IS DEMOCRACY VIABLE WITHOUT LIBERALISM?
Truths are illusions of which is it forgotten that they are such: metaphors that have been used up and have lost their sensible force, pieces of money that have lost their imprint and come into consideration not as coins but merely as metal. (Nietzsche: “The Philosopher’s Book”)
Who has not heard Churchill’s famous quip: “Democracy is the worst form of government imaginable, except for the others that have been tried so far”? Yet, as seductive it may sound, this statement does give pause for thought. For one thing, what is a “democratic form of government”? Is it one where the people, or at least a majority of them, have absolute sovereignty? If our answers to these questions are in the affirmative, a number of new questions arise: How, for example, would democratic rule be different from mob rule? And how, if it is not already one, could it avoid becoming a tyranny?
In his, The Republic, Plato saw clearly the dangers of democracy understood as the unrestrained rule by “the people”. He saw also, long before our time, how demagogues can use the forces unleashed by popular fear, envy and hatred to lead those very same people into catastrophe. It all starts, he says, “whenever a democracy thirsting for liberty has bad cup-bearers to preside over it and drinks too deeply from the pure wine of liberty” (565a). It will, inevitably, elevate one man above all others: making it a dictator who will not “abstain from spilling kindred blood” (565e). One can already see, here in Plato’s work, an indication of the tension between liberty and popular sovereignty. It is not liberty as such that Plato opposes, but its abuse. But it was Aristotle who first made the important distinction between two forms of democracy: what he called “extreme” and “moderate” democracies. In this way he distinguished between sovereignty of the people and sovereignty of the constitution: between what we might call “pure democracy” and “constitutional liberalism”. “Demagogues arise in states where laws are not sovereign”, he says; and adds: “Where the laws are not sovereign, there is no constitution.” (The Politics: 1292a).
In this essay, I want to explore the tension within what most people still call “democracy”, but which would more properly be called “liberal democracy”. I argue that debates about the nature and value of democracy go off track when insufficient attention is paid to the way in which current ideas of democracy and liberalism are intertwined. It needs to be shown how much of democracy is essential to liberalism and how much of liberalism is essential to democracy. But, in order to show this one must get clear about what one understands by “liberalism” and by “democracy”.
In a very influential essay, Fareed Zakaria had noted that “for almost a century in the West, democracy has meant liberal democracy – a political system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers and the protection of basic freedoms…” In other words, constitutional liberalism is an essential part of what, in the West is meant by “democracy”. And, Zakaria continues, “Today the two strands of liberal democracy, interwoven in the Western political fabric, are coming apart in the rest of the world. Democracy is flourishing: constitutional liberalism is not.” [Kritika & Kontext, 1/98: p.9]
What, then, are the two strands of liberal democracy? In philosophical terms, the highest value of liberalism is autonomy, and of democracy it is equality. In political terms liberalism means the protection of individuals and minorities; the rule of law, especially that of the constitution; the separation of the legislative and the executive branches of the State; and the separation of the State from institutions of civil society. Democracy, in political terms, means free and fair elections; the equality of all under the law; the equal right of all to participate in the political process; and the accountability of political leadership to the people as a whole. One might say that the slogan of political democracy is “all power to the people” and that of liberalism is “all power to the constitution”. Liberal democracy, as it has evolved in the West has been the attempt to resolve the tension implied by these two slogans. For, the question might be raised: “How far should, or could, the power of the people extend?” and, equally, “Who has the power to enact and defend the constitution?”
In the context of the previous observations, motivated by Zakaria’s critique of “illiberal democracy”, Churchill’s quip sounds less convincing. Not only is it clear today that certain democratic States are politically inferior to other types of states, but even historically, a state that respects popular legislative will, as it is expressed by a duly constituted representative of the people, might be superior to “pure democracy”, even if it is a monarchy. Thus, alongside constitutional liberalism, one might put constitutional monarchism as a valid alternative to pure democracy as a system of government.
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (Ph. R.) is one of the philosophically most profound treatments of constitutional monarchism. And, even if one does not agree with his advocacy of that particular form of government, one can draw important lessons about constitutional liberalism from it. Hegel’s critics ignore the extent to which many existing liberal democracies resemble, at least in spirit, what he calls the “absolutely rational State”. To begin with, Hegel is not an anti-democrat: he believes that the “democratic element” is an essential (organic) component of the fully realized state (Ph. R. 308). And his views on the relative merits of the three forms of government: monarchy, aristocracy or democracy, might surprise some of his critics. “[I]t is, he says, quite idle to inquire which of the three is most preferred. Such forms must be discussed historically or not at all” (Ph. R. 273). Second, the roles he ascribes to the “sovereign”, “the universal class” and the “legislature”, correspond to a large extent to that of “president”, “civil servants” and “parliament” of modern democracies. In fact, if one compares the way these instances function today with the way Hegel understands the components of the state, one might be tempted to decide in his favor. For example, the sovereign, while representing the subjective aspect of the state is “…bound by the concrete decisions of his counselors [who are appointed strictly on merit!], and if the constitution is stable, he has often no more to do than sign his name” (Ph. R. Addition to 279). By contrast, today’s presidents (who are elected) appoint their ministers largely on political grounds, having little to do with qualifications required for the task. And when these advisors, ministers or civil servants, happen to propose measures which do not suit the political agenda of their presidents, or his political party, they are forced to resign. By contrast, as Hegel sees it, the role of the ultimate decision maker in a state is largely ceremonial. And if it has a political purpose it is to resolve differences that cannot be decided either intellectually or politically. In short, pardoning criminals, choosing from among candidates of equal competence, and to resolve stalemates which cannot be resolved in any other way: “In a well organized monarchy, the objective aspect belongs to law alone, and the monarch’s part is merely to set to the law the subjective ‘I will’” (Ph. R. Addition to 279).
Hegel’s “legislature” is comprised of the monarch, the executive and what he calls the “Estates”. The Estates, in turn, contain, first, the landed aristocracy - who according to Hegel provides the element of stability because it has its own wealth: “It is [likewise] independent of favor, whether from the executive or the mob” – and, second, the representatives of what Hegel calls the “business class”. The latter, the “Second Estate” expresses the “fluctuating element in civil society” (308). Its main role is to “deliberate and decide upon public affairs” (matters pertaining to civil society) (309). And, while the special interest represented in the Estates cannot override decisions made (by the civil service) in the interest of the whole, the structure of civil society has an important implication for Second Estate. This is because delegates to it do not represent the interests of single persons, but, rather, the interests of “Corporations” - various trades and professions. “[Hence] the single person attains his actual and living destiny for universality only when he becomes the member of a Corporation, a society etc.,…and thereby it becomes open to him, on the strength of his skill, to enter any class for which he is qualified, the class of civil servants included”(308).
It might be interesting to ask whether Churchill, a landed aristocrat, citizen of a constitutional monarchy, would find sufficient democratic element in Hegel’s vision of the State to qualify it as the best form of government among the worst. But we, for our part might criticize Hegel’s vision in a number of ways. The first, and most obvious, objection to it is that, as a concrete political proposal, it is outdated. The idea of homogeneity presupposed by his account is very far from the reality of nation states as they are today. A landed aristocracy is no longer a factor in the political life of a nation. A vast number of nation states contain more than one cultural or ethnic group. And, the dynamic element in modern civil societies no longer allows for natural groupings into “Corporations”. Thus, the level of fragmentation and of conflict is much higher than Hegel imagined possible.
Nevertheless, the question may be posed whether, in spite of all this, Hegel’s view of politics might not be tenable as a regulative idea: a goal that all societies should aim at, knowing that they will never reach it? This question lies at the center of our discussions about democracy. For, it raises two fundamental questions: Do those who advocate democracy admit that even though it is not the most valuable form of government it is the only one that can lead towards the best? Or, do they claim that democracy is valuable in itself, precisely because it has no goal other then keeping open the debate about conflicting interests? If the first question is answered in the affirmative, “democratic” objections to Hegel would not constitute an attack on the spirit of his political philosophy. In the second case, democrats would have to abandon any claim to sovereignty, including sovereignty of the people. But, in any case, the commitment to keeping the discussion about conflicting values open is more a liberal than a democratic ideal. But, even as a liberal ideal it needs to be refined if it is to point beyond Hegel’s project.
It might be argued in his favor that Hegel’s emphasis on the role of the monarch and the executive branch is precisely because he recognizes the essential contingency of civil society. His view seems to be that in the end individuals will discover what is best for them and will consequently arrange their political interventions so as to maximize their own well being. The executive, on the advice of the “knowledge” class, will provide the intellectual grounds for harmonizing individual and group interests, and the monarch affirms by its (limited) “subjective” decisions the essential contingency of social life. Thus, on this reading of Hegel one could argue that he is not rejecting, or even limiting, contingency, but is affirming it.
Still, having shown that Hegel’s political philosophy can be reconciled with liberal democracy does not mean that it is the last word on the subject. For, liberal democracy may not be the last word on the subject either. In other words, it is not enough to insist upon the priority of the law over popular will; nor is it enough to insist that public institutions (civil service) be free from political pressures, or that conflicts inherent to societies need to be managed rather than suppressed. The very notion of political sovereignty must be brought into question. Beyond discrediting the notion of the “sovereignty of the people”, the notion of the sovereign constitutional state, and that of the sovereign individual must also be brought into question. By doing this one can mount an offensive against not only the Hegelian political philosophy but also against its liberal avatars.
I have mentioned earlier that Hegel left out of consideration societies composed of diverse cultural and ethnic groups. Also, I have mentioned that he underestimated the volatility of civil society and the consequent fragmentation of the political body. But as long as these are seen as merely factual (historical), rather than fundamental philosophical short comings, the challenges facing liberal politics will go unnoticed. With the globalization of economics, large movements of populations will become the norm, rather than just an exception. For this reason, the sphere of laws, rights and institutions will inevitably extend beyond the geographic confines of nation states. Also, with the immense advances in bio-technology, the very nature of what it is to be human will come into question. These two factors alone will render pure democracy, as it has come to be known hitherto, untenable as a political project. Under these conditions even liberal democracy will require constant, and vigilant, scrutiny. Liberal democrats need to have respect for the law, but at the same time they need to be alert about the injustices inherent in it. They need to strive for open debate among equal participants – whether they are nations, cultural/ethnic groups or individuals - but they need to recognize that these participants contain tensions within themselves. Globalization and bio-technology will further undermine attempts to hold unto strong communal and individual identities. Liberal democrats of the future will have to give up the ideal of a robust “democracy” in favor of the ideal of a fragile liberal democracy.
In this essay, I have argued that the concept of “democracy” has outlived its usefulness, especially as a polemic weapon. A much more precise concept, I suggested was “liberal democracy”. But, as the discussion about Hegel has shown, even this concept is in need of clarification. Liberal democrats are still committed to the Kantian notion that nation states, and individuals, are sovereign (autonomous). In this way, in spite of their hostility to him, many liberals are still deeply committed to the substance of the Hegelian political philosophy. And, for this reason, if (liberal) democracy is to remain the best among the worst forms of governments, its commitment to contingency needs to go beyond the simple “discourse” of equal, though agonistic, partners. If democratic politics is to be identified with the art of negotiating contingencies, then the radical differences within societies and within individuals must be part of that negotiation.
Bela Egyed, Ph.D. Concordia University, and Carleton University.