Transbountary environmental pollution constitutes a major challenge in international collaboration. Although global cooperation and coordination can benefit everyone involved, each country would like to unilaterally free ride on everyone else’s efforts. A number of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) are drafted and ratified to this date, in an effort to address this problem. While the process is ongoing it is widely accepted that IEAs are either of small size (in terms of signatories) or non-enforceable.
This study provides a framework that captures the current situation better, by shedding light on the issues that surround and on the mechanisms that generate the constitution of an IEA. It assists in identifying strategies and tools that can enhance IEA participation and enforceability in the future.
About the speaker:
Effrosyni Diamantoudi is Professor in the Department of Economics and Associate Dean of Recruitment and Awards at the School of Graduate Studies of Concordia University. With expertise in game theory, Professor Diamantoudi's research focuses on coalition formation and foresight, cartel stability, international environmental agreements.
This talk is aimed at a general audience; students welcome.