racially pure” German women (Koonz 2003, 6-7). Since German women actively fulfilled the roles of child bearer, provider and worker, she continues, then they, too, were perpetrators of the Holocaust (Koonz 2003, 6-7). Koonz’s (2003) arguments oppose those of Gisela Bock, who argues that the Nazi laws and policies were gendered, and were therefore laced with the same prejudices and biases as Nazi racial policies (Bock 1992, 82-83). Since National Socialism did not create nor advocate equality between the sexes, Bock (1992) argues, then those who believe that National Socialism favored women are most likely confusing “propaganda with actual policies” (83).

Although Koonz’s (2003) and Bock’s (1992) theories set the precedent for the discourse on German women and National Socialism, scholars have continually failed to consider how pronatal and antinatal Nazi policies and propaganda legitimized and reinforced one another’s ideological intent. It is certainly no small feat to discuss how “racially pure” and “racially impure” women were stripped of their agency in the Third Reich, however, this does not explain the reasons why the Nazi ideology of women and childbirth was successfully indoctrinated into the Nazi worldview. In this regard, it is crucial to keep Bock’s point of view in mind; one ought not to confuse propaganda with National Socialist policies, even though both aspects were cornerstones in the Nazi worldview.

Although it is certainly true that National Socialist speeches and rhetoric were instrumental in the institutionalization of Nazi natal policies, pronatalism and antinatalism were most effectively politicized through visual means. The following two propaganda images, cover pages from Hitler Youth publications, demonstrate how Nazi propagandists combined agrarian, militaristic, and maternal motifs to create separate homosocial spheres within the “racially pure” German youth. In other words, they aimed to drive young girls out of public life and into the home, where they were to have babies.
Figure 2

A cover page of Das Deutsche Mädel, September 1937, a unique declaration of Nazi foreign policy and of the Nazi worldview.
The cover page of the September 1937 issue of Das Deutsche Mädel (Figure 2), the official Nazi magazine for German girls, politicizes Nazi ideology through Lebensraum and gender dichotomies. A young girl, her hair modestly covered, is depicted as a housewife while a young boy is portrayed as a farmer. Together, they symbolize the Nazi ideal of a mass, agrarian utopia for the Germanic people. The map above depicts the Reich’s shifting borders and eerily foreshadows Anschluss, the Nazi annexation of Austria that would take place a mere five months later (Feldman and Steininger 2008, 13). Most astoundingly, however, is that the map reincorporates the territories that had been annexed by the League of Nations after the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 into Germany’s borders, including the
then-French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, the coal and iron-ore rich Saarland, parts of Belgium, West Prussia, and Upper Silesia (Stone 2009, 14). This illustration can thus be considered both pronatal propaganda and an early example of Nazi foreign policy.

The cover page of a February 1939 issue of Die Kameradschaft (Figure 3), a periodical for Hitler Youth leaders, conveys a similar pronatal message: “Eighty million Germans live on five-hundred eighty thousand square kilometers” of land, the illustration reads, while once again including Austria in the Reich’s borders even though Anschluss had yet to be carried out. Farmers, housewives, and children are tightly squeezed on the map to symbolize an overpopulated nation with insufficient living space, a clear attempt to promote Lebensraum. Both of these images are part of a larger Nazi ideological trend, and mark attempts to indoctrinate the Nazi ideology of Lebensraum into the youth’s worldview.

Art historian Joan Schwartz argues that visual media have “visual agenda[s]” and are thus “social constructs capable of performing ideological work” (Schwartz 1996, 29, 21). These agendas, Schwartz (1996) continues, enforce particular worldviews and “serve the interests [of] the photographers who made them, the patrons who commissioned them, the entrepreneurs who published them and the audiences who consumed them” (35). Careful study of Nazi visual propaganda reveals that natalist visual media was, in fact, designed with a specific ideological purpose in mind. Visual analysis exposes specific militaristic, maternal, and agrarian motifs that are consistent with Jill Stephenson’s theory about the ideal trichotomy of Nazi society, thus suggesting that the institutionalization of the Nazi ideology of women and childbirth mediated policies and propaganda (Stephenson 1981: 69).

Part II

Depopulation: A Continental Crisis

Birth control, according to Hitler, generated the “obvious desire to ‘save’ even the weakest and most sickly at any price” (Hitler [1925] 1999, 131-132). Although Hitler seldom mentions women in Mein Kampf, his seven-hundred page manifesto, a testimony to his misogynistic view of women in general, his nightmarish worldview became shockingly clear when the National Socialist Registry Office began distributing Mein Kampf to all newlywed couples for eight Reichsmarks a piece on May 1, 1936 (Ryan and Gumbrecht 2004, 795). His fanatic obsession with “racial purity” resonated throughout his Second Book as well, published posthumously in 1961, in which
he argues that pacifistic policies will generate a “racially weakened” nation state. He maintained that devoid of its Nordic blood, this would lead to the inevitable demise of the Germanic people (Hitler [1961] 2006, 13, 20). A decrease in the national birthrate, he continued, would compromise the essence of Lebensraum in that “a reduction in the birth rate eliminates those with superior qualities, while emigration destroys the average quality of the people” (Hitler [1961] 2006, 13, 20).

Pronatalism was by no means an advent of Nazi Germany, however. Depopulation anxieties dominated the domestic policies of the Soviet Union and many Western European nations long before Hitler’s seizure of power in 1933. The 1920s and 1930s witnessed a great deal of crisis and instability in France, Italy, and the Soviet Union, where issues about reproduction, gender, and the consolidation of women’s rights furrowed the brows of many policy makers.

Historian David L. Hoffman argues that the mass loss of life resulting from the First World War forced European and Soviet governments to pursue pronatal policies during the interwar period, although Soviet policies were radically different from their Western European counterparts due to the communist regime from which they emerged (Hoffman 2000: 35-36). Society’s disenchantment with four and a half years of warfare ushered in a modern and industrialized era where “a large and disciplined population was seen as essential for national power” and where “governments increasingly intervened to raise the birthrate and ensure the healthy upbringing of citizens” (Hoffman 2000, 35-36). This is certainly true of post-First World War France, where pronatalism coloured the ideologies of both the Left and the Right and became central to the “social question” (Jenson 1986, 16). Aristide Briand, Edouard Daladier, and Georges Clemenceau each shared a strong desire to strengthen the French population demographic regardless of their respective political leanings (Kalman 2008, 135).

Depopulation was not the only concern of French politicians and policymakers, however.
A set of posters by the Confédération Générale du Travail, a French national trade union, (c. 1919-1939). The images juxtapose the effects of long and short workdays on French families and thus strongly reinforce the heterosexual family unit and the importance of family life in interwar France.

The horrors of the First World War still dominated the French collective conscience, as half of all Frenchmen between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five had been killed by 1918 (Hoffman 2000: 37). Fear of depopulation and the memory of the Great War were further intensified by French Revanchism and Germanophobia, national sentiments whose origins can be traced back to France’s crushing defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1871 and the German Empire’s annexation of Alsace and Lorraine (Camiscioli 2009: 44). These factors fostered a climate that allowed pronatal policies to flourish during the French Third Republic, which in turn led to the introduction of family allowances, financial compensation for first-borns, and intensified efforts to criminalize abortion (Camiscioli 2009: 44). These pronatal policies culminated in 1920, when contraceptives were made illegal, and then again in 1923, when a new law stipulated harsher penalties for abortionists and women who terminated their pregnancies (Hoffman 2000: 39). The centrality of French family policy becomes especially evident in Figure 4, a Confédération...
Fascist Italy is perhaps most notorious for her pronatal policies and “demographic battles” during the interwar years (De Grazia 1993, 41). Dictator Benito Mussolini’s depopulation anxieties are most clearly reflected in his militant Ascension Day Speech to Parliament on May 26, 1927: “Let’s be clear: what are forty million Italians against 90 million Germans and 200 million Slavs? Let us look to the West: what are 40 million Italians against 40 million French plus 90 millions from the Colonies, or against 46 million British, plus 450 millions in the Colonies? [...] Gentlemen, Italy, in order to count for something, must face the second half of this century with a population not inferior to 60 million” (Falasca-Zamponi 2000, 158). The pronatal policies that Mussolini had put into effect a year earlier certainly reinforce his anxiety. Anyone who used contraceptives or who performed or underwent abortion was penalized, and unmarried Italian men between the ages of twenty-five and sixty-five were subject to a bachelor tax, a measure that Mussolini called a “demographic jolt” (Ipsen 2002, 73). Mussolini’s family policy is certain consistent with the Fascist ideology surrounding women and childbirth, one that is reflected by interwar propaganda publications such as the Rivista delle Famiglie in Figure 5.
The cover page of the June 1936 issue of Rivista delle Famiglie, a monthly illustrated Milanese Fascist Party magazine targeted toward Italian women and their families.

In spite of Mussolini’s pronatal policies, however, Fascist Italian pronatalism began to fail by 1938, when the national birthrate began to decrease (Forucci 2010, 5). Paul Ginsborg (2000) argues that Italian pronatalism was unsuccessful because Mussolini’s family policies were quite lenient in comparison to the “high degree of control and terror exercised upon families by Hitler and Stalin” (420). Still, while Italian pronatalism had failed, it nevertheless forms an interesting case study in conjunction with the Nazi warfare state.

The Soviet Union implemented several pronatal policies in the 1920s as well. Initially, the Bolsheviks had not been concerned by family policy, yet abortion laws were nevertheless liberalized after the Russian Revolution of 1917. Abortion and birth control were legalized in 1920 and 1923 respectively (Ginsborg 2000, 414; Hoffman 2000, 39). Soviet family policy shifted radically during the Stalinist Regime,
however, when it refracted in order to increase the Russian birthrate (Ginsborg 2000, 414).

In June of 1936, the Soviet Union issued a decree to criminalize abortion (Ginsborg 2000, 427). A section of the decree also promised to annually award women two thousand rubles for each additional child that they had after six children, with an increase of five thousand rubles for each child that they had after their tenth child (Hoffman 2000, 41). The Soviet government also generously funded maternity wards, pediatric hospitals, and nurseries in order to accommodate a potential increase in the national birthrate (Hoffman 2000, 41). In spite of a brief increase in Russian birthrates between 1936 and 1938, the birthrate dipped below its 1935 level due to factors including widespread poverty, endemic hunger, and slashes in maternity benefit funding, making Stalin’s demographic battle equally as unsuccessful as Mussolini’s (Ginsborg, 428). Although pronatal policies ultimately failed in France, Fascist Italy, and the Soviet Union, their respective family policies did not polarize the population demographic as radically as Nazi family policy did. Rather, Nazi natalist policies discriminated against religion, ethnicity, and political affiliation, leading them to implement just as many antinatal policies as pronatal policies between 1933 and 1939 (Ginsborg 2000, 428).

It would be an egregious error to overlook Weimar family politics just because the Third Reich presents an exceptional case. The Weimar Republic witnessed a relative consolidation of liberties and freedom for German women. Between 1919 and 1933, one hundred and eleven female politicians sat in the Reichstag from center and left-leaning parties (Stibbe 2003, 16). In addition, there was a growing yet divided feminist movement in Weimar Germany composed of a late nineteenth century bourgeois women’s movement and a youth movement that strove for gender equality and comradeship, both of which were criminalized upon Hitler’s seizure of power. Despite the seemingly liberal attitude of the “New Woman”, however, Weimar leaders did not condone promiscuity and sexuality as popular culture often suggests. Although abortion was decriminalized in 1927, it was only permitted if pregnancy posed as a risk to the health of a woman (Quine 2002, 108). During that same year, Weimar leaders also passed the Maternity Protection Act, which protected the rights of female workers by making contraceptives readily available to the working class (Quine 2002, 108).

These innovative family policies were short-lived, however. German Chancellor Heinrich Brüning’s disastrous efforts to counter the effects of the Wall Street Crash of October 29, 1929 led to the
near-collapse of the German economy. Widespread tax increases, staggering unemployment rates, funding cuts, and bankruptcy made social benefits and welfare unfeasible, which led to much public discontent with the Brüning administration (Quine 2002, 108). The “collapse of the Weimar welfare state”, Maria-Sophia Quine (2002) argues, most likely set the precedent for “negative eugenics” where people began to consider the “racially unfit”, especially the mentally and physically impaired, as societal burdens and unworthy recipients of welfare and state benefits (108). Consequently, the turbulent tail-end of the Weimar Republic led to the growing influence of the Communist Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD) and the Fascist Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP). The latter of these parties, the Nazi Party, was in many ways a continuation of Russian and Western European society’s long-standing tradition of intolerance. None of these interwar welfare and warfare states, however, institutionalized natalist ideology to the same degree of terror and efficiency as the Third Reich.

Part III

Institutionalizing Antinatalism: The Fate of the “Racially Impure”

Before one can understand how the Nazis attempted to increase the birthrate of “racially pure” Germans, it is first necessary to examine the ways in which “racially impure” non-Aryans were targeted and racialized by antinatal policies and propaganda. Goebbels once stated that “The goal is not: ‘children at any cost’ but: ‘racially worthy, physically and mentally unaffected children of German families’” (Bock and Thane 1994, 240). Goebbels believed that “childbearing in itself is, from the race viewpoint, far from being a merit” (Bock and Thane 1994, 240). Since Nazi family policy was composed of just as many antinatal policies as pronatal policies, and since the prewar German population was composed of women from numerous religions, ethnicities and political affiliations, analyzing the policies that were designed to prevent the births of “non-Aryans” will yield crucial insight into how ideology was institutionalized between 1933 and 1939.

In Mein Kampf, Hitler insists that “defective people” must be prevented from “propagating equally defective offspring” (Hitler [1925] 1999, 255). This ideology is consistent with Gisela Bock’s research on the forced sterilizations and abortions that were inflicted upon two million eastern European workers during the Second World War, the majority of whom were Russian, Polish and Ukrainian women (Burds
These procedures were ruthlessly executed in order to prevent German men from fathering Mischlinge, children of “mixed blood”, during the Second World War’s eastern campaigns (Burds 2009, 41-42).

The forced sterilization of eastern European women was by no means an isolated atrocity, however. On July 14, 1933, Hitler passed the Law for the Prevention of Genetically Diseased Offspring, also known as the “Sterilization Law”; furthermore, on September 18, 1935, he passed the Law for the Protection of the Hereditary Health of the German People (Stackelberg 2007, 303). These antinatal laws prevented physically and psychologically impaired persons from having children, and often sterilized them if they did not possess a certificate from the Office of Health that attested to their racial fitness (Stackelberg 2007, 283).

Children of “mixed blood”, especially Afro-Germans, were ruthlessly targeted by Nazi authorities as well. On April 14, 1933, Hermann Göring, Reichsminister of the Interior, instructed Nazi physicians to conduct an investigation into the numbers of mixed blood children living in Germany (Pommerin 1982, 320). Two years later, in March 1935, Reichminister Wilhelm Frick held a secret meeting in Berlin to decide the fate of Afro-German children. Although no law legally permitted it, Frick decided that children of “mixed blood” would be sterilized in a secret operation, and the children’s mothers were given an ultimatum to either allow their children to be sterilized or to be sent to concentration camps (Pommerin 1982, 321-2). On April 21, 1937, the Gestapo established three headquarters for the secret operation in Wiesbaden, Ludwigshafen, and Koblenz; soon thereafter, three hundred and eighty-five mixed-blood children aged seven to seventeen were sterilized against their will (Pommerin 1982, 322).
Figure 6

Anti-Allied Nazi propaganda depicting the alleged rape of “racially pure” German women during the Allied occupation of the Rhineland after the First World War. This image marks an example of how Nazi propagandists distorted Weimar national memory in order to target children of mixed blood.

Included in this number was a seventeen year-old boy cabin boy who was arrested by the Gestapo in a Dutch Rhine steamer in Duisburg harbor for treason and then sterilized in the Protestant Hospital in Cologne (Pommerin 1982, 315-316). The boy was a Mischlinge, a child of “mixed blood”, who had been fathered by a French African colonial occupation soldier during the Rhineland Occupation of 1919-1923. Gestapo records reveal that the boy was “a descendant of a member of the former Allied occupation forces, in this case a negro from Madagascar, and shows corresponding typical anthropological characteristics, for which reason he shall be sterilized” (Pommerin 1982, 322). The Anti-Allied Propaganda image (Figure 6) presents a particularly convincing case about the way in which Nazi authorities distorted the Weimar memory of the post-First World War period in order to persecute those who were considered “racially impure” with regards to the Nazi worldview.
As horrific as they were, these antinatal racial policies merely served as stepping stones toward the most harrowing Nazi racial policy of all, the Nuremberg Laws of September 15, 1935. The Nuremberg Laws, composed of Laws for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour, forbade marriage and sexual relations between Jewish-Germans and non-Jewish Germans, prevented Jews from employing German women as domestic workers, and even forbade Jews from wearing or displaying the Nazi flag and national colours (Noakes and Pridham 1975, 365-366). The Nazi children’s storybook Der Giftpilz (Figure 7) is certainly testimony to the horrific way in which anti-Semitism coloured antinatal policies in the Third Reich. Anti-Semitism also coexisted alongside misogyny and anti-Marxism in Hitler’s worldview. Hitler’s speeches of 1934 and 1935 portray the liberal, Marxist ideologies of the Weimar Republic as ideologically threatening by stating that women are unfit to participate in public spheres dominated by “both man and society” (Hitler 1934, 255-256). The genderization of social spheres is also explicitly expressed in Hitler’s speech to the Nazi Women’s Organization on September 8, 1934, in which he identifies the Versailles Diktat, Bolshevism, and the “Jewish Problem” as key causes of Germany’s strife during the interwar years. The Nazi ideology of women, furthermore, is also clearly expressed alongside intense anti-Semitic and anti-Marxist sentiments:

What the man gives in courage on the battlefield, the woman gives in eternal self-sacrifice, in eternal pain and suffering. Every child that a woman brings into the world is a battle, a battle waged for the existence of her people. And both must therefore mutually value and respect each other when they see that each performs the task that Nature and Providence have ordained (…) It is not true, as Jewish intellectuals assert, that respect depends on the overlapping of the spheres of activity of the sexes; this respect demands that neither sex should try to do that which belongs to the sphere of the other (Hitler 1934: 255-256).

This passage makes Hitler’s ideology of women and childbirth resoundingly clear. By juxtaposing militarism and maternalism, two central components of the ideal trichotomy of Nazi society, it becomes evident that Hitler blamed “Jewish Marxism” and its supposed insistence on women’s emancipation for the depopulation of the German Reich. In doing so, he also promoted the creation of separate masculine and feminine spheres.
Figure 7

An excerpt from Der Giftpilz (The Toadstool), an anti-Semitic Nazi children’s book published by the leading Nazi propagandist Julius Streicher in 1938. The story warns German children of the dangers of interacting with “racially impure” Jews.

In light of the numerous laws and policies implemented to prevent the births of the “racially impure”, Gisela Bock estimates that between ten and thirty per cent of “racially unfit” women were
sterilized from 1933 to 1945 (Bock and Thane 1994, 240). According to the Party Race Policy Office, only ten to thirty percent of women were actually “worthy of procreation” (Bock and Thane 1994, 240). The horrific nature of Nazi antinatal policies and propaganda offers insight into the reasons why the social construct of “race” disappeared from the academic lexicon after 1945, as will be examined (Grossmann 2009, 3-4).

Part IV

*Politicizing Pronatalism: A Gateway into the Institutionalization of Nazi Ideology*

A 1938 Christmas Day newspaper article from the Völkischer Beobachter, the official Nazi propaganda newspaper, reveals the degree to which Nazi leaders considered childbearing the principle patriotic duty of German women:

> The prolific German mother is to be accorded the same place of honor in the German Volk community as the combat soldier, since she risks her body and her life for the people and the Fatherland as much as the combat soldier does in the roar and thunder of battle.” With these words, Reich Physician Leader Dr. Wagner, head of the People’s Health Section in the Reich leadership of the party, at the behest of the Fuhrer, announced the creation of a Medal of Honor for prolific German Mothers at the Party Day of Labor. Three million German mothers, on the German Mother’s Day in 1939, for the first time will be solemnly awarded the new badge of honor by the leaders of the party (Mosse 2003, 45-46).

This article is referring to the Cross of Honour for the German Mother programme, also known as the MutterKreuz, one of the main Nazi pronatal policies designed to increase the birthrate of “racially pure” Germans. Every year on August 12, Hitler’s mother’s birthday, German mothers were awarded a bronze cross if they had four children, a silver cross if they had six children,
Figure 8

A cover page of Die Madelschaft (July 1937), a Hitler youth propaganda publication for German girls. Its inscription reads: “So long I live, so long I laugh”. This image attempts to aestheticize pronatal Nazi ideology.

and a gold cross if they had eight children (Noakes and Pridham, 365-366). Hitler believed that offering national recognition for women’s childbirth accomplishments would give women the incentive to remain in the home and strengthen the population demographic. The coverpage of a 1937 issue of Die Madelschaft (Figure 8), a Hitler Youth publication for German girls, is certainly consistent with this ideology about women and childbirth.

The MutterKreuz is not the only Nazi pronatal policy that awarded women’s ability to bear children, however. Nazi authorities made every attempt to drive women out of the public sphere and into the domestic one. Even Hitler’s dramatic reduction of the unemployment rate, from six million to five hundred thousand people between the years of 1933 and 1937, was guided by the desire to create separate homosocial spheres (Hall and Ferguson 1998, 132).
On July 1, 1933, Hitler passed the Law to Reduce Unemployment, which included the Law for the Encouragement of Marriage. This policy offered “racially pure” newlywed couples loans of one thousand Reichsmarks and allowed them to keep two hundred and fifty Reichsmarks for each child that they had (Noakes and Pridham 1975, 365-366; Kuhl 2002, 29). If the couple had four children, they were no longer required to repay the loan. By offering one thousand Reichsmarks (approximately one fifth of an average annual German worker’s salary), to “racially pure” couples tax and interest free, women had the incentive to leave the workforce and remain at home (Gellately 2007, 332; Stibbe 2003, 40).

Although the policy unabashedly sought to confine women to the domestic sphere, seven hundred thousand couples applied for the marriage loan between 1933 and 1937 (Gellately 2007, 334). Parenthetically, the drastic reduction in unemployment between 1933 and 1937 is not, by any means, due solely to the circulation of marriage loans. Hitler did not merely reduce unemployment through the creation of new jobs; rather, he removed women from the workforce altogether and did not place them on the unemployment register (Geary 2000, 57). In spite of these facts, these policies mark a crucial turning point in Nazi family policy.

Although pronatalism was a central component of Nazi natalist ideology, this did not necessarily lead to the institutionalization of pronuptualism in the Third Reich, as was the case in Fascist Italy. In fact, the Nazi regime made divorce easily accessible to childless couples starting in July, 1938 so that each party could remarry and respectively have children (Ginsborg 2000, 427). According to Lisa Pine, Nazi authorities even encouraged women to give birth out of wedlock if it meant that their babies would be “racially pure”: “The National Socialist state no longer sees in the single mother the ‘degenerate’… It places the single mother who has given a child a life higher than the ‘lady’, who has avoided having children in her marriage on egotistical grounds” (Pine 1999, 39). Analyzing this ideology in conjunction with the twenty-first clause of the Nazi Party’s 25-Points Program of 1920, a foundational party manifesto that pledged to raise “the standard of health in the nation by protecting mothers and infants”, makes it evident that Nazi authorities wanted “racially pure” children at any cost (Stackelberg and Winkle 2002: 64; Pine 1999, 26). In this regard, pronatal Nazi family policy was extended to single, spouseless mothers as well. The NS-Volkswohlfahrt, for example, provided welfare and social relief for single mothers, and even facilitated adoption services and foster care (Pine 1999, 26). In 1934, this organization even created a sub-
organization called the Hilfswerk 'Mutter und Kind', a relief organization for mother and child (Pine 1999, 26). Figure 8, a "Mutter und Kind" propaganda poster, asks for donations to support single mothers. A golden aura surrounds the nursing mother and child as a farmer ploughs the landscape in the distance. The mother and the farmer symbolize fertility and thus depict two of the three motifs that form the ideal relationship of Nazi society (Stephenson 1981, 69).

![Figure 8](image)

A propaganda poster for the 'Mutter und Kind' Relief Organization of the NS-Volkswohlfahrt. This poster demonstrates that even spouseless women were encouraged to remain in the home and have "racially pure" German children.

While Nazi pronatal visual propaganda may appear relatively utopic and idyllic, there existed a much darker side of Nazi eugenics where radical measures were taken to counter depopulation. The most extreme of these pronatal policies is without a doubt the Leader of the SS Heinrich Himmler's SS Lebensborn programme, developed by the SS Race and Resettlement Office in 1940 (Stibbe 2003, 156). In a fanatical desire to increase the birthrate of the Aryan race,
Himmler established institutions throughout Germany, Austria, occupied France, and occupied Czechoslovakia where “racially pure” women, both married and unmarried, could become pregnant and arrange to give birth to their children anonymously (Stibbe 2003, 156). In this regard, Himmler completely disregarded the traditional gender order:

I have made it known privately that any young woman who is alone and longs for a child can turn to Lebensborn with perfect confidence. I would sponsor the child and provide for its education. I know this is a revolutionary step, because according to the existing middle-class code an unmarried woman has no right to yearn for a child […] I have therefore created the possibility for such women to have the child they crave. As you can imagine, we recommend only racially faultless men as ‘conception assistants’ (Stibbe 2003, 156).

Thus, the SS Lebensborn programme, which literally means “source of life” in German, is testimony to the fact that the Nazi ideology of women and childbirth was unabashedly misogynistic. Although the SS-Lebensborn program was one of the most extreme Nazi eugenics policies and was never nearly as successful as Himmler had hoped, it nevertheless forges a crucial link between Nazi pronatal and antinatal laws. Even though Nazi pronatal and antinatal policies worked in tandem to reinforce one another’s ideological intent, they both exercised discriminate control over the Nazi population demographic. Nazi society became inherently gendered, and “racially pure” men and women were assigned to separate homosocial spheres. Those who were deemed “racially impure”, on the other hand, were targeted, persecuted, and eventually ruthlessly exterminated. In this regard, the Nazi ideology of women and childbirth was institutionalized through discriminatory policies designed to transcend ethnic, religious, and political boundaries.

Concluding Thoughts: A Historiographical Juncture

Although the historiography on the Nazi ideology of women and childbirth is contentious and in flux, careful consideration of interwar natalist policies and propaganda make it evident that the Third Reich was not a caesura in contemporary European history. The pronatal and antinatal ideologies explored in this research paper were, in many ways, a continuation and radicalization of a longstanding intolerance towards those who were perceived to be minorities within their own countries. The natalist visual propaganda
incorporated in this investigation has demonstrated the ways in which propaganda was used to legitimize natalist family policy in interwar welfare and warfare European states.

In the case of Nazi Germany, natalist propaganda gives particular insight into the ways that family policy polarized the German demographic. While on the one hand, pronatalist Nazi propaganda depicts the idealistic components of Nazi ideology, antinatalist propaganda exposes the darker side of Nazi eugenics which in turn set the precedent for some of Hitler’s most atrocious policies. Both forms of propaganda shared an objective to control women’s reproductive capacities through mutual ideological reinforcement and legitimization, which they respectively succeeded in doing to varying degrees. The turbulent climate of interwar Europe provided a fertile breeding ground on which the Nazi ideology of women and childbirth flourished and became the crux of warfare state.
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Shalom Québec:
Reappraising the Role of Language in the Integration of Jewish Communities in Montréal

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Abstract
Language has been emphasized as a dominant factor in the construction of the Québécois identity, prioritized in policies such as the Québec intercultural model of integration. Accordingly, literature on Québec interculturalism has attributed an overwhelming prominence towards the role of common language as a dominant facilitator of integration; however, empirical research on the subject has been lacking. To evaluate the effects and limitations of the linguistic factor in facilitating integration, a comparison between Anglophone Ashkenazi Jews and Francophone Sephardic Jews is undertaken. Using a multi-faceted and multifarious definition of integration sensitive to its varied types and forms, an evaluation of ‘disaggregated integration’ patterns between Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews and the Québec mainstream indicates that French as a primary language is not a dominant ‘trump card’ in determining levels of integration across all categories and dimensions. Instead, both Jewish groups integrate in different ways and with varying degrees of success depending on the indicator observed. These results arouse not only a reexamination of the influence and limitations of common language as a facilitator of integration, but also a review of the emphasis placed on language in the Québec model.
Biography

Jonathan Lang is a Master’s student at Université de Montréal studying identity and Canadian Politics. After completing his undergraduate degree in the Honours Political Science program at McGill University in 2007, Jonathan worked as a Parliamentary Intern and Constituency Assistant for Irwin Cotler, Canadian Member of Parliament, and as a Ski Host in Chamonix France, where he met his wife Lisa. Jonathan was also recently named the winner of the Canadian Study of Parliament Group’s national essay contest for his essay titled “Stabilizing Minority Governments: A Review.”
Canada is a country founded on linguistic dilemmas. The dynamic between French and English language and culture is embedded in the inner fabric of the country’s history and consciousness, even pre-dating the founding of Canada. This inter-relationship began with the British Conquest of 1760 and continues to underlie the pulse of the country. One need only look at the 2011 Canadian Census questionnaire to situate the almost singular importance of language as the main criteria for classifying Canada’s population (Statistics Canada 2010). Nowhere has the physical and symbolic root of this linguistic question been more pronounced than in the province of Québec and, more specifically, in the city of Montreal. Since the Québec Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, the protection of the French language has been given existential priority in the political and cultural pursuits of French Québécois, and it constitutes a pillar of the Québécois national identity. This promotion of the French language was institutionalized with the Charter of the French Language in 1977, which declared French as the official language of Québec and the instrument by which the Québécois identity is “articulated” (Québec 1977). Since the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, this emphasis on the French language has translated into the province’s social integration strategy as well.

Québec has distinguished itself from the rest of Canada by practicing an integration model for its diverse population called ‘Interculturalism’ (as opposed to Canadian ‘Multiculturalism’). Although the debate on the similarities and differences between the two approaches is far from over (Rocher and Labelle 2010), interculturalism differs ostensibly in that it “…seeks to reconcile ethnocultural diversity with the continuity of the French-speaking core and the preservation of the social link” (Bouchard and Taylor 2008, 19). Simply put, the Québec model differs by centering cultural diversity around the protection and promotion of the French language for successful integration into Québec society.

The role of the French language as a fundamental facilitating factor in the province’s integration model has rarely been challenged. This project therefore explores the following question: What role does common language – French in this case - play in facilitating integration in Québec and what are its limitations? Put differently, is common mother tongue sufficient or necessary to facilitate the integration of minorities in Québec? These questions will be

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3 Though the short form Census questionnaire inquires into the language capabilities of respondents, there are no questions pertaining to country of origin, race or religion.
investigated through a comparative analysis of two linguistically
different Jewish communities in Montréal, Anglophone Ashkenazi
Jews and Francophone Sephardic Jews. This comparison enables an
examination of whether French as mother tongue has enabled greater
integration into Québec mainstream society or whether other factors
have played salient roles.

Integration is a complex term that can be used to explain a
political, social or economic dynamic. By evaluating the integrative
processes of two Jewish minority groups – one Anglophone
(Ashkenazi Jews) and Francophone (Sephardic Jews) - the role of
language can be more adequately examined among the multitude of
other possible variables influencing integration. The research
presented here will suggest that language is not a singular, isolated
and deterministic prerequisite for integration as is often assumed, but
can be but one important variable among many. Put differently,
proponents of the interculturalist model have tended to focus too
much attention on the linguistic factor as facilitating integration, often
at the risk of underestimating other essential components such as
religion, socio-economic standing, and intra-group relations. By
examining both Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jewish groups, I am hoping
to enrich the discourse by suggesting that though the French
language may facilitate integration, it is not a prerequisite nor does it
trump all others in determining opportunities of integration. In fact,
groups that are less integrated linguistically may be more integrated
in other dimensions.

In order to evaluate this hypothesis, I will situate the case’s
historical context by exploring the emphasis on language in Québec’s
development since the Quiet Revolution, with special attention
allocated to the current interculturalist model. I will then briefly
describe the history of the Sephardic and Ashkenazi communities in
Montreal before embarking upon a multi-level analysis of integration
patterns between both groups and the Québécois political, social and
economic apparatus using a variety of indicators. The scope of this
section will be two-fold: demographic patterns and attitudes at an
individual level will be explored following with an institutional-level
analysis. In both cases, the Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jewish
communities will be contrasted vis-à-vis their relationships with the
rest of Québec. A discussion of the implications of this comparison
will follow. As we will see, Ashkenazi Anglophones and Sephardic
Francophones have both taken separate but interconnected routes in
integrating into Québec society at varying rates and levels of success.
Although language has played a role in determining these patterns, it
has not acted as a trump factor. Rather, it must be understood as one
element of a larger equation. Before beginning with this layout, we must first briefly examine the multi-dimensional nature of integration.

Integration: A Pluralistic Term

Authors have often debated the nature of integration (Glazer and Moynihan 1963; Gordon 1964). To account for these diverse perspectives, Irene Bloemraad emphasizes an understanding of integration that is inclusive of its multitude meanings, as the process of becoming “part of” a system (Bloemraad 2007). With the construction of a typology of integration, Bloemraad enabled an understanding of the term sensitive to its multiple dimensions. First, an array of distinct but inter-related types of integration was highlighted, such as civic, political and socioeconomic varieties (Bloemraad 2007). In this sense, groups may integrate with varying degrees of success depending on the type of integration observed. Consequently, we can infer that policies directed towards some of these types of integration may fail to apply to the full spectrum.

Different understandings of how integration works have also been debated. Bloemraad (2007) distinguishes between two forms of integration, namely assimilation and incorporation. As assimilation, integration is described as an exercise where groups are indistinguishable from one another and follow a process of fusion (Park and Burgess 1921; Gordon 1964). Alternatively, with integration as incorporation, individuals maintain certain respective particularities while integrating through the broader collective arena via their group associations. These associations then play a part in influencing the collective identity and socio-political apparatus of the larger state community (Glazer and Moynihan 1963). In this sense, integration can be conceived of as occurring either through acculturation and dissolution into a host community or by joining a particular group association that is institutionally integrated to the larger community.

In a subsequent paper, Bloemraad, along with Anna Korteweg and Gökce Yurdakul highlighted the importance of identifying the many forms of citizen participation that exist (Bloemraad, Korteweg and Gökçe 2008). These include not only political participation, but also social inclusion and economic well-being. They claim, “participation in the labour market or business sector, payment of taxes, participation in local schools or other activities that make people an integral part of their communities and institutions can be understood as a form of participatory citizenship…”
Again, the authors agree that the paths of participation encompass not just political participation as through a community town hall for example, but rather include all forms of interaction - direct and indirect, social and economic - within the larger community. With regards to language, the authors suggest that although one must not ignore the value of learning the host society’s dominant language to facilitate economic advancement and social and political participation, one must nuance its necessity for successful integration and good citizenship (Bloemraad, Korteweg and Gökçe 2008, 169). In other words, although a common language is undoubtedly of great importance in promoting integration, it is not a requirement and will affect certain forms of integration more than others.

In the heat of a growing controversial public debate on the limitations of ‘reasonable accommodation’ of minorities in Québec society, the Québec government under Jean Charest commissioned an enquiry under the leadership of acclaimed scholars Charles Taylor and Gérard Bouchard aimed at elaborating the Québec integration model while proposing possible solutions to ensure its viability. Published in 2008, their report – commonly referred to as the ‘Bouchard-Taylor Commission’ (BTC) - authoritatively outlined the Québec intercultural integration model (Bouchard and Taylor 2008). Although this report did in some ways reflect a nuanced understanding of the disaggregated forms of integration that could occur - similar to Bloemraad - it did so only to a limited extent. The Bouchard-Taylor Commission recognized political, cultural, social and economic dimensions of integration – through the coining of the term integrative pluralism (Bouchard and Taylor 2008, 115) - and understood that integration could occur multifariously through both assimilation and group incorporation when stating that “…almost without exception, each citizen integrates into society through a certain milieu, such as the family, a profession, a community group, a church, or an association which acts as a link” (Bouchard and Taylor 2008, 120). Nevertheless, the authors fail to sufficiently account for the possibility that groups do not necessarily integrate evenly across all the categories mentioned, but rather in a differentiated manner, with some displaying greater integration in some categories than others.

In sum, upon analyzing the levels and types of integration, one must appreciate the diversity of the term and the array of forms within which integration can occur. Inspired by Bloomraad’s work, a disaggregated typology of integration will be employed as a key component of the evaluation. In this sense, integration will be defined
broadly as the increase in political, economic and/or social proximity between individuals and groups through either assimilation or incorporation. The less isolated groups are from one other politically, economically and socially, the more they can be considered to be integrated with each other. In this manner, we can segment and localize integration within any given category, and allow for the comparison of integration tendencies between each one.

According to the BTC model (or Québec Model), integration within Québec is understood to be a linear and unified exercise, with little consideration that integration could occur more successfully in some dimensions than in others. As the model implies, if language is both a tool for ensuring coherent communication and the expression of cultural identities, groups that share the same mother tongue should integrate more cohesively with each other across all categories (see left column of Figure 1). With this logic, therefore, one would expect Francophone minority groups to display greater integrative tendencies than non-Francophone minority groups when comparing their relationships with the rest of the province. A more nuanced and sophisticated model of integration based on disaggregated integration, however, may produce different conclusions (see right column of Figure 1). It is this latter model that will be adopted in this study. Before engaging in a comparison of Francophone and Anglophone Jewish groups, some historical background regarding the evolution of interculturalism in Québec is needed.

### Historical Context and Interculturalism

#### The Quiet Revolution and the Importance of Language

With the election of Jean Lesage’s Liberal provincial government in 1960, Québec embarked on a rapid process of self-affirmation, development and modernization through state intervention that was in stark contrast to the free enterprise policies of
Maurice Duplessis’ Union Nationale party during the era known popularly as La Grande Noirceur – or The Great Darkness (Levine 1997, 55). Although the causes and consequences of the transformations of this era were far-ranging, encompassing economic, social and political dimensions, the link of Québécois nationalism with the parallel movement of French language protection served as motors of this Quiet Revolution. In the lead-up to changes, the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism released in 1963 highlighted a large economic inequality between the Anglophone and Francophone populations of Québec. To illustrate, Montréal Francophones comprised only 37% of those earning more than $5,000 per year and only 17% of those earning more than 15,000$ (Levine 1997, 45). As Marc Levine (1997) argues, vertical economic mobility depended largely on the mastery of the English language and it was believed by many that this economic inequality threatened French language and culture (255). As illustrated above, those in Québec whose mother tongue was French were at an economic disadvantage despite the fact that Francophones comprised the majority of the population. In addition, Levine demonstrated that according to the Gauthier Commission released in 1967, when attempting to integrate, immigrants in Montréal tended to opt for English as their preferred language (Levine 1997). Although part of the reason for this was due to Québec’s confessional schooling system whereby French schooling fell under the purview of a Catholic school board hesitant to accept non-Catholic students (a situation that directly impacted Jewish immigrants at this time), there was nevertheless a fear of eventual French minoritization in Québec in the long-term. Immigrant families preferred to send their children to English schools to capitalize on an economy more favourable to Anglophones. Thus, during the formative years of the Quiet Revolution, language was perceived as the battleground of a larger political struggle, and would serve as the focal point of the Québécois identity.

As Charles Taylor (1993) explains, “For each individual to discover in himself what his humanity consists in, he needs a horizon of meaning, which can only be provided by some allegiance, group membership, cultural tradition. He needs, in the broadest sense, a language in which to ask and answer the questions of ultimate significance” (Taylor 1993, 46). It was in this sense that the primacy of the protection of the French language took shape as a project that was necessary not only for the language itself, but for the culture and conscience of the French Québécois people. Although several language bills preceded it, the legal institutionalization of the
protection and promotion of the French language culminated with the Charter of the French Language in 1977, also known as Bill 101. Simply put, this legislation resolved to make “French the language of government and the law, as well as the normal and everyday language of work, instruction, commerce and business” in Québec (Québec 1977). It reinforced the supremacy of French as Québec's official language, placed limitations on the use of English in commerce and business and restricted access to English instruction for new immigrants. These laws were also intended to give Québec a French visage linguistique or a French appearance to ensure that newcomers would understand French as being the language of public life. Simply put, an enormous emphasis was placed on the promotion of the French language as a mechanism for ensuring the self-determination of Francophone Québécois.

These policies also opened the door for Québec society to enter into a post-ethnic multicultural era. As Will Kymlicka notes, although such language policies were perhaps illiberal, they were adopted at least in part, “...in order to shift Québécois nationalism from an ethnic to a post-ethnic form of nationalism. The nationalist leaders wanted to attack the older ethnic model of nationhood, and wanted Quebecers to accept the necessity and desirability of attracting immigrants, and of becoming a post-ethnic, multicultural society” (Kymlicka 2001, 286-87). With the francization of immigrants, the ethnic composition of French Québécois society would be changed forever, spawning a cultural transformation with regards to Québécois identity.

**Interculturalism**

The emphasis on the primacy of the French language would come to dominate many features of Québec society after the Quiet Revolution, including the integration model of interculturalism. Although the Québec government has never officially defined interculturalism, its principles were formulated through the Charter of the French Language, and subsequent Québec government policy proposals. Kymlicka summarizes these principles as: “Recognition of French as the language of public life; respect for liberal democratic values including civil and political rights and equality of opportunity;
and respect for pluralism, including openness to and tolerance of others’ differences” (Kymlicka 2001, 280). Although in many ways, the politics of difference and respect for diversity represented in Québec’s Interculturalist model echo ideals reflected in the Canadian model of Multiculturalism, as mentioned earlier, one key difference is the emphasis placed on the French language as the foyer – or common arena - of public life.

The Bouchard-Taylor Commission underlines the importance of language when it notes that “The first avenue is that of French (sic) as the common public language...the intercultural approach would hardly have any meaning if Quebecers were unable to communicate with each other in the same language” (Bouchard and Taylor 2008, 125). In this sense, the BTC goes a step further in defining Québec's integration model by noting the importance of the French language as a requirement for its success. As will be noted in the case of Anglophone and Francophone Jewish Montreal communities, this assertion can be misleading, as it serves to overstate the importance of common language at the risk of ignoring the multitude of other factors that can determine patterns of integration, such as levels of religious adherence and internal dynamics. It is in this spirit that the comparison of the Anglophone and Francophone Jewish communities of Montreal will be explored.

As a final note on interculturalism, the BTC also emphasizes the transformative effects of intercultural policy on Québec culture itself. By engaging in such a system of integration, “Members of the majority ethnocultural group, i.e. Quebecers of French-Canadian origin, like the members of minorities, accept that their culture (traditions and identity referents) will be transformed sooner or later through the interaction that the system implies” (Bouchard and Taylor 2008, 120). This suggests a constant hybridization between cultures and the rejection of a static approach to cultural characteristics and preservation (aside from French as the language of communication). Therefore, to understand the Québec interculturalist model through the lens of the BTC is to accept the malleable and transformative characteristics of culture as opposed to an understanding based on rigidity and stagnancy. As mentioned in the Commission, “....immigrants get on a moving train and participate in the future of the society. However, it also happens that not just passengers but railway cars also join the train” (Bouchard and Taylor 2008). In this sense, integration is multifarious, and it is with this approach that the remainder of this project will be guided when evaluating Francophone and Anglophone Jewish integration into Québec society.
Prior to comparing the Francophone and Anglophone Jews in Montreal, it is important to briefly introduce the history of the Ashkenazi and Sephardic communities of Québec. Simply put, those who identify as Ashkenazi (Ashkenaz was formerly a Hebrew word for ‘Germany’) have “…origins …in Central and Eastern Europe dating back to the middle ages, associated with the Yiddish language and culture, and influenced by Christianity and European Civilization” (Weinfeld 2001,17). Sephardi Jews (Sepharad meaning ‘Spain’ in Hebrew) originated from the Iberian Peninsula, and settled in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East after being expelled during the Spanish Inquisition of 1492 (Weinfeld 2001, 16).

Although early Jewish communities existed in Québec as early as the British Conquest in 1760, the first large-scale migration of Jews to Québec began in 1880 with a large Yiddish migration of European Ashkenazi Jews (Langlais and Rome 1996). From 1891 to 1931, the Montreal Jewish population grew from 2,700 to 60,000 (Anctil 2010, 18). These Jews adopted English as the language of integration, with most children being enrolled in Anglophone educational institutions. As mentioned earlier, this was partially due to the interdiction of Jews into the Catholic Francophone schooling system (Bouchard 2000,18-9) but was also likely due to an overarching trend of Anglicization for the purpose of encouraging economic advancement in an Anglophone dominated Québécois economy. Although Québec was in many ways a welcoming society to those of varying cultural backgrounds, experiences of anti-Semitism during this time should also be noted, as highlighted by xenophobic accusations against Jews made by Québécois writer J. Edouard Plamondon in 1910 and the controversial opinions of Québécois priest and nationalist leader Lionel-Groulx (Langlais and Rome 1996, 93-4, 114-15).

This migration of Ashkenazi Jews preceded the migration of Sephardic Jews, which began in the later half of the twentieth century. As such, the history of the Quiet Revolution and early anti-Semitism in Québec significantly affected the Ashkenazi Québec experience in ways that differed from the later Sephardic migrants. As we will see, this longevity also enabled the existence of an institutionalized and deeply rooted community prior to the arrival of the Sephardi. As Anglophones, Ashkenazi Jews identified with the larger Anglophone community in their overwhelming opposition to Bill 101 and the imposition of restrictions on the English language. Therefore, also
embedded in the Ashkenazi culture, is the experience of the Quiet Revolution and French nationalism from the Anglophone perspective, a feature that will be demonstrated in the following section. A study from 2001 revealed that only 0.4% of the Ashkenazi Jewish community spoke French as their mother tongue, so for the purpose of this project, Ashkenazi Jews will comprise the Anglophone grouping of the Jewish population of Montreal (Shahar and Perez 2005, 22).

Major waves of immigration for the Sephardic community followed those of the Ashkenazi community, as large-scale immigration began from Morocco in 1956 through the 1980s. During this period, it is estimated that 11,000 Jewish Sephardic immigrants arrived in the province of Québec, with the North African Jewish population reaching 20,000 in Montreal by 1981 (Lasry and Tapia 1989, 25). As Jean-Claude Lasry suggests, motivations for migrating stemmed from the installation of a largely Muslim government following Morocco’s independence from France and fears of persecution (Lasry and Tapia 1989, 26). Although the majority of Moroccan Jews migrated towards Israel and France, a significant portion considered Québec as a promising destination due to a shared French common language and the pursuit of the ‘North American dream’ as epitomized by the pursuit of liberty and economic advancement (Berdugo-Cohen et al. 1987, 13). These North African origins comprised the overwhelming majority of the Sephardic population of Montréal, and by 2001 it was estimated that 21,220 Sephardi lived in the city, of which 80% reported French to be their mother tongue (Shahar and Perez 2005, 22). Influenced by the Arab world, Sephardic Jews experienced a distinct history from their Ashkenazi counterparts, possessing a separate linguistic and cultural history. A significant majority of Sephardic Jews originated from Morocco and were Francophone. Hence, for the purpose of this project, the Sephardic community will comprise the Francophone grouping of Montreal Jews.

Although the political culture – or historically imprinted culture worldviews (Brubaker 1992) - of these groups will not be emphasized in this project, it is worth noting that the Sephardic and Ashkenazi communities likely possess distinct histories and cultures, value-systems, and worldviews. More specifically, the comparison of Arab influenced political cultures versus Central and Eastern European influenced ones may shed some insightful perspectives on varying approaches to integration. For our purposes however, I will limit historical experiences to the contrasting languages of the communities, and the experiences of the Ashkenazi community as an
Anglophone minority during the turbulent years of the Quiet Revolution.

Demography and Attitudes

Much can be learned about the integration patterns of the Montreal Sephardic and Ashkenazi populations by looking at demographic trends and attitudes from the respective communities. One theme that resonates throughout the data is the limited influence of language as a determining trump factor in explaining levels of integration and social proximity with the majority French Québecois culture and population. In other words, contrary to the logic of interculturalism, there are instances where the Ashkenazi Anglophone population demonstrates greater integration with the rest of Québec compared to the Francophone Sephardic community. Indicators that will be observed in this section include: intermarriage, migration, political and social attitudes, informal social/professional relations, media preferences, income and religious adherence.

With regards to the sources of demographic and attitudinal data, a rich body of statistical and scholarly research conducted by Federation Combined Jewish Appeal (CJA) - a major Montreal Jewish community organization – will be utilized. Research published by Federation CJA was undertaken through the commissioning of surveys by Leger Marketing as well as through analysis of Canadian census data (Shahar 1996; Shahar 2000; Shahar and Perez 2005; Shahar and Schnoor 1997).

Interrmarriage

Interrmarriage is an indicator that can provide insights on levels of openness between Jewish and non-Jewish communities. Although CJA data does not look at integration with the French Québecois community specifically, rates of intermarriage shed light on whether a community is isolated, or more likely to mix with other groups. Simply put, greater rates of intermarriage indicate a higher degree of integration with the host community.

During the early years of Sephardic immigration, Jean-Claude Lasry cautioned at the rapid assimilation of North African Jews by declaring the intermarriage rate 49.8% (Lasry and Tapia
1989, 34-5). However, as Charles Shahar notes in his 2000 survey, this was:

at a time when they had not yet integrated into the Jewish community here. Since their mother tongue was mostly French, these Sephardim had greater facility of communication with the larger Québécois community and perhaps felt alienated from the English-speaking majority of Ashkenazi Jews, a situation that might explain higher rates of intermarriage (Shahar 2000, 39).

More recently, despite sharing a common language with the majority Québécois society, evidence suggests that Sephardic Jews tend to intermarry at lower rate than their Ashkenazi Anglophone counter-parts. This reversal can be demonstrated by the responses from Shahar’s 1996 survey, where 77.2% of Sephardim claimed that they actively opposed intermarriage compared to 42.7% of Ashkenazim. This indicated that common language attracted less intermarriage as the Sephardic community became more institutionalized and integrated with the pre-existing Jewish Ashkenazi population. Although the motives behind their views were not determined, as will be shown below, a larger Sephardic pattern of religious adhesion could be a factor influencing their lower intermarriage rate.

Migration

Desire for emigration from Québec may also shed light on levels of attachment between Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews and the province of Québec. Although a variety of factors may lead to mobility such as income, politics and language and degree of historical roots, high levels of group retainment are usually good indicators of integration and vice versa. For instance, in Charles Shahar’s 1996 study, Sephardic Jews were more likely to consider leaving the province than did Ashkenazi Jews (30.3% compared to 25.9% respectively) (Shahar 1996, 36). When asked about reasons influencing respondents to consider leaving, 24% of Sephardim stated a desire to immigrate to Israel compared to only 3.7% of Ashkenazim (Shahar 1996, 38). Seventy-five percent of total respondents listed the political situation as being a very important factor influencing out-migration, while 38% identified language issues as a very important factor (Shahar 1996, 38-9). Although Shahar did not specify the exact distribution of this figure, he remarked that Ashkenazim were “much more likely to leave because of the political situation or language issues” (Shahar 1996, 38).
When surveying the parents of emigrated children moreover, Shahar (1996) noted that 12% of Ashkenazim stated that they had left because they were “fed-up with the political situation,” while none of the Sephardic parents mentioned it as a motivating factor (40). What is interesting to note is that although more Sephardic seemed likely to emigrate from Québec, evidence suggests that their motivations were more oriented around religious reasons as opposed to political or linguistic ones. As Shahar (1996) notes, “…it would be an inaccuracy to suggest that Ashkenazi [Jews] are necessarily more inclined to consider leaving the city than Sephardic [Jews]” (96), however Sephardic Jews tended to desire to move to Israel as opposed to elsewhere in Canada or the United States. In addition, although Charles Shahar does not list the exact figures, he notes that “Sephardim are much more likely than Ashkenazim to have siblings in Israel. The siblings of Ashkenazim are more likely to reside in the United States” (Shahar 1996, 42). The connotations of these patterns may provide interesting insights on the networks of Ashkenazi Jews in North America compared to French speaking Sephardic Jews. Although such an inquiry lies outside the scope of this paper, what is telling is the greater desire to emigrate by a Francophone population compared to an Anglophone one.

Political / Social Attitudes

Conducted in the aftermath of the 1995 Québec referendum on sovereignty-association, the 1996 survey brings to light interesting opinions with regards to the political and social attitudes of Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews. When surveyed on levels of optimism about life in Québec, 26.4% of Ashkenazim declared that they were very pessimistic compared to only 11.9% of Sephardim (Shahar 1996, 30). Although regrettably the survey does not specify the motivations for these attitudes, previous data regarding migration suggests that language and political climate may be responsible for the differences of opinion.

The survey also probed into preferences for the constitutional future of Canada. In this case, 48.6% of Ashkenazim favoured the status quo, 37.2% favoured a revised federalism for all provinces, and 0.9% supported sovereignty-association or independence for Québec (Shahar 1996, 32). In comparison, 31.7% of Sephardim favoured the status quo, 46.2% were in favour of a revised federalism and 5.7% supported sovereignty association or independence for Québec contrary to assumptions (Shahar 1996). Greater support for sovereignty or renewed federalism does not in
and of itself imply different levels of integration into Québec society. However, when contrasting these points of view with those of the general Québec population at the time, the Sephardic community’s views more closely mirrored the preferences of the general public than did the Ashkenazi community. For example, in the 1995 referendum, 49.4% of Quebecers voted in favour of sovereignty-association while 50.6% voted against it (Le Directeur Général des Élections du Québec 1995). With regards to political preferences vis-à-vis Québec’s place in Canada, Ashkenazi Jews voting patterns can be described as more anomalous to the Québec profile than those of the Sephardic community.

**Social/Professional Relations**

Social and professional relationships are another indication of integration between Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews and the general Québec public. Groups that interact more with the mainstream majority are more likely to possess an open and varied network of contacts, with greater openness to the diversity of the province. One indicator of such an outreach concerns patterns of volunteerism for non-Jewish organizations. Ashkenazim Jews are almost three times more likely to volunteer for a non-Jewish organization than their Sephardic counterparts (14% of Ashkenazi Jews compared to 5% of Sephardic Jews) (Shahar 1996, 13). This is significant because it demonstrates a greater willingness on the part of Ashkenazi Jews to participate and intermingle with non-Jewish groups.

Another indicator is teenage recreation. 44.9% of Ashkenazi teenage Jews preferred to use Jewish services for teenage recreation – such as extra-curricular sports - compared to 63.9% of Sephardic Jews (Shahar 1996, 2). With regards to informal affiliations, Ashkenazim and Sephardic Jews scored similarly when surveyed on whether their friends were exclusively Jewish (59.3% of Ashkenazi Jews stated such was the case compared to 55.4% of Sephardic Jews) (Shahar and Schnoor 1997, 38-9). In addition, 65.7% of Sephardic Jews found it very important to live within a sizeable Jewish population compared to 46.7% of Ashkenazi Jews (Shahar and Schnoor 1997, 39). Evidence suggests that in these cases, Ashkenazi Jews are in fact more likely to cross the borders of their community and integrate with the general public of Québec than Sephardim. Although the data is limited in determining both the motivations for these behavioural patterns in addition to the Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews are integrating with the Francophone
or Anglophone non-Jewish community, as will be seen evidence suggests that level of religious adherence and level of historical rootedness in Montreal may play a role. Future surveys dealing specifically with these issues directly would contribute greatly to answering some of these important questions.

In an interesting twist, evidence suggests that Sephardic attitudes to non-Jews have shifted within the last forty years. In a 1972 survey within the Sephardic community, Jean-Claude Lasry found stronger attachments between the Sephardic community of Montreal and the non-Jewish Francophone communities (Lasry 1993, 397). For example, 46% of Sephardic Jews declared that French Canadians made the best work colleagues compared to 26% for North African Jews, 13% for Canadian (Ashkenazi) Jews and 14% for English Canadians. In addition, 41% of Sephardic Jews declared that French Canadians made the best ‘work-place bosses’, compared to 31% for English Canadians and 22% for Canadian (Ashkenazi) Jews.

Finally, 25% declared French Canadians to make the best neighbours, compared to 55% for North African Jews, 15% for Canadian (Ashkenazi) Jews and 5% for English Canadian Jews. Although these figures may reflect likelihoods of certain social configurations in addition to attitudes - for example, a Sephardic Jew may have been more likely to have a French Canadian professional superior (or boss) than an Ashkenazi one - it nevertheless paints a much different picture compared to what is seen today. Even if preferences have remained unchanged, in 1972 Sephardic Jews seemed to interact with the majority Francophone population more closely. In a more recent study, different questions were asked, but research showed that only 6.2% of Sephardic Jews declared themselves to be socially close to the Francophone Québec population with a greater number feeling very connected the Jewish community in general (Shahar 2000, 45). As Shahar (2000) notes, “This data suggests that culture, religion and language interact in complex ways to determine identification patterns of Sephardim. It appears that religion is the dominant binding force…” (45). As will be demonstrated, evidence suggests that as the Sephardic community became more institutionally established and integrated with the Ashkenazi community, Sephardic Jews generally became less likely to associate with members of the non-Jewish public.
Media Habits

Media habits of residents can also be good indicators of integration, revealing not only the language of the chosen medium, but it also serves to enlighten on specific issues of interest to the reader. Although more data on this subject would further enlighten the discourse on Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews, Shahar’s 1996 survey did discover that 43.7% of Sephardim read the Gazette compared to 33.9% for La Presse, 11.7% for the Journal de Montreal and 5.1% for Le Devoir (44-5). This suggests that Sephardic Jews were more interested in focusing on an Anglophone newspaper in a foreign language rather than a paper written in French but perhaps dealing with issues more pertinent to the French Québécois community. Although there are many possible explanations for this phenomenon, such as a greater Sephardic proclivity to be interested in Anglophone Montreal news that may report more on the mostly-Anglophone Jewish community, at the very least one cannot ignore the limitations of common language in determining media preferences.

Economy / Income

As noted from Bloemraad et al. (2008), economic contributions to the host society (in the form of paying taxes for example) can also be considered a form of integration into a host society. Charles Shahar notes some minor differences when comparing Ashkenazi and Sephardic communities. For example, the median individual income for Ashkenazi Jews was $25,845 compared to $23,268 for Sephardic Jews (Shahar and Perez 2005, 28). In addition, 23.6% of Ashkenazim earned under $10,000 in yearly individual income compared to 25.8% of Sephardic Jews. Finally, 14.7% of the Ashkenazi community earned more than $70,000 per year compared to 10.4% of the Sephardic community (Shahar and Perez 2005, 28). Although Ashkenazi Jews fared slightly better in terms of income than their Sephardic counterparts, the proximity of the two groups are surprising, considering the much deeper historical roots of the Ashkenazi in Montreal. Common language may have played a role in explaining Sephardic economic success, but it may also have been influenced by the support received from the Québec government and the Jewish community as a whole, as will be examined. In any case, it appears that in terms of economic contributions, language does not appear to be an overarching factor in determining integration.
Religiosity

Although religious piety does not necessarily have implications on levels of integration, religious factors contributing towards greater group isolation do. Evidence strongly suggests that the Sephardic community of Montreal attributes greater importance to religious adherence than the Ashkenazi community. One indication of Jewish adherence pertains to the maintenance of Jewish dietary restrictions, known as the laws of kashrut. In a survey conducted in 2000, Shahar discovered that 63% of Sephardic Jews maintained kosher observance at home, compared to 43% of Ashkenazi Jews (Shahar 2000, 23). Furthermore 47.7% of Sephardic Jews maintained kashrut outside of their homes (for example in choosing restaurants) compared to 18.2% of the Ashkenazi community (Shahar 2000, 23-4).

When asked about religious affiliations, 10.3% of Sephardic Jews declared themselves to be ‘Secular’ or ‘Just Jewish’ compared to 32% of the Ashkenazi community (Shahar 2000, 31). With regard to denominational affiliation, an earlier survey suggested that 13.1% of Sephardim considered themselves to be Orthodox while 70.4% regarded themselves as Traditional (Shahar and Schnoor 1997, 4). In comparison, 24.3% of Ashkenazim considered themselves as Orthodox while 35.1% regarded themselves as Conservative. Because Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews have distinct medieval origins, their modern denominational grouping labels are not identical (for example, there is no ‘traditional’ Ashkenazi grouping and no ‘conservative’ Sephardic grouping). As a result, the Traditional Sephardic grouping can be interpreted as containing Jews that would more closely correspond to the Conservative Ashkenazi groupings. More importantly, if we add these more religious groupings together, we find that 83.5% of Sephardic Jews identify themselves as either Orthodox or Traditional while 59.4% of Ashkenazi Jews identify themselves as Orthodox or Conservative. The remaining respondents indicated that they were either Secular, ‘Just Jewish,’ or affiliated with the less religious Reform or Reconstructionist denominations. Finally, regarding synagogue attendance, 41% of Sephardic Jews reported attending synagogue services at least once a month, compared to 20% of Ashkenazi Jews (Shahar and Schnoor 1997, 12-14). With greater religious self-definition, adherence to dietary restrictions and synagogue attendance, this data strongly suggests that Sephardic Jews are more religious than their Ashkenazi counterparts. This greater proclivity to religious identification suggests that language is

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5 With this question, answering ‘Secular’ or ‘Just Jewish’ was considered as the lowest level of religious adherence.
not the only pole of identification that minorities adhere to when integrating into a host society. As will be seen, religious identification may act as a rival force of attraction for groups that can cut through linguistic cleavages.

Jewish education is another factor that can shed light on levels of religious adhesion and social integration. According to the 1996 survey, 67.4% of Sephardim were inclined to send their children to Jewish elementary school while 50.5% preferred to send their children to Jewish high school (Shahar and Schnoor 1997, 28). In comparison, 44.7% of Ashkenazim were inclined to send their children to Jewish elementary school while 22.8% preferred to send them to Jewish high school. Shahar and Schnoor (1997) measured factors influencing parents to send their children to Jewish day schools, and found that household observance levels and religious denominations were scored to have the highest saliency in affecting decisions, while household income was not considered to have a significant influence (Shahar and Schnoor 1997, 31). This evidence suggests that when it comes to education, Francophone Jews are less likely to attend a public secular school and that income does not have a significant impact on the decision making of parents.

After considering key demographic and attitudinal indicators, it appears that Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews have demonstrated varied integration patterns within Québec society. Evidence suggests that Ashkenazi Jews are less likely to be religious and to receive a private Jewish education, more likely to intermarry, less likely to emigrate from the province, more likely to associate with non-Jewish organizations, and are more likely to make greater financial contributions to the host economy. Sephardic Jews however, tend to be more optimistic about their lives in Québec, more closely share the political and linguistic views of the rest of the province, but are less likely to intermarry and send their children to public schools and more likely to want to leave the province. These indicators focusing more on the social proximity of Jews and non-Jewish Québécois – or the extent that the two communities are ‘passengers on the Québec societal train’ to use the BTC analogy - seem to indicate not only that integration patterns are mixed between the two groups, but also that language cannot be considered a trump factor or requirement for successful integration. Before elaborating more on the implications of these findings, it is important to first evaluate the institutional levels of integration between both communities’ organizations and the Québec mainstream society and political apparatus.
Institutions of the Jewish Communities

As mentioned earlier, integration can also consist of ‘adding railway cars to the societal train’ of Québec, and this is well demonstrated through the institutional analysis of the two Jewish communities. As will be shown, although linguistic friction has implicitly been historically less prevalent between the Québec government and Sephardic organizations, the Québec government has been remarkably supportive of both communities and their respective institutions. In addition, an interesting intra-group dynamic of institutional integration illustrates another factor that can affect integration with the host society. More specifically, the two Jewish communities have not only integrated vertically with the provincial government, but also horizontally between each other.

Ashkenazi Institutions

According to Morton Weinfeld, Jews in Québec can be considered an “institutionally complete” ethnic group, with the community providing a diverse array of welfare, health, social, cultural, recreational, religious and educational services for its members (Weinfeld 1993,181-2). Weinfeld argues that the roots and motivations of this organized community building “…lie both in the tradition of Jewish collective responsibility in Europe, as well as the anti-Semitism which Jews faced in North America in a variety of settings, from hospitals to social clubs. This led Jews to develop their own institutions in response” (Weinfeld 1993, 182). One example of this type of discrimination was the Jewish quota-system implemented by some universities in Québec to limit the enrolment of Jewish students. In another case – and not necessarily an anti-Semitic practice – the existence of confessional Protestant and Catholic school systems in Québec likely led to the formation of separate Jewish schools catered to a unique community. One dominant umbrella community organization in Montreal was the Allied Jewish Community Services (AJCS) now called the Combined Jewish Appeal Federation (Federation CJA). According to Weinfeld (1993), this organization “…combines the function of fund-raising with administration and co-ordination of the more than twenty welfare and cultural agencies in its jurisdiction” (182).

These organizations intersect with all dimensions of Jewish community life and as such, receive a significant amount of financial support from the provincial government. Many of these institutions are of a ‘public character’ in the sense that their services are open to the
public. For example, Weinfeld (1993) notes that many Jewish services such as the Jewish General Hospital, Jewish Family Services – a social welfare agency, the YMHA, the Jewish Public Library, the Segal Arts Center and the Hillel student organization, receive funding from the provincial government. Furthermore, Jewish day schools receive significant funding as well, with the government of Québec providing subsidies of over 50% per pupil once schools have met certain government requirements regarding French-language instruction. Although these institutions are not exclusively for Ashkenazi Jews, their relationship with the Québec government was constructed before the mass migration of Sephardim from Morocco. As Irene Bloemraad notes, government support for minority organizations can play a salient role in determining integration when she stresses the level of symbolic and material public support offered to immigrant or newcomer communities (Bloemraad 2006). This *Structured Mobilization*, to use her term, seems to be prevalent in the history of government support for the Ashkenazi Jewish community.

Although the overwhelming majority of the Ashkenazi community are Anglophones, there has been little significant interruptions or existential threats of rupture between the lines of support from the provincial government to the Jewish community. This has in large part been due to the fact that Anglophone institutions were in many ways protected by the Québec government with the language laws of the 1970s. For example, although Bill 101 restricted the English language in the public sphere, the exceptions made to Anglophone citizens of Québec applied largely to the Ashkenazi community who had mostly immigrated in the years preceding the Québec Charter of the French Language. Although measures such as the aforementioned French language instruction requirements in day schools may have created some linguistic requirements in relations with the Québec government, no major documented tensions unique to the institutions of the Jewish community were found to exist as a result of these policies. One need only look towards the history of Réné Levesque’s continual outreach and friendship with the Jewish community as a symbol of the political support received from even some of the most ardent promoters of the French language (Anctil 2010, 183-95). Evidence suggests that although there may have been minimal tensions over the years between the Ashkenazi institutions and the Québec government, for the most part the relationship has been cordial and supportive and has allowed institutions to serve as a gateway to individual contributions to the larger Québec society and economy.
Although the Sephardic community constructed institutions distinct from the Ashkenazi community, over time many became integrated into the umbrella Federation CJA apparatus, linking the institutional capacities of both Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews. The initial wave of Sephardic immigrants founded l’Association Juive Nord-Africaine in 1959, an organization that evolved to become what is known today as the Communauté sépharade unifiée du Québec (CSUQ) (Cohen 2010, 243). As Lasry and Tapia note, newly-arrived Sephardic Jews were in a peculiar position as they were squeezed between a community that shared the same religion but not the same language, and a non-Jewish majority keen on promoting the common French language (Lasry and Tapia 1989, 58). This propelled Sephardim to form their own particular institutions that reflected their respective pursuits and particular identities. One famous example of this distinctiveness was the formation of Maimonides, a Francophone Sephardic school constructed in 1972 and supported financially (as were Anglophone schools) by the Québec government. As Langlais and Rome suggest, the construction of Maimonides was a ‘dream’ for the Sephardic community, as they could now couple their Francophone identities with the pursuit of affordable Jewish education (Langlais and Rome 1996, 227).

As one might imagine, an inclination for French education probably facilitated an easier lobby process on the part of the Sephardic community in securing such rights. Although little research has been conducted examining the inner-workings of this arrangement, we can conclude that like the rest of the Jewish community, Sephardic relations were marked by understanding as well as financial and symbolic support.

In May 1976, the Sephardic CSUQ merged with the more mainstream AJCS, demonstrating an intra-community integration that remains apparent today (Lasry and Tapia 1989, 43). Although the CSUQ maintains a separate department within Federation CJA, in many ways the institutional governance of the umbrella organizations have been integrated, effectively hybridizing many aspects of the Jewish institutional apparatus in addition to their relations with the Québec government. For example the Association for Jewish Day Schools (under the auspices of the CJA) represents educational institutions to public and government bodies and is comprised of both Sephardic and Ashkenazi schools in Montreal. This horizontal integration between the Ashkenazi and Sephardic communities is worth noting, since it may influence the integrative strategies of both
communities vis-à-vis each other and the majority Québécois population. As Yolande Cohen suggests, Sephardic Jews have in many ways served as gateways for the *rapprochement* of Anglophone Jews with the Francophone majority (Cohen 2010, 289). Although a more comprehensive review of these unique intra-group dynamics in the facilitation of minority integration is a promising course of future enquiry, at the very least, intra-group dynamics between Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews have influenced how institutions and their members integrate with Québec society.

**Implications and Discussion**

Upon analysing the demographic and institutional orientations and attitudes of the Sephardic and Ashkenazi communities, evidence suggests that both groups have integrated into Québec society in complex and unique ways and to varying degrees. As we saw earlier, heavy emphasis has traditionally been placed on common language as a key ingredient, or even requirement, for the successful integration of minority groups into Québec society. However, findings demonstrate that the dynamics and influences of integration are more complicated. Additional factors that lie outside the scope of language, such as religious adhesion and intra-group dynamics have also been shown to be salient factors that influence integration patterns.

Regarding religious adhesion, as Shahar’s demographic and attitudinal study suggests, Sephardic Jews tend to be more religiously devoted to Judaism, maintain a stronger attachment to Israel and find greater value in living in a predominantly Jewish community. Although a direct and isolated causal link between religion and integration has not been discovered, it appears that these characteristics have affected indicators such as intermarriage, migration, informal associations, and settlement preferences of Sephardic Jews. As shown above, in matters pertaining to religious and community life – such as piety, intermarriage, education, voluntary work, and attitudes towards spatial living within the confines of a Jewish-centered area - Sephardic Jews have shown stronger centrifugal patterns vis-à-vis mainstream Québec. However, in matters where religion is not directly implicated, such as political and linguistic attitudes, Sephardic Jews have shown to be more consistent with the views of the general Québécois population.

Ashkenazi Jews on the other hand have tended to be generally less religious and more attached to North America as
opposed to Israel. This has corresponded to greater acceptance of intermarriage, greater informal associations with the non-Jewish populations of Montréal and less rigidly held communitarian values than the Sephardic community. However, like the rest of the Anglophone Québec population, Ashkenazi Jews tend to feel less secure about the political and linguistic climate of Québec than their Sephardic counterparts and hold views and voting patterns that are anomalous when compared to the general French Québécois public. Again, these conclusions denote that levels of religious and ethnic adhesion have shaped the two communities integration patterns in significant ways.

Regarding intra-group dynamics, as mentioned with the example of institutional integration, the Sephardic and Ashkenazi communities have in many ways been transformed as a result of the existence of these competing identities. In particular, the Sephardic community’s integration with the larger Jewish community has altered their social identifications and aspirations. For example, in a 2000 survey, 75.8% of Sephardic Jews identified themselves as close to the entire Jewish community - encompassing both Ashkenazi and Sephardic segments - whereas 70.1% identified themselves as close to the Sephardic community (Shahar 2000,45). In the same survey, 67% of Sephardic Jews claimed that Jewish development was an important factor in determining their children’s primary Jewish education whereas only 33% indicated that Sephardic development was of primary importance (Shahar 2000, 81). As Shahar (2000) notes, “It can be clearly seen that Jewish identity development is much more important than Sephardic identity development for respondents when it comes to choosing a primary school for their children” (81). Although this is merely hypothetical, it is possible that a greater quantity of Ashkenazi schools (and/or more favourable academic reputations) have caused greater integration between the two Jewish groups.

This growth in a closer identification with the general Jewish community contrasts sharply with some of the earlier research conducted regarding social relations (for example, Lasry’s study on informal associations mentioned earlier). Furthermore, any tendency for Sephardic Jews switching from Anglophone to more Francophone schooling may have even larger implications. In any event, three trends can be surmised: firstly, it appears that common religion has been an important factor in pulling the two Jewish communities closer together over the years. Secondly, this dynamic demonstrates that in addition to our claim that common language is not a trump factor determining levels of integration between Jewish communities and
the Québec mainstream, common language is also limited as a factor determining the intra-group integration between Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews. Simply put, common religion, rather than common language can be considered the dominant factor influencing group integration between Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews. Thirdly, the intra-group integration of Francophone and Anglophone Jews likely encouraged transformations in the dynamics between Jewish individuals and institutions and the general Québécois public.

What is also of interest is the view held by some academics that the relationship between both communities and the Québec government and general public has contributed to the Québec model of integration itself and its application to the plethora of minority groups across the province. As Pierre Anctil and Ira Robinson note, the history of Jews in Québec has not only reconciled the Jewish community with the province, but the experience of 200 years in Québec has also laid the tracks for how Québécois view their own identity and the model of integration they support with regards to all minority groups (Anctil and Robinson 2010, 254-55). In other words, the Jewish communities of Montreal have in a profound sense implicitly contributed to the model of integration advocated by the BTC and the conceptions of identity felt by many Québécois. This, in itself, can be considered a form of integration within the Québec community in a way that affects all minority groups as well. Of course, that is not to say that the Jewish community single-handedly set the tone for future integration strategies, only that it has played a significant role in the evolution of the model.

Finally, the findings presented in this paper have public policy implications. With a better understanding of the role and limitations of language as a facilitator of integration in Québec, policymakers may have a better understanding on how to develop more effective and appropriate integration strategies. For example, an over-emphasis on linguistic homogeneity as a facilitator of integration in the Québécois model may mistakenly lead politicians to ignore other salient factors such as religious adhesion and social networks. This indicates that integration problems cannot be solved by narrowly engaging only in linguistic dimensions, but rather through a wider and more well-rounded approach.

The survival of the Québécois nation has been inextricably linked to the survival of the French language in Québec. Although measures to reaffirm the French language may be necessary to ensure the survival of the French Québécois nation, they are not necessary to ensure social integration of minority groups. In other
words, one must be careful not to conflate nationalist self-determination with theoretical models of integration. Likewise, although the French language may be imperative for an integration strategy in Québec, it is not sufficient on its own to ensure successful integration of minority groups. As a result, policymakers must be cautious in putting linguistic homogeneity in its proper context – as one factor among many and not as a trump card – when developing integration policies.

**Conclusion**

Upon reviewing the attitudes, demography and experiences of the Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jewish communities of Montreal, it is apparent that their integration into Québec society has been a complex undertaking. As mentioned earlier, this analysis not only highlighted the importance of unpacking the notion of integration when evaluating the effectiveness of intercultural policy, but it also emphasized the shortcomings of an overemphasis of common language in the Québec model. If we look at integration from a multifarious prospective, we find that both Sephardic and Ashkenazi communities have integrated into the Québec mainstream with varying degrees of success depending on the integration indicator observed. As a result, evidence suggests that Sephardic and Ashkenazi integration patterns cannot solely be explained by linguistic factors. Although language surely plays an important role in determining how Francophone and Anglophone Jews integrate into Québec society, it is also accompanied by other factors, such as religious adherence, historical experiences and intra-group dynamics.

Two limitations of this study are worth mentioning. Although these findings certainly have implications on the larger debate surrounding the saliency of language as a facilitator of integration, its generalizability may be limited when applied outside of Québec. The Québec integration model and its emphasis on language is the product of a unique historical experience and thus, similar conditions may not exist elsewhere. In addition, many Anglophone and Francophone Quebecers are at least minimally bilingual, enabling a degree of functional interaction between both groups. The existence of these particular conditions may only be particular to the Québec case.

Secondly, it is also important to note that although Ashkenazi and Sephardic groups were utilized to correspond to separate linguistic communities, these Jewish groups are not
perfectly divided along linguistic boundaries. Nevertheless, with 80% of Sephardic Jews being Francophones compared to 1% of Ashkenazi Jews, this division remains an excellent starting point with which to investigate the research question. Attitudinal studies separating respondents strictly along linguistic lines rather than ethnicity surely should be considered for future research, reflecting a more accurate portrait of Francophone/Anglophone divisions, further isolating the linguistic variable.
Bibliography


Stolen Childhoods, Partial Promises:
Disarming, Demobilizing, and Reintegrating Former Child
Soldiers in Sierra Leone

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Abstract

The civil war in Sierra Leone left a country in shambles, a destabilized political structure, and thousands of child soldiers in need of rehabilitation. Due to the Revolutionary United Front being one of the largest recruiters of youth combatants after Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army, this added a challenging dimension to post-conflict rebuilding. While the World Bank lauded the state’s program of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), was its addressing of underage combatants truly the success it was extolled to be?

Assumptions about DDR and child soldiering will be explored, particularly in light of the youths’ ambiguous identity as both victims and perpetrators. Problems were exacerbated with hindered power transfers to child-focused organizations, and adult soldiers being treated alongside children, leading to struggles with reintegration, and the danger of possible relapses. Of particular concern is the deficient addressing of girl soldiers, and the gender bias in DDR programs. Though widely acclaimed, the “Girls Left Behind” project proved to be inadequate in rehabilitation, often serving to further victimize rather than empower girls. With rates of child soldiering increasing internationally, it is critical that gaps in reintegration approaches be addressed in order for DDR programs to more effectively meet the needs of underage combatants, as well as facilitate meaningful social recovery.
**Biography**

Randy Pinsky is a Masters Candidate in Public Policy and Public Administration at Concordia University, with a focus on conflict resolution and human rights. Committed to merging the fields of academia and activism throughout her Bachelors in Anthropology/Archaeology (McGill University), and Political Science (Concordia), Randy recently had the opportunity to engage in ‘research in action’ through an internship with Médecins Sans Frontières. In a similar field, Randy’s poster entitled “Action or Inaction? American Policy Towards Genocide”, was selected to be exhibited in Concordia’s Political Science Department. After having worked at the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, Randy is currently doing research on Alternative Dispute Resolution as a more culturally-informed means of conflict resolution within domestic legal systems. Randy’s most recent activist venture was helping to build a low-cost housing unit with Habitat for Humanity in Kingston, Ontario.
After more than a decade of violence, the Sierra Leone civil war left a country in shambles, a destabilized political structure, and thousands of former child soldiers in need of rehabilitation. With the Revolutionary United Front being one of the largest recruiters of youth combatants after the Lord’s Resistance Army of Uganda, this added a challenging dimension to post-conflict rebuilding, with questionable outcomes. While the World Bank lauded Sierra Leone’s Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program as a model for emulation, the substance of the changes at times tarnished the otherwise glowing appraisal, provoking the question of whether it truly was the success it was extolled to be.

In spite of the specific provisions regarding child soldiers in the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement, DDR programs were still plagued with pervasive challenges that belied facile resolution. Problems included reliance on generalized presumptions rather than the reality of child soldiering, compounded by the ambiguous identity of youth combatants as both victim and perpetrator that would be a recurrent theme throughout the process; obstructed power transfers to child-specialized organizations; and adult soldiers being treated alongside their younger counterparts.

Of particular concern is the inadequate attention allocated to the specific needs of girl soldiers, particularly in light of an incomplete understanding of the multiple roles played, the pervasive gender bias in DDR programs, and the exclusionary requirements for reintegration. Moreover, in spite of being widely acclaimed, the “Girls Left Behind” project proved to be deficient in meaningful rehabilitation, and paradoxically served to further victimize, rather than empower, the girls it was intended to assist. With armed groups increasingly recruiting child soldiers, it is critical that gaps in reintegration approaches be exposed and addressed in order for there to be tangible improvements and sustained post-conflict recovery.

After situating both the conflict and subsequent attempts for its resolution, an examination of the ‘rationales’ for recruiting child soldiers will be followed by a highlighting of the complexity of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration program, particularly in regards to youth combatants. The nuances and paradoxical outcomes of tailored DDR projects in addressing the child soldier conundrum will then be explored, using an analysis of common assumptions upon which organizations rely. It is only by unpacking these misperceptions that one can expose the reality of child soldiering and best address their situation. This is particularly with regards to what would prove to not be an anomaly: the phenomenon
of the girl soldier. Through examining the limitations of often misguided programs put in place, one can develop more meaningful and effective post-conflict models, beyond the overly simplistic ‘success’ of reintegrating child soldiers with their families.

RUF: The ‘Shining Path’ of Africa?

Since its independence in 1961, Sierra Leone experienced relative stability as a newly founded state until the start of the 1990s. While still struggling with development, the country’s status progressively changed from ‘failed’ state status to the designation of merely ‘fragile’. Prior to the Revolutionary United Front’s (RUF) formation and eventual demands for the restoration of a multi-party democracy, the All People’s Congress (APC) one-party regime ruled the country with little opposition (Richards 1996, 5). Starting as a tiny group of dissatisfied citizens, the RUF soon swelled into a formidable armed force of 50,000-75,000, becoming one of the largest recruiters of child soldiers after the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (Peters and Richards 1998,186). In fact, it has been estimated that between 5,000-7,000 child combatants were engaged during Sierra Leone’s decade-long civil war (1991-2002) (Zack-Williams 2001, 73).

The rebel group was funded and trained by warlord-turned-president of Liberia, Charles Taylor. Motivated by the desire to secure access to Sierra Leone’s valuable diamond mines, Taylor assisted in destabilizing the country to punish it for having supported international peacekeeping efforts during Liberia’s 1989 war. The idea of abducting children and forcing them into armed service was conceived by Taylor, as he realized that youth could be easily intimidated from straying or resisting orders, resulting in effective military forces. A rationalization was also that this strategy would stump and bewilder the opposing side, enabling troops to garner valuable offensive time and ultimately, the upper hand. By the mid-1990s, over half of the RUF forces were between the ages of eight and fourteen, with around 30% of these youth being girls serving in both combative and supporting roles. In order to make these underage soldiers reckless and to dispel hesitation in terrorizing villages, many were given aggression-inducing drugs (Richards 1996, 91).

The RUF has been compared to the Peruvian Shining Path rebels as, rather than being composed of uneducated soldiers desiring to benefit from violence, members were intellectuals disenchanted with the government who perceived mobilization to be a means for accruing change (Richards 1996; Thusi 2004). The RUF’s
guiding mantra focused on enhanced governance, accountability, improved social services, and more multi-partied elections, however, their aggressive actions undercut their noble objectives. Acting as ‘sobels’- “soldier[s] by day, rebel[s] by night”- they engaged in sweeps of intimidation, which Human Rights Watch estimates as being over 50,000 deaths and one million displaced (Richards 1996, 7). Villages were terrorized if they refused to support the forces, institutions were destroyed, and people’s hands were amputated to be physically prevented from voting; a bewildering act given the group’s alleged focus on fair elections (Richards 1996, 17). The drastic measures adopted by the RUF made it even more of a frightening force with which to contend, and the Sierra Leone government struggled to subdue the group.

Although the state offered numerous concessions, the RUF remained dissatisfied. Leader Foday Sankoh was difficult to appease, seeing through government promises to provide the RUF with minor political positions if they would agree to a ceasefire. Despite being offered the position of prime minister if he would order an end to the terrorizing, Sankoh maintained that unless tangible power would be granted to the RUF, the violence would continue (Rashid 2000, 6).

With tensions escalating, the United Nations intervened with the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) peacekeeping operation (1999-2005), setting up demobilization camps and assisting with attempted peace accords. The RUF contested the mission’s legitimacy, obstructed its operations, refused to disarm, and even held several peacekeepers hostage, claiming that their presence was undermining their chances for accruing change (Bright 2000, 2). In the desire to force government concessions, the RUF “literally stuck[ ] to their guns” in their refusal to concede (Bright 2000, 6). The reluctance to disarm was also motivated out of fear of communal retribution. As such, this concern would be granted much consideration in the planning and execution of the ultimate DDR program. It would only be once the conflict ceased subsequent to a decisive military blow by the British forces in 2002 that the RUF would disarm and become a political party. However, it would be a labored process until then.

A Chance at Peace, an Attempt to Heal

In 1999, the RUF and Sierra Leone government signed the Lomé Peace Accord - largely a refurbishment of the failed Abidjan Peace Accord of three years prior. The agreement was named after
the capital of the Togolese Republic in West Africa in which negotiations took place and where the agreement was ultimately signed. It included a commitment to a cessation of the hostilities, a focus on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), and provisions for rebel leader Sankoh to gain a position in the transitional government (Rashid 2000).

Despite the stated commitment to peace, violence erupted once more when the RUF refused to disarm, and abducted and murdered UN peacekeepers (Berman 2000:8). In fact, a year after the agreement was signed, small arms sales actually increased in spite of international moratoriums and the 1997 UN arms embargo (Berman 2000, 5). Weapon sources ranged from the Ukraine to Cote d'Ivoire, and this continual supply frustrated attempts at stabilizing the devastated state, leading to a merely transient peace (Berman 2000, 12-3). It would only be with the Abidjan II Accord of 2002 that a ceasefire would be successfully brokered and enforcers to recommit to meeting the provisions of its precedent, the Abidjan Peace Accord.

Several concessions were made in order to entice the RUF rebels to demobilize. A blanket amnesty was granted to Sankoh and his fellow combatants, power sharing was instated, and the RUF became a political party once it disarmed (Rashid 2000, 3). The United Nations highly objected to this granting of amnesty, declaring that such an act contradicted international humanitarian law and was unjustified in crimes against humanity or war crimes, as was the case in Sierra Leone. As a result, the Lomé Accord was often “perceived as rewarding violence, instead of punishing it,” although many argued it was the only means by which stability could be attained (Omotola 2007, 43). Other components of the agreement included the establishment of a Truth Commission for attaining closure, and a detailed disarmament, demobilization and reintegration campaign. While special provisions were made to address the particular needs of former child soldiers, their actual impact was questionable.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in Sierra Leone was deemed by many to be mostly show and little substance in spite of its lauded nature, serving to merely continue to frustrate the local population against the already criticized amnesty (Kelsall 2005). As a result, well-intentioned acts served to cast doubt as to the genuine nature of change prescribed in the accord. Apologies to villagers appeared hollow and insincere, and aside from expressing regret for their participation in factions that had committed atrocities, soldiers avoided claiming individual responsibility for crimes (Kelsall 2005, 372).
Further complications developed with confusion between the truth commission and the UN-led Special Court that wielded the power to try those complicit of violations, leading to reluctance to admitting guilt for fear of prosecution. Moreover, as the main objective was to facilitate combatant reintegration, greater emphasis was placed on aggressor hearings than on victim testimonies. As a result, Sierra Leoneans felt the commission was slanted more in favor of the perpetrators. It would be in the traditional ceremonies of healing that meaningful change would develop, guided by the sentiment that the “will [for] peace” superseded the “will [for] truth” (Kelsall 2005, 390).

These tensions and deficient attempts at attaining truth and justice were further complicated by the anomaly of the thousands of returning child soldiers. While the Truth Commission had particular provisions for youth, they were solely perceived as victims, negating their role as executers of violence. As a result, their dual identities were reduced to their victim roles, leading to contested perceptions of culpability and ultimately, confusion for their treatment. The general sentiment was for the child soldiers to be absolved of their crimes, abiding by the popular Krio proverb posted in communities, *bush no dà to tro wà bad pikin* or “whatever a child might do, it cannot be banished…but must be forgiven” (Kelsall 2005, 365, emphasis added).

Though perhaps well-intentioned, this decision to overlook the child soldiers’ roles as perpetrators served to undermine the acts of aggression the youth *had* committed, bypassing what could have been a healing process for them. One factor was due to the Special Court only criminally trying those deemed as bearing the “greatest responsibility for human rights violations and war crimes”, thereby exempting the youth (Kelsall 2005, 381).

While the conundrum of the dual identity of child soldiers as both victim and perpetrator was at times acknowledged by the facilitators of the post-conflict rebuilding, it was often downplayed, with harmful ramifications. Many argue that while former child soldiers should not have been placed on equal standing as free acting adult militants, more substantial healing and closure could have developed had the courts and truth commission addressed both parts of their personas (Williamson 2006; Betancourt et al 2005; Zack-Williams 2001). This ambiguous duality would be a theme that would resonate and be contested throughout the entire post-conflict process.

As noted, the Lomé Peace Accord included provisions for former child combatants to be recognized as requiring customized programs of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR).
In fact, the ultimate DDR program of Sierra Leone would be among the sole cases of post-conflict disarmament that had a focus on child protection (Williamson 2006, 200). Coupled with international legislations holding governments accountable for such a crime, the programs in Sierra Leone yielded superior outcomes than in cases such as Liberia where this specific focus was absent. In spite of such gains however, it is interesting to note that Liberia witnessed a substantially greater number of girls being demobilized, as will be discussed.

While this child-focus feature was a critical improvement over other accords which failed to recognize the complex situation of underage combatants, several difficulties persisted. For instance, the means for approaching reintegration was vague and resulted in confusion for its application, as well as numerous oversights. Among these included insufficient attention being allocated to the specific needs of girl soldiers, and the contested skills training for youth. Neglecting the former group resulted in female child combatants being consistently excluded from conventional reintegration programs. Moreover, although education and skills training were effective, successful reintegration was obstructed by the fact that qualified former youth combatants were released into areas teeming with unemployment. This ‘half thought out’ quality and short-term thinking would be a theme that would repeat itself numerous times in the Sierra Leone response to its child soldier problem, resulting in incomplete post-conflict healing.

Why Children?

Prior to discussing Sierra Leone’s DDR programs and their often incomplete addressing of youth combatants, it must first be explored why children are recruited in the first place. Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire, former UN Commander of the ill-fated peacekeeping mission to Rwanda, recently published They Fight Like Soldiers, They Die Like Children: The Global Quest to Eradicate the Use of Child Soldiers (2010). The title denotes the complexity in effectively addressing the needs of this group, as their ambiguous identity obscures facile resolution. Dallaire discusses the alarmingly logical rationale for using child soldiers in armed forces; the prevalence of which UNICEF estimates as currently being numbered at around 300,000 in more than thirty conflicts internationally (UNICEF Factsheet: Child Soldiers). Advancements in arms technology have facilitated children’s involvement as weapons have been drastically reduced in size, complexity and weight (Zack-
Williams 2001, 73). Moreover, through violence and pressure, children are easily intimidated to obey orders and not revolt, and possess few other obligations such as a family or employment to hold them back.

Children are loyal, ruthless, and indispensable, in plentiful stock, and require low maintenance. They are small enough to act as spies, do not garner much suspicion, and are effective soldiers. This is particularly in light of the destabilizing effect they can have on the opposing side, as they can force them to hesitate before acting, garnering valuable time to gain the offensive. With such an analysis, Dallaire bluntly asserts, “child soldiers are a commander’s dream come true: the perfect low-technology, cheap and expendable weapon system that can perpetuate itself ad infinitum” (Nutt 2010, 2).

Dallaire critiques currently implemented DDR programs as inadequately addressing the particular needs of child soldiers. He helped found the Child Soldier Initiative guided by the mandate to act as “a partnership to build the will, knowledge, collaboration and tools necessary to eradicate the use of child soldiers” (Child Soldiers Initiative). The organization aims to critically examine and prevent the “child-soldier pandemic”, and proposes ways for ameliorating DDR programs, such as eliminating the weapons prerequisite; the significance of which shall be discussed (Nutt 2010, 1).

Neutralizing Violence, One Gun at a Time

With such issues in mind, how did the DDR undertaking unfold in Sierra Leone? Led by the United Nations, such programs play a critical role in facilitating meaningful change and stability. In order for it to be maximally successful however, it is imperative that the first stage of disarmament be attempted in tandem with enhancements of security. Insufficient consideration can lead to a reluctance of compliance by former combatants, and subsequently, a continuation of violence (Spear 2006, 64). Indeed, this fear of communal retribution in the form of “mob justice… [and] revenge killings” was one of the reasons claimed by the RUF in its initial refusal to disarm (Bright 2000, 8). In order for there to be progress beyond flawed attempts of fragile change and temporary peace,

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6 Aside from the critical work being undertaken by this organization, Dallaire’s commitment to the cause is further evidenced by the fact that proceeds garnered from his renowned Shake Hands with the Devil (2003) book documenting his experiences in Rwanda, are directed towards it.
protection against possible revenge must be ensured. Indeed, it is only by addressing such long-term security concerns that individuals will surrender their violent livelihoods. Without the assurance of security, aggression can once more develop, with escalating consequences.

The collection of military arms is also insufficient in the disarmament stage if little is done to render them impotent. Weapons can be stolen and can quickly refuel conflict if there is no follow through on them. As if to confirm fears of such potential, the Small Arms Survey claims that most of the weapons collected in the Sierra Leone DDR program were not destroyed, leading to concerns about the sustainability of change and potential for relapse (Berman 2000, 23).

While numerous arguments abound reiterating the need for the dismantlement of arms for post-conflict reconstruction, two predominate. First, as noted, the continual presence of weapons can be used to reignite violence, and subsequently, shatter the fragile progression to peace. If they are not destroyed, weapons can be refunneled into furthering tensions in neighboring regions (Spear 2006, 65). Secondly and equally as important, the tangible act of destroying weapons serves to symbolize a decisive break with a violent past, and facilitate the start to meaningful healing. As an example, the German Agency for Technical Co-operation is very effective in securing sustainable peace, as it dismantles weapons and rebuilds them into productive tools and peace monuments, demonstrating a commitment to a new reality (Thusi and Meek 2003, 33).

The demobilization of groups is subsequent to the disarmament stage. This is a critical undertaking, as without such a step, the possibility for military reorganization persists, and true commitment to change remains suspect. While this is a significant stage, one of the most complex aspects of DDR programs is the third component of reintegration. If reintegration is improperly addressed, problems can remain latent and the possibility of violent resurgence to be ever-present.

It is at this stage that psychological support, job training, and educational opportunities are provided for former combatants. Through gaining marketable skills, societies are more likely to cautiously accept back soldiers, as combatants are able to prove their worth as contributing members. The more transferable the skills learnt, the more likely former combatants will be received and not stigmatized. Former soldiers are also frequently granted sums of
money and food to facilitate their reintegration, so that they are perceived to be an enhancement to the economy rather than a liability. More than this, monies can also be an incentive for soldiers to abandon their formerly violent lifestyles and commit to a new life. Unfortunately, if the latter forms the dominant motivation for change, delays in payment or insufficient funding can be dangerous, as incomplete reintegration runs the risk of causing setbacks in the otherwise progress (Thusi and Meek 2007, 36).

Beyond its basic components, DDR programs have been instrumental in securing important gains in post-conflict rebuilding and inspiring confidence in progression towards new futures. In Sierra Leone, this was particularly the case when the diamond-rich, rebel-dominated and volatile Kono region not only witnessed successful disarmament, but was also eventually able to usher in elections in 2002 (Thusi and Meek 2003, 30, 34). While examples of progress being made in unlikely regions such as this contributed to the World Bank’s glowing appraisal of Sierra Leone’s DDR program, the application to former child soldiers would be somewhat more contested.

‘Child Soldiers are Youth Engaged in Direct Warfare’

Contesting assumptions is critical for evaluating the true ‘successes’ of Sierra Leone’s efforts to address the conundrum of youth militants. One of the reasons programs were not as effective as they could have been was due to deficient understandings of the child soldier reality. For instance, the dominant perception utilized in such programs conceives of the issue as exclusively involving boys engaged in combat, a definition which is reductionist at best. Consequently, if programs are based upon such a narrow definition, they are bound to be flawed, with those who fall out of its narrow purview to remain unaddressed.

For the purposes of DDR, UNICEF describes child soldiers as “any child - boy or girl- under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of...armed group in any capacity” (UNICEF Factsheet: Child Soldiers, emphasis added). This conceptualization is valuable as it takes into account the engagement of both male and female youth, as well as hints at the multiplicity of roles they may undertake. Indeed, tasks are not limited to militant activity, but can also include acting as porters, mine sweepers, or sex slaves (Human Rights Watch: Facts About Child Soldiers). The failure to be cognizant of this reality resulted in several of the DDR programs to be internally weak. In
particular, access to reintegration services was initially conditional upon presenting a weapon in order to accelerate the disarmament process, as will be discussed. As several of the roles adopted by child soldiers did not include wielding arms, such a prerequisite resulted in the dangerous overlooking of many in need of assistance. In particular, as girls were thought to not meet the narrow and unrepresentative definition of child soldiers, they were consistently excluded from any form of protection.

Organizations specializing in youth were thus instrumental in addressing gaps in Sierra Leone’s DDR programs, although the transfer of power from the United Nations was reluctantly undertaken. They ensured that a child-focused mandate would accompany the DDR programs in order to better address the anomaly of youth combatants consistently falling through the cracks. Leaders of initiatives such as UNICEF’s Girls Left Behind project effectively pushed for legislation addressing this overlooked niche of child combatants.

Moreover, beyond the Sierra Leone case, organizations were successful in pressuring for the ratification of international laws condemning the use of child soldiers. Among these were the 2002 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child that outlawed the involvement of children under the age of eighteen in hostilities (UNICEF Factsheet: Child Soldiers). A milestone was also reached in July 2002 with the enforcement of the Statute of the International Criminal Court that made the “conscription or enlistment of …children under 15 in hostilities by national armed forces or armed groups a war crime” (UNICEF Factsheet: Child Soldiers, emphasis added).

Although these statutes constitute critical achievements as they imply that those complicit can at last be held accountable, the use of youth in warfare continues to persist, often with impunity. While the participation of such organizations addressed the ambiguous nature of the youth that was severely lacking in the DDR programs, several contentions would continue to plague their ultimate success. Predominant among the problems would be the dangerous reliance on assumptions, rather than the reality of child soldiering, as will be explored in depth.
The Revolutionary United Front was notorious for having one of the greatest proportions of child soldiers in the region. While most were abducted through school and street kidnappings, not all were forcibly recruited. In fact, contrary to common assumptions, a good proportion voluntarily sought out the army. As noted by Peters and Richards (1998), policy makers must be “caution[ed] ... against seeing child soldiers solely as victims of war”, as the reasons for their involvement and their circumstances range considerably (183). One rationale is due to commonly held perceptions that Sierra Leone’s future appeared bleak. The corrupt government, lack of opportunities, restricted access to education, debilitating poverty and insufficient jobs, make the army with its garnered respect and opportunities for self-advancement, very appealing. In fact, many felt this was simply a substitute form of skills and education otherwise withheld from them.

In order to sustainably prevent children from being lured into armed forces, these socio-economic failings must be addressed, as the current rehabilitation system merely contends with the manifestations of the problem rather than their source. It is those living in combat zones with limited access to education, separated from their families, or who have lost parents due to conflict, that are most vulnerable (UNICEF Factsheet: Child Soldiers).

A second rationale is the problematic family structure that exists in Sierra Leone. Due to inconsistent sources of food and supplies, parents will often send their children to be wards for other families. Despite its initial benefits, problems abound with such fostering systems, as the children are often mistreated and perceived as subservient to the host family (Zack-Williams 2001, 76). They must undertake servant positions and are susceptible to abuse, with food being withheld as punishment. Aspirations for education must often be forgone as they are obliged to assume the chores of the other children in order to enable the latter to go to school. Needless to say, resentment ensues, with the “fostering and... wardship system [merely]... produc[ing] a mass of alienated young people” (Zack-Williams 2001, 76). The army, with its plentiful meals, salaries, and desperately desired respect, can thus be perceived as an enticing opportunity.

A final possible reason for willingly joining an armed force is particular to the Revolutionary United Front. With its millenarian appeal as a “people’s movement for national recovery” much like that
of Peru’s Shining Path, it was viewed as inspiring for children who perceived few prospects for their future (Richards 1996, 1; Zack-Williams 2001, 74). Specifically, the rebel group proclaimed, “we...fight[ ] for democratic empowerment to enable us to reclaim...ourselves as enterprising ... Africans...[W]e are tired of poverty... and our state of self-imposed backwardness” (Zack-Williams 2001, 75).

The RUF welcomed idealist children, convincing them that the only means for obtaining tangible change would be to take up arms, which many did. Though abuses abounded, the forces provided the youth with a surrogate family, protection and amenities, often “substitut[ing] for lost family and friends” (Peters and Richards 1998, 187). One girl, questioned as to why she supported the rebel group who had abducted her, simply replied, “they offered me ...shoes and dresses- I never had decent shoes before” (Richards 1996, 28). Many of the children were originally living on the streets and had already been hardened by their experiences. The alienation and constant marginalization made them easy prey for such an appeal for change.

Those who joined hoping to procure much needed improvements for their country were the hardest to reintegrate, as many claimed their actions were motivated by the desire to defend their state and would return to the army should they have another chance (Peters and Richards 1998, 192). Several still believed in the rationale of their actions, and unashamedly acknowledged that some must be killed in order for improvements to become realized. Even more difficult to integrate were those who had consciously joined to “[a]venge my people’... and ...‘defend my motherland’”, as they were most reluctant to abandon what was perceived to be a perpetually unfinished task (Zack-Williams 2001, 78).

‘DDR; Appropriately Child-Tailored’

Although the Lomé Agreement was unique in its special provisions regarding differential treatment for child, as opposed to adult, combatants in the UN-led DDR process, it took many attempts for this to be properly achieved (Child Soldiers Global Report 2008, 2). In fact, Spear (2006) claims that the war reignited partly due to the fact that the specific needs of child soldiers were neglected, compounding the already inconsistent RUF compliance with the process (66). Perhaps the greatest oversight was the fact that rebel leaders and in general, adults, were demobilized alongside former
child soldiers, enabling a tense atmosphere as the ties of control were not completely severed. Moreover, the ambiguous identity of such youth became problematic for peacekeepers, as they found themselves to be woefully inept at dealing with them, confused by their dual characterization. Rather than engaging with hardened soldiers who consciously chose their line of action, these were youth who had their childhood stolen from them. Although programs had to contend that not all youth had been abducted and that some in fact, had voluntarily sought out the armed forced, how were they to be properly addressed? In particular - were they soldiers foremost or children?

A critical advancement took place when the United Nations invited child-focused non-governmental organizations to lead DDR programs specified for ex-youth combatants. Under the guidance of UNICEF, this was a vital move as the youths’ ambiguous identities would now be more coherently addressed. Such work was funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), affiliated with the Displaced Children and Orphans Fund that directly dealt with youth in such complex situations. Rather than being limited by the original DDR plans, UNICEF expanded its mandate. In addition to reuniting almost all of the 6,800 former child soldiers with their families, the organization facilitated special medical procedures, and set up Interim Care Centers (ICC) and sensitization projects (UNICEF Factsheet: Child Soldiers). Each of these factors will be further explored.

To start, the significance of the medical treatments becomes more apparent with greater understanding of the tactics adopted by the RUF to preclude youth from escaping. Far from merely aesthetic, these procedures played critical roles in enabling a veritable break from the past. Child soldiers were often forced to commit atrocities in their own villages to ensure that returning home would be inconceivable (Williamson 2006, 189). The trauma and shame solidified their fear of the leaders, eliminated any inclinations for disobedience, and ensured their permanence in the army. In addition to compelling the children to engage in such terrorizing, the RUF tattooed their group name on the children’s bodies, reinforcing their control, precluding the possibility for escape, and ensuring stigmatization should they ever return home (Williamson 2006, 190). Cognizant of this reality, UNICEF took a step beyond providing psycho-social counseling, employing plastic surgeons to complete life-altering procedures. More than merely removing unsightly tattoos, this served to decisively break the hold the groups possessed over the children, made reintegration possible, and enabled a progression
from their pasts. This tangible gesture was akin to the destruction of weapons as it both reinforced that the armed forces no longer lay claim to their lives, as well as was an essential means for moving ahead (Williamson 2006).

Alongside the traditional DDR components, UNICEF workers established Interim Care Centers where children, simply put, learned how to be children again. This was a vital transition step in reintegrating former combatants, as they learned necessary skills for enhancing their chances for acceptance by their communities. The building of self-esteem and feelings of self-worth accompanied these life skills, supplemented by traditional ceremonies for healing (Williamson 2005, Betancourt et al 2005).

Those who had been assisted by the reintegration services were markedly better adjusted, had higher levels of confidence, and enhanced pro-social skills over their counterparts who lacked the integration preparation (Betancourt et al 2005, 10-11). Interestingly, it was only slightly more likely that those who had taken part in such programs would have a traditional cleansing ceremony. In spite of this fact, the traditional ceremonies were highly instrumental in easing the transition back into the community, and were associated with higher levels of family acceptance and pro-social behavior (Betancourt et al 2005, 11).

It was also discovered that those villages who were visited by NGOs assisting to facilitate the child soldiers’ return, were associated with higher community acceptance, lower cases of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and higher levels of well-being (Betancourt et al 2005, 12). Additionally, NGO visitation was associated with higher levels of pro-social behavior, and lower cases of hostility and depression.

Beyond counseling services, reintegration was also effected in Transition Camps where youth were provided with the opportunity to choose either academic or professional skills training (Williamson 2006). Though both bore potential, they each resulted in challenging outcomes. When surveyed, most of the former child soldiers claimed that while the educational option was beneficial, it was not as instrumental as trade apprenticeships for becoming self-sufficient. To address these concerns, programs were adapted to include proficiency instruction in trades in tandem with literacy and mathematical skills. While this adaption was slow to integrate, it proved critical for former combatants impatient to move on with their lives.
Despite the fact that skills training was perceived to be more immediately beneficial, it also proved to be problematic as it resulted in a plethora of qualified youth with few positions to be filled due to high levels of unemployment. This glut in the market resulted in intense frustration as the skilled laborers were not met with enhanced economic opportunities. It is for this reason that DDR programs designed for former combatants (underage or not) must take the economic situation of the area into account when crafting the training programs. For lack of alternatives or venues for their newly-developed skills, some ex-combatants resorted to mining ventures, with others even returning to fighting in countries such as Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire (Child Soldiers Global Report 2008, 2). In spite of these issues however, the apprenticeship programs were essential for facilitating the children’s acceptance, as it enabled them to prove themselves as potential contributors rather than burdens to their communities (Ball 2007, 90).

In order to most effectively condition communities for the ultimate return of youth combatants, non-governmental organizations in Sierra Leone led sensitization programs in the villages. Although these programs were significant for the reintegration of adult soldiers, such an undertaking was particularly important as the children would be returning as dependents, more in need of acceptance than autonomous, self-sufficient adults. Successful reintegration was contingent on this preparation as many community members had suffered at the hands of these child soldiers and were justifiably wary of their return. There was thus understandably much concern as to how they would be ultimately received. Community responses fluctuated dramatically, from some individuals promoting unconditional acceptance, to others “indicating that they never wanted to see them again, as if they did, they would probably kill them” (Williamson 2006, 185).

Reactions were also divided on political lines depending on whether the children had been part of the RUF or local civil defense forces. As might be predicted, the former group was reacted to with hostility and stigmatization, while the latter were welcomed as heroes (Zack-Williams 2001, Richards 1996). It was thereby critical that such perceptions be addressed in the communities prior to the arrival of the youth in order to maximize successful reintegration. These aspects underscore the delicate nature of DDR, compounded when the ex-combatants are youth as in the case of Sierra Leone. While the factor of being underaged complicated an already intricate process of reintegration, this would become exponentially more complex with the returning of girl child soldiers.
“Girl Soldiers’ is an Oxymoron’

Contrary to popular assumptions, girls play a major role in child soldiering, both in active combat as well as periphery positions. Addressing this small yet substantial group is compounded by the fact that they are often not considered in the conventional perception of child soldiers, and thus are frequently overlooked in rehabilitation programs. Mackenzie (2006) effectively portrays this reality in terming those in this situation, “forgotten warriors”.

The multiplicity of roles played by girl soldiers makes them targets for ostracism and stigma, particularly if they have been the victims of sexual abuse. These factors often exacerbate their status as a vulnerable group with particular needs which are more often neglected than provided for. Such a complex situation is compounded by the fact that peace accords such as the Lomé Agreement fail to specify the unique situation of girl soldiers, leaving them with few tailored programs. These issues complicate an already delicate process of reintegration, with problematic consequences.

While the popular perception is that girls are kidnapped to act as sexual slaves and bush wives, this is a role that is in addition to rather than in replacement of, combating functions. In fact, in all the civil wars in Africa where child soldiers have been utilized – with the exception of Libya – girls have been engaged as active combatants (McKay 2006, 153). The Shining Path rebel group of Peru was notorious for having “one of the ‘largest female contingents of any [other] armed group’”, and Human Rights Watch notes that in countries such as Nepal, Sri Lanka and Uganda, a third or more of child soldiers may be female (Mazurana et al 2002, 105; Human Rights Watch: Facts About Child Soldiers). In the specific case of Sierra Leone where 30% of the underage combatants were girls, such a reality needed to be factored in for the country’s DDR programs.

The complexity in responding to the situation of female child soldiers is due to their variety of overlapping roles as combatants, mine sweepers and sex slaves, whereas boys are more often limited to one or two such functions. Gender role expectations can be reversed, as witnessed in Liberia and Uganda where some “boys were forced into sexual servitude [to higher ranking female commanders] whereas some girls were front-line fighters” however, this situation is infrequent (Thompson 1999 in Mazurana et al 2002, 109).
Members of UNICEF realized that consistent failure to account for the reality of girl soldiers resulted in the DDR proposed plans in Sierra Leone having an unintentional gender bias. While almost 7,000 children were demobilized in the program, only 8% were girls, revealing the alarming gap in access (Williamson 2006, 191; Child Soldiers Global Report 2008, 2). The Girls Left Behind (GLB) project was created as a subgroup to the general DDR program to address such low rates, funded by USAID’s Displaced Children and Orphans Fund (Williamson 2005). It was intended to resolve such oversights and assist the girls with psychological healing, skills learning, and general care.

UNICEF notes how the Girls Left Behind Program was created to address those who had not been included in the conventional DDR projects. Working in collaboration with the Child Protection Network, Ministry of Social Welfare, and various national and international NGOs, the focus was on community reintegration, and providing girls with basic education, income generating activities, and skills training (UNICEF 2005, 17). The program involved sensitization and advocacy campaigns, mentorship by women leaders and groups, and had a family tracing and reunification component. The girls had the option of reuniting with their families, remaining with their ‘husbands’, or living with friends. Interestingly, as much as fifty percent decided against staying with their families, opting to either return to their former partners, or live with a same-sex peer group (UNICEF 2005, 17-8).

The Girls Left Behind Program: Addressing or Reinforcing the Problem?

While the Girls Left Behind initiative was critical in identifying and targeting the issue of girl soldiering, it still contained critical flaws that undermined its potential and intended nature. Most problematic was the inadequate promotion of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programs and what they entailed to the girls, even with the supposedly more gender sensitive GLB angle. Even if female child soldiers became aware of the program’s existence, they were only eligible for the services upon demonstrating their knowledge or possession of guns as part of the disarmament component. As most of the girls had escaped without their weaponry, many believed this made them ineligible, and consequently often did not even seek out the programs. In fact, over 46% cited the lack of such a possession as being one of the main reasons for not benefitting from the services provided (Williamson 2005, 11). This was a critical oversight of the
GLB program, as even when the criteria changed, girls were not sufficiently informed, and thus lost out on potentially valuable support and counseling.

Another limitation was the failure to separate the adults from the youth in the DDR camps, with several Interim Care Centers for children being located within the vicinity of the adult DDR encampment (Williamson 2005, 14). While this was problematic on a variety of levels, it was compounded for the girl soldiers as it often resulted in former ‘husbands’ preventing them from entering the program, thereby still retaining control over their lives (Williamson 2006, 191). Moreover, neglecting to divide soldiers by gender allowed for stigmatization, abuse, and harassment to proliferate unhindered, further deteriorating an already ambivalent experience. Consequently, separate and well-distanced centers would be valuable considerations for future such endeavors.

Girls were also disadvantaged due to the fact that they could only benefit in theory from the provided education classes and skills training. In practice, this was not possible as youth care centers had no provisions for children born of forced ‘marriages’. Girls who were pregnant were also prevented from attending schools, thereby refusing those most in need. The possession of a child further complicated matters, due to the fact that even if girls had presented themselves at DDR camps, it was questionable if they would be accepted based on their unclear status; Were they a soldier? A child? A woman? Confusion led to inadequate and improperly targeted services, resulting in programs impressive in structure yet lacking in substance.

For instance, in spite of the glowing appraisal of the Girls Left Behind project, significant failings undermined its potential effectiveness. One obvious problem was the fact that the program was initiated in 2002, thus only commencing upon the termination of the regular DDR programs (Mackenzie 2006). This left girls with virtually no alternative prior to its creation, resulting in their problems only being addressed years later.

Another central concern with the Girls Left Behind project was in the implications of its name. Far from inspiring change, the title was patronizing, denied the girls agency, and, despite best intentions, reinforced that girls were secondary considerations (Mackenzie 2006). Moreover, through the very nature of others speaking on their behalf, the girls were further victimized as “agency and empowerment cannot exist without the ability for self-expression” (Mackenzie 2006, 11). Even prior to unpacking the program’s services, the title’s
inferences are unreflexive of the girls’ self-perceptions, and obscured their true courage and self-reliance. For instance, contrary to the belief that they felt compelled to passively accept forced relationships, many left as soon as they perceived an opportunity (Williamson 205, 13).

When sought out, many girls claimed they had never been consulted in the development stages of the Girls Left Behind projects, probing questions as to whose needs the program was deemed to address if such a fundamental step was overlooked. This also meant that girls were doubly disadvantaged; first by being excluded from the benefits of the DDR program due to unclear criteria and ill-suited services, and then due to their input not being sought out or incorporated. In addition to admitting confusion regarding the perceived condition of gun possession for DDR eligibility, several former girl soldiers claimed they actively chose not to frequent the DDR or GLB camps.

It is critical to examine such issues as they reveal that despite their significance, the programs replicated several of the alleged ‘lessons learned’ in the general DDR initiatives. Many thus question if the GLB undertaking truly enhanced DDR in Sierra Leone. In particular, for the girls ‘forgotten’ in the conventional programs, did the services improve on the former’s failures? (Mazurana et al 2006; MacKenzie 2006; McKay 2006).

Several of the girls who participated in the program claimed that the project failed to enhance their situation, citing doubts as to its efficacy, concerns about bureaucratic delays, and suspicions of illicit NGO motives (MacKenzie 2006, 14). Interestingly, it was discovered that the traditional cleansing ceremonies were deemed to be more instrumental in enhancing their integration than externally imposed ones. This was due to the fact that communities were reminded that as the violence had not been the ‘fault’ of the girls (though they had often been the forced perpetrators of it), they should not be stigmatized for it (Williamson 2006, 196).

Girls often did not perceive the potential value of the program, with many feeling that they had ‘better alternatives’. They reinforced that the process appeared unappealing “because it was not designed with them in mind” (MacKenzie 2006, 19). While several girl combatants benefited from the services, others expressed even revulsion at taking part, claiming that they wished to distance themselves from anything to do with their traumatic past. Many did not want anyone to see them in association with the soldiers, desiring
to quietly reinsert themselves in the community without anyone knowing their background (MacKenzie 2006, 17).

This latter preference would be encumbered by several challenges as they had experienced mass trauma, were often burdened with a child they resented, and were ostracized as “rebel wi[v]e[s]” (McKay 2006, 161). Many subsequently experienced abuse by and exclusion from community members, with shame and stigma often been perpetuated by their families (Williamson 2005, 14). As a result, many chose to travel to other villages to escape the associations people placed upon them, and commence their lives anew.

Even when reintegration was facilitated, a number of girls found it difficult to surrender the deference and independence garnered as combatants, and reassume traditional gender-defined roles (McKay 2006, 159). This was especially the case as several had initially volunteered to join the forces in order to escape abusive families and societal problems they would now re-encounter. For these reasons, the mere existence of a seemingly targeted program is insufficient for addressing a bourgeoning need if it is not deemed to be meaningful and does not address the most glaring problems identified by those for whom it is intended.

‘98% Family Reunions, 98% Success’

The statistic of ‘98% of former child soldiers being reunited with their communities’ is one that is often quoted by the World Bank and United Nations. Yet what does this statistic truly reveal? In order to assess the impact such targeted programs have had, now nearly a decade subsequent to the end of the Sierra Leone conflict, longitudinal studies must be conducted. It is only through addressing the experiences of returning youth and girl soldiers that programs can be truly evaluated for their successes and flaws. As Boothby (2006) expresses, this is a critical attempt to see “what [in fact] happens when child soldiers grow up?”

As noted, organizations such as UNICEF led sensitization programs to prepare communities to receive the former child soldiers. This conditioning was a critical step for easing the latter’s reception and for forestalling potential tensions. In fact, it was discovered that preparatory visits from NGOs were associated with enhanced community acceptance, less depression, and “higher levels of well being” for all parties involved (Betancourt et al 2005, 12). The belief
that reintegration is complete once children are reunited with their families however, is unrealistic and irresponsible as this obscures the complexity of the true issues. Relations must be monitored and intervention made possible for success to be sustained, as problems that are unaddressed at the outset, can once again resurface.

In spite of the shortcomings of the DDR programs, improvements in the rehabilitated youth were witnessed over the span of the ensuing months, as a result of the invaluable contributions by the Interim Care Center mentors. These included enhanced levels of confidence, social behavior, and lower depression and hostility (Betancourt et al 2005). Some scholars such as Humphreys and Weinstein (2005) however, query the programs’ true beneficial impact, claiming that they did not substantially enhance former child soldiers’ ability to reintegrate. As a result, they question the value of the programs’ continuation (Humphreys and Weinstein 2005, 17). Others such as Williamson (2006) however, challenge such an assertion, and note that ex-RUF child soldiers who had gone through a transitory ICC were better adjusted than those who had been sent directly home, in a transformation akin to “moving from darkness into the light” (194). It is thus clear that the programs’ outcomes are contested by academics and NGOs alike. For this reason, they must not be rejected but rather, have their shortcomings addressed, as tangible benefits have been accrued in many cases.

In regards to the specific experiences of former girl combatants, Humphreys and Weinstein (2005) claim that one’s successful reintegration did not depend on if they were a child, an adult, or female. Rather, they argue, outcomes were more contingent upon the abusiveness of the particular unit (Humphreys and Weinstein 2005, 4). This contention is questionable as children, women, and particularly girl soldiers are plagued with double the burdens and trauma of returning adult combatants.

The experiences related by the girl child soldiers are telling. Many were not able to find a venue for self-improvement upon their return, and were compelled to become prostitutes due to a perceived lack of alternatives. Their lives were further complicated and reintegration strained, as they refused to comply with the traditional expectations of marriage due to their traumatic experiences with men (Mazurana et al 2002, 116). Contestations also arose when they were reluctant to subsume subservient gender roles, particularly following the deference and independence they had gained as soldiers. Moreover, even when community leaders intervened to contest their
stigmatization, many girls still experienced abuse in their families and often left.

In contrast, it was discovered that most male child soldiers did eventually marry, with most becoming committed parents and husbands (Boothby 2006, 245). In particular, they often promoted the importance of education over the average community member, due to the desire for their children to have the opportunities for self-advancement from which they themselves had been deprived.

While such claims appear to attest to the success of the DDR programs, they must be examined with caution. For instance, with the frequent lack of positive and stable parent models in their lives upon which to emulate, from where would these child soldiers have learned the skills of good parenting? Did their traumatic pasts impact their family relations, and were there any latent remnants of their formerly violent nature? More research must be conducted in order to properly address such queries.

According to Boothby (2006), communities accepted the child soldiers even when they were withdrawn, and tolerated their limitations, often involving a refusal to kill animals or handle machetes due to their traumatic pasts and associations. Many also resigned from social drinking as it had been enforced on them as soldiers along with drugs to make them fearless and reckless. It is clear that further research is needed to examine the immediate reintegration effects and longer-term life experiences of former child soldiers, in order to be able to assess the true impact of the DDR programs. It is only by undertaking such a project and incorporating a sincere focus on ‘lessons learned’, that future DDR programs will be better targeted and effective.

Conclusion and Directions for Future Research

The high rates of reunification of former child soldiers in Sierra Leone with their communities is a step in the right direction, yet cannot be taken at face value. To the contrary, assumptions must be countered, programs must be critically examined for their weaknesses and inconsistencies, and adaptations made accordingly. It is only through such an analysis, accompanied by longitudinal studies, that the lasting impact of such Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programs can truly be assessed.

Indeed, it is not sufficient to merely address issues on a case by case basis; rather, problems must be countered at their systemic...
source. What socioeconomic inadequacies are provoking children to seek alternatives in armed forces? Why is an emphasis not placed upon stimulating the economy in order to most effectively absorb returning child soldiers? How can their contested identities be best addressed? And perhaps most importantly, if conventional programs fail to acknowledge the complex realities of girl soldiers, why are they not sought out for the crafting of projects intended for them? As noted by Spear (2006), failing to address such issues will not only result in inadequately rehabilitated child soldiers, but also potentially in dangerous relapses of tension.

Future research would benefit from examining two critically underdeveloped fields. First, an enhanced exploration of the alternative healing ceremonies attempted alongside more official, externally coordinated programs would be highly valuable. Although they are under-recognized on the international scale, their local legitimacy and marked success in facilitating communal reconciliation and the reintegration of girl soldiers reveal their valuable nature worthy of further study. In particular, Betancourt et al (2005) demonstrate how having a traditional cleansing ceremony was associated with higher levels of family and community acceptance, and served to enhance pro-social skills and self-confidence more than with the DDR programs alone (11). Thus, the value of such ceremonies must not be undermined, but rather, that their virtues be highlighted. Secondly, a greater number of longitudinal studies is critical for revealing the development over time from traumatic pasts, and the extent of the healing. In this way, the long-term impact of the tailored DDR programs can be properly assessed and meaningfully adapted.

It is through enhancing DDR programs, ensuring disarmament is complete and undertaken by all involved, and addressing oversights, that relapses can be precluded. With rates of underage combatant use growing, with the Child Soldier Initiative noting that all global regions have been complicit, it is critical that customized legislations be enacted. The voices of child soldiers must be sought out, and customized DDR programs enhanced, in order for tangible change to be attained, and meaningful protection, secured.

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Such research has implications for informing the treatment and rehabilitation of child soldiers, as well as assisting in the development of meaningful post-conflict models.
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Throwing Candies at a Brick Wall:
Multiculturalism and its Consequences for European Welfare-State Democracy

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Abstract
The hegemony of the multiculturalist doctrine seems to be universal and unquestionable. All over Europe, immigrant communities aspire to set up enclaves in which religious law is much respected, and the law of the land is not. Moreover, these communities are becoming increasingly assertive about the imposing religious laws on non-Muslims. Apologists of multiculturalism usually push forward two arguments in its support. First, they insist that multiculturalism is the only way of sustaining a democratic society in a world in which there are deep-rooted conflicts between cultures with different values. Second, they claim that human beings have an intrinsic need for cultural identification and overlook the fact that human capacity for culture does not mean that all cultures are equal, and there might be other criteria of the quality of human development than the number of different ethnic or religious groups involved. The paper argues that multiculturalism has never been among European values. Nor has it ever been viewed as one of the critical attributes of human potential for social and technological progress. On the contrary, the modern Western civilization has been shaped by the ideas that have emerged from Renaissance and Enlightenment. Multiculturalism is nothing but a bi-product of political defeat of leftist ideologies that transformed political landscape in such a way that the quest for equality has been relinquished in favor of a diverse well-fare society that never existed before. The paper concludes that a modern plural society would be one in which people pursue their different cultural values or religious practices in private, while in the public sphere they would be treated as political equals. Today, however, the right to practice a particular religion is viewed as a public good rather than a private freedom. Paradoxical as it may be, multiculturalist dogma only serves to facilitate the return of ideologies that are anything but diverse or tolerant.
Biography

Mr. Grebennikov’s work experience prior to entering graduate school included seven years of public administration, non-governmental sector (emergency and relief operations in the North Caucasus) with extended frequent travel and shift work. He has been researching history and contemporary political and religious issues in the Islamic regions of the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia for the last seven years. Mr. Grebennikov’s doctoral research has been particularly concerned with the impact of religion on the formation of the post-Soviet political system, official national ideology and on the popular perceptions of religion in post-Soviet Caucasus.
Over the last fifty years, waves of migration to traditional homogeneous countries created one of the most compelling challenges facing Western democracies: how to maintain the bonds of community in ethnically diverse societies and how to reconcile growing levels of multicultural diversity and the retention of common identity that sustains the norms of mutual support and underlies an effective welfare state? This article is to a large extent designed as a reaction to the existing theoretical approaches that have been employed in policy debates to examine if the appraisal of pluralism and diversity conflict with social cohesion and immigrant integration in multinational democratic states.

Wright and Bloemraad (2012) believe that this dilemma—between integration and national attachment on one hand, and multiculturalism on the other—implies that there is a zero-sum trade-off between the two. Such a view is reflected in fears that immigrants and minorities live “parallel lives” due to residential segregation, unemployment, lack of national identity, inadequate community cohesion, and a rejection of common citizenship, a situation encouraged and aggravated by multiculturalism (Wright and Bloemraad 2012). Other scholars who defend a multicultural model posit that by recognizing and accommodating minority cultures, members of those communities will feel increased connection to and engagement in the broader polity (Kymlicka 1995, Parekh 2006, Taylor 1992). As Banting and Kymlicka (2006) have argued, the term multiculturalism is often used to describe both the policy approach and the actual increase in heterogeneity as a consequence of immigration, but it is important to keep the two distinguished, “lest deficiencies of particular public policies are mistaken for defects of immigration and diversity as such” (Koopmans 2008).

The public debate around multiculturalism will not only continue but also become a new battleground for the whole spectrum of political ideologies in Europe in the foreseeable future. However, different interpretations of multiculturalism and its effects on immigrant integration, welfare system and social cohesion are often reduced to divisive effects of multiculturalism and calls to stem the tide of immigrants or to select potential new migrants according to their skills, and for the creation of

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8 Concerns about parallel lives encompass residential and economic "ghettoization," and they include fears over a lack of common values, shared identity, civic culture and socio-political solidarity.
more effective assimilation policies and programs in host countries. Much of the contemporary debate over the impact of multiculturalism involves specific public policies, laws, and regulations the appropriate way to deal with diversity and immigrant integration. A growing number of political activists argue that greater ethnic diversity in Western democracies is eroding public support for redistribution, and that this underlying tension is exacerbated by the adoption of robust multiculturalism policies without taking into consideration different views on the issue (Banting 2005). The distinction between the various types of multiculturalism becomes crucial in addressing the inevitably different responses of majorities and minorities to diversity in society and how respective public policies must deal with that diversity (Banting 2005). Some of the growing criticism of multiculturalism by native residents comes from frustration over the perceived accommodation of diversity in public policy and institutions. Banting (2005) believes that much of this critique reflects concern over demographic multiculturalism, namely the growing pluralism in European countries brought about by immigration. Thus, these issues raise difficult questions both for scholars and policymakers on how to balance majority preferences with minority interests. What is multiculturalism? For many political scientists and policy makers, multiculturalism can represent a demographic situation, a particular set of philosophical ideas, or an ideological orientation toward a diverse population. Moreover, even conceptual differences over the interpretation of multiculturalism often lead to confusion and misunderstanding when people debate its challenges and benefits (Banting 2005).

**Multiculturalism: Demographic Situation and Political Ideology**

For most people, “multiculturalism” is a descriptive connotation, confirming the actual pluralism present in societies. Such intrinsic pluralism is usually ascribed to the coexistence of longstanding minority groups, such as the distinct linguistic communities within Hungary, Belgium and Switzerland, or it might be directly linked to the migration of people with different cultures, religions, languages, and origins in such European countries as Italy, France, and Germany (Banting 2005).

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9 However, as Fennema and Tillie believe, it may well be the case that multicultural policies have been successful in the political participation of immigrants (1999). Besides, legitimate normative reasons have been advanced by, for example Carens (2000), Kymlicka (1995); Parekh (2002) to explain why state recognition of cultural differences is valuable for its own sake.
However, most of the contemporary public discourse over multiculturalism is focused on immigrants and their descendants rather than on traditional minority groups. In this regard, multiculturalism is seen as a major threat to social cohesion and welfare system of host societies, not a particular philosophy or public policy (Banting 2005). More often multiculturalism is seen not just as demographic pluralism but a political ideology favoring acknowledgement, accommodation, and support of cultural pluralism. The political ideology of multiculturalism is now broadly employed by politicians, institutions, and governments as well as by political scientists advancing their sets of ideas to cope with a growing number of public policy challenges. In doing so, they often juxtapose multiculturalism with liberalism arguing that, according to classical liberalism, all people must be treated the same, and governments should remain indifferent to particularities of ethnicity, religion, or national origin. This means, in particular in France, that governmental institutions should not provide any public funding for cultural minority groups. However, as Banting puts it, multiculturalists argue that cultural neutrality in public institutions is impossible by definition due to the fact that in democracies minorities always face disadvantages in the public sphere in spite of laws guaranteeing certain rights and freedoms (2005). At the same time, there are political scientists such as Charles Taylor (1992) who argue that the assumption of individualism is also quite problematic, because all humans are born into particular social and cultural communities that provide meaning and identity (Banting 2005). Banting further insists that despite different points of view, multiculturalism as an ideology recognizes de facto pluralism in a society, favors that diversity, and requires governments and institutions to encourage pluralism through public policies (2005).

Multiculturalism as Public Policy

Even though governments in Australia, Sweden, and the Netherlands adopted policies of multiculturalism in the late 1970s and 1980s, political scientists have only recently begun to explore multiculturalism as public policy. Canadian scholars Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka of Queen’s University have constructed a multiculturalism policy index (MCP Index) that measures the extent to which eight types of public policies appear in 21 Western nations. The index accounts for the presence or absence of multicultural policies across these countries at three distinct points — 1980, 2000, and 2010. This typology is similar to those of scholars who use alternative measures, such as that created by Ruud Koopmans and colleagues in 2005 or constructed by the
Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). These scholars provide us with valuable tools to tackle objectively the issue in question.

The above-mentioned indices indicate that Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, and Switzerland are among the least multicultural of all countries measured, “though Germany has adopted more multicultural policies over time” (Banting 2005, 6). Belgium and the United Kingdom rank as moderate multicultural countries, while Canada and Australia rank highest as having adopted the broadest range of multicultural policies. While the general trend is toward a greater range of multicultural policies in most Western countries, some developed nations, like the United States, have shown no change in multiculturalist policies. Both Italy and the Netherlands have had even lower scores on the MCP Index in 2010 than in 2000 that might be seen as the beginning of a downward trend for multicultural policy in these countries. However, Irene Bloemraad suggests that actual policy in many countries is slowly moving toward greater accommodation of pluralism, despite the political rhetoric around the perceived problems of diversity (2011).

How much do policies of multiculturalism matter? Empirical research on these questions has been unexpectedly limited, and evidence on the socio-economic consequences of multiculturalism is ambivalent. The main arguments of multiculturalists can be described as recognition and accommodation of minority cultures in a way that members of those communities feel increased attachment to and engagement in the larger polity, whereas growing number of critics points out that excessive emphasis on diversity undermines a cohesive collective identity and increases dependence on social benefits. Moreover, some scholars believe that one of the most negative consequences of multicultural policies is discouragement of immigrants from competing in the national labor market, leading to higher unemployment and welfare use. Other scholars, drawing upon studies of Asian minorities, point out that it is exactly the retention of ethnic social capital and culture that facilitates the educational success of immigrant children and the native-born second generation (Bloemraad 2011). In Bloemraad’s view, the middle position is that immigrants living in countries that adopt multicultural policies are more likely to engage in nonviolent political activities directed at their country of residence rather than their homeland, more likely to report trust in government, less likely to report discrimination based on their group membership, and more likely to become citizens (2011). However, even if multiculturalism

10 According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), by 2007, only 57 percent of such immigrants in Denmark took on Danish
increases immigrants’ civic attachment and sense of inclusion, the negative rhetoric of multiculturalism in various European countries suggests that more and more people become very alarmed about diversity (Banting 2005, Bloemraad 2011).

Growing fears that some minority cultures are not sufficiently respectful of individual rights, gender equality, and tolerance for cultural diversity are coupled with pessimism about the impact of diversity on support for the welfare state (Banting 2005). Historically, challenges to immigration and multiculturalism have tended to come from the conservative right. Now, however, doubts are also emerging from the left of the European political spectrum, which increasingly fears that multiculturalism makes it more difficult to sustain and enhance the traditional patterns of economic redistribution (Banting 2005). In particular, three main concerns dominate the debate. The first is that growing levels of ethnic diversity in Western Europe are eroding support for the redistributive system. The second is that multiculturalism policies adopted by some countries in response to rising levels of diversity further divide potential supporters of the welfare state, driving a wedge between ethnic diversity and redistribution. The third is that a trade-off between sustaining traditional social democratic agenda of economic redistribution and embracing cultural diversity and multiculturalism that has historically supported immigration, multiculturalism and the welfare state in European countries is already stretched to the limit. In this regard, Banting (2005) presents two findings: first, there is no relationship between the proportion of the population born outside the country and growth in social spending over the last three decades, controlling for other factors associated with social spending and, second, when the analysis examines the relationship between growth in the foreign-born population and change in social spending as a proportion of GDP between 1970-1998, the result was that countries with large increases in the proportion of their population born outside the country tended to have smaller increases in social spending. Even though social spending as a proportion of GDP rose in every country, the growth was smaller in countries that saw a significant increase in the portion of the population born outside the country, other things held constant (Banting 2005).

citizenship, 47 percent in France became French citizens, and 37 percent in Germany adopted German citizenship. To the extent that taking on citizenship is an indicator of civic incorporation and a facilitator of further integration, either in politics or through access to certain jobs, higher integration is found in countries with more developed multicultural policies.
European governments have employed different policies to address challenges of diversity. However, various combinations of three models stand out. First, the liberal model drawing a fundamental distinction between the public and private spheres; its main idea is that state guarantees individual rights and the equal treatment of all citizens in the public realm, but tolerates substantial diversity in people’s private lives and in the internal affairs of distinct communities. Second, the nationalist model, strives to ensure that immigrants assimilate or integrate into a dominant national culture, adopting a common language and national identity. Third, the multicultural model, which celebrates and supports cultural differences and rejects the distinction between the public and private realms, views the public realm itself accommodating diversity in society. In recent years, this model has attracted much criticism both in the academic literature and in political debates in as much as it went beyond the protection of basic civil and political rights guaranteed to all individuals in a liberal democratic state towards public recognition and support to ethno-cultural minorities to assist them in maintaining and expressing their distinct identities and practices (Kymlicka 1995, Banting 2005). Some scholars argue that the adoption of multiculturalism policies not only corrodes trust among vulnerable groups who would otherwise coalesce in a pro-welfare position but distorts the real problems facing minorities, leading them to believe that their problems reflect their culture rather than economic barriers that they confront along with vulnerable members of many other cultural groups (Phillips 1999, Barry 2002, Wolfe and Klausen 2007). In reply, dwindling defenders of multiculturalism posit that distrust is the historical legacy of repression of ethnic or religious differences and, in the long run, multiculturalist policies will result in mutual respect, trust and support for redistribution (Yong 1990, Kymlicka 1995, Banting 2005).

Ruud Koopmans (2009) argues that unrestricted access to welfare state arrangements in combination with a large degree of facilitation of cultural differences, have had unexpected negative effects on the socioeconomic integration of immigrants. He then challenges a central assumption in the literature on multicultural rights, whereby recognition of cultural differences, the granting of special cultural rights, and protection against cultural discrimination are effective counterweights against cultural bias and exclusion in immigration societies (Koopmans 2009). Drawing on the Netherlands and Belgium, Koopmans (2009) proves that this claim is contradicted by the evidence, which shows that, far from having successfully reduced socio-economic inequalities between immigrants and natives, the Netherlands and Belgium are among those European countries in which immigrants are socio-economically the worst-off, in spite of the far-reaching recognition and
rights that they enjoy. Moreover, Koopmans (2009) points out that similar combination of multicultural integration policies and a generous welfare state in Sweden displays similarly unfavourable integration outcomes, compared either to Germany, which has had less inclusive integration policies, or the United Kingdom, with its relatively small welfare system. Goodhart (2004) claims that there is a "progressive dilemma" between sustaining an inclusive welfare state with a high provision level on the one hand, and policies of multiculturalism that facilitate immigrants' access to welfare-state arrangements on the other. The idea is that multiculturalism is in principle good for immigrants, but that it undercuts support among the majority population for the welfare state. My argument, however, is that multiculturalist orientation in public policy is not beneficial for immigrants at all, because it leads to dependence on welfare-system entitlements and thereby to further social and economic marginalisation.

Many comparative studies of citizenship and integration policies have focused on the rules for nationality acquisition (Brubaker 1992, Safran 1997). Nationality acquisition is a crucial determinant of migrants’ access to citizenship rights, since it entails that they become formally equal before the law - individual equality dimension. If we consider Marshall’s (1950) three categories of rights civil rights, political and social, most European countries have extended most civil rights to all permanent residents. Germany and Switzerland have relatively strict interpretation of these rights whereas France and the Netherlands tend to interpret civil rights in favor of legal immigrants (Koopmans et al. 2005, 42-43). Social rights are also granted to permanent residents, but long-term dependence on social welfare may block access to a renewal of residence status or to naturalisation in Germany and Switzerland (Koopmans et al. 2005). The political rights to vote and to run for elections have, in contrast, generally not been granted to non-nationals (Layton-Henry 1990). Koopmans et al. (2005) distinguishes a second dimension of immigrant rights: cultural rights attributed to them as a group, and cultural obligations that the state expects immigrants to meet before obtaining full citizenship rights. It is the cultural dimension of citizenship based on racial, cultural or religious group membership has been at the centre of philosophical discussions on multiculturalism and assimilation (Kymlicka 1995, Joppke 2007, Parekh 2003).

Analyzing welfare-state regimes in comparative perspective, Koopmans (2009) argues that the effects of immigrant integration policies on the socio-economic position of immigrants are to an important extent shaped by the structure of the welfare state. Esping-Andersen (1990) has distinguished three types of welfare state on the basis of their degrees of “decommodification” that takes place when a service is rendered as a
matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market” (21-23). In Esping-Andersen's view, “decommodification” entails both the scope of welfare-state entitlements, and the provision levels of these entitlements: social-democratic welfare states have the highest, liberal welfare states the lowest level, and ‘conservative’ welfare states intermediary levels of “decommodification” (1990). Chiswick and Miller (1995), Koopmans (2009) and Van Tubergen (2004) suggest that there are three reasons why welfare-state’s level of “decommodification” is important for the socio-economic position of immigrants compared to non-immigrants. First, immigrants with lower educational skills and a concomitant weaker labour market position will tend to migrate to countries with a relatively equal income distribution, which offer disadvantaged groups relatively good protection against economic adversity. Therefore, immigration to countries with relatively inclusive and generous welfare states will be selected. Second, once in the host country, immigrants’ decisions on whether or not to invest in improving their human capital in order to find employment will be influenced by similar considerations: welfare states with low provision levels exhibit stronger push factors for immigrants to invest in improving their labour market chances through language acquisition, education and gaining knowledge about and developing ties with the host society (Chiswick and Miller 1995, Koopmans 2009). By contrast, in generous welfare systems, immigrants, dependent on welfare benefits, can maintain a comparatively decent standard of living without making such adaptations (Koopmans 2009). As Koopmans points out, dependence on welfare state is also related to the subjective perception of welfare benefit levels. In particular, how the standard of living associated with being dependent on welfare benefits is subjectively perceived is likely to be different for natives than for immigrants, particularly those of the first generation (Koopmans 2009). Deprivation is always relative (Gurr 1970) and depends on comparisons of a present situation with one’s own past, or with the situation of relevant reference groups. For natives, the relevant comparison group consists of other, but better-off natives, and thus welfare dependence is likely to be seen as a strong source of relative deprivation. Immigrants will also judge their living conditions in relation to their economic situation when they were still in the country of origin. Even for those on welfare benefits, that comparison is likely to be positive, because their income from welfare benefits is likely to be well above what they earned in the country of origin, even correcting for the greater cost of living in the country of immigration. Koopmans (2009) concludes that relative deprivation as a push factor to invest in the acquisition of human capital is likely to be considerably weaker for immigrants than for natives, the more so the higher the level of provisions that a particular welfare regime offers. Put it simply, the socio-economic
gap between immigrants and natives will be highest in comparatively generous welfare states and lowest in liberal welfare states. Drawing on Van Tubergen et al.'s (2004) positive effects of language acquisition on labour market participation, Koopmans (2009) believes that policies that emphasise linguistic and cultural assimilation exert pressure on immigrants to acquire skills, knowledge and social ties that improve their chances on the labour market, whereas multicultural policies that emphasise immigrants’ own language and culture, and stimulate migrants to orient themselves towards their ethnic community, may have the unintended consequence of sustaining linguistic deficiencies. Indeed, the emphasis in multicultural policies on the maintenance of the group’s language and culture, in Koopman’s (2009) view, are usually detrimental to the development of social contacts with natives, thus depriving immigrants of an important source of social capital, since natives hold the keys to the knowledge and positional resources relevant for successful labour market integration.

From the arguments and evidence on diversity and welfare-state regimes, the following conclusions can be formulated: (1) The labour market participation of immigrants (relative to the native population) will be lower in relatively generous welfare states of the ‘social-democratic’ type (Sweden), higher in countries with ‘liberal’ welfare states (UK), and intermediate in countries that have ‘conservative’ welfare states (Germany, France, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands). (2) The labour market participation of immigrants will be higher in countries where equal citizenship rights are difficult to acquire (Germany, Switzerland, Austria), lower where individual citizenship rights are easy to acquire and pressures towards cultural assimilation are low (UK, Sweden, Netherlands, Belgium-Flanders), and intermediate where individual rights are easily accessible but cultural assimilation pressures are high (France, Belgium-Wallonia). In sum, the UK, with its liberal welfare regime, shows a relatively good labour market integration of non-EU immigrants, whereas the Swedish social-democratic welfare state is associated with relatively poor levels. However, the welfare-state approach does not explain why Germany and Switzerland have even higher rates than the UK, and why the Netherlands and Flanders perform as poorly as Sweden. Moreover, the welfare-state approach does not explain either why Wallonia does better than Flanders, because the welfare-state regime is, unlike important aspects of integration policies, uniform across Belgium.

Put it simply, countries that either have a limited welfare state or a restrictive and assimilationist integration regime display the highest level of immigrant labour market participation. An analysis of welfare enrollment among immigrants can be employed to address these
questions directly. The existing literature has focused on welfare assimilation, disregarding the possibility of selective re-migration. For North America, Borjas and Trejo (1991), Baker and Benjamin (1995) and Borjas and Hilton (1996) find that the probability of welfare participation significantly increases with time of residence for immigrants in general (Ekhaugen 2005). The increase among European guest workers in Germany is also found to be insignificant (Riphahn 1998). Only Hansen and Lofstrom (2003), using Swedish data, concludes optimistically, with a substantial decrease in the welfare participation rate among refugees and a somewhat smaller, yet significant, decrease among other immigrants. The existing evidence thus seems to contradict expectations in that the most generous welfare state examined, i.e. Sweden, is the only country where immigrants are found to assimilate out of welfare.

As we see, the contemporary sway from official support for multiculturalism toward an emphasis on a dominant culture is spreading among politicians and scholars in Western democracies. In their latest scholarship, Wright and Bloemraad (2012) compared absolute levels of immigrants’ scores on these measures across public policy regimes and immigrant/native-born gaps in outcomes to address the possibility that regime-level differences might be a function of the dominant culture into which immigrants are integrating. However, their findings focus primarily on immigrants’ engagement in the political community rather than in the welfare system. Furthermore, they conclude that “repeal of such policies is likely to have the perverse effect of further marginalizing, and alienating, immigrant populations, to the detriment of both civic inclusion and political legitimacy. This surely cannot be a good thing for the future of liberal democracy” (Wright and Bloemraad 2012) This implies that destruction of social responsibility, mutual trust and crumbling of European welfare systems will be a good thing to do. Barely able to distinguish immigrants of “visible minority” and “majority” status, Wright and Bloemraad (2012) accounted for “Asian exceptionalism” but failed to do so to make more nuanced distinctions between sun-Saharan migrants, on the one hand, and Chinese migrants, on the other. Taking into consideration the above-mentioned deficiencies, I suggest that immigrant political incorporation is substantially dependant on country of birth or political socialization in the homeland as pointed out by Luttmer and Singhal (2008), Paskeviciute and Anderson (2007). In particular, much of the concern over multiculturalism and integration targets Muslim minorities. Another limit of Wright and Bloemraad’s (2012) analysis is the narrow focus on foreign-born migrants to the exclusion of their native-born descendants. Despite the fact that contemporary concern in Europe comprises a population of second- and third-generation minorities, most scholarship is uniquely centered on the foreign-born population. With this
in mind, Wright and Bloemraad (2012) admit that multiculturalism imperils a common sense of “we” among second and third generation immigrants. Since political debates surrounding multiculturalism apply to immigrants as well as their descendants, there is clearly a need for more research on the attitudes and behaviors of those born of immigrant parents. Due to data constraints, Wright and Bloemraad (2012) could not examine outcomes separately for Muslim and non-Muslim migrants. These themes are areas for further research as data collection efforts increasingly oversample immigrant and minority populations and ask more sophisticated questions to get at the diversity of the foreign born population and their descendants. How to resolve this academic gridlock without bending on either side of the European political spectrum?

With the exception of the UK where post-colonial immigrants from the Caribbean and South Asia continue to account for the highest numbers of immigrants (The House of Commons, 2010), other European countries recruited a major part of their immigrant populations from Mediterranean countries, including the Muslim countries of the North Africa and Turkey. For the past few decades, immigration to Norway and Sweden has mainly consisted of the following three groups: western labor immigrants, immigrants from North African countries arriving for economic reasons, and refugees and asylum seekers from all over the third world (Hansen and Lofstrom 2003). As Ekhaugen (2005) points out, there is a strong tendency for immigrants from non-Western societies to assimilate into welfare dependency rather than out of it. Non-western immigrants are much more likely to receive welfare at any given point than the average western immigrant, whose expected welfare probability after eight years of residence was 16%. The average refugee immigrant faced a 63% welfare probability after three years of residence, decreasing to 55% after eight years of residence. The average non-western, non-refugee immigrant faced a steadily increasing welfare probability, up 15 percentage points (58%), from year one to eight after arrival, landing on 39% (Ekhaugen 2005).

Concluding Remarks

As Thomas Faist (2012) suggests, the criticisms waged against multicultural policies and multicultural citizenship can be encapsulated in three sets of exemplary arguments. First, polices of multiculturalism are held to aggravate cultural distinctions and to endanger societal cohesion through the policy-induced ethnicization of migrant groups. Multiculturalism policies are thought to fuel cultural conflict and thereby
increase levels of opposition to immigrant rights (Faist 2012). Second, cultural distinctions embraced by policies of multiculturalism can lead to socio-economic segregation which in turn fosters spatial segregation and socio-economic exclusion. Thus, for example, schooling in the mother tongue in segregated institutions might reinforce separate identities, leading to the exclusion of migrants or minorities from attractive positions in the formal labour markets. Third, only a few critics argue that special group rights lead to internal oppression within culturally-defined groups. In particular, academic and public debates have been focused on the encouragement of oppression and violence through forced marriages, female genital mutilation, and honour killings (Hirsi Ali 2008). For example, Fish and Brooks (2004) regard these trends as particularly worrisome because they lead to a disregard of basic human and political rights and unravel the fabric of socio-moral resources in. The greatest worry of these critics is that multicultural tolerance promotes radical cultural relativism Faist (2012). As Faist skilfully captures, while these general criticisms have often been vague and lacking in solid empirical supporting evidence, the debate on multiculturalism and the welfare state has been more specific both theoretically and empirically (2012). More precisely, the contentious issue between defenders and critics of multiculturalism has been incompatibility between heterogeneity and solidarity. The critics have alleged that policies of multiculturalism privilege “diversity” over solidarity and have argued that negative impacts of multicultural policies occur through the following mechanism: policies of multiculturalism contribute to cultural heterogeneity and thus divide the welfare state and erode solidarity with co-citizens (Wolfe and Klausen 1997). Indeed, Alesina and Glaser (2004) find that public spending tends to be lower in countries with higher levels of ethnic and racial heterogeneity, even if other factors are held constant. These authors suppose that the majority public in ethnically more heterogeneous countries more easily withdraws support from social programs that redistribute material resources to persons they conceive of as alien (Faist 2012).

Welfare states were designed for traditional largely homogenous European countries during the industrial revolution, but combined with

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11 In Sniderman and Hagendoorn’s view, when Dutch government policies had provided funding for separate schools, housing projects, broadcast media, and community organizations for Muslim immigrants, the perception among both categories that they belong to different societies have contributed to anti-immigrant sentiment, and have made it easier for xenophobic parties to garner votes (2007).
open markets; the European welfare states thus get squeezed between two opposing forces of globalization. On the one hand, the growing economies of the Asian countries push European manufacturing out of global markets. On the other hand, the failure of Africa and the Islamic world to keep up with globalization pushes much of their excess population to the European welfare states. A European welfare state will thus experience a slow decline and more dangerous disintegration with the introduction of mass immigration of persons who do not share any group loyalty with that nation state and do not have the cultural background to trust in the welfare state. At the same time, the natives become less willing to contribute if this is seen as supporting other ethnic groups, and may eventually decide to opt out from such a system. Thus, in my view, a welfare state can only work in an ethnically homogenous society with high levels of mutual trust based on a strong cultural and religious work ethic that had just experienced several generations of a capitalist economy. The fundamental dual concepts of multiculturalism are “tolerance” and “inclusiveness”. These concepts are founded upon the idea that all cultures are of equal value and that differences between cultures are to be extoled rather than downplayed. How far is too far? If all cultures are equal, why aren’t the Chinese, the Arabs, the Pakistanis, the Indians, the Africans all allowing alien cultures and religions to be of equal importance to their own? It turns out that immigrants embrace equality the sexes, between the races and between cultures only when they leave their own countries for better living conditions. Even though this model has worked for decades in Europe, something went wrong in the mid-1990s.

When Parekh (2008) sets off to discuss the link between European liberalism and Islam, he urges liberal society not to homogenise Muslims and treat them as an undifferentiated mass, because liberal society welcomes criticism and diversity of views. Thus, Muslim criticisms should be welcomed and engaged with (Parekh 2008). In Parekh’s view, the challenge is twofold. First, are Muslims willing to adapt themselves to liberal society and to live as good citizens? Second, how can liberal society legitimise itself in their eyes and secure their moral allegiance? (Parekh 2008) With regard to the small but deeply alienated group of young radical Muslims in Europe, Parekh (2008) notes that individuals develop a commitment to their society and form a view of their place within it based on their experiences of how it perceives and treats them (127). Therefore, he suggests that “European societies need to give young Muslims a stake in society, hope for a better future, and the opportunity to develop and enjoy multiple and mutually moderating identities” (Parekh 2008, 128). The roots of their disadvantage and alienation need to be addressed through educational, economic and
other strategies, in consultation with young Muslims themselves (Parekh 2008, Bromell 2008). At this point, I agree with both Parekh (2008) and Bromell (2008) that the only alternatives to dialogue are either a vicious cycle of massive violence or acquiescence in the current regime of injustice. What if those enlightened strategies are not applicable to particular cultures? Thus, what kind of dialogue will be relevant to this situation?

Since modern scholarship deliberately avoids any in-depth analysis of culture-specific studies of multiculturalism and its uneven impact on European welfare system, I dare to suggest that every culture has its own traits and values that do not integrate into traditional European societies if upheld after immigration. This is especially true for cultures heavily shaped and therefore dominated by religious norms and views. I believe that the model of assimilation crumbles not because of socio-economic reasons underlying immigrants’ integration into European societies. My argument is that, for example, Islam does not fit a multiculturalist model because Islam does not either assimilate or co-exist with other cultures through dialogue. Multiculturalist policies crumble because Islamic cultures have no interest in multiculturalism because tenets of Islam are incompatible with the fundamental concepts of multiculturalism - all cultures and religions are of equal value and worth. In my view, the main problem for immigrants from Muslim countries is not principles of Western democracy itself, but bearing with a multicultural society. Muslim minorities in European countries are convinced of the absolute superiority of Islam, which is demonstrated in the constant invocation Islamic values, as well as a positive duty to convert followers of other religions (Parekh 2003). Muslim attitudes towards multiculturalism are explicitly self-oriented regardless of underlying cultural fabrics. They welcome it because it gives them the freedom to retain their religious identity on tax-payers contributions and to familiarise others with their beliefs; but they resent it because it denies their metaphysical superiority and exposes them and their children to other religions and secular cultures of allegedly equal value (Parekh 2003). The on-going bulging of cultural differences in European societies is certainly a negative legacy of multiculturalist dogma left on its own in times of dwindling support for a welfare state. If any difference must be accepted and tolerated at all, then when certain differences become intolerable sooner or later, cultural disparities will be easily appropriated by ideologies that are anything but diverse, inclusive, and tolerant. The only question is how soon.
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