Philosophy Workshop: Logics of Consequence: Logical Inferentialism, Defeasible Reasoning and Transitivity

This workshop will discuss some recent developments in logic, the philosophy of logic, theory of meaning and the philosophy of reasoning. In particular, we will be thinking about non-transitive and non-monotonic logics in connection with logical and semantic inferentialism, the semantic paradoxes and the nature of logic vocabulary.

Here are some of the questions we will be discussing: What does it mean to say that some things follow from others? What does consequence have to do with rules, proofs, reasoning, argumentation, assertion, denial and the like? Should we think of consequence as non-monotonic? Are consequence relations always transitive? Or should we accept failures of transitivity in order to deal with semantic paradoxes or for other reasons? What does consequence have to do with logic and logical connectives? Do logical connectives mean what they do in virtue of their place in a consequence relation? Why do we want logical connectives, what is their job?

This workshop is free and open to all. For more information, please see the event website.